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Thesis Abstract 
 
 
This thesis concerns the inter-relationship between international investment law and the 
law of sovereign immunity focusing on the enforcement of arbitral awards against 
sovereign states. The core hypothesis is that investor-state arbitration is severely 
hampered in its role of providing a remedy to foreign investors for losses to their 
investments caused by the breaches of International Investment Agreements by host 
states. In particular, there exists the risk that an arbitral award against the respondent state 
can be undermined by the respondent state’s use of the sovereign immunity doctrine 
against execution as a defence against the payment of compensation.  
 
Accordingly, this leads to the main research question: Whether the defence of sovereign 
immunity doctrine should be fully available to a state in order to refuse the enforcement 
of arbitral awards, or should it be subject to limitations specified in the municipal 
sovereign immunity law of the country, in which the enforcement is sought? The major 
problem of investor-state arbitration is the extent to which the consent of a state to waive 
its immunity from enforcement and execution in both arbitration clauses and municipal 
sovereign immunity laws actually exists in any given case. 
 
The thesis argues that international investment law is a hybrid law displaying both private 
and public law characteristics. This can influence the development of rules concerning 
immunity from execution. Accordingly, the balancing of state obligations and investor 
rights under a proportionality analysis could be considered as an effective tool to promote 
the investment and to protect the interests for both investors and host countries towards a 
fair and impartial forum, where such immunity is in issue. Lastly, this attempt could not 
be effective without the development of international conventions and municipal laws on 
sovereign immunity in parallel to secure the execution of arbitral awards before a 
municipal court as well as to support the applicability of international conventions. Thus, 
this would limit the excessive or unjustified claims of sovereign immunity as a defense 
against the enforcement of arbitral awards in which state responsibility could not be 
avoided for a breach of investment treaty obligations towards private investors. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
  
1. Brief synopsis 
With over 3,200 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and additional international 
investment agreements negotiated at the end of 20141, both developed and developing 
countries have been increasingly involved in commercial transactions with private 
parties. This brings the total amount of identified investor-state treaty based dispute 
settlement (‘ISDS’) cases, brought by international investment agreements (‘IIAs’), to 
608.2 Therefore, international investment arbitration has become a vital mechanism for 
settling investor-state disputes, through arbitral institutions such as the International 
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’), the International Chamber of 
Commerce Court of Arbitration (‘ICC’), the London Court of International Arbitration 
(‘LCIA’) and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (‘SCC’), as well as ad hoc tribunals 
such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’). 
Among these institutions, the majority of cases have been brought under the ICSID 
Convention and ICSID Additional Facility Rules, amounting to 497 cases (33 of the 42 
new disputes in 2014 were filed before the ICSID, 6 disputes under the Arbitration Rules 
of UNCITRAL, 2 disputes under the SCC and 1 dispute under the ICC Arbitration 
Rules).3 
 
The establishment of the ICSID, in turn, allows investors to claim against the state 
without exhausting local remedies plus directly seeking enforcement of arbitral awards 
                                                
1 UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note (2015), No.1 February 2015, pp.1,  ,   
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf> ; See also UNCTAD Investment 
Policy Hub, it shows a number of Bilateral Investment Treaties in total of 2927, which is in force only 
2280, while a number other international investment agreements in total of 349, which is in force only 278, 
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA > accessed June 9, 2015. 
2 UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note (2015), No.2 May 2015, pp.1,  < 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/UNCTAD_WEB_DIAE_PCB_2015_%202%20
IIA%20ISSUES%20NOTES%2013MAY%20.pdf>. 
3 ibid 4; See also The ICSID Caseload – Statistic (Issue 2015-1), < 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202015-
1%20(English)%20(2)_Redacted.pdf> 
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before the domestic court, so as to resolve the problem of an unfair dispute settlement.4 
The drafters of the ICSID Convention intended to offer a forum of international 
adjudication on a footing of equality in order to protect the risk inherent in diplomatic 
protection, which is granted by a powerful state to one of its nationals.5  
 
Therefore, the ICSID Convention aims to depoliticize the settlement of investment 
disputes.6 Besides, it further attempts to build a reliable international arbitration 
mechanism, which is able to promote the economic development and balance the interests 
between the developing and developed countries.7 Therefore, the nature of investment 
arbitration rests on the borderline amid international and domestic law.8 Accordingly, the 
ICSID mechanism has replaced a national court’s dispute settlement process with a 
private model of adjudication in matters of public law at an international level.9 Gus Van 
Harten and M. Loughlin have discussed this phenomenon suggesting that “the regime of 
investment arbitration should be recognised as constituting an exceptionally important 
and powerful manifestation of global administrative law.”10 
 
In general, the subject-matter of an investment arbitration is a regulatory dispute arising 
with a host state, acting in its capacity as a public authority, for example, expropriation 
either direct or indirect and nationalisation of foreign property, to impose a public policy 
or legislation, and foreign investor, which is connected to the application of that public 
                                                
4 Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
Law’ 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121 (2006), pp.128. (Investment treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law) 
5 I. Seidl-Hohenveldern ‘Proportionality in and Under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States’ in I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Collected Essays on 
International Investments and International Organizations (Kluwer Law, The Netherlands 1998),pp 375. 
6 Article 10 of The report of the World bank executive directors on ICSID Convention. 
7 J. Paulsson, ‘Third World participation in international investment arbitration’ 2 ICSID Rev. 19 (1987); 
A. Broches, ‘Awards Rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, 
Enforcement, Execution’ 2 ICSID Rev. 287 (1987). 
8 C. Schreuer, ‘The Relevance of Public International Law in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Investment Disputes’ < http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/81_csunpublpaper_1.pdf >, pp.1 
9 Gus Van Harten, ‘The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims 
against the State’  56 ICLQ. 371 (2007), pp. 372. (The Public-Private Distinction) 
10 Investment treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law (n 4), pp. 148; See also R. 
Dolzer, ‘The Impact of international investment treaties on domestic administrative law’, 37 Int’l & pol. 37 
(2006). 
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authority by a host state.11 A host state has the right to control its property and economic 
resources within its own territory, without compensation under the legitimate exercise of 
the so-called “police power”.12 However, a host state has also been obliged under the 
treaty obligations to protect foreign investment and foreign investors.13 The rights and 
obligations of a state have been reflected in the provisions of IIAs between states.  
 
The IIAs provisions have required a host state to provide and guarantee an appropriate 
legal, administrative and regulatory framework, that will shield foreign investment with 
special international law rights and remedies,14 including national treatment, most-
favoured nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, the prohibition against 
expropriation without compensation, stabilisation clause and other general clauses.15 
However, it could be seen from the recent IIAs that the protection of foreign investors’ 
rights and interest has not been given much attention in these provisions, while they 
significantly preserve the rights for the host states in controlling the activities of the 
investors.16 Therefore, there has been an attempt to balance the rights and obligations of 
both parties in modern international investment agreements (IIAs).17 
 
In the enforcement of arbitral awards, a state’s treaty obligations may be used as leverage 
by an investor to claim against a host state, who wishes to frustrate or refuse an arbitral 
                                                
11 See Investment treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law (n 4). 
12 R. Higgins, The taking of property by the State (1982) 167 Recueil des Cours  267.; See also M. 
Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment  (CUP, UK 2010), pp. 363.; Rudolf Dolzer, 
Indirect expropriation: New development, NYU, 11 Environmental Law journal 64, pp.67 
13 W. M. Reisman and R. D. Sloane, ‘Indirect Expropriation and its valuation in the BIT Generation’  75 
Brit. Y.B.I.L. 115 (2004), pp. 117.  
14 ibid.; Howard Mann, International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights : Key issues and 
opportunities, (International institute for sustainable development, 2008) 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/iia_business_human_rights.pdf., pp. 3 
15 R. Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriation: New Development’, 11 N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 64 (2002-
2003), pp.67. 
16 I. Seidl-Hohenveldern ‘Proportionality in and Under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States’ in I. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Collected Essays on 
International Investments and on International Organizations (Kluwer Law, The Netherlands 1998), pp. 
375. 
17 See L. Zarsky (eds), Balancing Rights and Rewards: International Investment for Sustainable 
Development (Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, UK 2005). 
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award under “sovereign immunity”18 doctrine. Therefore, a state as a party to the 
International Conventions on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, either the 
New York Convention or ICSID Convention, is under an obligation to enforce arbitral 
awards rendered elsewhere. In a case of non-compliance by a party, it would be breach of 
treaty obligation and lead to legal, political and economic consequences in the 
international business community.19 
 
In international law, two doctrines are involved in proceedings for the enforcement of 
arbitral awards, namely, treaty obligations under international investment law (pacta sunt 
servanda)20 and the doctrine of sovereign immunity (par in parem non habet 
jurisdictionem).21 Whilst the former principle forms the basis for Article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which states “every treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”.22 The latter principle 
forms the basis of the doctrine of absolute immunity, which holds that “one sovereign 
state is not subject to the jurisdiction of another state”. Therefore, there is a conflict of 
law when a domestic court applies and interprets these two principles simultaneously. As 
principles come from different areas of international law it must be ascertained which 
doctrine takes precedence or how they will interface together. Consequently, the rules of 
lex specialis and jus cogens are necessary to deal with the matter of conflict of laws.23 
 
By a states’ entry into BITs, it is obliged to settle the investor-state dispute, by arbitral 
tribunals and is additionally deemed to waive its immunity from jurisdiction of the 
                                                
18 L. Reed and L. Martinez, ‘Treaty obligations to honor arbitral awards and diplomatic protection’ in D. 
Bishop (eds), Enforcement of arbitral awards against sovereigns, (Jurisnet, New York 2009) pp.13. 
19 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp. 1107-1108.  
20 It is a Latin word, meaning that “agreements must be kept”; See also W. Park and A. Yanos, ‘Treaty 
Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration’ 58 Hastings Law.Rev. 251 
(2006); J. Yackee, ‘PACTA SUNT SERVANDA and state promises to foreign investors before bilateral 
investment treaties: Myth and reality’ 32 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1550 (2009). 
21 See H. Lauterpacht, ‘The problem of jurisdictional immunities of foreign states’ 28 Brit.Y.B. Int’l L. 220 
(1951); J. Crawford, ‘International law and foreign sovereigns: Distinguishing immune transactions’ 54 
Brit.Y.B. Int’l L.75. (1983). 
22 Art. 26 of VCLT, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
23 See L. Coolins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of laws (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006) pp. 
778-785. 
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national court in favour of arbitration proceedings.24 However, a significant problem of 
the enforcement of arbitral awards is the express permission of a state to waive its 
immunity from enforcement and execution in arbitration clauses and municipal sovereign 
immunity law. Whilst the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been shifted from an 
absolute to a restrictive immunity approach in the late 1970s, the defence of sovereign 
immunity is still available for host states before a national court to refuse arbitral awards 
enforcement and execution.25 Therefore, although the arbitral awards could be recognised 
and enforced before a national court, it does not mean that the victorious investor will 
successfully attach the assets of a state when such assets are categorized as sovereign 
assets or specially protected assets in the execution stage.26 
 
In the light of the above, the core hypothesis of this thesis is that investor-state 
arbitration, under the global regime of international investment agreements (‘IIAs’), is 
severely hampered in its role of providing a remedy to foreign investors for losses to their 
investments, caused by the breaches of IIAs by host states. In particular, there exists the 
risk that an arbitral award against the respondent state can be undermined, by the 
respondent state’s use of the sovereign immunity doctrine against execution, as a defence 
against the payment of compensation. Accordingly, this leads to the main research 
question being: whether the defence of the sovereign immunity doctrine should be fully 
available to a state, in order to refuse the enforcement of arbitral awards, or should it be 
subject to limitations specified in the municipal sovereign immunity law of the country, 
in which the enforcement is sought?  
 
This thesis argues that international investment law is a hybrid law displaying both 
private and public law characteristics in which it creates the relationship between a state 
and private parties. This relationship is not equal but hierarchical, because a state, unlike 
                                                
24 A. Blane, ‘Sovereign immunity as a bar to the execution of international arbitral awards’, 41 JILP 453 
(2009) 
25 ibid 455; R. Brazil-David, ‘International Commercial Arbitration Involving a State Party and the Defense 
of State Immunity’, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 241 (2011) pp. 260-261. 
26 A. Bjorklund, ‘Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: 
The re-politicization of International Investment Disputes’, 21 Am.Rev.Int’l. Arb. 211 (2010) pp. 211-213. 
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private parties under reciprocal legal relationship, possesses a different set of powers and 
obligations in law27 in which a state can unilaterally exercise those powers and 
obligations to bind foreign investor by administrative order or legislation.28 The public-
private characteristics rest on the concept of state sovereignty, which uses to determine 
the function and nature of state activities.29 Accordingly, the balancing of state 
obligations and investor rights under a proportionality analysis could be considered as an 
effective tool to promote the investment and to protect the interests for both investors and 
host countries towards a fair and impartial forum, where such immunity is in issue.  
 
Given that a pure economic approach of investment treaty arbitration system has failed to 
balance the rights under investment protection of foreign investors with rights to regulate 
of a host state as well as it is perceived as a threat to the effectiveness of other legal 
regimes, particularly non-investment matters, such as, human rights and sovereign 
immunity law. In this regard, investment treaty arbitration does not adequately provide an 
engagement with other areas of international law and public concerns. This thesis, 
therefore, contends that investment treaty arbitration should be considered as a form of a 
global administrative law in order to interpret those public-private rights. However, this 
thesis does not literally adopt a global administrative law approach in interpreting the 
relationship between international investment law and sovereign immunity law.  
 
Rather, it particularly focuses on the application of public law principle of proportionality 
to deal with a conflict between investor’s rights and public concerns in investment treaty 
arbitration. Accordingly, the thesis is trying to balance a state control in investment 
arbitration with a foreign investor protection. A proportionality analysis is deemed to be 
methodologically workable as a means to compare and balance the interests by a court or 
tribunal. Moreover, it could also be an effective tool to deal with the theoretical tension 
between conflicting legal concepts. In pursuing this approach, an investment treaty 
                                                
27 Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, SIEL Working papter no.22/08, (2008), pp. 4 
28 S. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological 
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 Virginia J. Int’l L. 57, pp.77 
29 See L.J. Bouchez, The nature and scope of state immunity from jurisdiction and execution (1979) 
Netherlands Y.B.I.L. 1. 
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tribunal and municipal court would be able to weight a regulatory measure or sovereign 
immunity defense raised by state against the economic damage done to a private investor 
by that regulatory measure or defense.30  
 
However, this attempt could not be effective without the development of international 
conventions and municipal laws on sovereign immunity in parallel to secure the 
execution of arbitral awards before a municipal court as well as to support the 
applicability of international conventions. Combining these two fundamental sets of 
frameworks, this cross-fertilisation would provide some potential practical considerations 
as well as to unite the two areas of international law or so-called ‘defragmentation’ of 
international law towards a harmonised development.31 Thus, this would limit the 
excessive or unjustified claims of sovereign immunity as a defense against the 
enforcement of arbitral awards in which state responsibility could not be avoided for a 
breach of investment treaty obligations towards private investors.  
 
To support this presumption, it is believed that the capacity of arbitral awards varies 
between different jurisdictions, depending on the performance and interpretation of 
municipal sovereign immunity law as well as the arbitration clauses of a national court. 
As yet, despite the fact that the role of domestic courts in interpreting and enforcing 
arbitral awards is a vital, and the final stage of investor-state dispute settlement, the issue 
of sovereign immunity from execution, defensively raised by a host state, rarely receives 
much attention from scholars. The majority of literature in this field has limited its 
research, concentrating on the finding of jurisdiction over dispute settlement in a 
domestic court. The relevant literature does not delve into other jurisdictional aspects or 
examines the limitations and challenges of the enforcement of arbitral awards.  
                                                
30 B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investor’s Rights with State Regulatory 
Actions in the Public Interest- The Concept of Proportionality’ in S. Schill (ed.), International Investment 
Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP, New York 2010), pp. 77 
31 C. Schreuer, The Relevance of Public International Law in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Investment Disputes, Available at < www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/81_csunpublpaper_1.pdf >, pp. 
9; Anne Van Aaken, Fragmentation of International law : The case of International investment protection, 
(University of St. Gallen Law School, Law and Economics Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 
2008-1, 2008), pp. 2. 
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In addition, the issue of measures of execution would be significant and problematic 
when a host state itself or a third state is a losing party; because there is no guarantee for 
an investor to effectively obtain its awards. Without this guarantee, the investor-state 
arbitration mechanism might be just an illusion and its arbitral award worth nothing more 
than a promissory piece of paper. Therefore, this thesis will need to fill the gap in the 
existing literature in order to develop the understanding in this field and to provide an 
effective solution for an investor. 
 
A key purpose of this thesis is to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of 
sovereign immunity, particularly immunity from enforcement and execution, and analyse 
the arguments for and against its use by a state as a defence against the enforcement of 
arbitral awards. The discussion must take into account both state practice and doctrine. 
Accordingly, this thesis aims to answer and examine the following questions: 
 
- Whether the development of international investment law and its related 
doctrine regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards are considered as a 
fragmentation or harmonisation of international law 
- Do the New York Convention and ICSID Convention alter and/or supersede 
the domestic rules of immunity from execution or other challenges applicable 
in contracting states? 
- What are the criteria to distinguish immunity from jurisdiction and immunity 
from enforcement and execution? (Separate immunity principle) and under 
this circumstance to what extent can the state’s undertaking to arbitrate (a 
treaty obligation) be considered as an implied waiver from execution? 
- In a process of execution, whether the exceptions provided in certain 
codifications have provided sufficient grounds in order to allow for an 
execution against foreign property with a mixed purpose or of specially 
protected property as well as further challenges and additional requirements 
specified in some codifications.  
- Whether a proportionality analysis could be used as an effective tool to 
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balance state obligations and investor rights under a hybrid regime of investor-
state dispute settlement. 
 
2. Structure 
In order to answer and examine the questions mentioned above, this thesis is split into 
four parts, as follows: 
 
Part I introduces the background of the thesis and methodology used to analyse the 
problem, which based on both doctrinal and comparative legal research.  
 
Part II considers the basis of the relationship between international investment law and its 
related doctrines. Chapter 2 analyses the development of international investment law 
towards a regime of public international law. This will lead to a problem of 
defragmentation of international law when dealing with a different area of international 
law. Moreover, it will provide a background of the doctrines, which relate to investor-
state dispute settlement, plus whether they are treaty interpretation and state 
responsibility. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the evolution of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity from the absolute to restrictive approach in different jurisdictions, as well 
considering the commercial activity exception and its relevance to investment treaty 
arbitration. 
 
Part III examines the enforcement and execution of arbitral awards, which is the main 
objective of this thesis. Chapter 4 analyses international conventions, which provide a 
ground for the enforcement and execution of arbitral awards in a municipal court. This, 
particularly, focuses on the New York and the ICSID Convention. Also, a comparison of 
enforcement and execution, between these conventions, is provided to recognise the 
problems and conditions in enforcing arbitral awards. Chapter 5 shows the impact of 
international arbitration conventions on an agreement to arbitrate before municipal courts, 
which reflects the state practices on the enforcement and execution of arbitral award in 
municipal courts. This will analyse the relationship between international conventions 
and municipal laws on sovereign immunity in the stage of enforcement and execution of 
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an arbitral award, on the basis of a waiver of sovereign immunity. The chapter will 
demonstrate that the enforcement of arbitral awards by a municipal court could cause 
diverse circumstances owing to the combination of different arbitral procedures of 
international conventions and different law on sovereign immunity in a forum state. 
 
Part IV clarifies the challenges and limitations in enforcing arbitral awards against 
foreign states. It shows that certain types of property are protected from execution in any 
situation, even when a foreign state has waived its sovereign immunity from execution. 
Moreover, some codifications add a further requirement of jurisdictional nexus in order to 
execute against a commercial property of foreign state. Therefore, these difficulties have 
caused some potential challenges and limitations when enforcing arbitral awards against 
foreign states’ property both for a municipal court and investor.   
 
Part V deals with the conclusion of the thesis. Chapter 7 provides some practical 
considerations to overcoming the difficulties in enforcement and execution of arbitral 
awards against the sovereign state, offering certain solutions, at both a domestic and an 
international level. More importantly, it will discuss a way forward for the investor-state 
arbitration, in a theoretical framework. Chapter 8 concludes on some of the significant 
ideas and propositions developed in this thesis, making suggestions for further research. 
 
3. Methodological Framework 
The legal framework of this thesis is principally concerned with the inter-relationship 
between international investment law and doctrine of sovereign immunity. It will 
examine and critically analyse the enforcement of arbitral awards against sovereign states 
by a comparison of several jurisdictions where such issues have arisen under a public law 
approach. The methodological framework will be focused on both doctrinal and 
comparative legal research. This thesis will first consider the “black-letter-law”32 
approach, in order to clarify the relevant laws to understand socio-political and economic 
context of each jurisdiction, and then it will extend to the comparison of legal materials, 
                                                
32 See M. McConville and W.H. Chui, Research Methods for Law, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 
2010) pp.4  
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from a variety of jurisdictions, in which the main research problem has arisen in order to 
understand the “legal transplants”33 on the topic where the principles and practices of 
one legal system influence to another system. The predominant source, of this thesis, is 
concentrated on the treaties, legislations and judicial decisions at both international and 
domestic levels. The thesis will be developed in three main stages as follows; 
 
(a) Doctrinal issues  
This first stage aims to provide an overview and the background of the investor-
state arbitration mechanism, particularly under ICSID, which has replaced a national 
court’s dispute settlement process with a private model of adjudication in matters of 
public law at an international level.34 In international law, two doctrines are involved in 
the process of the enforcement of arbitral awards, namely, treaty obligations under the 
international investment law (pacta sunt servanda) and the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity (par in parem non habet jurisdictionem). However, it is not clear how the 
development of these two doctrines might be affected by each other or which doctrine 
might take precedence.  
 
To tackle this problem, the first part will conceptualise the basic terms and the 
usages relevant to this thesis, based on doctrinal research. It is important to have a clear 
understanding of the basic terms by distinguishing the claims of a sovereign act (acta jure 
imperii) and a commercial act (acta jure gestionis) under a restrictive immunity 
approach. By adopting this approach, a foreign state cannot raise the defence of immunity 
from jurisdiction with respect to the claim involving a commercial act of state. However, 
there is no clear definition of those terms and certain activities or assets could be 
categorised as mixed activities or assets. Moreover, certain assets are not clearly 
designated or used for sovereign acts. Therefore, this thesis will need to examine the 
basis of restrictive immunity to clarify what is meant by a commercial act or asset. 
Specifically, the framework of this analysis will not only cover the state’s assets, but also 
                                                
33 See P.Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’, 4 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 111 (1997); N. Foster, ‘The Journal of Comparative Law: A New Scholarly Resource’, 1 
Journal of Comparative Law 1 (2006). 
34 The Public-Private Distinction (n 9), pp. 372 
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extend to a state entity or its instrumentality’s asset, which has a separate legal entity. The 
thesis will look at this problem by referring to a recent trend of capital-exporting 
countries investing in capital-import countries (North-South), since the growing of BITs 
period in 1970s, which raises difficulties when determining a commercial act. 
 
The doctrine of treaty obligations also requires consideration. This will necessitate 
a review of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, particularly Article 31-33, 
which sets out the rules of treaty interpretation.35 Whilst this rule is applicable in the 
interpretation of all treaties, constituting a customary international law, whether a state 
involved is a party to the Vienna Convention or not, it is doubtful when it comes to the 
interpretation of a treaty in a domestic level and whether a treaty, which is governed by 
international law, is excluded from Vienna rules within a national legal system.36 
Additionally, as Article 31(3)(c) clarifies that “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties”, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a 
well-recognised doctrine in international law, has come into play together with the treaty 
provisions in the process of interpretation.37 Thus, this thesis will need to look at the 
development of international law as a legal system, whether it is by way of harmonisation 
or fragmentation, in order to understand the relationship of those two areas of 
international law, namely, international investment law and sovereign immunity doctrine. 
Accordingly, the rules of lex specialis and jus cogens are needed to deal with the matter 
of conflict of laws. 
 
(b) Legislative practice  
The enforceability of international arbitral awards in a national court is based on 
two international conventions; the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (the New York Convention) and the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965 
(the Washington or ICSID Convention). The adoption of these conventions ensures the 
                                                
35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed at Vienna, 23 May 1969: UN DocA/Conf39/28 
36 See R. Gardner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP New York 2008). 
37 C. McLachlan, ‘The principle of systemic integration and article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, 54 
ICLQ 279 (2005). 
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enforceability of arbitral awards before a national court of signatory states and precludes 
the challenge of a national court on several grounds. However, both Conventions leave 
some uncertain issues needed to be analysed. 
 
For the purpose of this study, the research is focused on the applicability of these 
two Conventions, being the ICSID Convention based on a treaty obligation and the New 
York Convention based on a contractual obligation, in order to enforce arbitral awards in 
a domestic court. Whilst the judgment or arbitral award of the ICSID is revered as the 
final judgment of the domestic court, the judgment or award under the New York 
Convention is seen as a foreign judgment, subject to the review of the national court. 
Thus, this thesis will investigate the role of the domestic court in limiting or refusing the 
enforcement of an arbitral. Here, the rule of treaty interpretation, as discussed in the first 
stage, raises its face again in the determination of the conflict of laws between treaty 
obligation under international law and country’s public policy and legislation under 
domestic law.  
 
Accordingly, it is necessary to compare the capacity between these Conventions 
through Articles and the effectiveness of their awards in order to understand the drafters’ 
intention since these two Conventions come from a different history and background. On 
the one hand, the New York Convention is adopted by the United Nations in order to 
recognise and enforce arbitral awards in cross border both on commercial and investment 
arbitration grounds. On the other hand, the ICSID Convention is created by World Bank, 
which is an autonomous international organization, on the purpose of protecting the 
foreign investment from political risks and economic crisis. Consequently, this is to 
promote the foreign investment in developing countries and provide a dispute settlement 
mechanism, particularly focusing on investment disputes. 
 
By comparing these Conventions, the issue of sovereign immunity is one of most 
controversial provisions in the ICSID Convention, since it leaves the immunity from 
execution to the law of a forum state, where the arbitral awards is sought, as stated in 
Article 54 (3) and 55. With regards to the purpose of the ICSID Convention, the inclusion 
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of immunity from execution runs into opposition with developing countries, which could 
affect the wide ratification of the Convention.38 Further, it would become a tool for a 
court as a procedural bar to the enforcement of arbitral awards against a sovereign state. 
In contrary, the New York Convention makes no mention on this issue. Therefore, it is 
necessary to locate the reasons of the drafters, as to why they included or excluded the 
provision of immunity from execution between these Conventions. 
 
At this point, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is primarily concerned in the 
thesis. Although sovereign immunity doctrine is part of international law, the domestic 
courts have developed and made an important contribution to state practice leading to the 
variation in both practice and interpretation of this doctrine.39 Therefore, this thesis will 
need to look at the development of this doctrine, which has been adopted and transplanted 
from international law to domestic law. 
 
The methodology of this stage will rely on a comparative law research. This 
method will enable me to examine the legal transplants, the harmonisation of law and the 
conflict of laws in detail in which the legal development and evolution from the origin to 
the other countries or from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction may be observed.40 
The methodological problem raised here is the dilemma of interpretation and comparison 
in three relationships; between national laws in themselves, between national law and 
international treaties, and between treaties in themselves. The distinctions between these 
relationships will scrutinize the degree to which these domestic laws and international 
treaties have grown over time, and to what extent they have limited or assured the 
enforcement of arbitral awards in a domestic court. 
 
With regards to the domestic laws, it is necessary to focus on the 1970s and 
1980s, in which many common law countries, including the US, the UK, Canada and 
                                                
38 A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States’, 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 403 (1972-II).  
39 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A Commentary (CUP, UK 2009), pp.1155. 
40 N. Foster, ‘The Journal of Comparative Law: A New Scholarly Resource’, 1 Journal of Comparative Law 
1 (2006). 
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Australia, adopted legislation to regulate the sovereign immunity doctrine in their 
domestic law. The most important domestic codification and model statutes are in the 
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and the United 
Kingdom State Immunity Act of 1978 (SIA), which require consideration regarding the 
similarities and differences because these two domestic laws and how they have been 
developed in parallel. Although these two domestic laws share the same ground of 
restrictive immunity, the interpretation of sovereign immunity by the different courts 
provides a dissimilar solution, in which the FSIA imposes a further restriction. On the 
other hand, in civil law countries, like France and Switzerland, although there is no 
domestic law on sovereign immunity doctrine, state practice is necessary to be 
considered, which reflects its transformation to a restrictive approach in a parallel with 
common law countries. 
 
At an international level, there is also an adoption of the European Convention on 
State Immunity of 1972 as well as the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property of 2004, based on International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property of 
1991. Here, it is important to observe the development of this doctrine from a regional 
level to an international level, in order to see the relationship between these Conventions 
and how the restriction, which is different in both, has been flexible from an absolute 
immunity to restrictive immunity over time. 
 
Finally, the relationship between domestic laws and international treaties could be 
seen as an important process of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. With regards to the 
treaty interpretation rules, the relevant laws from an international law level could be 
interpreted together with the domestic law when determining the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. The thesis will need to analyse how far the international treaties could be 
interpreted and implemented in a different domestic courts and their law. Therefore, the 
public international law could also affect the legal transplant of the domestic law, be it 
either divergent or convergent. It is important to see whether a domestic law of sovereign 
immunity, adopted from international treaties and somehow provides a different rule and 
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exception on the enforcement and execution of arbitral awards, could be recognised as a 
doctrine in international law. This will require an observation of state practices, which 
may lead to the creation of a body of customary international law.41 
 
From the problems of interpretation and comparison in the sovereign immunity 
doctrine on the enforcement of arbitral awards, the uniform international instrument is 
still absent. Thus, it can be seen that it is insufficient to only focus on the codification of 
international and domestic law of sovereign immunity, as the judicial law making is 
additionally an important process used to develop the doctrine of sovereign immunity and 
the enforcement of arbitral awards, illustrating either possible solutions or strict 
limitations.  
 
(c) Judicial decisions and arbitral awards  
Since a multilateral instrument on the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not yet 
exist, many jurisdictions, including both common and civil law jurisdictions, have 
adopted a restrictive immunity doctrine in their municipal law. Although these countries 
have developed their municipal law in the same direction, the law of sovereign immunity, 
which has been adopted, are not always consistent between countries. This is because the 
system of operative rules is different; common law jurisdictions, such as the US and UK, 
have adopted specific instruments to clarify a considerable detail of sovereign immunity 
doctrine while civil law jurisdictions, such as France and Germany, have directly applied 
the principles of public international law and relied on the case laws and judicial law 
making, which are developed by their national courts.42 Therefore, it is so restricted and 
difficult to interpret the state practice in many countries. Furthermore, it is well known 
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in socialist countries, for instance, China, 
remains an absolute one. Accordingly, the divergence of state practices could be seen in 
their judicial decisions and arbitral awards, which raises concern as to enforcement 
because of sovereign immunity. These important cases and arbitral awards in the 1990s 
                                                
41 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A Commentary (CUP, UK 2009)  pp.1155. 
42 Karl M. Meessen, ‘State immunity in the arbitral process’ in Norbert Horn (eds) Arbitrating foreign 
investment disputes (Kluwer law international 2004), pp. 388. 
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include LETCO v Liberia,43 Sedelmayer v Russian Federation,44 Benvenuti & Bonfant v 
Congo45 and SOABI v Senegal.46 
 
The thesis will analyse, by jurisdictional case comparison, the development of the 
sovereign immunity doctrine, which has been transplanted from its origin in the common 
law countries to the civil law countries and finally to socialist countries. The problem 
here is how to compare these cases, which involve different legal systems and cultures, 
and to what extent could it be possible that a case from one jurisdiction is considered as a 
precedent in another. Therefore, the thesis will need to collect domestic cases relevant to 
the sovereign immunity issues raised in the enforcement of arbitral awards before a 
domestic court, which are broadly categorised into four grounds: the link between the 
property to be executed and the claim, the implied waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution in arbitral agreement, the difficulties in distinguishing commercial from 
sovereign property, plus as mixed-purpose property and specially protected property and 
the execution against its agency or instrumentality. The thesis will, thus, chiefly focus on 
these grounds of claims in specific jurisdictions. 
 
In common law countries, whereas their laws are developed by the court decisions 
as opposed to statues and legislations adopted through a legislative process in civil law   
countries, they, by some means, have adopted a municipal law on sovereign immunity. It 
is necessary to look at the cases and statues in the US and UK jurisdictions. This is 
because these two jurisdictions are regarded as traditional municipal law on sovereign 
immunity law in respect with the restrictive approach, which has been developed in 
parallel. More importantly, most arbitral awards have been rendered in these jurisdictions 
and have become a framework and precedents to other countries. Therefore, these two 
jurisdictions must be compared, as they offer a different test and exception, when 
enforcing and executing arbitral awards, especially the nexus requirement. The cases 
                                                
43 LETCO v Liberia, ICSID case no. ARB/83/2, Award, March 31, 1986. 
44 Sedelmayer v Russian Federation, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Decision on Jurisdiction and Final 
Award, July 7, 1998.   
45 Benvenuti & Bonfant v Congo, ICSID case no. ARB/77/2, Award, August 8, 1980. 
46 SOABI v Senegal, ICSID case no. ARB/82/1, Award, February 25, 1988. 
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include the UK case of Alcom v The Republic of Colombia 47 compared with Birch 
Shipping Co v The United Republic of Tanzania48 and LETCO v Liberia 49 cases in the 
US. This is because these cases highlighted the difficulty in persuading the home courts 
that the property involved was intended to be used for a commercial purpose. 
 
In civil law countries, on the other hand, they have not adopted any comparable 
legislation. However, they refer to international law on sovereign immunity and develop 
though their case laws. Most of the cases have been rendered in the French courts. The 
practice of the French courts is in line with the common law jurisdictions, which allow 
the enforcement and execution for the property in use for commercial activities. 
However, in the case of Creighton v. Qatar,50 the decision of the Cassation court, it was 
held that the hierarchy and authority to set a French jurisprudence, seems to be out of line 
from the general practice in regards to the implied waiver from execution when a state is 
undertaking to arbitrate, following the US position which allows the waiver of immunity 
from execution to be given either explicitly or implicitly (set forth in the FSIA and 
interpreted by the US court).  
 
In this context, the Creighton decision set a new precedent in defining what 
constitutes a waiver of immunity from execution. As a matter of fact this case has been 
rendered in the US courts as well. Accordingly, it may demonstrate the perception and 
interpretation between these two jurisdictions on the sovereign immunity doctrine and 
how the US law has had an effect on the French court’s decision. In this research, it is 
necessary to analyse the cross-influence of decisions, especially the new precedent, not 
only between the US and French Court but also between other jurisdictions, in order to 
see how domestic courts will adopt and develop court decisions from other jurisdictions, 
which potentially could lead to the harmonisation of the doctrine. 
                                                
47 Alcom Ltd. v The Republic of Colombia, House of Lords (Court of Appeal) AC 580 (1984). 
48 Birch Shipping Co v Embassy of The United Republic of Tanzania, D.C.C., 18 November 1980, 63 ILR 
524 (1982). 
49 LETCO v Liberia, United States District Court, the District of Columbia, Judgment, 16 April 1987, 2 
ICSID Reports 390. 
50 Creighton Limited v Government of the State of Qatar, The French Cour de Cassation, (6 July 2000), 
reported in XXV Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 458 (2000). 
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Another civil law country, which needs to be considered is Argentina, which 
adopted its own statue on the restrictive immunity doctrine. Recently, there have been 
many arbitral awards claimed against Argentina due to its financial crisis. These cases 
will significantly demonstrate the political and economical considerations, which have 
been raised in the proceedings, in order to avoid the enforcement of arbitral awards. As in 
the case of NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina (NML),51 before the French 
Supreme Court, regarding a waiver of sovereign immunity from enforcement and 
execution, the French Supreme Court required an express and specific waiver of 
sovereign immunity to public assets or category of public assets over which the waiver 
was granted. This jurisprudence could be seen as a strict approach applied to a waiver of 
sovereign immunity from execution and seems to be a more state friendly approach. 
 
In socialist countries, including China, the possible transformation on its shift of 
position may well be considered by those countries, as they have already signed a 2004 
UN Convention. In the recent case between FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v 
Democratic Republic of the Congo,52 before the High Court of the Hong Kong SAR, the 
court has needed to consider whether a common law of Hong Kong, a special 
administrative of China, continues to recognise the doctrine of restrictive immunity post 
1997. After the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that the doctrine of absolute 
immunity applied in Mainland China and could not supersede the common law 
jurisdictions’ practice of restrictive immunity in Hong Kong, the Court of Final Appeal 
proceeded to reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, ruling that Hong Kong could not 
adhere to a doctrine of sovereign immunity, which is different from that adopted by 
Mainland China in accordance with the Basic law. This extreme jurisprudence of Hong 
Kong Court could be seen as a case study for foreign investors, who wish to invest in a 
centre of international commerce, such as Hong Kong, causing them hardship when 
enforcing an arbitral award against state assets. Moreover, this is not reconciled with the 
                                                
51 NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina, Cass civ 1, March 28 2013, No. 11-10-450. 
52 FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of the Congo, FACV 5-7/2010 (Court of Final 
Appeal).  
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position of China in signing of the UN Convention, which shifts to a restrictive approach 
of sovereign immunity.  
 
Considering a comparative analysis, the background of each jurisdiction also 
necessitates investigation in a political and economic context, in order to determine the 
doctrinal research problems, and see what is the reasons or factors behind these problems, 
plus understand what makes one or another means more or less effective in particular 
contexts that have created an effect on the development and/or adoption of the doctrine.53 
Looking at the way of differences and similarities of context in each jurisdiction are well 
explainable in court reasoning and interpreting the doctrine in each case. Consequently, 
these judicial decisions coming from principal cases, pursuant to the domestic and 
international law enactments of sovereign immunity, could be used to construct the 
improvements to the sovereign immunity doctrine, with regards to the enforcement and 
execution of arbitral awards. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The interpretation of the doctrines and concepts in each jurisdiction is different with 
regards to the waiver of immunity from execution. As yet, the three stages in enforcing 
arbitral awards, being jurisdiction, recognition or enforcement and the execution stage, 
are still unclear and needed to be closely re-examined. More importantly, there are a 
limited number of cases. Until now, only few ICSID cases have involved the defence of 
sovereign immunity, when enforcing arbitral awards, as well as these few cases are not 
open to public. Moreover, most of the cases are before other arbitral tribunals. Therefore, 
it is necessary to use the cases from those tribunals to support and analyse the comparison 
with the ICSID cases. Lastly, the relevant literatures are mainly focused on the immunity 
from jurisdiction, without mention to the immunity from execution. Apart from the 
limitation of literatures, there is also a methodological problem in dealing with the 
conflict of laws between international law and domestic law when interpreting the 
doctrine and state practice. Therefore, it depends on the domestic court to interpret and 
                                                
53 G. Wilson, ‘Comparative Legal Scholarship’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research 
Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2010) .  
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enforce arbitral awards, in which it is inconsistent, and varies between different 
jurisdictions. Consequently, the lack of data in this field either from the cases or 
literatures is a main concern in the research of this thesis in which it limits the ability of 
the thesis’s writer to analyse on a variety and adequate data. On this account, this is a 
main challenge for future researchers in this field to overcome this problem.    
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  Chapter 2 
International Investment Law as a Regime of 
Public International Law and its related Doctrines  
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the recent past international investment law has been recognised as the fastest evolving 
area of international law, however, it has been seen as controversial, with increasing 
debates and challenges from scholars and practitioners, relating to its interpretation and 
implementation of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS).1 With regards to the 
phenomenal proliferation of international investment agreements (IIAs) and growing 
number of treaty-based cases in arbitral tribunals, one of the main concerns focuses on 
the relationship between international investment law and international law. Yet, 
notwithstanding the growth of the development of international investment law and the 
literature in this field, the theoretical framework is incomplete and insufficient to tackle 
the debates and challenges. The core question in this context is whether the development 
of international investment law and related doctrines regarding the enforcement of 
arbitral awards are considered as a fragmentation or harmonisation of international law.  
 
Generally, investor-state dispute settlement, in particular investment treaty arbitration, is 
not based on a form of reciprocal dispute settlement between an investor and a state.2  
Instead, it should be analysed as a structure of “global governance”, being a mechanism 
of an adjudicative evaluation in public law.3 As the nature of investment treaty arbitration 
is frequently implicated in the scope of a regulatory dispute, it is not only required to 
distinguish between the public (sovereign) and private (commercial) nature of disputes 
                                                
1 B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, ‘Investor-state arbitration as governance: Fair and equitable treatment, 
proportionality and the emerging global administrative law’, New York University Public law and legal 
theory working papers (2009) 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1146&context=nyu_plltwp&sei-
redir=1#search=%22Investor-
state+arbitration+as+governance:+Fair+and+equitable+treatment,+proportionality+and+the+emerging+glo
bal+administrative+law%22  , pp.1. (Investor-State Arbitration as Governance) 
2 Gus Van Harten, Investment treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP, New York 2007), pp. 45 
3 ibid 
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but also to reach a balance between investor protection and state regulatory power.4 From 
this perspective, this issue becomes a matter of public-private distinction, with many 
doctrines in public international law coming into play in tandem with international 
investment law in order to understand and classify this distinction.  
 
In dealing with the public-private characteristic, this thesis adopts a global administrative 
law approach. It is necessary to have recourse to a structure of global governance to strike 
a fair balance between international investment law and sovereign immunity law, as well 
as between foreign investor protection and the sovereignty of the state.  Therefore, it is 
the aim of this chapter to provide a general background to the doctrine of treaty 
interpretation and state responsibility, considering their interactions and influences when 
assessing the relevance of different bodies of international law in investment treaty 
arbitration, characterised by a regime of global administrative law.   
 
2. International Investment Law as a Regime of Public International Law 
Despite the reality that international investment law has received much attention from 
scholars and practitioners, especially with growing numbers of states entering into many 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and numerous significant regional treaties, its 
theoretical and conceptual framework remains insufficiently studied in both procedural 
and substantive aspects, including the interpretation of provisions in BITs to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards in the final stage.5  More importantly, the growth of 
investment treaty arbitration has made the underlying issues at stake in disputes more 
diversified and complicated, especially when it concerns the relationship of obligations of 
a host state under international investment law and other areas of international law.6 This 
consequently leads to the unpredictability and inconsistency of decisions and arbitral 
                                                
4 Investor-State Arbitration as Governance (n 1), pp.1. 
5 See Andrea K. Bjorklund, ‘State immunity and the enforcement of investor-state arbitral awards’ in 
C.Binder, U.Kriebaum, A. Reinisch and S. Wittich (eds.), International Investment Law for the 21st 
century: Essays in honour of Christopher Schreuer (OUP, New York 2009). 
6 W. Burke-White and A. von Staden, ‘Private litigation in a public law sphere: The standard of review in 
Investor-state arbitrations’, University of Pennsylvania Law school (2009) 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1291&context=upenn_wps&sei-
redir=1#search=%22Private+litigation+in+a+pibliv+law+sphere:+The+standard+of+review+in+Investor-
state+arbitrations%22> , pp 284. (Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere) 
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awards in arbitral tribunals.7 In order to tackle such uncertainties, a purely doctrinal 
analysis would be inevitability limited. In addition, the current perspective in this field 
still overlooks one vital fact, being the need for a comprehensive framework to analyse 
and understand international investment law as a whole mechanism as well as its role in 
the relationship and development with other areas of international law as a dynamic 
process.8. 
 
Among scholars, there has been a substantial amount of criticism regarding the 
significant ‘asymmetry’ of the investment protection regime.9 Although it is an identified 
provision of investment treaties that they create obligations for host states, but not for 
foreign investors, it is also recognised that the treaties create rights for foreign investors 
but not for host states.10 Therefore, there has been an attempt to balance the rights and 
obligations of both parties in modern international investment agreements (IIAs). This 
attempt is reflected in recent UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports ranging from 2012 
to 2014, by the enhancement of the sustainable development dimension of international 
investment policies.11 However, it has been seen, from the provisions contained in some 
agreements, that it focuses too much on expanding the rights of investors with the 
responsibility of host states to protect them, but gives too little effort to preserve the 
                                                
7 J. Behring, T.R. Braun, R.A. Lorz, C. Tams, S. Schill, and C. Tietje, ‘General Public International Law 
and International Investment Law: A Research Sketch on Selected Issues’ Beiträge zum Transnationalen 
Wirtschaftsrecht. International Law Association German Branch – Sub-Committee on Investment Law, 
Halle (2009) pp. 5; See M. Sornarajah, ‘A Coming Crisis: Expansion Trends in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration in K. P. Sauvant, Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes, (OUP, New York 
2008); S.D. Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law through Inconsistent Decisions’, 73 Fordham Law Review 1522 (2005). 
8 See S. Schill, ‘International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights: A Case 
Study in Cross-Regime Analysis as an Instrument of Defragmentation’, 
http://works.bepress.com/stephan_schill/1 , pp1 (International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, 
and Human Rights); See also Z. Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 Br. 
Y.B. Int'l L. 151 (2003) (The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration) 
9 Tra T. Pham, ‘International investment treaties and arbitration as imbalanced instruments : a re-visit’ 
13(3) Int. A.L.R. (2010), pp 81. 
10 ibid. 
11 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012 : Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies (UN, 
Switzerland 2012) pp. 84; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013 : Global Value Chains: Investment 
and Trade for Development (UN, Switzerland 2013), pp. 101; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014 : 
Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan (UN, Switzerland 2014) pp. 114. 
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rights for host states.12 Therefore, there must be a potential conflict of interest between 
the protection of foreign investor in IIAs and the protection of state regulatory powers 
and control or so-called “police power”, in the domestic legislation of the host states with 
regards, in particular, to environment, national security and human rights policies.13   
 
Traditionally, foreign nationals needed to rely on the exercise of diplomatic protection, 
by their home states, in order to protect their rights and property in the host state, either 
by bring a case before the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) or under the host state’s 
court and domestic law.14 By exercising a diplomatic protection, a state national relies on 
to its home state to exercise its rights on the basis of interstate claim, in which such a 
right to bring a claim is not legally transferable to the national investor, even if the home 
state successful pursues the claim.15 As Douglas points out that; 
 
“In the context of diplomatic protection, the state of the injured national has full discretion 
as to whether to take up the claim on behalf of its injured national at all. It may waive, 
compromise, or discontinue the presentation of the claim irrespective of the wishes of the 
injured national. In exercising this discretion, the state often gives paramount 
consideration to the wider ramifications of the espousal of a diplomatic protection claim so 
fat as it concerns the conduct of its foreign policy vis-à-vis the host state.”16  
 
Therefore, the state has full ownership and control over the claim by whatever means or 
extent. This is demonstrated in the case of Barcelona Traction.17 Given these difficulties 
                                                
12 L. Zarsky (ed.), Balancing Rights and Rewards: International Investment for Sustainable Development 
(Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, UK 2005), pp. 6; See also Konrad von Moltke, ‘A model 
international investment agreement for the promotion of sustainable development’, (International institute 
for sustainable development and the Swiss agency for development and cooperation, 2004) 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf. 
13 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP, UK 2010), pp. 224-225; See Omar 
E. Garcia-Bolivar, ‘Sovereignty v. Investment Protection : Back to Calvo?’, 
http://works.bepress.com/omar_garcia_bolivar/12/. 
14 L. Reed and L. Martinez, ‘Treaty Obligations to Honor Arbitral Awards and Diplomatic Protection’ in D. 
Bishop (ed), Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against Sovereigns, (Jurisnet, New York 2009). 
15 A. Boralessa, ‘Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID awards against the 
Republic of Argentina: Obstacles that Transnational Corporations may Face’, 17 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev 53 
(2004) pp. 111. 
16 The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration (n 8), pp. 169. 
17 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case (Belgium v. Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep.3, para 78-79, reads: 
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and uncertainties, an investor is often willing to decline a recourse to diplomatic 
protection but rather intends to satisfy its arbitral award more directly by means of 
investor-state arbitration dispute settlement provided under investment treaty basis where, 
in the word of Douglas:  
 
“the investor is under no obligation to inform its national state of the existence of 
proceedings against the host state, nor to consult with the state on the substantive and 
procedural issues that arise in the proceedings. The investor is guided in the prosecution of 
its claim solely by the dictates of self-interest without necessary regard for any 
consequences to the diplomatic relationship between its national state and the host state.”18  
 
By pursuing a diplomatic protection in solving a dispute, in the context of investor-state 
arbitration in the interstate level, such action is, by some means, heavily influenced by 
political considerations. Undoubtedly, it relies on the basic notion of amicable 
international relations between home and host state, which is outside the control of the 
national investor.19   
 
In breaking with a traditional means of dispute settlement under customary international 
law, investment treaty arbitration, in turn, empowers foreign investors to directly claim 
against a host state without exhausting local remedies, plus directly seeking enforcement 
of arbitral awards before the domestic courts of a host state in order to solve the problem 
of unfair dispute settlement.20 In principle, investment treaty arbitration obliges state 
parties to submit its jurisdiction over a dispute in an arbitral tribunal involving a 
unilateral ‘public offer’ or ‘general consent’ of arbitration by a host state provided for in 
                                                                                                                                            
“...within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic 
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that 
the State is asserting… 
The State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be 
granted, to what extent it granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this respect a 
discretionary power to exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a 
political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.” 
18 The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration (n 8), pp. 169. 
19 E Baldwin M Kantor and M Nolan, ‘Limit to Enforcement of ICSID awards’ 23 J Intl Arb 1 (2006), 7-8; 
I. Shihata, ‘Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID and MIGA’, 1 
ICSID Review 1 (1986), pp.9. 
20 Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative 
Law’ (2006) 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 128. (Investment treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law) 
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BITs or IIAs in a prospective and generalised form21 so as to establish a classical 
‘agreement to arbitrate’ with a foreign investor. As such, Paulsson has termed this unique 
form of investment treaty arbitration as “arbitration without privity”22, which makes its 
mechanism fundamentally different from other forms of dispute settlement. In this 
context, a state under ‘general consent’ has much less control over the dispute than the 
traditional means of diplomatic protection. Therefore, it could be said that, instead of 
being reminiscent of “gunboat diplomacy”23, a treaty-based system of dispute settlement 
would be a superior alternative for investor protection, rather than reliance on an 
uncertain political-based system of diplomatic protection.24  
 
As demonstrated above, contemporary investment treaty arbitration goes beyond the 
traditional concerns, with a simple expropriation and nationalisation disputes arising 
between a host state and a foreign investor.25 The subject matter frequently covers a 
broader range of the regulatory powers, either by the legitimate or invalid exercise of 
power by a host state, ranging from the provisions of basic public service to the 
maintenance of public orders.26 In dealing with these complicated matters, the investment 
treaty arbitration mechanism has become a significant method in relocating an 
adjudication power from a state to a multinational enterprise (MNE) or a foreign investor 
and from a domestic court to a private arbitration body.27  
 
                                                
21 S. Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological 
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’, 52 Virginia J. Int’l L. 57, pp.77 (2011) (Enhancing 
International Investment Law’s Legitimacy); S. Schill, ‘Crafting the International Economic Order: The 
Public Function of Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the Arbitrator’, 23 
Leiden J. Int’l L. 401 (2010) pp. 411 (Crafting the International Economic Order) 
22 J. Paulsson, ‘Arbitration Without Privity’, 10 ICSID Review Foreign Investment Law Journal 232 
(1995); J. Paulsson, ‘Arbitration Unbound: Award detached From the Law of Its Country of Origin’, 30 
Int’l L and Com. L. Q. 358 (1981). 
23 See O.M. Johnson Jr. and J. Gimbleet , ‘From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern International 
Investment Law’ in K.P. Sauvant (eds), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2010-2011 
(OUP, New York 2012) pp. 649-692. 
24 P. Muchlinski, ‘The Diplomatic Protection of Foreign Investors: A Tale of Judicial Caution’ in C. 
Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, and S. Wittich (eds)  International Investment Law for the 21st Century 
Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer. (OUP, Oxford 2009) pp.362. 
25 Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere (n 6), pp. 284. 
26 ibid, pp 289. 
27 Van Harten, ‘Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion’, 2(1) Trade L. & Dev. 1 
(2010) pp. 2. 
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In addition, although the characteristic of public and private of international law is 
considered as a distinct discipline, the lines blur when it is regarded in relation to 
investment treaty arbitration. Consequently, contemporary investment treaty arbitration is 
not only recognised as another form of private law in commercial arbitration, in which 
one party of the dispute is a state, but also constitutes another form of dispute settlement, 
involving a public law context at both domestic and international level.28 Van Harten has 
pointed out that: 
 
“States have in fact taken this additional step by establishing an international adjudication 
system, based on investment treaties that give to arbitrators a comprehensive jurisdiction 
over what are essentially regulatory disputes... Arbitrations conducted pursuant to 
investment treaties are distinct from international commercial arbitration- where the latter 
engages disputes between the state and a private individual- because sates are assumed in 
the commercial context to be acting in a private capacity... Investment treaty arbitration is 
a much clearer instance of the state’s retreat from adjudication because it replaces courts 
with a private model of adjudication in matters of public law”29 
 
Given the public-private characteristic of investment treaty arbitration, it displays a 
system of hybridisation30, where either public international law or private transnational 
dispute resolution cannot adequately rationalise its mechanism. In other words, the 
system of investment treaty arbitration combines the applicable law of public 
international law with the procedural law of private arbitration rules, used for resolving 
disputes between private parties in commercial arbitration.31 Not surprisingly, this hybrid 
model of investment treaty arbitration nowadays is a unique form of pubic law 
adjudication in which its mechanism has been understood by many scholars as public 
regulatory or administrative law. Van Harten and Loughlin have described this 
phenomenon, stating that “the regime of investment arbitration should be recognised as 
constituting an exceptionally important and powerful manifestation of global 
                                                
28 Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere (n 6), pp. 285. 
29 Van Harten, ‘The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against 
the State’, 56 ICLQ 371 (2007) pp. 372. (The Public-Private Distinction) 
30 See The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration (n 8) 
31 Crafting the International Economic Order (n 21), pp.402 
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administrative law.”32 Similarly, Choudhury has contended that “the breadth of the 
regulatory powers of arbitrators in their review of national state decisions, regulations, 
and legislation has even caused some scholars to characterise investment arbitration as 
part of the evolving concept of global administrative law.”33 Therefore, the conception of 
global administrative law can be summarised as:  
 
 “…comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social 
understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative 
bodies, in particular by ensuring they met adequate standards of transparency, 
participation, reasoned decision, and legality and by providing effective review of the rules 
and decisions they make. Global administrative bodies include formal intergovernmental 
regulatory bodies, informal intergovernmental regulatory networks and coordination 
arrangements, national regulatory bodies operating with reference to an international 
governmental regime, hybrid public-private regulatory bodies, and some private regulatory 
bodies exercising transnational governance functions of particular public significance.”34 
 
With regards to global administrative law, the institutional architecture of investment 
treaty arbitration has highlighted a commonality of judicial review in domestic 
administrative law, which has been replicated to a greater degree by an intergovernmental 
regime or so called ‘global administrative space’.35 Therefore, it supports the underlying 
assumptions that investment treaty arbitration, unlike international commercial 
arbitration, is a form of public law adjudication, which is particularity utilised in order to 
resolve regulatory disputes reaching beyond a state and its domestic law.36 Accordingly, 
                                                
32 Investment treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law (n 20), pp. 148; B. Kingsbury, 
N. Krisch and R. Stewart, The Emergence of global administrative law 68 Law & Contemporary Problems 
15 (2005); K. Ladeur, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and Transitional Regulation’, IILJ 
Working paper 2011/1.  
33 B. Choudhury, ‘Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest 
Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?’, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 778 (2008).  
34 See B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R. Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ 68 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 15 (2005). 
35 N. Krisch and B. Kingsbury has provided a definition of ‘Global Administrative Space’ in N. Krisch and 
B. Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal 
Order 17 EJIL 1 (2006) that “a space in which the strict dichotomy between domestic and international has 
largely broken down, in which administrative functions are preformed in often complex interplays between 
officials and institutions on different levels, and in which regulation may be highly effective despite its 
predominantly non-binding forms”. 
36 See also Van Harten, ‘A Case for an International Investment Court’, SIEL Working paper no.22/08, 
(2008). 
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this form of public law adjudication is reflected by the ability of international tribunals, 
particularly the ICSID, to override domestic law with public international law, obliged by 
a state under Bilateral Investment Treaties (‘BITs’) and other forms of International 
Investment Agreements (‘IIAs’).37 This is contrary to an international commercial 
arbitration in the way that it is a reciprocal consensual adjudication based on a negotiated 
contract.38  
 
In particular, an international commercial arbitration deals with a dispute between private 
parties, including a dispute between a private party and a state party, who assumed to be 
acting in a private capacity.39 Alternatively, investment treaty arbitration is used to 
resolve a dispute between a private party, particularly foreign investor, and a state acting 
in a sovereign power. Thus, the relationship between the parties is not equal but a 
hierarchical structure. The state, unlike private parties under a reciprocal legal 
relationship, possesses a different set of powers and obligations in law40 as well as it may 
unilaterally exercise to bind foreign investor by administrative order or legislation.41 This 
public conduct of the state, affecting a foreign investor under investment treaty 
arbitration, is more aligned to the domestic constitutional and administrative law than the 
function of the state under international commercial arbitration based on a commercial 
contract in private law.42  
 
In both contexts, it is clear that the public-private distinction between those two 
international adjudication mechanisms rests on the concept of state sovereignty, which is 
used to determine the function and nature of state activities.43 As mentioned earlier, states 
are now increasingly losing their control over regulatory disputes and appearing to 
                                                
37 V. Greiman, ‘The Public/Private Conundrum in International Investment Disputes: Advancing Investor 
Community Partnerships’, 32 Whittier L. Rev. 395, 404 (2010-2011). See also Investment treaty 
Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law (n 20), pp123.  
38 See The Public-Private Distinction (n 29). 
39 ibid 372. 
40 Van Harten, ‘A Case for an International Investment Court’, SIEL Working paper no.22/08, (2008) pp. 4. 
41 Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy (n 21), pp.77. 
42 ibid 59.  
43 See L.J. Bouchez, ‘The nature and scope of state immunity from jurisdiction and execution’ (1979) 
Netherlands Y.B.I.L. 1. 
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transfer their sovereign power to private adjudication in matters of public law.44 For this 
reason, a challenge has been posed to a legal conception of state sovereignty as the 
public-private characteristic of investment treaty arbitration may result in ‘the retreat of 
the state’.45  
 
Meanwhile, this new sense of uncertainty of state sovereignty raises the criticism that the 
structure of international investment law and investment treaty arbitration has established 
an asymmetric legal regime, in favour of the private interests of foreign investors over the 
public interests of the host states.46  Still, it is important for the host states, especially the 
developing host states, to be aware of the equivocal impact on the definition and 
interpretation of the discretion by sovereign states being challenged by foreign 
investors.47 Indeed, existing IIA models remain focused on the interests of investors and 
pay less attention to public interests in a host states’ policy space.48 Therefore, it seems 
that many investor-state cases and their regime do not intend to strike an appropriate 
balance between these public and private interests but instead tend to increase the conflict 
between public and private international law.49 
 
A considerable amount of literature intimates and casts a “legitimacy crisis”50 in relation 
to the entire system of international investment law and investment treaty arbitration, 
                                                
44 The Public-Private Distinction (n 29), pp. 372; See  also Van Harten, ‘Private Authority and 
Transnational Governance: The Contours of the International System of Investment Protection’, 12 Rev. 
Intl. Pol. Eco. 600 (2005). 
45 See S. Strange, The Retreat of the State (CUP, Cambridge, 1996). 
46 C.N. Brower and S. Chill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International 
Investment Law’, 9 Chi. J. Int’l L. 471, 474 (2008-2009). 
47 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies (UN, 
Switzerland 2012) pp. 84. 
48 See Vicente Yu and Fiona Marshal, ‘Investor’s obligations and host state policy space’, 2nd Annual 
forum of developing country investment negotiators (2008) 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/dci_inv_obligations.pdf  accessed 25 July 2010. 
49 See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP, New York 2007) pp.152-184. 
See also, Gus van Garten, ‘A Case for An International Investment Court’, Society of International 
Economic Law Inaugural Conference Working Paper No.22/08, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1153424 . 
50 M. Sornarajah, ‘A Coming Crisis: Expansion Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration in K. P. Sauvant, 
Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes, (OUP, New York 3008); M. Sornarajah, Power 
and Justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration, 14 Journal of International Arbitration 103-140 (1997). 
S.D. Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
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which is based on a pro-investor bias and is detrimental to a state sovereignty.51 With 
those aspects of international investment law and investment treaty arbitration, it is 
purported that the hybridisation of investment treaty arbitration is firmly situated within 
the matrix of public international law.52 To strike a distinction within the conceptual 
framework between a public and private law perspective, Van Harten contends that “even 
though the system relies on the model of international commercial arbitration and 
expands private authority as a method of governance, the system exists within the realm 
of public international law- not international commerce- and it remains tied to the 
authority of states.”53  
 
In conclusion, it is submitted that international investment law is considered as a part of 
public international law because investment treaty arbitration is a form of public law 
adjudication, in which one party of a dispute is a state and is utilised to resolve regulatory 
disputes. Accordingly, the thesis will adopt this approach to analyse and examine each 
research question throughout the thesis since it serves as an effective tool to balance the 
interests between a state and private party. In other words, a global administrative law 
approach under a public law aspect has brought a public dimension into a private sphere 
of international investment law, which mainly concerns the interest of a private party. It 
is the main purpose of this thesis to balance the defense of sovereign immunity doctrine 
under public international law and investment protections under international investment 
law by the application of proportionality analysis, which is provided under a public law 
concept. Thus, this would limit the excessive or unjustified claims of sovereign immunity 
as a defense against the enforcement of arbitral awards as well as allow a state to defend a 
public interest in response to an unreasonable claim for a protection of private interests.  
                                                                                                                                            
through Inconsistent Decisions’, 73 Fordham Law Review 1522 (2005); M. Sornarajah, ‘The Legitimacy 
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent 
Decisions’, 73 Fordham Law Review 1521,1523 (2005) 
51 N. Brower and S. Chill, ‘Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment 
Law’, 9 Chi. J. Int’l L. 471, 474 (2008-2009). 
52 J. Behring, T.R. Braun, R.A. Lorz, C. Tams, S. Schill, and C. Tietje, ‘General Public International Law 
and International Investment Law: A Research Sketch on Selected Issues’. Beiträge zum Transnationalen 
Wirtschaftsrecht. International Law Association German Branch – Sub-Committee on Investment Law, 
Halle (2009) pp. 5. 
53 Van Harten, ‘Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours of the International System 
of Investment Protection’, 12 Rev. Intl. Pol. Eco. 600 (2005), pp. 604. 
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3. The Fragmentation or Defragmentation of International Law 
It is unsurprising that international investment law is embedded in the discipline of public 
international law. It is concerned with the restriction of the state authority to regulate 
foreign investors within the scope of public interests obliged by legislative, 
administrative and judicial conducts.54 In addition, modern BITs have adopted the 
traditional investment protection provisions found under classical public international 
law, whether as local remedies rule, police power, the taking of foreign property, 
diplomatic protection and the treatment of aliens.55 Significantly, a public international 
law is not only applicable in international investment law, investment treaty arbitration; 
the customary international law concerning the rules of treaty interpretation under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,56 and the rules of state responsibility under 
ILC’s Articles on state responsibility57 are also central to international investment law 
and investment treaty arbitration.58  
 
Faced with this particular interaction of legal concepts, there is a close relationship and 
mutual influence between these two areas of international law; the analysis of 
international investment law in certain specific issues, referring to the doctrines of public 
international law, and public international law affected by the development of 
international investment law. This highlights the cross-fertilisation and integration of 
international investment law with other areas of international law in relation to the 
                                                
54 See C. Schreuer, ‘The Relevance of Public International Law in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Investment Disputes’, www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/81_csunpublpaper_1.pdf. (The Relevance of 
Public International Law) ; See also S. Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration Global 
Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT Generation (Hart, Oxford and Portland 2009). 
55 See generally C.F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law (2nd ed.), (CUP, UK 2004).; J. 
Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law, (CUP, UK 2010), pp.100-130. 
56 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) 
57 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1 
58 J. Behring, T.R. Braun, R.A. Lorz, C. Tams, S. Schill, and C. Tietje, ‘General Public International Law 
and International Investment Law: A Research Sketch on Selected Issues’. Beiträge zum Transnationalen 
Wirtschaftsrecht. International Law Association German Branch – Sub-Committee on Investment Law, 
Halle (2009), pp. 7 
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interpretation and application of legal concepts by an arbitral tribunal, pertinently 
covering the concept of state responsibility and treaty interpretation.59 
 
However, the interpretation and application of legal concepts by arbitral tribunals are 
insufficient to fulfil the gap between international investment law and public international 
law. In addition, as it is commonly known that there is no doctrine of precedent (stare 
decisis) in investment treaty arbitration60, the system is inevitably faced with the 
unpredictability and inconsistency regarding decisions and arbitral awards in arbitral 
tribunals, which could lead to the threat of fragmentation of international law.61 
Following the International Law Commission’s (‘ILC’) Reports on the ‘Fragmentation of 
International Law’, due to the increasing emergence of new and special type of laws, self-
contained regimes and limited treaty system, a problem of coherence is created in 
international law where: 
 
 “What once appeared to be governed by “general international law” has become the field 
of operation for such specialist systems as ‘trade law”, “human rights law”, “environment 
law”, “law of the sea”, “European law” and even such highly specialized forms of 
knowledge as “investment law” or “international refugee law”, etc.- each possessing their 
own principles and institutions.”62 
 
                                                
59 See P. Sands, ‘Custom, Treaty, Cross-Fertilisation of International Law;, Yale Hum.Rts.Dev.L.J. 3 
(1998). 
60 See G. Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?’, 23(3) Arbitration 
International 357 (2007); J. Commission, ‘Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration A Citation Analysis 
of a Developing Jurisprudence’, 24(2) J. Int’l. Arb. 129-158 (2007). 
61 See M. Koskenniemi and P. Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’, 15 
Leiden Journal of International Law 553 (2002); Anne van Aaken, ‘Defragmentation of Public International 
Law Through Interpretation: A Methodological Proposal’, 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 483 
(2009); M. Craven, ‘Unity, Diversity and Fragmentation of International Law’, 14 The Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law 3 (2003); A. Fischer-Lescana and G. Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for 
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999 (2004); A 
Reich, ‘Bilateralism versus Multilateralism in International Economic Law’, 60 U Toronto LJ 263 (2010); 
S. Schill, ‘W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law’, 
22(3) EJIL 875 (2011). 
62 Study Group of the International Law Commission, Report on Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law – Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi (A/CN.4/L.682), 13 April 2006, para 8. 
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Accordingly, scholars of international law have been mostly concerned with the conflict 
of different areas in international law.63 Koskenniemi has summarised in the ILC report 
that “conflict exists if it is possible for a party to two treaties to comply with one rule 
only by thereby failing to comply with another rule.”64 As Schill has maintained in 
relation to the multilateral system of BITs that “the existing investment treaties, whether 
bilateral, regional or sectoral, can be understood as part of a treaty-overarching legal 
framework65 that backs up an international investment space that is part of the developing 
global market economy.”66 However, he contends that the proliferation of dispute 
settlement would cause a large degree of fragmentation of international investment law, 
resulting from the multiplicity of sources and proceedings and the inconsistent 
interpretations.67  
 
This is one of the main concerns with regards to the relationship of international 
investment law and other areas of international law when arbitral tribunals need to 
determine the law governing the merits of the dispute. While some treaties may agree the 
governing law of the dispute between the host state and foreign investor, certain treaties 
contain a clause allowing a choice of law, in case there is no such concord between the 
parties.68 The ICSID tribunal refers to the law of the host state and the international law 
in the absence of such an agreement, which is stipulated in Article 42(1). This rule could 
also be found in Article 1131 of NAFTA69 and Article 26(6) of the Energy Charter 
                                                
63 See L. Collins, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of laws (Sweet & Maxwell, London 2006), pp. 
778-785. 
64 Study Group of the International Law Commission, Report on Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law – Finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi (A/CN.4/L.682), 13 April 2006, para 24. 
65 S. Schill, ‘Investment Treaties: Instruments of Bilateralism or Elements of an Evolving Multilateral 
System?’, Paper for the 4th Global Administrative law Seminar (2008). 
66 ibid 2. 
67 ibid 5; See also S. Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, (CUP, UK 2009); P. 
Muchlinski, ‘Corporations and the Uses of Law: International Investment Arbitration as a “Multilateral 
Legal Order”’, 1 Onati Socio-Legal Series (2011), 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1832562 > . 
68 The Relevance of Public International Law (n 54), pp. 9.  
69 Article 1131 of NAFTA, reads “A Tribunal established under this Section shall decide the issues in 
dispute in accordance with this agreement and applicable rules of international law.”  
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Treaty.70 In addition, the foreign investor is also subject to a domestic court and the law 
of a host state in relation to the enforcement of arbitral awards under the ICSID 
Convention, which is the main concern of this thesis.  
 
Since conflicts of law may arise between an obligation of a state towards a foreign 
investor during proceedings concerning the enforcement of arbitral awards, a state being 
a party to the International Conventions on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards either the New York Convention or ICSID Convention, is under a treaty 
obligation to enforce arbitral awards rendered elsewhere before its jurisdiction. Non-
compliance by a party would be a breach of the treaty obligations and lead to legal, 
political and economic consequences.71  
 
With this respect, although the governing law of the dispute is far from uniform,72 it is 
submitted that international investment law has to be interpreted and be applicable in 
consistency and compatibility with other areas of international law. This needs to be both 
in investment and non-investment obligations, such as, WTO law, human rights law, 
diplomatic law and state immunity law, as well as domestic law of the host state, 
particularly domestic law of state immunity.73 Anne van Aaken has contended that “a 
good faith interpretation of substantive provisions of investment law may lead to a 
reading and application of investment law more consistent with other special areas of 
international law.”74 Therefore, international investment arbitration, in contrast, gives 
even more leeway to the parties and arbitrators by having a broader wording in the 
procedural as well as in the substantive law.75 
                                                
70 Article 26(6) of the Energy Charter Treaty, reads “A tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide 
the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international 
law.” 
71 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp. 1077.  
72 The Relevance of Public International Law (n 54), pp. 9.  
73 See Moshe Hirsch, ‘Interactions between investment and non-investment obligations in international 
investment law’, (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2006) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=947430. 
74 Anne Van Aaken, ‘Fragmentation of International law : The case of International investment protection’, 
(University of St. Gallen Law School, Law and Economics Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 
2008-1, 2008) pp. 2. (Fragmentation of International Law) 
75 ibid. 
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4. Doctrines relating to Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(a) The doctrine of treaty interpretation  
As mentioned earlier, international investment law must be interpreted 
consistently with other areas of international law. Nonetheless, a conflict of norms may 
arise, on both procedural and substantive grounds, between a state and an investor in 
relation to the obligations each party has. With regards to the enforcement of arbitral 
awards, the conflict of laws between two doctrines is involved; namely, treaty obligations 
under international investment law (pacta sunt servanda)76 and the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity (par in parem non habet jurisdictionem).77 While the former principle forms 
the basis for Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which 
states “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith”78, the latter principle forms the basis of the doctrine of absolute 
immunity, being that “one sovereign state is not subject to the jurisdiction of another 
state”. This creates a grey area concerning the exchanges between investment and non-
investment obligations within international investment law. Therefore, there is a conflict 
of norms when a domestic court applies and interprets these two principles 
simultaneously as they originate from different areas of international law. This leads to 
the question regarding which doctrine might take precedence over the other and/or how 
they interface with each other.  
 
In order to solve the ensuing legal issues, a tribunal will mainly refer to Article 31 
and 3279 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) when it is required to 
                                                
76 In Latin for “agreements must be kept”; See also W. Park and A. Yanos, ‘Treaty Obligations and 
National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration’, 58 Hastings Law.Rev. 251 (2006); J. 
Yackee, ‘PACTA SUNT SERVANDA and state promises to foreign investors before bilateral investment 
treaties: Myth and reality’, 32 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1550 (2009). 
77 See H. Lauterpacht, ‘The problem of jurisdictional immunities of foreign states’, 28 Brit.Y.B. Int’l L. 220 
(1951); J. Crawford, ‘International law and foreign sovereigns: Distinguishing immune transactions’ 54 
Brit.Y.B. Int’l L.75 (1983). 
78 Art. 26 of VCLT, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
79 Art.32 of VCLT, reads: 
“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
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interpret the treaties. Therefore, the treaty interpretation under the VCLT is considered as 
a main tool in interpreting the treaties and other principles. Article 31(3) (c) of VCLT sets 
out a general rule of interpretation to “any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties” 80 
 
Considering the interpretation of the international investment law and other areas 
of international law, the traveaux preparatoires of Article 31(3) (c) say that it codifies a 
principle of systematic integration81 in that all sources of international law, including 
treaties, are to be included. Therefore, this provision should be taken into account in the 
context of interpreting treaty obligations82 where other human rights or environmental 
law have acquired a customary international law status.83 Accordingly, this could include 
other non-investment obligations as a relevant legal obligation underlying an investment 
disputes. However, Anne van Aaken has highlighted that  “a distinction has to be drawn 
conceptually between the application of other (general or special) norms of international 
law in investment disputes directly on the one hand and the interpretation of investment 
                                                                                                                                            
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
80 Art. 31 of VCLT, reads: 
“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes; 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty  which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more of the parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context; 
(a) any subsequent agreement  between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty of the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”  
81 C. McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, 
54(2) ICLQ 279 (2005).  
82  Fragmentation on International Law (n 75), pp. 11-12. 
83 Anne van Aaken, ‘Defragmentation of Public International Law Through Interpretation: A 
Methodological Proposal’, 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 483 (2009), pp. 497-498; See  also 
R. Gardner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP New York 2008); C. Schreuer, ‘Diversity and harmonization of 
Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration’ in M. Fitzmaurice, O. Elias and P. Merkouris (eds.) Treaty 
Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Brill, The Netherlands 
2010) 
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norms by considering non-investment law, indirectly, mainly through Art. 31(3) (c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) on the other hand.”84  
 
The application of non-investment law in investment dispute has been clarified in 
the Article 42 (1) of ICSID Convention, which reads that “the Tribunal shall decide a 
dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the 
absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party 
to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international 
law may be applicable.”85 Article 42 provides a mechanism for the tribunal to select the 
most appropriate substantive law applicable to the merits of the disputes.86 In investment 
disputes rendered before the ICSID, the applicable law will normally be the host state’s 
law and international law. This may result in a conflict between the obligation of a host 
state towards a foreign investor (under the IIAs) and its obligations in domestic laws or 
international laws in the area of environment, national security and human rights, 
considered as a jus cogens norm. In this regard, although sovereign immunity law is 
considered as a procedural bar in enforcing arbitral awards, which is not determined here 
and treated differently, it is necessary to see how the tribunal deals with other non-
investment laws by referencing to Article 42 of the ICSID Convention. This practice of 
the tribunal could influence other tribunals or courts to consider and interpret the 
investment law and non-investment law in a procedural level when enforcing arbitral 
awards together with the application of principal of proportionality, which will be 
discussed later.    
 
The application of non-investment law before the tribunal can be observed in the 
case of Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa.87 In this case, an Italian mining 
company challenged the South African’s Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act (‘MPRDA’), which was backed by the Black Economic Empowerment (‘BEE’) 
                                                
84 Fragmentation on International Law (n 74), pp. 9. 
85 Art. 42(1) of ICSID Convention. 
86 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP, UK 2009) pp. 550. 
87 Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli and others v. Republic of South Africa (International Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes, Case No. ARB (AF)/07/1). 
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policies, in an effort to improve and protect the participation of the historically 
disadvantaged South Africans (HDSA) within the mining sector.88 The investors claimed 
before the ICSID Additional Facility that this policy was in breach of the provisions of 
the Italy-Republic of South Africa (‘RSA’) BIT and the Benelux89-Republic of South 
Africa BIT non-discrimination provisions.90 The tribunal did not provide a decision on 
the merits of the case, as the case had been dropped at the request of the claimant who 
sought to discontinue the proceeding. In this context, although the tribunal did not give 
the decision, it could be seen that it had to take Article 54 of the ICSID Additional 
facility rules when applying the rules of law nominated by the parties as appropriate to 
the elements of the dispute, including international law, as a method of interpretation. 
This rule of interpretation is similarly provided in Article 42(1) of the ICSID and Article 
31 (3) (c) of the VCLT. Therefore, international human rights law could be considered as 
having legal relevance applicable to the dispute. 
 
In dealing with the conflicts of peremptory norms and other general international 
laws, Article 53 of VCLT goes further in clarifying that “a treaty is void if, at the time of 
its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general law”91 and could lead to 
Article 64 that “if a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any 
existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”92 This 
application of the jus cogens rule is also illustrated in Article 103 of the UN Charter.93 
Therefore, the superior normative status of jus cogens rules undoubtedly protects certain 
fundamental human rights obligations, including the prohibition against racial 
discrimination. For a purpose of this thesis, it, however, raises a question of whether the 
                                                
88 M. Jacob, ‘International Investment Agreements and Human Rights’, (INEF Research paper series of 
human rights, corporate responsibility and sustainable development, 2010)  http://www.humanrights-
business.org/files/international_investment_agreements_and_human_rights.pdf , pp14. (International 
Investment Agreements and Human Rights) 
89 The Benelux is an economic union in Western Europe that comprises three neighboring countries, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 
90 International Investment Agreements and Human Rights (n 87), pp 14-15. 
91 Art. 53 of VCLT. 
92 Art. 64 of VCLT. 
93 Art. 103 of UN Charter, it reads “in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, 
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
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fundamental human right obligations or other peremptory norms would, in any case, take 
precedence over the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which is not considered a jus cogens 
norm. 
 
In this context, the jurisprudence of courts and tribunals has considered Article 53 
of the VCLT together with Article 31(3) (c) of the VCLT when interpreting the conflict 
of laws. In the ICJ case of Arrest Warrant,94 a separate joint opinion of Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal considered a relationship between immunity of high state 
officials and peremptory jus cogens norms of international criminal law as follows: 
“These trends reflect a balancing of interests. On the one scale, we find the interest of the 
community of mankind to prevent and stop impunity for perpetrators of grave crimes 
against its members; on the other, there is the interest of the community of States to allow 
them to act freely on the inter-State level without unwarranted interference. A balance 
therefore must be struck between two sets of functions which are both valued by the 
international community. Reflecting these concerns, what is regarded as a permissible 
jurisdiction and what is regarded as the law on immunity are in constant evolution. The 
weights on the two scales are not set for all perpetuity. Moreover, a trend is discernible 
that in a world which increasingly rejects impunity for the most repugnant offences, the 
attribution of responsibility and accountability is becoming firmer, the possibility for the 
assertion of jurisdiction wider and the availability of immunity as a shield more limited. 
The law of privileges and immunities, however, retains its importance since immunities 
are granted to high State officials to guarantee the proper functioning of the network of 
mutual inter-State relations, which is of paramount importance for a well-ordered and 
harmonious international system.”  
In this respect, although international criminal law is considered as a “peremptory 
jus cogens norm”, it has to be harmonised with other areas of international law in order to 
balance the interests of both private and public. Therefore, it is apparent that a reference 
to Article 31 (3)(c) of the VCLT could not only apply to human rights obligations, but is 
also extendable to the law of sovereign immunity, where the court or tribunal adopts a 
                                                
94 Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), 
Judgment, 14 February 2002, Joint Separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, ICJ 
Report 2002, 63, para 75.  
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proportionality analysis to harmonise a conflict of norms between special and general 
international law through interpretation.95In addition to the ICJ case law, the ECtHR 
jurisprudence applies a similar nature of reasoning when dealing with human rights and 
sovereign immunity law. As in Al-Adsani,96 Forgarty97 and McElhinney,98 the ECtHR has 
adopted the rule of treaty interpretation in order to determine whether the rule of state 
immunity, under domestic law, is a proportionate or legitimate measure to prevail over 
the right to access of justice in Article 6 of ECHR.  The court confirmed the treaty 
interpretation to Article 31(3) (c) of VCLT, in which the law of state immunity is 
considered a relevant rule of international law and must be interpreted, as with other rules 
of international law, with consistency.99. The issue of proportionality analysis, raised in 
these human rights cases, and its significance in relation to the issue of sovereign 
immunity in the enforcement of arbitral awards, will be more fully discussed later in the 
thesis.  
 
With regards to the interpretation of international investment law, by considering 
non-investment law, while most IIAs are silent on the subject of non-investment law, the 
tribunals have at times referred to non-investment law, such as human rights obligations, 
when interpreting investment law so as to defend the treatment provided to foreign 
                                                
95 Anne van Aaken, Defragmentation of Public International Law Through Interpretation: A 
Methodological Proposal, 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 483 (2009) pp. 493-502. 
96 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001. 
97 Forgarty v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 37112/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001. 
98 McElhinney v Ireland, Judgment, ECtHR Application no. 31253/96, Judgment, 21 November 2001. 
99 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 55-
56 
“…the Convention has to be interpreted in the light of the rules set out in the Vienna 
Convention… and… Article 31(3)(c)… indicates that account is to be taken of ‘any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’. The 
Convention, including Article 6, cannot be interpreted in vacuum. The Court must be 
mindful of the Convention’s special character as human rights treaty, and it must also take 
the relevant rules of international law into account…The Convention should so far as 
possible to be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it 
forms part, including to those relating to the grant of State immunity. 
 
It follows that measures taken by a High Contracting Party which reflect generally 
recognised rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in principle be 
regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to court as 
embodied in Article 6(1).” 
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investors.100 Moreover, in Maffezini, the tribunal accepted the protection of 
environmental rights of the citizen,101 as did the tribunals in SD Myers102 and Santa 
Elena103 in relation to international environmental law.  Moreover, the issue of cultural 
rights was considered in both Parkerings104 and SPP.105 Therefore, in this regard, it could 
be possibly said that most recent tribunals do not hesitate to face the inconsistency 
between investment and non-investment obligations.106 
 
Although they have not reached a jus cogens norm ranking, there are other rules 
which can regulate the determination of other international law rules, such as those 
exiting in human rights treaties. The lex specialis rule might be applied in other non-
investment obligations in international law.107 This is where the legal relevance of non-
investment obligations might be usually stopped due to the fact that IIAs are considered 
as a specific law that prevails over other general laws in investor-state disputes. At this 
point, an interpretation by reference to Article 31(3) (c) is more effective than other 
techniques, because “the application of a technique of interpretation that permits 
reference to other rules of international law offers the enticing prospect of averting 
conflicts of norms by enabling the harmonisation of rules rather than the application of 
one norm to the exclusion of another.”108 As a result, this approach could solve the 
conflicts between different areas of international law as well as balance the relation 
between public and private interests. 
 
                                                
100 Jasper Krommendijk and John Morijn, ‘Proportional by what measure (s)? Balancing Investor interests 
and human rights by way of applying the proportionality principle in investor-state arbitration’ in P-M 
Dupuy, F Francioni and E-U Petersmann (eds), Human rights in international investment law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2009) 426. 
101 Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICDIS No. Apr/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 
January 2000; Award of the Tribunal of 13 November 2000, at 67. 
102 SD Myers Inc. v Government of Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Partial award (Nov. 13, 2000).  
103 Santa Elena v Costa Rica, ICSID case No. ARB/96/1, Award on Merits, 17 February 2000. 
104 Parkerings v. Lithuania, ICSID case no. ARB/05/8, Award, September 11, 2007, section 8.3.1. 
105 SPP v Egypt, 19 Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 51 (1994). 
106 Moshe Hirsch, Interactions between investment and non-investment obligations in international 
investment law, (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2006) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=947430>, at 25. 
107 ibid at 8. 
108 C. McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, 
ICLQ 54 (2005), 286. 
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(b) The doctrine of state responsibility 
In investment treaty arbitration, the doctrine of state responsibility is no less 
important than the doctrine of treaty interpretation of obligations international investment 
law (pacta sunt servanda)109 and the principle of sovereign immunity (par in parem non 
habet jurisdictionem).110 Historically, the doctrine of state responsibility has been 
developed due to the traditional concern for the diplomatic protection of nationals and 
injuries to aliens. Therefore, this doctrine reflected the traditional legal systems between 
states as a sovereign state, where states are accountable under international obligations 
and diplomatic status.111   
 
With regard to a diplomatic protection, although the modern dispute settlement of 
investor-state arbitration has been established to replace diplomatic protection, a state can 
rely on some forms of diplomatic protection when there is non-compliance of a state; 
provided for under the ILC’s 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.112 Therefore, 
a diplomatic protection doctrine has long been established for the protection of foreign 
investment in the form of state responsibility, particularly regarding assets of an alien. 
Sornarajah explains concerning this doctrine that: 
 
“Historically, this area of the law has been built up as a part of the area of the diplomatic 
protection of citizens aboard and of state responsibility for injuries to aliens. Since the 
function of diplomatic missions was the protection of nationals living in the states to 
which the missions were assigned, the protection of the property of these nationals also 
became a concern of such missions. The right of diplomatic missions to intercede on 
behalf of the property rights of their nationals came to be asserted in the diplomatic 
                                                
109 W. Park and A. Yanos, ‘Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International 
Arbitration’ 58 Hastings Law.Rev. 251 (2006). 
110 See H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States’ 28 Brit.Y.B. Int’l L. 
220 (1951); J. Crawford, ‘International law and foreign sovereigns: Distinguishing immune transactions’ 54 
Brit.Y.B. Int’l L.75 (1983). 
111 E.B. Weiss, ‘Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century’, 96 AJIL 798 (2002) pp. 798. 
112 Art. 1 of the International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.684, it reads: 
“For the purposes of the present draft articles, diplomatic protection consists of the 
invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of 
the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act 
of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to 
the implementation of such responsibility.” 
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practice of the capital-exporting states. Since this right of protection of the alien can be 
extended to the protection of foreign investment, it was a logical step to argue that this 
right could be utilized to protect the investments made by aliens. The roots of the 
international law on foreign investment lie in the effort to extend the right were contested 
from the time it was attempted on the ground that it leads to unwarranted interference in 
the domestic affairs of the host state.”113 
 
Moreover, although the New York Convention requires that any contracting state, 
under state’s obligations, must recognise and enforce arbitral award rendered elsewhere, 
it does not expressly mention a state’s responsibility for a breach of this obligation. This 
is contrary to the ICSID Convention in which Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention, 
which provides that: 
 
“(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, 
in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have 
consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless 
such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award 
rendered in such dispute.”  
 
Therefore, once a state has refused to honour an ICSID award, an investor can 
seek diplomatic protection pursuant to Article 27 plus request the investor’s home state 
(state of nationality of a natural person) to initiate a claim to the International Court of 
Justice (‘ICJ’) to review the dispute between the Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation and application of the ICSID Convention pursuant to Article 64. This reads: 
 
“Any dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the 
International Court of Justice by the application of any party to such dispute, unless the 
States concerned agree to another method of settlement.” 
 
In this context, foreign nationals have to rely on their home states to exercise of 
diplomatic protection in order to protect their rights and property in the host state, either 
by bringing a case before the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) or under the host state 
                                                
113 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd ed.), (CUP, UK 2010) pp.18.  
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court and domestic law.114 In practice, an attempt to rely on a diplomatic protection and 
ICJ involvement remains a rare case as most states are inclined to voluntarily comply 
with an arbitral award rendered against them, even if it may face some difficulties at an 
execution stage. This could be supported by an empirical survey conducted in 2008 by 
School of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University demonstrates that nearly 90% 
of the awards are voluntarily complied by the respondents.115  Although a home state of 
an investor allows an exercise of a diplomatic protection, it may choose not to do so due 
to political concerns. This is because the reinstatement of a home state involvement 
constitutes a re-politicisation in which it is likely that a more powerful state could get 
involved or apply pressure in a dispute settlement against a less powerful host state. If 
that is the case, a state responsibility, to a certain extent, could be seen as a last resort in 
enforcing an arbitral award under treaty obligations in the context of investor-state 
arbitration. 
 
Apart from international conventions dealing with a state responsibility by 
recourse to a diplomatic protection in an episode of non-compliance, the concept of state 
responsibility is demonstrated in the 2001 International Law Commission’s Articles on 
State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (the 2001 ILC’s Articles),116 in 
order to preserve an amicable international relations between states. This concept is not 
only considered part of public international law but is also accepted as forming part of 
customary international law.117 The main concern of this doctrine is whether a state and 
its sub-organ can be held responsible for violation of investment treaty obligations and 
other international law obligations by a foreign investor.118 Article 1 and 2 of the 2001 
ILC’s  Articles provide a general principle that: 
                                                
114 L. Reed and L. Martinez, ‘Treaty obligations to honor arbitral awards and diplomatic protection’ in D. 
Bishop (eds), Enforcement of arbitral awards against sovereigns, (Jurisnet, New York 2009). 
115 L. Mistelis & C. Baltag, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and Settlement and 
International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices, 19 Am. Rev. Int’L Arb. 319 (2008), pp.324. 
116 See J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text and Commentaries, (CUP, UK 2005). 
117 K. Hober, ‘State Responsibility and Investment Arbitration’, 25(5) J. of Int’l Arb. 545 (2008). 
118 See C.F. Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for injuries to aliens (OUP, UK 1967); K. Hober, ‘State 
Responsibility and Attribution’ in P. Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (OUP, UK 2008); E. Gaillard and Younan (eds.), State Entities in International 
Arbitration, (Juris Publishing, New York 2008). 
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“Every internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility of the 
state.” 
 
“There is an internationally wrongful act of a state when conduct consisting of an action or 
omission: 
(a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and 
(b) Constitutes a breach of international obligation of that State.”119 
 
Thus, both provisions provide a key concept of this doctrine in which the conduct 
or omission must be the internationally wrongful act, which is attributable to the state 
under international law, constituting a breach of international obligation by the state. 
However, since a state is an abstract legal person, it must be represented by its organ or 
entities, which are assumed to act in the conduct of the state. Such conduct can be 
considered as being ‘the attribution of conduct to state’.120 Moreover, due to the 
proliferation of investment treaty arbitration and economic liberalisation, the state is not 
the only main concern of the doctrine of state responsibility; it also creates a new 
dimension of the doctrine by including state organs or entities, person and groups acting 
on behalf of a state, which are attributed to a state conduct and give rise to state 
responsibility under international law.121  
 
Article 4122 of the 2001 ILC’s Articles provides the rule of attribution concerning 
the wrongful act of a state organs or entities acting on the behalf of the state in which a 
state is entirely responsible for the act of it organ, entity and person acting in the conduct 
of a state, regardless of the function or character of that conduct. In contrast, Article 5123 
                                                
119 Art. 1-2 of ILC’s Articles. 
120 G.I. Malumfashi, ‘State Responsibility in Investment Arbitration: to What Extent is the State 
Responsible for Contracts Concluded by State Enterprises and Sub-National Authorities?’, 2(1) TDM 
(2005). 
121 K. Hober, ‘State Responsibility and Investment Arbitration’, 25(5) J. of Int’l Arb. 545 (2008), pp. 347. 
122 Article 4 of ILC’s Articles, reads: 
 “1. The conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act of that state under 
international law, whether the organ exercise legislative, executive, judicial or any other 
functions, whatever position it holds in the organisation of the state, and whatever its 
character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the state. 
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the 
internal law of the state.” 
123 Article 5 of ILC’s Articles, reads: 
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of the 2001 ILC’s Articles deals with the conduct of a person or entity, which is not 
considered a state organ pursuant to Article 4. However, the conduct of a state enterprise 
must be an exercise of state authority. This characteristic of conduct under Article 5 is 
very close to the term of non-state entity or state enterprise in which the 2001 ILC’s  
Articles does not clearly define the position of state commercial entity and its act.124  
 
This new phenomenon of state responsibility has put the effectiveness and 
adequacy of the doctrine into question. Professor Crawford has responded to this concern 
stating that “to what extent the conduct of state enterprises is attributable to the state 
under general international law of state responsibility is far from clear.”125 Therefore, the 
rule of attribution of conduct to a state has become increasingly important in determining 
the nature and function of a state. In this respect, this rule has to examine the conduct of 
state enterprise, whether it is acting on the basis of sovereign acts (acta jure imperii) or 
commercial acts (acta jure gestionis). Accordingly, when state enterprise acting in a 
sovereign conduct breaches an international obligation, state will be held responsible for 
the purpose of attribution.  
 
This could be found in Articles 4-11 of the 2001 ILC’s Articles. However, the 
principles of attribution to a state of the conduct of its entities, under the rules of state 
responsibility, should be distinguished from the possibility of state entities becoming a 
party to proceedings.126 Article 25 of the ICSID Convention sets out the possibility of 
state entities becoming a party to proceedings, which would include “any constituent 
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State.”127 
However, the issue of attribution of state entities’ acts and the jurisdiction of that state 
                                                                                                                                            
“The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the sate under Article 4 but 
which is empowered by the law of that state to exercise elements of the government 
authority shall be considered an act of the state under international law, provided the 
person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.” 
124 G.I. Malumfashi, ‘State Responsibility in Investment Arbitration: to What Extent is the State 
Responsible for Contracts Concluded by State Enterprises and Sub-National Authorities?’, 2(1) TDM 
(2005) pp. 20; Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 97. 
125 J. Crawford, International Law Commission, First Report on State Responsibility, UN.Doc. 
A/CN.4/490/Add.5, 21.  
126 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP, UK 2009) pp. 150. 
127 See Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention. 
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entity has been addressed in several cases.128 In the case of the ICSID arbitration, the 
ICSID jurisdiction extends only to a violation of BIT and breach of contract that binds a 
state directly, this does not include a breach of contract by state entities unless that breach 
also amounted to a violation of the BIT as explained in Salini v Morocco129 and Vivendi v 
Argentina.130 
 
 Moreover, the 2001 ILC’s Articles provides countermeasures in Article 49-54 for 
an injured state against a recalcitrant state in the event of non-compliance with arbitral 
awards as a breach of investment treaty obligations.  Therefore, an injured state could 
take a countermeasure against a state, which is responsible for an internationally 
wrongful act but it has to comply with the requirements specified in the 2001 ILC’s 
Articles.131 These requirements include a proportionality of countermeasures132, a respect 
to the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents133 
as well as the fulfilment of its obligations under any dispute settlement procedure 
applicable between it and the responsible state.134  On this account, it seems that a state 
under its obligation under the ICSID Convention should first enforce an arbitral awards 
under the ICSID Convention before taking any countermeasures in which their actions of 
countermeasure for a purpose of execution cannot affect any immunity of diplomatic 
                                                
128 Maffezini v Spain, Decision of Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005, paras 71-89; Wena Hotels v. Egypt, Award, 8 
December 2000, paras 65-69, 82, 84.; Salini v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, paras 28-
35; Saipem v. Bangladesh, Decision on Jurisdiction, 21 March 2007, paras 146-149.  
129 Salini v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, paras 60-62. 
130 Vivendi v Argentina, Award, 21 November 2000, paras 50-51. 
131 Art. 50 of the ILC’s Articles, it reads; 
“1. Countermeasures shall not affect:  
(a) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations;  
(b)  obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights;  
(c)  obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals;  
(d)  other obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.  
2. A State taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations:  
(a) under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the 
responsible State;  
(b) to respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, 
archives and documents.”  
132 Art. 51 of the ILC’s Articles, it reads; 
“Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account 
the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.”  
133 Art. 50(2)(b) of the ILC’s Articles, it reads; 
134 Art. 50(2)(a) of the ILC’s Articles 
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property under diplomatic law. 
 
Apart from the consideration of state responsibility under the 2001 ILC’s 
Articles., the doctrine of state responsibility has long been recognised as a customary 
international law utilised to fulfil the gap of international investment law. One of the most 
controversial aspects of state responsibility, with regards to international investment law, 
is the question of expropriation of foreign investment and its standard of compensation. 
135  It is a well-recognised rule in international law that the taking of foreign investments 
or the so-called “aliens property” whether they are “direct” or “indirect” expropriation 
cannot be completed without adequate governmental compensation.136 Therefore, a state 
is obliged by an international minimum measure in relation to the treatment of foreign 
property under customary international law. Presently, although most modern BITs 
require the payment of the full market value as compensation, there is no clear rule, 
which sets a standard for a case of regulatory expropriation.137  
 
Conventionally, the Hull formula of “prompt, adequate and effective” has been 
recognised as a clear standard for compensation and adopted in many BITs.  The 
Chaorzow Factory case decision adopted the Hull formula to pay compensation for 
expropriation. The court stated: 
 
“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act- a principle which 
seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of 
arbitral tribunals- is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences 
of an illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed 
if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or if this is not possible, payment of 
a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need 
be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or 
payment in place of it- such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount 
of compensation due to an act contrary to international law.”138 
                                                
135 See A. Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law’, 20(1) ICSID 
Review-FILJ (2005). 
136 R. Higgins, ‘The Taking of Property by the State’ (1982) 167 Recueil des Cours 267. 
137 M. Sornorajah, The international law on foreign investment (CUP, UK 2010) pp. 412 
138 Chorzow case (Germany v Poland), 1928 PCIJ Rep Series A No. 13, at 47 (Sep., 13). 
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However, there are a number of questions and debates where it deals with the 
compensation for a public purpose. In Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, the court 
considered “whether a fair balance which needed to be struck between the general interest 
of the community and the protection of the individual’s fundamental’s rights.”139 The 
court in James followed this theory, holding that: 
 
“Article 1 [of protocol 1 of ECHR] does not, however, guarantee a right to full 
compensation in all circumstances. Legitimate objectives of public interest, such as 
pursued in measures of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social 
justice, may call for less than reimbursement of full market value. Furthermore, the Court’s 
power of review is limited to ascertaining whether the choice of compensation terms falls 
outside the state’s wide margin of appreciation in this domain.”140 
  
Therefore, the payment of less than the full market value is justifiable when there 
is a case of legitimate public interest. Banco National concluded regarding the standard 
of compensation that “it may well be the consensus of nations that full compensation 
need not be paid in all circumstances,… and that requiring an expropriating state to pay 
appropriate compensation- even considering the lack of precise definition of that term, - 
would come closest to reflecting what international law requires.”141  
 
Consequently, the state has a responsibility for a regulatory expropriation, obliged 
by clauses in BITs as well as the standard of compensation. As Newcombe contended: 
“the role of international expropriation law is to provide a minimum standard of 
protection to foreign investors against expropriatory measure.”142 Although there is still 
controversy relating to the standard of compensation due to on a case-by-case basis, both 
parties should be set a clear standard of compensation through BITs by either the 
approach of Hull Formula, appropriate compensation or just compensation in the case of 
                                                
139 Sporrong & Lonnroth v. Sweden, ECtHR Application no. 7151/75; 7152/75, Judgment, 23 September 
1982, para 69. 
140 James and others v the United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 8793/79, Judgment, 21 February 1986, 
para 147. 
141 Banco National de Cuba v Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d at 892 (2d Cir. 1981) paras 14-15. 
142 A. Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law’, 20(1) ICSID 
Review-FILJ (1005) pp. 5. 
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regulatory expropriation.  
 
Significantly, certain tribunals adopted a form of ‘proportionality’ rule from the 
ECtHR jurisprudence in order to strike a fair balance between investor rights and 
sovereign state regulatory power when attempting to shield the interests of both parties.143 
Sornarajah argued that “the divergence of standards and principles stated in the treaties 
are such that they cannot be regarded as supporting any definite proposition relating to 
the murky area of state responsibility for foreign investment”.144 In this regard, although 
the provisions of BITs are not being increasingly developed into a truly multilateral 
system as the claim of Schill,145 this jurisprudence will substantially set a threshold of 
proportionality, depending on the customary international law.146 Accordingly, this 
proportionality analysis will be used as a tool to limit the impact of investment treaty 
obligations and sovereign immunity laws upon the enforcement of arbitral awards under 
investor-state arbitration. At the same time, this would aid the development of sovereign 
immunity law and international investment law towards a defragmentation of 
international law. In consequence, the investor-state arbitration would become a friendly 
mechanism for foreign investors in terms of reliability and effectiveness regarding the 
enforcement of arbitral awards against sovereign states.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Although the interactions of different areas of international law has led to numerous 
criticisms by scholars, it should be considered as a normal process of legal development. 
                                                
143 August Reinisch, ‘Expropriation’ in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford Handbooks in Law) (OUP, UK 2008) pp 
456. 
144 M. Sornarajah, ‘State Responsibilities and Bilateral Investment Treaties’, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 79 
(1986) pp. 80. 
145 P. Muchlinski, ‘Corporations and the Uses of Law: International Investment Arbitration as a 
“Multilateral Legal Order”’, 1 Onati Socio-Legal Series (2011),  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1832562 >  pp. 6-9; See also S. W. Schill, The 
Multilateralization of International Investment law (CUP, UK 2009); S. Schill, ‘Investment Treaties: 
Instruments of Bilateralism or Elements of an Evolving Multilateral System?’, Paper for the 4th Global 
Administrative law Seminar (2008). 
146 A. Lowenfeld, ‘Investment Agreements and International Law’, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 123, (2003-
2004). 
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In conclusion, this chapter submits that the interconnections between international 
investment law and other areas of international law will develop on the basis of 
harmonisation or defragmentation rather than fragmentation through treaty interpretation 
methods as clarified in the VCLT’s systematic integration principle. In addition, this is 
coupled with the application of a global administrative law approach in international 
investment law in order to deal with public-private law contexts of investment treaty 
arbitration.  
 
Furthermore, the tribunals in recent arbitrations have resorted to the jurisprudences of 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)147 as well as adopting its ‘margin of 
appreciation’ and  ‘proportionality approach’ to balance investor and host state interests 
when interpreting the expropriation and fair and equitable treatment provisions of the 
investment treaty.148 Still, an investment treaty tribunal could additionally recourse to this 
approach when dealing with the tension between investment treaty obligations and 
sovereign immunity aspects. Taken together, this illustrates and introduces a cross-
fertilisation of international investment law and public international law under the 
hybridisation of investment treaty arbitration, providing and developing an integrated 
legal framework that serves the interests of both a state and foreign investor. This thesis 
will adopt this approach in its analysis of the legal norms and cases at hand, which will be 
discussed in Part V of this thesis. 
  
                                                
147 See James and others v the United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 8793/79, Judgment, 21 February 
1986; Lithgow and Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no.9006/80; 9262/81; 9263/81; 
9265/81; 9266/81; 9313/81; 9405/81, Judgment, 8 July 1986 
148 UNCTAD, Selected recent development in IIA Arbitration and Human Rights, 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/7, 5. 
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  Chapter 3 
The Progressive Restriction of  
Sovereign Immunity Law   
and its Relevance to Investment Treaty Arbitration 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When determining the relationship between international investment law and the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, it should be noted that the element of sovereign immunity from 
jurisdiction plays no role in investment treaty arbitration; however, sovereign immunity 
from enforcement is available for a state to invoke against the enforcement of arbitral 
awards.1 The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been highlighted in copious scholarly 
works and in the case law of numerous jurisdictions.2 Generally, it is a principle of 
international law, which requires application in accordance with municipal law in a 
national court. As Fox summarises: 
 
“The law of state immunity relates to the grant in conformity with international law of 
immunities to states to enable them to carry out their public functions effectively and to the 
representatives of states to secure the orderly conduct of international relations...When 
disputes arise a state or a state agency may prevent their adjudication in another state’s 
court by pleading state immunity.”3 
 
At this point, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is generally considered to be a 
procedural bar in the domestic courts. Hess points out that “it is the special feature of 
                                                
1 S. Schill, ‘International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights: A Case Study in 
Cross-Regime Analysis as an Instrument of Defragmentation’, http://works.bepress.com/stephan_schill/1., 
pp.3 (International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights) 
2 See H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States', 28 BYIL 220 (1951); P. 
Trooboff, ‘Foreign state immunity: Emerging consensus on principles’, 200 Recueil Des Cours V 235 
(1986) pp. 235; L.J. Bouchez, ‘The nature and scope of state immunity from jurisdiction and execution’ 
Netherlands Y.B.I.L. 1 (1979).; R. Higgins, ‘Certain unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity’, 29 
NILR 265 (1982); S. Sucharitkul, ‘Developments and Prospects of the Doctrine of State Immunity, Some 
Aspects of Codification and Progressive Development’ 29 NILR 252 (1982); I. Sinclair, ‘The Law of 
sovereign immunity: recent developments’,167 Recueil Des Cours 113 (1980)  pp. 113; N.C.H. Dunbar, 
‘Controversial aspects of sovereign immunity in the case law of some states’ 132 Recueil Des Cours I 197 
(1987) pp. 197; Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008); A. Dickinson, R. 
Lindsay and J. Loonam, State Immunity: Selected Materials and Commentary (OUP, New York 2004). 
3 H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008), pp. 1 
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state immunity that it is at the point of intersection of international law and national 
procedural law.”4  
 
The law of sovereign immunity has been the subject of several governmental and non-
governmental projects for codification.5 The international community has made an effort 
to codify a multilateral convention or treaty on sovereign immunity for several years.6 A 
multilateral convention relating to sovereign immunity includes the Brussels Convention 
relating to the Immunity of State Owned Vessels of 1926 (‘The Brussels Convention’), 
the European Convention on State Immunity of 1972 (‘The European Convention’)7 and 
most recently the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
Their Property of 2004 (‘The UN Convention’), 8 which is based on International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and Their Property of 
1991. In addition, the attempt to codify a law on sovereign immunity is to be found in 
many non-governmental drafts, including the Harvard Research Project, which published 
the Draft Convention III in 19329, the Institut de Droit International in 195410, the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement of Foreign Relations Law in 196511 and the Draft 
Montreal Convention of the International Law Association in 1982.12  
 
Building on the aforementioned Conventions and drafts, the United Nations Convention 
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property of 2004 appears to be the most 
influential, and also the first attempt to codify a universal convention for a substantial 
                                                
4 B. Hess, ‘The International Law Commission’s Draft Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and their Property’, 4 EJIL 269 (1993), pp. 271.  
5 J. Crawford, ‘Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity’, 75 AJIL 820 (1981), pp. 831. 
6 D. Gaukrodger, ‘Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors’, OECD Working 
papers on international investment, 2010/2, OECD Publishing (2010), pp. 10 (Foreign State Immunity and 
Foreign Government Controlled Investors). 
7 At present, only 8 states are the party to the Convention, at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=074&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG (Accessed 
on December 1th, 2014). 
8 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property of 2004, UN 
GAOR, 59th Session, Supp. No.22 (A/59/22), 16 Dec. 2004. 
9 Harvard Research’s Draft on the Competence of Courts in regard to Foreign States of 1932 
10 Institut de Droit International’s Resolution of 1954. 
11 American Law Institute’s Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of 1965 
12 Draft Montreal Convention of the International Law Association of 1982 
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harmonisation of state practices containing the general rules on sovereign immunity at an 
international level.13 However, currently, the Convention has not come into force as it 
first requires the ratification of thirty states (their acceptance, approval or accession) with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.14 As of May 2015, eighteen states, being: 
Austria; Czech Republic; Finland; France; Iran; Italy; Japan; Kazakhstan; Latvia; 
Lebanon; Liechtenstein; Norway; Portugal; Romania; Saudi Arabia; Spain; Sweden, and 
Switzerland have ratified or acceded to the Convention.15  
 
From these few numbers of adoption and ratification, the UN Convention might not 
achieve the status of customary international law where most states follow the same rule 
in their patterns of practice on sovereign immunity. Therefore, the UN Convention could 
not represent as a custom of state practice to bind on non-parties to the treaty.16 This is 
due to the fact that although the UN Convention adopts a restrictive approach of 
sovereign immunity, the degree to which a restrictive approach recognised by each state 
remains open to debate and shows a considerable divergence. This can be concluded that 
a restrictive approach is widely though not universally recognised in which such state 
practices are very difficult to interpret.17 More importantly, some provisions in the UN 
Convention are not congruent with the existing sovereign immunity laws and state 
practices, which might provide more favours to states. Accordingly, the attempts for an 
international convention on sovereign immunity could not be successful, which leaves the 
usefulness of the UN Convention open to doubt.   
 
As the legal implementation of international conventions is the best source of 
international law for the principles and rules of sovereign immunity, according to Article 
                                                
13 Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008), pp. 175. 
14 Art. 30 of the UN Convention. 
15 See The status of the UN Convention at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-13&chapter=3&lang=en<> 
16 L. F. Damrosch, ‘Changing the International Law of Sovereign Immunity Through National Decisions’, 
44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1185 (2011), pp. 1189-1191.  
17 D. Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors, OECD Working 
papers on international investment, 2010/2, OECD Publishing (2010) pp. 11. 
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38(1) of the Statue of the International Court of Justice,18 it would be imprudent to rely 
solely upon those Conventions as a primary source. This is because the plea of sovereign 
immunity is normally considered and raised by a state before a municipal court under 
municipal law to frustrate the whole arbitral process.19  Therefore, apart from the treaty 
obligations by way of international conventions by states, the enforcement of arbitral 
awards can be effective with the supportive role of a municipal court and a municipal 
legal system. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was not simply codified by a law 
making process of international conventions, but was gradually developed over a 
sustained period by municipal courts, by way of state practice.20 For this reason, national 
legislations and national court decisions may also be recognised as additional significant 
sources of international law on sovereign immunity, referred to in the subparagraph of 
Article 38(1).21 Sucharitkul has provided a forceful argument that: 
 
“The doctrine of state immunity, as far as can be ascertained, was sufficiently well 
established in the practice of states to justify its claim to become a principle of 
international law in the nineteenth century. The original version, as stated by Chief Justice 
Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon in 1812, is generally considered to be 
representative of absolute immunity.” 22 
 
This can be summarised in Higgins’ words that: “But by far the greatest source material 
                                                
18 Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 174. 
19 R. Brazil-David, ‘International Commercial Arbitration Involving a State Party and the Defense of State 
Immunity’, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 241 (2011) pp. 246. 
20 E.K. Bankas, The State Immunity Controversy in International Law: Private Suits Against Sovereign 
States in Domestic Courts (Springer, Germany 2005), pp. 13; S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading 
Activities in International Law (Stevens & Sons Limited, London 1959) pp. 3 
21 Art. 38(1) of the ICJ Statue, says:  
“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
  a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules    
                           expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
 b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
 c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations ; 
        d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of      
            the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means  
            for the determination of rules of law.”; 
     See also P. Trooboff, ‘Foreign state immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles’, 200 Recueil Des 
Cours V 235 (1986) pp. 253. 
22 S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law (Stevens & Sons Limited, 
London 1959) pp. 355.  
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is to be found in the case law of States and in their domestic enactments. The evidences 
of international law to be gleaned from domestic legislation may be categorized… as 
State practices, or as general principles of law.”23 As the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
was developed by way of state practice, many states have codified the law on sovereign 
immunity in order to accommodate the needs of their society. Interestingly, the 
intellectual framework of legal system in each country does not restrict an approach of 
law development in this area. The common law countries, on the one hand, such as, the 
United States and the United Kingdom, have decided to codify specific statutory 
instruments to shape their law in a considerable detail, whilst the civil law countries, such 
as, France and Germany, adhere to the principle of precedent, stare decisis, relying on a 
case by case approach.24 The most important domestic codifications and the model 
statutes are the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (US FSIA)25 and 
the United Kingdom State Immunity Act of 1978 (UK SIA).26  
 
Due to the increasing participation of states participating in commercial transactions with 
private entities, these international conventions and municipal laws on sovereign 
immunity have tended to veer towards restrictive immunity, limiting sovereign immunity 
to cases of sovereign, as opposed to commercial transactions.27 Nonetheless, the 
interpretation of sovereign immunity by a municipal court provides a different detailed 
solution. As will be submitted in this chapter, the sources of sovereign immunity law are 
fragmented and diverse owing to state practices arising from customary international law, 
treaty and municipal law. This situation could thus result in a number of problems, 
including a conflict of laws and an uncertainty of decision-making. Therefore, it is the 
purpose of this chapter to examine and compare state practice on sovereign immunity in 
                                                
23 R. Higgins, Certain unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NILR 265 (1982) pp. 265. 
24 K.M. Meessen, ‘State Immunity in the Arbitral Process’ in N. Horn (eds) Arbitrating Foreign Investment 
Disputes- Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (Aspen Publishing Inc., USA 2004) pp.388; A. 
Bjorklund, ‘Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: The re-
politicization of International Investment Disputes’, 21 Am.Rev.Int’l. Arb. 211 (2010) pp. 220 (Sovereign 
Immunity as a Barrier). 
25 United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, reprinted in 15 ILM 1388 (1976). 
26 United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978, c. 33 (UK), reprinted in 17 ILM 1123 (1978). 
27 K. H. Bockstiegel, ‘States in the International Arbitral Process’, in J.D. Lew, Contemporary Problems in 
International Arbitration, (Queen Mary College, UK 1996) pp. 47. 
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both common and civil law countries in relation to the restrictive approach. This chapter 
will detail the history of the sovereign immunity and how it has historically shifted from 
absolute to restrictive immunity, which is formative of a proportionality analysis, in order 
to differentiate sovereign function from private or commercial function of the state. 
Accordingly, it will illustrate the commercial exception, being the major characteristic of 
the restrictive sovereign immunity doctrine and its relevance to investment treaty 
arbitration, as well as its implementation into municipal law on sovereign immunity. 
 
2. The Evolution of Restrictive Sovereign Immunity 
(a) Foundations of modern sovereign immunity doctrine 
Historically, the foundation of the law of sovereign immunity is derived from the 
notion of sovereignty, independence, equality and dignity of states in international law.28 
As a result, the domestic courts of one state could impermissibly be able to sue another 
foreign state and refuse to jurisdiction over cases against another foreign sovereign state 
without their consent,29 under the maxim par in parem non habet jurisdictionem.30  Under 
this maxim, the status of each sovereign state is equally enjoyed by all independent states 
in order to protect states against interference by other states in an exclusive inter-state 
system.31  Therefore, the economic activities of states under the Westphalian system 
departed from the political differentiation into separate sovereign entities on the basis of 
internal and external absolute sovereignty. This function of states in their economy, 
underlying in the Westphalian system, is reflected in the law of sovereign immunity.32 
Prior to the19th century, this principle formed the basis of the doctrine of absolute 
immunity, which was initially aimed to protect representatives of foreign states, 
                                                
28 See S. Sucharuitkul, Immunities of foreign states before national authorities 149, Recueil Des Cours 87 
(1976); S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law (Stevens & Sons 
Limited, London 1959) pp. 13; J. Crawford, ‘International Law and Foreign Sovereign: Distinguishing 
Immune Transactions’, 54 BYIL 75 (1983), pp. 77. 
29 C. Miles, ‘Sovereign Immunity’ in D. Bishop (ed.), Enforcement of arbitral awards against sovereigns, 
(Jurisnet, New York 2009) pp 36. 
30 This means “submission of one state to the jurisdiction of another would be derogatory to the former’s 
dignity and independence.”; See H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign 
States’ (1951) 28 BYIL 220, 221. 
31 I. Sinclair, ‘The Law of sovereign immunity: recent developments’,167 Recueil Des Cours 113 (1980), 
pp. 198. 
32 International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights (n 1), pp.11. 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   80 
particularly heads of state, on the basis of diplomatic immunities, including diplomatic 
agents and warships.33 This absolute character extended to the state and its properties as 
well as to its agencies and instrumentalities regardless of the nature or purpose of 
activities, either sovereign acts or commercial acts.  
 
This principle is first applied in the classic US judicial decision of The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon regarding warships. In this case, a vessel owned by a US citizen, 
‘McFaddon’, was seized by the French government and remodelled as a public armed 
ship. However, this ship entered into a US harbour due to heavy storms. McFaddon 
claimed that it had been forcefully seized by the French government in 1810. Chief 
Justice Marshall granted immunity to the French government and held that “France, the 
purported sovereign owner of the vessel, was protected by an implied grant of immunity 
from the jurisdiction of US courts.”34 The Court based its decision on the reasoning that; 
 
 “One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations 
of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its 
sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign 
territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging 
to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by 
implication, and will be extended to him. 
 
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest 
impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an exchange of good offices with each other, 
have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the 
exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated 
to be the attribute of every nation.”35 
 
The reasoning in the above case became a classic formulation of the absolute 
immunity doctrine in the US, UK and other common law jurisdictions, not only with 
regard to warships but also as a general rule of state immunity.36 A similar justification 
and application of this doctrine is reflected in a UK judicial decision in The Parlement 
Belge,37 where the court granted absolute immunity to a mail packet owned by a Belgian 
monarch with respect to the independence and the dignity of every other state. The court 
                                                
33 Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp.201-204. 
34 The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812) 11 U.S. 116, at 147. 
35 The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812) 11 U.S. 116; At 135-137.  
36 Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 204. 
37 The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 P.D. 197.  
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held that: 
 
“The principle to be deduced from the cases is that, as a consequence of the absolute 
independence of every sovereign authority, and of the international comity which induces 
every sovereign state to respect the independence and the dignity of every other state, each 
and every one declines to exercise by means of its courts any of its territorial jurisdiction 
over the person of any sovereign or ambassador of any state, or over the public property of 
any state which is destined to public use, or over the property of any ambassador, though 
such sovereign, ambassador, or property be within its territory, and therefore, but for the 
common agreement, subject to its jurisdiction.” 38 
 
Based on this understanding of absolute immunity, the court of one sovereign 
state could not exercise jurisdiction over a dispute with another foreign sovereign; rather, 
a foreign sovereign could only be subject to its domestic court. In this context, a private 
trader and its interest were not considered as a ‘subject’ in international law and found no 
place under the Westphalian system with regard to the economic activities. Under this 
system together with an increasing state interference in economic activities, it could be 
said that the interests of foreign sovereign and foreign investors were not adequately 
protected in courts of a host state or a third state court, which constituted a significant 
obstacle in a widespread cross-border economy. In this respect, a court of a host state or a 
court of a third state applied many restrictions to disallow claims against foreign 
sovereigns arising in a dispute with foreign investors, including the sovereign immunity 
doctrine and the act of state doctrine.39 By adhering to the absolute doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, it is barely possible to accommodate an efficient legal protection for a private 
party before courts other than a host state, which results in a significant constraint to 
effective dispute resolution in non-host-state courts.40  
 
However, the law of state immunity has evolved dramatically over the last forty 
years in response to state participation in commercial activities through their agencies or 
                                                
38 The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 P.D. 197, at 214-215. 
39 S. Schill, ‘Private Enforcement of International Investment Law: Why We Need Investor Standing in BIT 
Dispute Settlement’, in M. Waibel, A. Kaushal, K.L. Chung and C. Balchin (eds), The Backlash against 
Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Wolters Kluwer, The Netherlands 2010) pp. 34.  
40 ibid; International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights (n 1), pp.14. 
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instrumentalities. During this transformation period, the number of disputes arising in 
connection with the relationship between states or its agencies and foreign private party 
increased. Unfortunately, the foreign private parties were denied legal remedies in respect 
to the defence of sovereign immunity. Therefore, the rationale of the absolute immunity 
doctrine has been attacked by domestic courts in re-examining the concept of sovereign 
immunity in litigation against a state.41  
 
(b) The effect of state trading  
As previously discussed, modern sovereign immunity is not limited to the 
jurisdictional immunity of state, in which a national court is exempt from the exercise of 
territorial jurisdiction over a foreign state on the foundation of sovereignty of state. 
Rather, the doctrine of sovereign immunity also refers to a situation where a private party 
is prevented from impleading a foreign state in a domestic court. In this circumstance, the 
absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits a suit against a sovereign state by a 
foreign state or private party regardless of whether the acts of the sovereign state were 
performed in a public or private capacity.  
 
Before the 19th century, state participation in trading was large scale phenomenon 
in foreign trade. However, during the 19th century, an epoch of laissez-faire marked a 
predominant ideology amongst political doctrines and social conditions, which believed 
that “if the self-interest of every individual was left uncontrolled by the state, it would by 
“natural forces” develop towards perfection and to the best public interest of the 
community as a whole”.42 Accordingly, it was a general belief that a state should not 
control or intervene in any commercial undertaking and international trade, leading to the 
presumption that a recognised function of the state did not include trade. In concert with 
the downfall of state trading in the 19th century, a doctrine of absolute sovereign 
immunity was fully developed amongst this political doctrine and social conditions, in the 
sense that a private party was a main player in international trade without any control and 
                                                
41 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign State Immunity and Arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 69. 
42 S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law (Stevens & Sons Limited, 
London 1959) pp. 15. 
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participation by a sovereign state under the system of laissez-faire. Therefore, the issue of 
jurisdictional immunities was scarcely focused towards state trading. This scenario can be 
demonstrated in a number of creditable judicial decisions of the period, including the US 
and UK courts, which allowed immunity to foreign states in respect of their trading 
activities.43 As Fensterwald pointed out that: 
 
“The far-reaching rules of absolute sovereign immunity became crystallized at a time 
when international lawyers did not envisage a return to more widespread state trading.” 44 
 
In the late 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, a downtrend was 
witnessed in many states regarding the laissez-faire system. Such a system was weakened 
by the imposition of restrictions upon private foreign trade as well as the emergence of 
state enterprise in many industries.45 The function of these state enterprises or state 
entities served a variety of purposes ranging from purely commercial ends to national 
development and political ends. Moreover, in developing and socialist counties, the 
existence of state enterprises could be regarded as being indispensable to the pursuit of 
their economic development policies on account of the proposed New International 
Economic Order (‘NIEO’).46 Owing to spread of state trading, a great change could be 
identified for the factual basis of the sovereign immunity doctrine, as well as the return of 
state control over international trade.  
 
In this manner, many states were engaged in trading by the beginning of the 
Second World War.47 Among these countries, the Soviet Union furnished the greatest 
momentum in the rebirth of state trading organs, for instance, the Soviet Commissariat 
for Foreign Trade and Trade Delegations in various countries.48 Since it is now evident 
that the trading activity of the state and its agencies is likely to increase and continue in 
the future, it is, thus, questionable to what extent the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
                                                
43 ibid 19. 
44 B. Fensterwald, Jr., ‘Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading’, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 614 (1949-1950) 
pp. 614. 
45 ibid 
46 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments, (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp. 92. 
47 ibid 17. 
48 B. Fensterwald, Jr., ‘Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading’, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 614 (1949-1950) 
pp. 614. 
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would be affected by a significant change of state trading in commercial activities, and 
whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity should continue to apply in cases concerning 
commercial activities of foreign states. 
 
Despite the start of decline in absolute sovereign immunity in response to the 
trading activities of foreign state, socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, refused 
to apply the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. They instead adhered to the 
absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity, rooted in a particular characteristic of the 
socialist state.49 As Boguslavsky explained:  
 
“The Socialist State, as a sovereign, is vested not only with political, but also with 
economic power, and because of this unity of political and economic leadership the 
socialist state itself fulfils economic activities. It is impossible to split up the socialist state 
into two subjects: a sovereign power and an entity subject to private law rules. As already 
underlined, the state is one, but the expression of its activity are manifold.”50 
 
In this regard, the socialist state perceived that the political and economic 
activities, performed by or on behalf of the socialist states, fell within the realm of 
sovereign immunity in which they refused to recognise the notion that immunity should 
be limited to only acts of a sovereign nature (acta jure imperii), and did not extend to 
commercial acts (acta jure gestionis).51 This perception of socialist countries together 
with the scale of their state trading was seen as a threat to capitalist countries. It was 
perceived that socialist countries would shield the liability of a state’s trading enterprise 
from a contractual breach, using the barrier of state ownership, thus leading to the claim 
of sovereign immunity. Unlike the situation in a socialist state, the function of a capitalist 
state, or so-called western country, is separated between the sovereign and economic 
activities by the sharing of certain state’s functions or powers to private parties. This 
distinction of the state’s function is favourable to the adoption of restrictive immunity in 
                                                
49 C. Osakwe, ‘A Soviet Perspective on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Law and Practice’, 23 Va.J. Int’l L. 
13 (1982-1983) pp. 18-20. 
50 M.M. Boguslavsky, ‘Foreign State Immunity: Soviet Doctrine and Practice’, 10 Neth. Y.B. Int’l L. 167 
(1979) pp. 169-170.  
51 B. Fensterwald, Jr., ‘Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading’, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 614 (1949-1950) 
pp. 617. 
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a western country. 
 
Accordingly, western countries attempted to overcome the expansion of NIEO in 
developing countries and the threat of a socialist state’s trading by the adoption of 
restrictive immunity. However, it was not apparently evident until after the Second World 
War when the US and the UK, the leading capitalist states, announced a distinct policy 
shift to restrictive immunity, followed by an implementation of municipal law legislation 
relating to sovereign immunity. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider how sovereign 
immunity could be entrenched in this great change and more importantly, how the 
contestation of sovereign immunity between the West and the East countries could be 
mutually developed.  
 
Post the Second World War, the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity doctrine 
widely shifted into a new restrictive immunity doctrine, distinguishing between sovereign 
acts and commercial acts on the basis of stability, fairness and equity in the market 
place.52 Under this doctrine, the vision of a state with dual personality was created, in 
which immunity was only granted to sovereign acts, albeit with a refusal of immunity in 
relation to their commercial acts.53 Therefore, a state loses its immunity whenever it 
conducts a commercial activity and acts as a private entity.54 In this respect, the sovereign 
immunity doctrine reflects the legal protections required by foreign investors in order to 
provide a fair and just dispute settlement process in a domestic court of a third state.  
 
With the purpose to limit or refuse sovereign immunity, Lauterpacht stated that 
“international practice shows no frequent instances of protests against assumption of 
                                                
52 R. Higgins, ‘Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NILR 265 (1982); C. 
Schreuer, ‘Some Recent Developments in the Law of State Immunity’, 2 Comparative Law Yearbook 215 
(1978) pp. 215; G.M. Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View (Martinus Niighoff, The 
Hague 1984) pp.22. 
53 A. van Blankenstein, ‘Enforcement of an Arbitral Award against a State: with Whom are you dealing?’ in 
S. Muller (eds), The Flame Rekindled: New Hopes for International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff, London 
1993) pp. 164. 
54 M. Sornarajah, ‘Problems in Applying the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity’, 31 ICLQ 661 
(1982) pp. 661. 
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jurisdiction, including execution, over foreign states.”55 Crawford also supported this 
position and pointed out that “there is no good reason why international law could not 
specify the grounds for distinguishing immune from non-immune transactions, but it is 
significant that the distinction in each jurisdiction tends to be drawn, to some extent at 
least, in terms indigenous to the forum, terms that are often hardly susceptible to 
translations.”56 Bearing this in mind, some national courts of leading trading states have 
enacted a municipal law on sovereign immunity to shape their jurisprudence and 
commercial activities with private parties.57 Therefore, such state practice and 
codification have played key roles in developing a doctrine of restrictive immunity.58 
 
(c) The shift to restrictive immunity 
The trend of restrictive sovereign immunity was first introduced in the Belgian 
courts in the middle nineteenth century,59 when in 1879 the Court of Appeal in The 
Havre60 case regarding the freight on Peru’s guano shipped to Ostend, Belgium. The 
Court assumed jurisdiction in an action based on the commercial activity of state and 
denied a sovereign immunity with regard to the non-public acts irrespective of the 
respondents’ claim that the guano was the property of Peru and acting as its agents.61 The 
more restrictive approach was found in the Italian court case of Morellet c. Governo 
Danese,62 based on the recognition of ‘the dual personality of the state’, either a public 
act of state as a sovereign power or a private act of state as a juristic person entering in a 
                                                
55 H. Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States’ 28 BYIL 220 (1951) 
pp.227.  
56 J. Crawford, ‘Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity’ 75 AJIL 820 (1981) pp.855. 
57 R. Brazil-David, ‘International Commercial Arbitration Involving a State Party and the Defense of State 
Immunity’, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 241 (2011) pp. 247. 
58 R. Higgins, ‘Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NILR 265 (1982) pp. 265. 
59 S. Sucharitkul, ‘Immunities of Foreign States before National Authorities’, 149 Recueil Des Cours 87 
(1976) pp. 132 ; H. Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 224. 
60 S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law (Stevens & Sons Limited, 
London 1959) pp. 243 ; Rau, Vanden Abeele et Cie c. Duruty, P.B. 1879-II-175, 176. 
61 ibid 243-244; S. Sucharitkul, ‘Immunities of Foreign States before National Authorities’, 149 Recueil 
Des Cours 87 (1976) pp. 132; G.M. Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View (Martinus 
Niighoff, The Hague 1984) pp.21-24. 
62 Giu. It. 1883-I-125, at 130-131; S. Sucharitkul, ‘Immunities of Foreign States before National 
Authorities’, 149 Recueil Des Cours 87 (1976) pp. 127. 
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private law63, which observed that: 
 
“it being incumbent upon the State to provide for the administrations of the public body 
and for the material interests of the individual citizens, it must “acquire and own property, 
it must contract, it must use and be sued, and in a word, it must exercise civil rights in like 
manner as ‘un altro corpo morale o  private individuo qualunque’.”64 
 
The Belgian and Italian cases undoubtedly influenced many countries decisions, 
in the late nineteenth century, in relation to the court formulation of a restrictive 
approach. The various courts providing limitations to the immunity, providing 
distinctions between state acts, commercial exploitation, implied submission and 
execution of judgment against foreign government.65 The jurisprudence of the Italian-
Belgium courts has been completely adopted in the Mixed Courts of Egypt. The special 
characteristic of the Mixed Courts of Egypt, established in 1875, was the nationality of 
the judges, originating from several international countries.  
 
In this context, Badr points out that: 
 
“the case-law of the Egyptian Mixed Courts, as they were called, reflects not only the 
Egyptian point of view on state immunity but the consensus of judges from a number of 
countries including England, the United States and France whose courts were counted at 
the time among the more articulate proponents of the absolute doctrine of state 
immunity.”66  
 
This adoption of restrictive immunity was also affirmed in the decision of the 
German Constitutional Court in the Empire of Iran case.67 Apart from the early attempt of 
state practices from Belgium, Italy, Egypt and Germany, the attempt to distinguish was 
also being applied in other civil law jurisdictions, including Switzerland, Romania, 
                                                
63 G.M. Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View (Martinus Niighoff, The Hague 1984) 
pp.24. 
64 Giu. It. 1883-I-125, at 130-131; S. Sucharitkul, ‘Immunities of Foreign States before National 
Authorities’, 149 Recueil Des Cours 87 (1976) pp. 127. 
65 S. Sucharitkul, ‘Immunities of Foreign States before National Authorities’, 149 Recueil Des Cours 87 
(1976) pp. 140. 
66 G.M. Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View (Martinus Niighoff, The Hague 1984) 
pp.26-27; Bankas, pp. 72. 
67 Empire of Iran case, German Federal Constitutional Court, 30 April 1963, UN Legal Materials, 282, 45 
ILR 57. 
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France Austria and Greece; all who were adopting a restrictive doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.68  
 
Considering the state practices of those leading trading countries in common law 
jurisdictions, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the tendency to move 
from the absolute immunity towards a restrictive approach was significantly evidenced 
after the Second World War. As mentioned previously, the US was the first country to 
adopt a restrictive approach; announcing in 1952 that “it would follow the restrictive 
theory of immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of 
sovereign immunity.”69 This policy was reflected in the 1952 letter written by the Acting 
Legal Advisor, Jack Tate, to the Acting Attorney-General; well-known as the ‘Tate 
letter’.70 In light of the development under the ‘Tate letter’, the practice of the United 
States regarding claims of sovereign immunity no longer adhered to the determination by 
the executive branch, namely, the Department of State, but to the courts.71 Accordingly, 
the Tate letter’s restrictive doctrine has been entrenched and confirmed by the legislative 
enactment of the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (The US 
                                                
68 E.W. Allen, ‘The Position of Foreign States before National Courts: chiefly in Continental Europe, (New 
York, The Macmillan Company) 1933, pp. 301 cited in I. Sinclair, ‘ The Law of Sovereign Immunity 
Recent Developments’, pp. 134. 
69 26 Department of State Bull. 984 (1952), cited in P. Trooboff, ‘Foreign state immunity: Emerging 
Consensus on Principles’, 200 Recueil Des Cours V 235 (1986) pp. 268. 
70 See the Tate Letter of May 19 1952, State Department, 26 BULL 984, it states that: 
“It is thus evident that with the possible exception of the United Kingdom little support 
has been found except on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites for continued full 
acceptance of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. There are evidences that British 
authorities are aware of its deficiencies and ready for a change. The reasons which 
obviously motivate state trading countries in adhering to the theory with perhaps 
increasing rigidity are most persuasive that the United States should change its policy 
Furthermore, the granting of sovereign immunity of foreign governments in the courts of 
the United States is most inconsistent with the action of the Government of the United 
States in subjecting itself to suit in these same courts in both contract and tort and with its 
long established policy of not claiming immunity in foreign jurisdictions for its merchant 
vessels. Finally, the Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the 
part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice 
which will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the 
courts. For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department’s policy to follow the 
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign 
governments for a grant of sovereign immunity.” 
71 M. Sornarajah, ‘Problems in Applying the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity’, 31 Int’l L. & 
Com. L. Q. 661 (1982) pp. 662; See also Congressional Committee Report on the Jurisdiction of United 
States Courts in Suits against Foreign States (1976) 15 I.L.M. 1398, at. 1402. 
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FSIA), which is considered to be the first national statue governing sovereign immunity 
under the restrictive approach, which was to be determined by the courts.72  
 
In this trend, other common law countries have rapidly followed the US practice 
in their codification efforts,73 especially, the United Kingdom. While it was commonly 
supposed that the United Kingdom practice adhered to an absolute sovereign immunity 
for a sovereign state until the mid-1970’s,74the trend and precedent of absolute immunity 
in The Parlement Belge was successfully challenged in The Phillippine Admiral75 and 
followed in Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v The Central Bank of Nigeria.76 The 
Privy Council advised in the 1977 historic landmark case of The Philippine Admiral that 
“although the theory of absolute immunity was applicable to an action in personam 
against a foreign sovereign state on a commercial contract it was inapplicable to an action 
in rem against a ship to which the “restrictive” theory should apply.”77 In Trendex, the 
court held that “international law now recognised no immunity from suit for a 
government department in respect of ordinary commercial transactions as distinct from 
acts of a government nature.”78 This position of the UK courts has been affirmed in I 
Congreso del Partido79 supporting the restriction of immunity in situations where the 
sovereign engages in commercial activities. 
 
Therefore, the restrictive approach in the United Kingdom was affirmed by the 
enactment of the United Kingdom State Immunity Act of 1978 (‘UK SIA’).80 In addition, 
the enactment of the UK SIA not only shifted to a restrictive approach but also paved the 
way for the ratification of the Brussels Convention and the European Convention on 
                                                
72 Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors (n 6), pp. 11. 
73 P. Trooboff, ‘Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles’, 200 Recueil Des Cours V 
235 (1986) pp. 271. 
74 R. Higgins, ‘Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity’, 29 NILR 265 [1982] pp. 266; 
See also The Charkieh [1973] L.R. 4 A. & E. 59; The Parlement Belge [1880] 5 P.D. 197; The Christina 
[1938] A.C. 485; Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan  [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1485. 
75 The Phillippine Admiral [1976] 2 W.L.R. 214. 
76 Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v The Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529. 
77 The Philippine Admiral [1977] A.C. 373; [1976] 1 All ER 78; 64 ILR 90. 
78 Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v The Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529. 
79 I Congreso del Partido [1978] 1 All E.R. 1192; See M. Sornarajah, ‘Problems in Applying the 
Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity’  31 Int’l L. & Com. L. Q. 661 (1982). 
80 R. Hggins, ‘Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity’, 29 NILR 265 (1982), pp. 266. 
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Sovereign Immunity.81 Without any doubts, the US FSIA and UK SIA have influenced 
and been a model statue for other common law countries promoting the codification of 
sovereign immunity municipal laws.82 
 
Taking the above into account, it is submitted that state practices reflected in the 
international conventions and municipal laws, as well as national court decisions, appear 
to have moved towards a doctrine of restrictive immunity. Sucharitkul states that “the 
doctrine of absolute immunity can no longer be said to continue to apply in the least 
restrictive jurisdiction.”83 He also adds in his ‘Reports on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property’ that:  
 
“the restrictive trend is also overwhelming in the opinions of contemporary writers that it 
is no longer possible to find any trace of an ‘absolute’ doctrine among living authorities on 
international law. Indeed the authors, who had earlier expressed opinions favouring an 
unlimited doctrine of immunity, appear to have changed their mind in the face of drastic 
reversals of principles in modern case-laws and in international conventions, each and 
every one of which seems to turn away from ‘absolutism’ towards a more realistic and 
relative theory of State immunity.”84 
 
Thus, the movement of state practices from an absolute to a restrictive sovereign 
immunity approach has significantly contributed, not only literally, to the development of 
sovereign immunity doctrine, but also to the law of international arbitration; particularly, 
investment treaty arbitration involving sovereign states.85 However, it should be noted 
that whilst the state practices of many states have moved to a restrictive immunity, the 
actual application of state practice is varied and has posed difficultly to the courts when 
being interpreted. This has led to divergent and contrasting outcomes in cases; even when 
                                                
81 E.K. Bankas, The State Immunity Controversy in International Law: Private Suits Against Sovereign 
States in Domestic Courts (Springer, Germany 2005), pp. 73. 
82 For example, The Singapore State Immunity Act of 1979, The Pakistani State Immunity Ordinance of 
1982, The Canada State Immunity Act of 1985, The Australia Foreign States Immunities Act of 1985, The 
South Africa Foreign States Immunities Act of 1987. 
83 S. Sucharitkul, ‘Immunities of Foreign States before National Authorities’, 149 Recueil Des Cours 87 
(1976), pp. 126. 
84 S. Sucharitkul, Special Rapporteur, ILC Reports on “Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property”, Report No. 4, UN doc. A/CN.4/357 (31 March 1982), at 77, para 119. 
85 R. Brazil-David, ‘International Commercial Arbitration Involving a State Party and the Defense of State 
Immunity’, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 241 (2011) pp. 250. 
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based on similar facts.86 Clearly, the shift from absolute immunity to restrictive immunity 
has not entirely solved all problems in this area of law. However, a state practice shows 
that many states have considered a commercial activity exception to distinguish between 
public act of state and private act of state under a restrictive approach in which it only 
grants immunity to only public act of state. This is in order to uphold the balance of 
interests between a state and a private party. Therefore, this state practice will eventually 
have a significant impact in investment treaty arbitration when a state entity engages in 
commercial activities.      
 
3. The Commercial Activity Exception and its Relevance to Investment 
Treaty Arbitration 
Due to the increasing participation of states and their entities engaging in commercial 
activities, investment treaty arbitration has become a significant method for the resolution 
of investment disputes between a state and a private party. In respect of the special 
characteristics relating to public-private disputes, many issues of sovereign immunity 
doctrine have arisen when a state is a party to arbitration.87 Accordingly, the relevance of 
sovereign immunity and investment treaty arbitration become more apparent. The claim 
of sovereign immunity can be raised by a state in many stages of an arbitration process, 
either procedurally or substantially, resulting in the disruption of the entire process of 
arbitration.88 If the claim of sovereign immunity is to be allowed during arbitration 
proceedings a private party would be left without any remedy or compensation.89 As Fox 
summarises, “whereas a court proceeding leading to judgment may be conducted in the 
absence of the foreign state and produces no immediate hindrance to that State’s conduct 
of its affairs, execution of the judgment involves, in the last resort, the use of force 
                                                
86 S. Sucharitkul, Special Rapporteur, ILC Reports on “Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property”, Report No. 4, UN doc. A/CN.4/357 (31 March 1982), at 37, para 51. 
87 K. H. Bockstiegel, ‘States in the International Arbitral Process’, in J.D. Lew, Contemporary Problems in 
International Arbitration, (Queen Mary College, UK 1996) pp. 47. 
88 G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, pp. 
404. 
89 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign State Immunity and Arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007), pp. 79 
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against the foreign State by the seizure of assets.”90 Yet, such situations might be less 
problematic, since state practices in many jurisdictions appear to have moved towards a 
restrictive immunity.  
 
Traditionally, many states have widely accepted the restrictive jurisdictional immunity 
concept, which means that a domestic court only exercises jurisdiction over cases relating 
to the commercial activity of a state. With regards to the investor-state dispute settlement, 
many states have also adopted a restrictive immunity doctrine to distinguish between 
sovereign activity and commercial activity, as well as the separation between property 
used for public purposes and property used for commercial purposes, in order to 
determine jurisdiction and enforcement powers. In this respect, the separate regime of 
immunity from enforcement and execution from immunity from jurisdiction is considered 
by most states and reflected in the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention.91 It 
is submitted that once a state is a party to the Conventions and consents to submit the 
dispute to a tribunal, which is so called “an agreement to arbitrate”, it is deemed to have 
waived its immunity from jurisdiction raised, during the recognition and enforcement 
procedures before the tribunals and courts.92  
 
This position was also adopted in the US FSIA, the UK SIA and the UN Convention, but 
with considerable variations.93 In these circumstances, it appears that immunity from 
execution is considered to be unclear and absolute, which is difficult to change or 
develop. Sucharitkul describes this characterization as “the last bastion of sovereign 
                                                
90 H. Fox, ‘Enforcement Jurisdiction, Foreign State Property and Diplomatic Immunity’ 34(1) ICLQ 115 
(1985) pp. 123. 
91 Art. III of the New York Convention and Art. 54 of the ICSID Convention; Second report on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, by Mr.M.Ogiso, Special Rapporteur, [1989] 2 Y.B. 
Int’l Law Comm’n 72, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.1.; See also H. Fox, ‘Enforcement Jurisdiction, 
Foreign State Property and Diplomatic Immunity’ 34(1) ICLQ 115 (1985) pp. 123.  
92 Bernini and Van Den Berg, ‘The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against a State: the Problem of 
Immunity from Execution’ in J DM Lew, Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (Queen 
Mary College, UK 1996) pp. 359. 
93 C. Schreuer, State immunity : Some recent developments (Grotius Publication, Great Britain 1988) pp. 
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immunity”,94 since actual measures of enforcement are considered to more drastically 
affect and directly interfere with a state’s sovereignty than the mere assumption of 
adjudicatory jurisdiction.95  
 
Despite this uncertainty, a number of domestic courts and their municipal sovereign 
immunity laws have clearly expressed the opinion/position that immunity from 
enforcement and execution is no longer absolute. Although these judgments and 
codifications have listed a condition or exception in the denial of immunity from 
execution, they are still controversial and scholarly conceptualisations concerning the 
possibilities and grounds to grant or deny immunity from execution frequently encounter 
difficulties.96 This proposition will be discussed further in the next chapter. Since both 
types of sovereign immunity are subject to a commercial exception, this section now 
turns to the relevance of the commercial exception to the separation regime of sovereign 
immunity. It is the aim of this section to provide an explanation of the relevance of 
sovereign immunity and investment treaty arbitration. Thus, the main question is to what 
extent a commercial activity exception, under a restrictive approach, applies to the 
immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from enforcement and execution, for the 
purposes of enforcement of an arbitral award.  
 
(a) Immunity from jurisdiction 
The separation regime of sovereign immunity has made a distinction between the 
plea of adjudication or jurisdiction immunity and enforcement immunity. The plea of 
jurisdictional immunity has been seen from the first stage of the arbitration process to the 
final stage in order to refuse the exercise of jurisdiction of a forum court state or arbitral 
                                                
94 ILC Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property 1991 in Yearbook Int’l Commission 
(YBILC), ii, Part Two, 1, at 56. 
95 C. Schreuer, State immunity: Some recent developments (Grotius Publication, Great Britain 1988) pp. 
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tribunal.97 However, the exercise of jurisdictional immunity is commonly referred to 
territorial jurisdiction. This principle could be found in the Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon; where the court clarified that: 
 
“This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction, being alike the attribute of every sovereign 
and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate 
foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no 
respect amenable to another, and being bound by obligations of the highest character not 
to degrade the dignity of his nation by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the 
jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express 
license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign 
station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended 
to him.”98 
 
In this context, the notion of territorial jurisdiction limits the role of a municipal 
court, in a forum state, exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state, grounded in the 
principle of the independence, equality and the dignity of states under the maxim par in 
parem non habet jurisdictionem.99 Therefore, a sovereign immunity defence may be 
raised by a foreign state before a municipal court, since it enjoys immunity from 
jurisdiction. In addition, the jurisdictional immunity extends equally to its agencies and 
representatives acting in the function of the state to pursue missions based on the 
principle of extraterritorial. The jurisdictional immunity, consequently, is not limited to 
the territory of the forum state, but extends to a person or an act of nationality outside the 
territory of the forum state.100 In applying the extraterritorial jurisdiction, the state might 
need a territorial connection or territorial link to identify the relationship between a 
person or act and the forum state. This requirement of a territorial link has been reflected 
in the codification of certain sovereign immunity laws, such as, the UN Convention and 
the US FSIA, in order to initially establish a jurisdiction over private persons or assets of 
a foreign state relating to the subject-matter in dispute.  
                                                
97 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign State Immunity and Arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 79; See 
also AJ van den Berg, ‘The New York Arbitration Convention and State Immunity’ in KH Bockstiegel 
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100 Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp.70-74. 
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The exercise of sovereign power, regarding the territorial jurisdiction, applies only 
to the relationship between the court of a forum state and a foreign state party or its 
asset.101 In respect to the arbitral tribunal, Fox asserts that “the plea of sovereign 
immunity in the sense of a procedural bar to jurisdiction based on the personal capacity of 
the litigant, has little immediate relevance in arbitration proceedings.”102 This is due to 
the fact that arbitration proceedings are based on the consent of both parties in the form 
of an arbitration agreement. When a state is entering into an arbitration agreement with a 
private party, it is widely accepted that the state consents to the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal and is deemed to waive its immunity from jurisdiction. Therefore, as Crawford 
states, “subject to the doctrine of non-justiciability, no fundamental principle prohibits the 
exercise of jurisdiction, and immunity may be waived by the state concerned either 
expressly or by conduct.”103  
 
It can be said that a state cannot plead the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
doctrine, not only because of the restrictive sovereign immunity limiting the immunity 
only to the sovereign activities, but also because of good faith regarding its treaty 
obligation, pacta sunt servanda, under the agreement to arbitrate between the parties. As 
will be seen in the next chapter, international conventions on the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards have provided a manner of dealing with the issue of 
immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement in their provisions.  
 
For the purpose of this section, it is necessary to identify the preferred criteria 
used to distinguish a sovereign activity and a commercial activity in order to plead 
jurisdictional immunity. It is submitted that the nature of the activity is more decisive 
than the purpose of the activity in determining whether sovereign immunity should be 
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allowed regarding the activity in question for a jurisdictional purpose.104 Many decisions 
of the municipal courts and the codifications of states regarding sovereign immunity have 
supported this position,105 as mentioned earlier in the Empire of Iran case.106 However, 
although some municipal courts also refer to the purpose or the contextual test in 
distinguishing a sovereign and commercial act, as in the case of I Congreso del Partido, 
the most possible and practical approach now appears to refer to the nature test, which is 
adopted in the US FSIA, the UK SIA and the UN Convention.107  
 
All codifications regarding sovereign immunity refer to a commercial activity 
exception, albeit with considerable variations. Under the US FSIA, the most significant 
provision, embodying the core concept of restrictive immunity is the commercial 
exception provision. Section 1605(a) (2) deals with a general exception to jurisdictional 
immunity of a foreign state, providing that: 
 
“(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or of the States in any case- 
      (2) in which in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act 
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.”108 
 
This commercial activity exception under this section has three requirements: 
action based upon a commercial activity, an act performed in connection with 
commercial activity and there being a sufficient nexus to the United States. In addition, 
Section 3(1) (a) of the UK SIA also provides that “a state is not immune with respect to 
proceedings relating to a commercial transaction entered into by the State”. Apart from 
the municipal law on sovereign immunity, an international convention also provides a 
                                                
104 L. J. Bouchez, ‘The Nature and Scope of State Immunity from Jurisdiction and Execution’, 10 
Netherlands Y.B.I.L. 1 (1979) pp. 14.  
105 Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors (n 6), pp. 19; See the US FSIA, 
section 1603 (d). 
106 Empire of Iran, German Constitutional Court, 45 ILR 57 (1963). 
107 R. Brazil-David, ‘International Commercial Arbitration Involving a State Party and the Defense of State 
Immunity’, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 241 (2011) pp. 254-255. 
108 Section 9(1) of the UK SIA. 
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commercial activity exception stipulated in Article 10 of the UN Convention.109  
 
As mentioned earlier, the main difficulty of a restrictive sovereign immunity 
doctrine is how to define a commercial activity exception.110 The US FSIA provides a 
meaning for “commercial activity” under Section 1603 (d) and (e), it provides: 
 
“(d) A “commercial activity” means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a 
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be 
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or 
act, rather than by reference to its purpose. 
 (e) A “commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state” means 
commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with the 
United States.”111 
 
This meaning of “commercial transaction” leaves much to be debated since it 
does not clearly define this term in a straightforward manner.112 On the other hand, the 
UK SIA provides a very broad definition of this term under Section 3(3), it includes: 
 
“(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services; (b) any loan or other transaction for 
the provision of finance and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction 
or of any other financial obligations; and (c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a 
commercial, industrial, financial, professional or other similar character) into which a 
State enters or in which it engages otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign 
authority.”113 
 
This broad definition of “commercial transaction” has been similarly adopted in 
                                                
109 Art. 10 of the UN Convention, it reads; 
“If a State engages in a commercial transaction with a foreign natural or juridical person 
and, by virtue of the applicable rules of private international law, differences relating to 
the commercial transactions fall within the jurisdiction of a court of another State, the 
State cannot invoke immunity from that jurisdiction in a proceeding arising out of that 
commercial transaction.” 
110 R. Brazil-David, ‘International Commercial Arbitration Involving a State Party and the Defense of State 
Immunity’, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 241 (2011), pp. 250. 
111 Section 1603 (d) and (e) of the US FSIA. 
112 G.R. Delaume, ‘Three Perspectives on Sovereign Immunity Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976’, 71(3) AJIL 399 (1977), pp. 404. 
113 Section 3(3) of the UK SIA. 
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the UN Convention.114 From the above provisions, it can be said that those instruments 
providing a broad definition of “commercial activity” leaves the task to a municipal court 
to provide a final pronouncement on the issue.115 Accordingly, although the nature and 
purpose test is widely adopted in municipal courts as a technique to distinguish between a 
government act, which is immune from jurisdiction, and a commercial act, which is not 
immune, it is widely accepted that, in order to distinguish between a government act and 
a commercial act for a jurisdictional immunity purpose, the nature test is preferable. This 
can be seen in many codifications116 and court decisions.117  
 
Furthermore, a commercial exception has been combined with an agreement to 
arbitrate provision in some codifications by specifically referring only to arbitration on a 
commercial matter.118 This limitation is not included under the UK SIA and the US 
FSIA.119 Ideally, such a limitation should not be added to an arbitration agreement clause. 
As Schreuer contends “the rationale for denying immunity in cases involving agreements 
to arbitrate is consent and this should not be combined with other exceptions to 
immunity. Such a combination would tend to dilute or even defeat the effects of the 
                                                
114 See Art. 2(1)(c) of the UN Convention, reads: 
“A “commercial transaction” means: (i) any commercial contract or transaction for the 
sale of goods or supply of services; (ii) any contract for a loan or other transaction of a 
financial nature, including any obligation of guarantee or of indemnity in respect of any 
such loan or transaction; (iii) any other contract or transaction of a commercial, industrial, 
trading or professional nature, but not including a contract of employment of persons.” 
115 G.R. Delaume, ‘Three Perspectives on Sovereign Immunity Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976’, 71(3) AJIL 399 (1977) pp. 404. 
116 See Art. 2(2) of the UN Convention; Sec. 1603(d) of the US FSIA.  
117 Empire of Iran case, German Federal Constitutional Court, 30 April 1963, UN Legal Materials, 282, 45 
ILR 57; Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 US 607 [1992], at 614 the court states: 
“…when a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of 
a private player within it, the foreign sovereign’s actions are “commercial” within the 
meaning of the FSIA. Moreover, because the Act provides that the commercial 
character of an act is to be determined by reference to its “nature” rather than its 
“purpose,” 28 U. S. C. § 1603(d), the question is not whether the foreign government is 
acting with a profit motive or instead with the aim of fulfilling uniquely sovereign 
objectives. Rather, the issue is whether the particular actions that the foreign state 
performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a private 
party engages in “trade and traffic or commerce.”; 
     See also Saudi Arabia v Nelson, 507 US 349 [1993], at 359. 
118 See Art. 12(1) of the European Convention; Art. 17 of the UN Convention. 
119 C. Schreuer, State immunity : Some recent developments (Grotius Publication, Great Britain 1988) pp. 
68-69. 
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arbitration exception by adding further requirements.”120 Last but by no means least, the 
differences in the commercial activity exception between the US FSIA and the UK SIA 
should not be overlooked. While Section 1603(e) and 1605 of the US FSIA apply only to 
a commercial activity taking place or having a jurisdictional link in the United States, 
Section 3 of the UK SIA contains no such limitation.121 In this context, a jurisdictional 
nexus reveals a significant effect in US jurisdiction, which raises a number of 
jurisdictional problems in the enforcement of an arbitral award, particularly in the context 
of non-ICSID arbitration. Thus, it is necessary to analyse in more detail the issue of 
jurisdictional link in the next chapter.  
 
From the above situations, under restrictive immunity, although all recent 
codifications and court decisions among major jurisdictions generally agree that a state is 
not immune from the jurisdiction of a forum state when a state engages in a commercial 
activity, the definition of commercial activity is still uncertain and not uniform in 
practice. Nevertheless, the implication of the commercial activity exception is still used 
as criteria for the determination of the nature of a transaction or property of a state at 
every stage in arbitration proceedings. However, owing to this uncertainty it should not 
be considered that the test is unworkable.122 A possible solution to this issue could be 
found by relying on judicial interpretations, in order to find a common international 
standard. Currently, a nature test is well recommended, which is already adopted in the 
US FSIA, the UK SIA and the UN Convention.123  
 
(b) Immunity from enforcement and execution 
Regarding the separate regime of immunity, it is generally agreed that the issue of 
immunity from execution is distinct from immunity from jurisdiction. Whilst 
jurisdictional immunity relates to adjudication by means of a judgment and declaration of 
                                                
120 Ibid. 
121 G.R. Delaume, ‘The State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom’, 73(2) AJIL 185 (1979) pp.190-191. 
122 C. Schreuer, State immunity : Some recent developments (Grotius Publication, Great Britain 1988) pp. 
41. 
123 R. Brazil-David, ‘International Commercial Arbitration Involving a State Party and the Defense of State 
Immunity’, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 241 (2011) pp. 254-255. 
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rights and obligations on the territorial basis, enforcement immunity relates to the 
measure of constraint against the property of foreign state, either for the purpose of 
enforcing post-award execution or pre-award attachment (provisional measures) resulting 
from the exercise of jurisdiction.124 In this context, the enforcement immunity stage is 
comprised of three different steps: recognition, enforcement and execution. The problems 
relating to a sovereign immunity defence could arise at any enforcement step; however, a 
private party is likely to face a problem at the execution step when it comes to executing 
an arbitral award against sovereign assets.125  
 
The separate regime of sovereign immunity has been welcomed by courts in many 
jurisdictions in order to distinguish between immunity from jurisdiction and immunity 
from execution. This position was found in a leading case of Duff Development Co. Ltd. v 
Government of Kelantan, in the House of Lords, where the court affirmed the plea of 
sovereign immunity to a foreign state in respect to proceedings to enforce an arbitral 
award. The reasoning of the House of Lords was as follows: 
 
“The Government of Kelantan had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court for the 
purpose of the proceedings to enforce the award, either by assenting to the arbitration 
clause or by applying to the Court to set aside the award.”126 
 
Similarly, this state practice can also be seen in Yugoslavia v SEEE,127 which was 
before the French and Dutch court. Nevertheless, the precedent towards a separate regime 
of sovereign immunity might be challengeable after the French Cour de Cassation 
decision in Creighton v Qatar,128 wherein the court adhered to a single regime of 
sovereign immunity. Breaking new ground, the Creighton v Qatar decision has made a 
remarkable impact to a long established precedent in many jurisdictions. This will need to 
                                                
124 Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 35; See also I. Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law, (7th ed.) (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 342. 
125 R. Brazil-David, ‘International Commercial Arbitration Involving a State Party and the Defense of State 
Immunity’, 22 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 241 (2011) pp. 260. 
126 Duff Development Co. Ltd. v Government of Kelantan [1924] AC 797; 2 ILR 140. 
127 Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance, 65 ILR 46 (6 July 1970) 49; Paris Court of Appeal (29 January 
1975)(21 April 1982); Netherlands Supreme Court, 65 ILR 356 (26 October 1973). 
128 Creighton Limited v. Government of the State of Qatar, The French Cour de Cassation, (6 July 2000), 
reported in XXV Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 458 (2000). 
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be discussed in more detail in the following chapter with regard to a waiver of sovereign 
immunity by an agreement to arbitrate. A leading scholar in this subject, Professor 
Christopher Schreuer, has made thorough argument stating that by:  
 
“allowing plaintiffs to proceed against foreign States and then to withhold from them the 
fruits of successful litigation through immunity from execution may put them into the 
doubly frustrating position of having been lured into expensive and seemingly successful 
lawsuits only to be left with an unenforceable judgment plus legal costs.”129 
 
In addition, although this jurisprudence is not widely welcomed among major 
jurisdictions, it cannot be implied that there is no previous state practice in denying the 
distinction between the two immunities. Additionally, the courts in certain jurisdictions 
depart from a separate regime to the single regime of sovereign immunity, in which 
immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from enforcement and execution could be 
regarded as a single immunity.130 For instance, the Swiss courts have explicitly denied the 
separate regime of immunity in which the court treats immunity from jurisdiction and 
immunity from execution on a similar footing.131 In this context, the proposition is that 
the court asserts ‘the overall unity of substantive law’ for the enforceability of a judgment 
and the execution of property, which is not in public use and has a connection with the 
Swiss forum.132 It could be said that the Swiss court, by requiring a jurisdictional nexus, 
aims to balance the wide power of the Swiss court under the single regime of sovereign 
immunity, with the sufficient connection between the claim and the Swiss territory 
                                                
129 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments, (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp. 125. 
130 I. Sinclair, The Law of sovereign immunity: recent developments,167 Recueil Des Cours 113 (1980) pp. 
220. 
131 Kingdom of Greece v Julius Bar and Co., Swiss Federal Tribunal, 6 June 1956; 23 ILR 195, the court 
declared that:  
“As soon as admits that in certain cases a foreign State may be a party before Swiss courts 
to an action designed to determine the rights and obligations under a legal relationship in 
which it had become concerned, one must admit also that a foreign State may in 
Switzerland be subjected to measures intended to ensure the forced execution of a 
judgment against it. If that were not so, the judgment would lack its most essential 
attribute, namely that it will be executed even against the will of the party against which it 
is rendered… there is thus no reason to modify the case-law of the Federal Tribunal 
insofar as it treats immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from execution on a similar 
footing.” 
132 Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 603. 
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(Binnenbeziehung).133 As a result, the Swiss practice appears to be towards the less 
restrictive approach to the sovereign immunity doctrine. 
 
Although it has long been recognised that immunity from execution is no longer 
absolute, the restrictive doctrine has less effect on the immunity from enforcement and 
execution on state property than immunity from jurisdiction.134 This is due to the fact that 
the issue of immunity from execution against state property has more difficulties than 
immunity from jurisdiction. A main obstacle to immunity from execution is the political 
sensitivity between a forum state and other states affected by this execution, either being 
a home state of a foreign investor or a host state or a respondent state, in implementing a 
measure of forcible execution against the assets of losing party.  As a result, this may 
discourage a forum state to enforce an arbitral award since it would affect the friendly 
relationship between states with good diplomatic relations.135  
 
With regard to the possibilities and grounds in denying immunity from execution, 
the most important trend is waiver of immunity from execution, regarding certain types 
of state property, which are not serving a sovereign purpose. This position was adopted in 
The Empire of Iran136 and Philippine Embassy137 cases by the German Constitutional 
Court. This approach of the court decisions, in allowing immunity from execution for 
property used for a sovereign purpose but not property used for a commercial purpose has 
also been found in subsequent cases in the Spanish138 and Italian Constitutional Courts,139 
as well as in the codifications on sovereign immunity in the US FSIA140, the UK SIA141, 
                                                
133 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign State Immunity and Arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 213. 
134 ibid 92. 
135 Fox CMG QC, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 601. 
136 Empire of Iran case, German Federal Constitutional Court, 30 April 1963, UN Legal Materials, 282, 45 
ILR 57 
137 The Philippine Embassy case, 46 BverfGE, 342; 65 ILR 140; UN Legal Materials 297 13 December 
1977, at 395. 
138 Abbott v Republic of South Africa, the Spain Constitutional Court (2nd Chamber), 1 July 1992; 113 ILR 
413. 
139 Condor and Filvem v. National Shipping Company of Nigeria, 2-15 July 1992, 33 ILM 393. 
140 Section 1610(a) of the US FSIA. 
141 Section 13(4) of the UK SIA. 
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the Australia FSIA142, the Canada SIA143 and the UN Convention.144  
 
Considering the criteria used to determine a commercial exception, it is, however, 
contrary to the requirements of immunity from jurisdiction; which considers the nature of 
activities instead of the purpose of activities. Accordingly, this could imply that the 
limitations on the immunity from execution are somehow less intrusive than in the field 
of immunity from jurisdiction.145 Therefore, a more cautious view is reflected in the 
codification of the law of sovereign immunity in both domestic and international levels as 
well as in court decisions, in order to protect state property from execution (as mentioned 
above). Thus, a majority of state practices for immunity from execution appear to be 
adopting the restrictive approach, by using the criteria of a purpose to distinguish 
between sovereign property and commercial property, which reflects in a court practice 
and domestic statue of the US, UK Canada and Australia.146 
 
However, although most municipal laws on sovereign immunity follow the same 
approach of restrictive sovereign immunity from execution, each municipal law on 
sovereign immunity might vary in degree regarding the conditions and definition of 
commercial activity when allowing execution against a foreign state’s commercial 
property.147 Therefore, it is the purpose of this section to determine the distinction 
between the types of property that are subject to execution and those that are not. In other 
words, the distinction is usually made between a foreign state property used for 
commercial activity (under the US FSIA) or being in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes (under the UK SIA) and a foreign state property used for sovereign 
activity.  
 
                                                
142 Section 32(1) of the Australia FSIA. 
143 Section 11 of the Canada SIA. 
144 Article 19(C) of the UN Convention. 
145 A. Reinisch, ‘European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from Enforcement Measures’, 17 
EJIL 803, 804 (2006). 
146 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp.1155-1158; I. Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law, (7th ed.) (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 343. 
147 P. Trooboff, Foreign state immunity: Emerging consensus on principles, 200 Recueil Des Cours V 235 
(1986) pp. 364. 
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In this context, the availability of commercial properties for execution seems 
requires an investor to locate a state owned property in order to levy an execution.148 
However, it is not always easy to levy against all commercial properties of a foreign state 
since some municipal laws also add a jurisdictional nexus requirement between the 
property subjected to an execution and the underlying claim with a commercial activity 
exception. The combination of a commercial activity exception and a jurisdiction nexus 
requirement limits the availability of commercial properties for execution leading to more 
difficulties for the investors to locate a specified property and to satisfy execution. 
Schreuer argues that “it is unlikely that a host state will keep commercial assets in 
another country that can be said to have a direct connection to an investment in its 
territory.”149 
 
Such a requirement between the property subjected to an execution and the 
underlying claim is a main characteristic of the US FSIA. Under the US FSIA, a foreign 
state property is immune from an execution under Section 1609,150 unless it falls under 
the exceptions provided in Section 1610 and 1611. The US FSIA has a two-tiered 
requirement, which must be met in order to enable execution of an arbitral award.151 
However, those exceptions are limited to only a foreign state’s property used for a 
commercial activity in the United States, which is considered a first threshold 
requirement. Once this first requirement has been established, a second tier threshold 
must be satisfied, as provided in Section 1610 (a)152 in which the most referred exception 
                                                
148 Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier (n 21), pp. 225. 
149 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp.1160. 
150 Section 1609 of the US FSIA, reads: 
“Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the 
time of enactment of this Act the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be 
immune from attachment arrest and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 
1611 of this chapter.” 
151 A. Boralessa, ‘Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID awards against the 
republic of Argentina: Obstacles that transnational corporations may face’, 17 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev 53 (2004) 
pp. 63. 
152 Section 1610 (a) of the US FSIA, reads: 
“(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603 (a) of 
this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from 
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of 
the United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if— 
     (1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution or 
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is that the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is 
based.153 In this respect, it clearly appears that the possibility of the availability of foreign 
state’s property depends on a foreign state’s property used for a commercial activity 
together with a jurisdictional nexus requirement. Another interesting exception, which 
has been added in the 1988 amendment of the US FSIA, to a sovereign immunity from 
execution is Section 1610 (a) (6). Under this Section, it is provided that: 
 
“(6) the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against the 
foreign state, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would not be 
inconsistent with any provision in the arbitral agreement, or” 
 
The 1988 amendment of the US FSIA in Section 1610 (a)(6) allows execution 
against all foreign state property used for a commercial activity in the United States, but 
it no longer requires any jurisdictional nexus between the underlying claim and the 
property sought to execute.154 Accordingly, this provision places cases involving arbitral 
awards on a better footing, by the creation of a special rule to facilitate the execution of 
                                                                                                                                            
from execution either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the 
waiver the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the 
waiver, or 
     (2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is 
based, or 
     (3) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property which has been 
taken in violation of international law or which has been exchanged for property taken in 
violation of international law, or 
     (4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property— 
          (A) which is acquired by succession or gift, or 
          (B) which is immovable and situated in the United States: Provided, That such 
property is not used for purposes of maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission or the 
residence of the Chief of such mission, or 
     (5) the property consists of any contractual obligation or any proceeds from such a 
contractual obligation to indemnify or hold harmless the foreign state or its employees 
under a policy of automobile or other liability or casualty insurance covering the claim 
which merged into the judgment, or 
     (6) the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against the 
foreign state, provided that attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would not be 
inconsistent with any provision in the arbitral agreement, or 
     (7) the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under 
section 1605A or section 1605 (a)(7) (as such section was in effect on January 27, 2008), 
regardless of whether the property is or was involved with the act upon which the claim is 
based.” 
153 Section 1610 (a)(2) of the US FSIA. 
154 M.B. Feldman, ‘Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States Courts 1976-1986’, 19 Van. J. 
Transnat’l L. 19 (1986) pp. 44-46. 
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arbitral awards.155 In this regard, the amendment of the US FSIA has provided a more 
possible ground or exception, making it easier for an investor to locate a foreign state’s 
property in the Unites States. In effect, it should be noted that it is more generous to the 
arbitral awards based on an arbitration agreement than to the decisions of the United 
States courts.156  
 
Nevertheless, the amendment to this provision might contradict with Article 54 of 
the ICSID Convention, since it treats an arbitral award as a final judgment of a court in a 
forum state. In fact, the draftsmen of the ICSID Convention intended to place the ICSID 
award in the highest position without any court intervention or review in a court of a 
forum state. Therefore, the amendment of the US FSIA does not restrict the degree of 
effectiveness towards the enforcement and execution of arbitral awards157 but it, rather, 
supports the ICSID Convention by filling the gap of execution stage under Article 55, 
which is subject to a municipal law of sovereign immunity. In this respect, the interaction 
between an international convention and a municipal law can be referred to as two sets of 
relationships in parallel. On the one hand, it could refer to the principle of good faith and 
binding force of the treaty (pacta sunt servanda)158 and provision of effectiveness to the 
arbitration agreement (favor contractus),159 which could be found in the US FSIA 
provisions on immunity from execution in Section 1610 and 1611, which are subject to 
                                                
155 G. Kahale, ‘New Legislation on the United States Facilities Enforcement of Arbitral Agreements and 
Awards Against Foreign States’, 6(2) J. Int. Arb. 57 (1989) pp. 63. 
156 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp.1161. 
157 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp.1161. 
158 See Art.26 of the VCLT, which reads: 
“Article 26: Pacta sunt servanda 
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith.” 
159 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009), pp.1161.; See Art. 46 of the 
VCLT; which reads: 
“Article 46: Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties 
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been 
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude 
treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule 
of its internal law of fundamental importance. 
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself 
in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.” 
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international conventions to which the US is a party.160 On the other hand, it could refer 
to the principle of a treatment of more specialized rule (lex specialis) over a generalized 
one (lex generalis).  Therefore, these two relationships do not always result in opposite 
results. However, the amendment of the US FSIA and the ICSID Convention could be 
jointly implemented in order to retain the effectiveness of ICSID award.  
 
Although the fact that most states have generally accepted either the nature or 
purpose test, the difficulty in determining whether a specified property is the commercial 
property of foreign state, especially if such property is not clearly designated, came to 
light in the case of LETCO v Liberia.161 In this case, LETCO sought to execute an ICSID 
award against registration fees and other taxes in the United States from ship owners 
flying the Liberia flag. The court recognised and enforced an arbitral award plus further 
considered whether the property in question was used for a commercial activity in the 
United States. Liberia, inevitably, claimed a sovereign immunity from execution provided 
for under the US FSIA, in which those fees were used for a sovereign purpose, whilst 
LETCO argued that the fees could not be immune from execution under the US FSIA. 
Following the reasoning in MINE v. Guinea case, if a state has consented to ICSID 
arbitration, it has waived sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement. 
However, the arbitral award could not be executed against those fees due to the fact that 
such registration fees and other fees were revenues to support and maintain the 
government functions. Therefore, Liberia’s motion to vacate the execution upon such 
funds was granted on the ground that those fees were sovereign rather than commercial 
and thus were immune from execution under the US FSIA.162 In this respect, it could be 
summarised that although the effectiveness of ICSID arbitration assures the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral award, it provides no guarantee when it comes to the issue of 
                                                
160 See Section 1609 of the US FSIA; D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron 
May, London 2007) pp. 222. 
161 Liberia Eastern Timber Corporation v. Liberia, The District Court for the Southern District of Mew 
York, 650 F. Supp. 73 [1986]. 
162 LETCO v Liberia, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Judgment, 12 December 
1986, 2 ICSID Reports 367/8.December 1986, 2 ICSID Reports 387/8; See also C. Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp.1133, 1161. 
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sovereign immunity from execution.163 
 
Apart from the complicated provisions under the US FSIA, the UK SIA provides a 
simpler commercial activity exception for a sovereign immunity from execution. Under 
Section 13(4) of the UK SIA, it is provided that: 
 
“Subsection (2)(b) above does not prevent the issue of any process in respect of property 
which is for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes; but, in a 
case not falling within section 10 above, this subsection applies to property of a State party 
to the European Convention on State Immunity only if— 
(a) the process is for enforcing a judgment which is final within the meaning of 
section 18(1)(b) below and the State has made a declaration under Article 24 of the 
Convention; or 
(b) the process is for enforcing an arbitration award.” 
 
In order to execute an arbitral award against a foreign state’s property, it must 
show that a foreign state’s property is for the time being in use or intended to be used for 
a commercial purpose. In contrast with the US FSIA, the UK SIA does not require any 
jurisdictional nexus between the commercial property and the underlying claim. 
Therefore, it is easier for an investor to satisfy the claim by allowing execution of all 
property used for commercial purpose in the United Kingdom.164 As mentioned earlier, in 
the event that the specified property is not clearly designated for either a sovereign or 
commercial purpose, the Act, unlike the US FSIA, provides a clearer solution by 
allowing the head of the diplomatic mission to issue a certificate to clarify the use of such 
property.165  
  
Furthermore, the UN Convention also deals with a commercial activity exception 
for a post-judgment measure of constraint in Article 19 (c), which reads: 
 
“No post-judgment measures of constraint, such as attachment, arrest or execution, against 
property of a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another 
                                                
163 A. Alexandroff and I. Laird, ‘Compliance and Enforcement’ in P. Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (2008) (OUP, UK 2008) pp. 1180. 
164 G.R. Delaume, ‘The State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom’, 73(2) AJIL 185 (1979) pp.195. 
165 See Section 13(5) of the UK SIA. 
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State unless and except to the extent that: 
(c) it has been established that the property is specifically in use or intended for 
use by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes and is in the territory 
of the State of the forum, provided that post- judgment measures of constraint may only be 
taken against property that has a connection with the entity against which the proceeding 
was directed.” 
 
This provision allows attachment and execution against a foreign state’s property 
in use or intended to be used for a non-governmental purpose, but with a nexus 
requirement between a commercial property of foreign state and an entity of a foreign 
state, which the proceedings relate to. In other words, it is possible to execute against a 
commercial property of a foreign state if it is directed against property owned by the 
same states.166 Unlike in the US FSIA,167 it should be noted that the UN Convention does 
not combine a waiver of sovereign immunity exception to a commercial activity 
exception, plus an express waiver does not only cover a commercial property.168 In this 
context, a commercial activity exception is independent from the consent of a foreign 
state.  
 
Whilst the commercial activity exception permits execution only against a 
property in use or intended to be used for a commercial purpose, Article 21169 is 
                                                
166 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp.1166. 
167 The US FSIA allows execution regarding the commercial property of a foreign state, even in the case of 
an express waiver under Section 1610. 
168 See Art. 19 of the UN Convention. 
169 Art. 21 of the UN Convention,  reads: 
“1. The following categories, in particular, of property of a State shall not be considered as 
property specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other than government non-
commercial purposes under article 19, subparagraph (c): 
 (a) property, including any bank account, which is used or intended for use in the 
performance of the functions of the diplomatic mission of the State or its consular posts, 
special missions, missions to international organizations or delegations to organs of 
international organizations or to international conferences; 
 (b) property of a military character or used or intended for use in the performance 
of military functions; 
 (c) property of the central bank or other monetary authority of the State; 
 (d) property forming part of the cultural heritage of the State or part of its archives 
and not placed or intended to be placed on sale; 
 (e) property forming part of an exhibition of objects of scientific, cultural or 
historical interest and not placed or intended to be placed on sale. 
2. Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to article 18 and article 19, subparagraphs (a) and (b).” 
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expressly limited to certain types of property, including bank accounts of a diplomatic 
mission, military property, central bank property, cultural heritage property and 
exhibition of objects of science, cultural or historical interest. These could not be 
regarded as a commercial property under Article 19 (c) but are classified as specifically 
in use or intended for use by the state for a sovereign purpose. Since an express waiver by 
a state is not limited to execution against only commercial property, an execution against 
either a sovereign property or specific categories of property might be possible under the 
UN Convention. As Schreuer stated “a waiver of immunity from execution for non-
commercial property would appear particularly important. Since most statues provide for 
non-immunity of commercial property anyway, provisions on waiver of immunity from 
execution make sense only if they extend to non-commercial property.”170 
 
As mentioned earlier, a commercial activity exception has been combined with a 
waiver of sovereign immunity exception, in which these two exceptions seem to be the 
most common approaches to defeat a sovereign immunity defence. However, although a 
test used to distinguish a commercial activity exception is far from uniform, depending 
on municipal court’s interpretation, a waiver of sovereign immunity exception appears to 
be more problematic, since it is very difficult to determine whether consent to a waiver of 
immunity from jurisdiction could constitute an implicit waiver of immunity from 
enforcement and execution. To put it another way, the question is whether a ‘state 
undertaking to arbitrate’ or ‘agreement to arbitrate’ can amount to a waiver of immunity 
from jurisdiction or whether it extends equally to a waiver of immunity from execution 
on a basis of an implied waiver. Although most investment treaties and international 
conventions do not contain a waiver of immunity from execution in their provisions, a 
successful claimant must rely on the claim of an implied waiver from a ‘state undertaking 
to arbitrate’ obligation under investment treaties or international conventions.171 
Therefore, a wavier of sovereign immunity exception significantly depends on the 
provisions and obligations under investment treaties or international conventions. The 
                                                
170 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp.1177. 
171 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments, (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp. 75; Sovereign 
Immunity as a Barrier (n 21), pp. 223. 
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next chapter will discuss this issue in more detail. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
From the increased participation of states in commercial activities in the twentieth 
century, the development of the sovereign immunity doctrine has shifted from the 
practice of absolute immunity to a restrictive immunity before a municipal court in order 
to uphold the balance of interests between a state and a private party.172 Under a 
restrictive doctrine, a commercial exception to immunity is considered the hallmark of a 
restrictive approach,173 in which it only grants immunity to public acts of states (acta jure 
imperii) whilst denying immunity to their private acts (acta jure gestionis). Hence, it is 
not reasonable for a state to plead a sovereign immunity before a municipal court when a 
state engages in commercial activities and acts as a private entity.174 With regards to the 
criteria used to distinguish the commercial activity of state, Schreuer provides a thorough 
summary that “for purposes of immunity of foreign states from jurisdiction the 
overwhelming authority points towards a test that looks at the nature of the activity and 
not its purpose. But the test for immunity from execution is usually the purpose of the 
property that is to be seized although the origin of the property is also sometimes taken 
into account.”175 This could be seen as an initial step to balance the public and private 
interest on account of the proportionality analysis; used as a tool to increase the balance 
court decision-making.  
 
However, if the plea of sovereign immunity is denied before a municipal court for a 
commercial activity, the enforcement of arbitral awards is very difficult to execute when 
it involves a state asset or governmental policy matters. Sornarajah asserted that “difficult 
problems would arise only in situations where a transaction which has commercial 
characteristics is nevertheless one that is undertaken in pursuance of a governmental 
                                                
172 C. Schreuer, ‘Some Recent Developments in the Law of State Immunity’, 2 Comparative Law 
Yearbook 215 (1978) pp. 215; G.M. Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View (Martinus 
Niighoff, The Hague 1984) pp.22. 
173 Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors (n 6), pp. 18. 
174 M. Sornarajah, ‘Problems in Applying the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity’, 31 ICLQ 661 
(1982) pp. 661. 
175 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A Commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp. 1160. 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   112 
policy or where a breach of contract or a tort is brought about by changes in policy made 
by state.”176 Such difficulties in determining those regulatory acts, which are conducted 
for a sovereign purpose and affect foreign investors, will be left to a municipal court to 
determine. By any means, the sovereign immunity doctrine will continue to benefit a state 
when it is claimed in third state courts, which tend to refrain from reviewing sovereign 
acts or regulatory acts of foreign states.  
 
Without doubt, a municipal court of third states could use this lacuna of municipal law on 
sovereign immunity to avoid exercising jurisdiction over an investor of a foreign state. 
Therefore, the municipal court and municipal law on sovereign immunity itself does not 
provide a sufficient legal protection for foreign investors against sovereign acts or the 
regulatory acts of host states. As will be seen in the next chapter, the establishment of 
international investment agreements and investor-state arbitration can be seen as a 
reaction to insufficient legal protection from municipal courts of a third state or a home 
state in order to ensure the enforceability of arbitral awards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
176 M. Sornarajah, ‘Problems in Applying the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity’, 31 ICLQ 661 
(1982) pp. 665. 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III 
THE ENFORCEMENT AND EXECUTION 
 OF ARBITRAL AWARDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   114 
  Chapter 4 
International Conventions on the Enforcement and 
Execution of Arbitral Awards in  
Municipal Courts Jurisdictions 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of investment treaty arbitration depends on the question 
of whether arbitration awards can be voluntarily enforceable against losing parties in 
municipal courts.1 Nonetheless, it is not always the case that the winning party is 
successful in enforcing an arbitral award against a losing party when the losing party, 
mostly a state, refuses to pay or the municipal court could not execute the assets in the 
country where the arbitral award is rendered by claiming the “sovereign immunity” 
doctrine. Accordingly, an investor is inevitably left with the hurdle of a sovereign 
immunity defence, claimed by a state, when locating any available assets in an 
enforcement stage. In an attempt to remove this barrier, the international community has 
attempted to create comprehensive international mechanisms and vehicles in respect to 
investment protection.2  
 
Methods used to provide such protection for an investor are reflected in a variety of 
formulations and provisions in order to internationalise the agreement between a state and 
an investor, particularly in the context of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).3  More 
importantly, the most frequent vehicles used for determining and providing enforcement 
of arbitral awards against the state are the Convention on the Recognition and 
                                                
1 A. Bjorklund, ‘Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: 
The re-politicization of International Investment Disputes’, 21 Am.Rev.Int’l. Arb. 211 (2010). (Sovereign 
Immunity as a Barrier) 
2 ibid pp.212. 
3 H. Booysen, ‘The Municipal Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against States in Terms of Arbitration 
Conventions, with special reference to the New York Convention- Does International Law Provide for a 
Municipal Law Concept of an Arbitrable Act of State?’, 12 South African Yearbook of International Law 
73 (1986/87) pp. 74 (The Municipal Enforcement of Arbitral Awards). 
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Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (‘the New York Convention’)4 and the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States of 1965 (‘the Washington’ or ‘ICSID Convention’).5 Therefore, a state, 
which is a party to both Conventions, is under a treaty obligation (pacta sunt servanda) to 
enforce arbitral awards rendered elsewhere in any contracting states of the Conventions 
before its jurisdiction.6 A non-compliance by a party would be a breach of treaty 
obligations and lead to legal, political and economic consequences.7 
 
It may be believed that the current mechanism of investment treaty arbitration and the 
network of multilateral treaties and conventions ensure the enforceability of international 
arbitral awards in multiple jurisdictions by limiting the challenges and standardizing the 
treatment of arbitral awards.8 Although such mechanisms and conventions have 
technically been recognised as “depoliticization” and “delocalisation”,9 international 
investment arbitration, however, cannot be completely separated from the municipal 
courts and laws. As a matter of fact the New York Convention fails to limit the role of the 
municipal court to determine and interpret the merit of the award by providing grounds to 
deny the enforcement of arbitral awards. Whilst the ICSID Convention requires the 
municipal court to treat and enforce its awards as a final judgment in that state; it leaves 
the execution stage to be determined by the municipal court and its law. By all means, the 
enforcement and execution of arbitral awards under either Convention will inevitably 
take place and be open to challenge in a municipal court and under municipal law.   
 
The enforcement of arbitral awards before municipal courts can be divided into two 
stages. In the first stage, an arbitral award must be recognised and enforced as a legally 
binding decision and confirmed, or the so-called exequatur, to the parties under the law 
                                                
4 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, 10 Jun. 1958. 
5 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States of 
1965, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270. 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
6 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1124. 
7 ibid 1077.  
8 Alexis Blane, ‘Sovereign immunity as a Bar to the execution of international arbitral awards’, 41 JILP, 
453 (2009) pp. 454. (Sovereign immunity as a Bar) 
9 See J. Paulsson, ‘Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration’,. 32 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 53 
(1983). 
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of the forum state. At this stage, a defendant state could raise a plea of immunity from 
jurisdiction so as to prevent the recognition of an award. The following stage or the final 
stage of enforcement of arbitral awards consists of the measures of execution against the 
property of a defendant state. At this stage a state could claim immunity from execution 
to refuse the enforcement of arbitral awards.  
 
However, it is clear that the capacity of the municipal court to enforce and execute an 
arbitral award is not only subject to simply international conventions but also to the 
sovereign immunity doctrine, which is varied under the differing municipal law 
systems.10 This is because it contains a different set of limitations and conditions both at 
the stage of enforcement and of execution.11 Theoretically, a municipal law of sovereign 
immunity should be applicable along with the law governing enforcement in the process 
of enforcement and execution.12 Nevertheless, in the event of non-compliance the 
sovereign immunity doctrine, in municipal law, is usually raised by a state as a 
procedural bar to international conventions in order to avoid satisfying an arbitral 
award.13 In this regard, the application of sovereign immunity defense at any stages of an 
enforcement of arbitral awards, therefore, could nullify the most attractiveness of 
investor-state arbitration system as the most impartial method of dispute settlement from 
the investors’ perspective in which it is dependent from a municipal law and municipal 
court intervention.   
 
Therefore, it is the aim of this chapter to examine whether the ICSID Convention and the 
New York Convention, which assure the enforceability of arbitral awards before a 
municipal court of signatory states, can override the defence of sovereign immunity and 
other challenges in the municipal courts. For this purpose, it is necessary to provide an 
overview and an outline of the structure of the ICSID Convention and the New York 
Convention. In particular, this chapter will examine and compare how the municipal 
court determines the substantive provisions regarding the enforcement of an arbitral 
                                                
10 G. Delaume, ‘Sovereign immunity and transnational arbitration’, 3(1) Arb. J. (1987) 28, 29-30. 
11 Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier (n 1), pp.212. 
12 Section 1609 of US FSIA. 
13 Sovereign immunity as a Bar (n 8), pp. 466. 
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award, illustrating the enforceability and limitation between these two Conventions. The 
comparison, tertium comparationis, between the ICSID Convention and the New York 
Convention is established through a core function and provisions of these Conventions, 
which affect the nature and effectiveness of an arbitral award. Although these two 
Conventions have shared the same purpose in ensuring the enforcement of arbitral 
awards, the outcome of an enforcement of arbitral awards through each convention does 
not necessarily to be the same in which this chapter will illustrate this presumption.    
 
2. The ICSID Convention 
(a) Background  
The ICSID Convention was formulated by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (‘the World Bank’) and is administered by the 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’).14 It entered into 
force on 14 October 1966 and currently has 159 signatory states.15 The main purpose of 
the ICSID Convention, as stated in the Preamble, is to “promote private foreign 
investment by improving the investment climate for investors and host states alike.”16 
The mechanism of the ICSID is the expectation that it should assure the protection of 
investors under international law from unilateral action from host states. Walde has also 
contended that “investment arbitration is one of the most powerful instruments available 
to foreign investors to counteract political risk at least to the extent such risk is within the 
control of the host state.”17 Thus, it aims to maintain an equitable balance between the 
interests of investors and host states.18 
 
                                                
14 J. K. Ryans JR. and J. C. Baker, ‘The International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID)’, 10 J. of World Trade Law 65 (1976). 
15 ICSID, List of contracting states and other signatories of the Convention (as of April 11th, 2014), ICSID 
Doc. ICSID/3. 
16 A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States’, 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 348 (1972-II). 
17 T. Walde, ‘Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty- From Dispute settlement to Treaty 
Interpretation’ 12 Arb. Intl’l 429 (1996), 432.  
18 ‘Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States’, 18 March 1965, in ICSID, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules 
(2006) 35, 40.  
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Another distinctive feature of ICSID is the establishment of the investors’ 
capacity to bring a claim directly against states without reliance on the investors’ home 
states.  This recognition of an individual as a subject of international law is initiated by 
the cornerstone of the ICSID jurisdiction, which lies in the ‘consent of the parties’19 and 
the two criteria set out in the ICSID Convention: jurisdiction ratione personae and 
jurisdiction ratione materiae. Once consent to jurisdiction has been met, it takes away the 
investor’s right to call upon ‘diplomatic protection’.20 At the same time, consent to 
jurisdiction under an ICSID arbitration also excludes other remedies, including the 
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. The exclusivity of ICSID proceedings is a 
result of the delocalised character of ICSID arbitration.21 This represents a significant 
development in international law and state practice with regards to the dispute settlement 
between foreign investors and host states. Sir Elihu Lauterpacht pointed out that:  
 
“For the first time a system was instituted under which non-state entities- corporations or 
individuals- could sue sates directly; in which state immunity was much restricted; under 
which international law could be applied directly to the relationship between the investor 
and the host state; in which the operation of the local remedies rule was excluded; and in 
which the tribunal’s award would be directly enforceable within the territories of the state 
parties.”22 
 
Apart from this limited interference of a home state, a host state and its municipal 
court are also prevented from reviewing an arbitral award, which is considered a final 
judgment and enjoys automatic enforcement.23 In this respect, the ICSID Convention 
provides a comprehensive, self-contained and independent system, insulated from the 
                                                
19 Art. 26 of the ICSID Convention, it says: 
 “Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, 
be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. A Contracting 
State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition 
of its consent to arbitration under this Convention.” 
20 P. Muchlinski, ‘Dispute Settlement under the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes’ in W.E. Butler (eds), Control over Compliance with International Law (Kluwer, the Netherlands, 
1991), pp. 177. 
21 ibid 174-185; M. Sornarajah, The international law on foreign investment (CUP, UK 2010) pp. 289. 
22 E. Lauterpacht, ‘Forward’ to C. Schreuer in  C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (CUP, 
UK 2001). 
23 C. Schreuer, ‘The ICSID Convention: A Commentary’ (CUP, UK 2001). 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   119 
national law, enabling enforcement in the area of investment dispute,24 whilst most other 
instruments governing arbitration do not cover an enforcement stage but leave it to be 
interpreted by other domestic laws or applicable treaties.25 However, as will be seen, the 
ICSID Convention, by some means, leaves the execution of arbitral awards to be 
governed by the municipal court under municipal law on sovereign immunity and that 
role of the municipal court is of limited judicial assistance, aiming to promote and assure 
the effectiveness of arbitral awards.26 This process inevitably requires interaction between 
international law and municipal law in order to execute an arbitral award, which creates 
the erection of ‘a mix juridical structure’.27  
 
(b) The enforcement of ICSID arbitral awards 
The significant provisions dealing with the recognition, enforcement and 
execution of arbitral awards are Article 53-55. While Article 53 deals with the binding 
force of arbitral awards, Article 54 requires a domestic court to recognise and enforce an 
arbitral award as if it was a final judgment. These two provisions are intended to facilitate 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by limiting the role of a domestic 
court to review the merit of the case or its jurisdiction (res judicata).28 As stated in 
Article 53(1): 
 
“(1) The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to 
any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. 
Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent 
that enforcement shall have been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this 
Convention. 
                                                
24 A.J. Van Den Berg, ‘Some Recent Problems in the Practice of Enforcement under the New York and 
ICSID Conventions’, 2 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 439 (1987), 441 (Some Recent 
Problems in the Practice of Enforcement) 
25 A. Broches, Selected Essays: World Bank, ICSID, and other subjects of public and private international 
law, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Netherlands 1995) pp. 433.  
26 G. Delaume, ‘ICSID Arbitration and the Courts’, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 784 (1983), 785. 
27 A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States’, 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 396 (1972-II). 
28 See A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States’ 136 (1972-II) Rescueil des Cours 331, 403 G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial decisions related to 
sovereign immunity and transnational arbitrations’ (1987) 2 ICSID Review-FILJ 403, 404. 
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(2)   For the purpose of this section, “award” shall include any decision interpreting, 
revising or annulling such award pursuant to Article 50, 51 or 52.” 
 
Article 53(1) provides that ICSID awards are final and binding on the parties to 
ICSID arbitration without any review from other forums outside ICSID; being one of the 
most important advantages of ICSID. In other words, ICSID awards are not subject to 
review or challenge by the municipal court of host states.29 Accordingly, the losing party 
should comply and be bound by the award immediately. It is crucial to appreciate that the 
enforcement of arbitral awards under ICSID Convention is different from the 
enforcement of arbitral awards under the New York Convention rooted in the municipal 
law on arbitration.30 
 
The obligation of parties to comply with an award is originally based on the 
concept of res judicata and the maxim pacta sunt servanda, under customary 
international law.  According to Bjorklund, “most investment treaties permit claims to be 
brought by foreign investors against host states, but do not expressly permit reciprocal 
claims by the state against a foreign investor on the basis of applicable treaty 
provisions.”31 Therefore, the legal basis of binding force is not entirely symmetrical 
between the parties. Considering the binding force between the parties, it is not necessary 
that the legal consequence of the award is limited to either a contracing state on the one 
hand or a foreign investor of another contracting state on the other hand.32 This could be 
extened to “a constituent subdivision or agency” designated to the ICSID arbitration by 
that State in accordance with Article 25(1),33 in which its consent to arbitration is 
                                                
29 J. M. Hunter and J. G. Olmedo, ‘Enforcement/Execution of ICSID Awards against Reluctant States’, 12 
J. World Investment & Trade 307 (2011), 309. 
30 Some Recent Problems in the Practice of Enforcement (n 24), pp.440-441. 
31 A. K. Bjorklund, ‘State immunity and the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards’, in in 
C.Binder, U.Kriebaum, A. Reinisch and S. Wittich (eds), International Investment Law for the 21st century: 
Essays in honour of Christopher Schreuer (OUP, New York 2009) pp. 305. 
32 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp. 1100 
33 Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, it says: 
“(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of 
an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent 
unilaterally.” 
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required for approval by the state. Such a designated entity has a separate locus standi in 
an ICSID proceeding.34   
 
Nevertheless, it raises the question as to whether a state is responsible for all the 
acts conducted by its constituent subdivisions or agencies. In respect to governmental 
agencies, it is not necessary that consent by a constituent subdivision or agency amounts 
to consent by the host state itself. Accordingly, the binding force of an award under 
Article 53 rendered against a constituent subdivision or agency would not be binding 
upon a host state, but it only obliges such entity to be a party to that proceedings.35 On the 
other hand, a state would be responsible for such entities by the principle of attribution, 
under the rule of state responsibility, in certain circumstances codified in the International 
Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility,36 as discussed in the previous 
chapter. The issue of attribution has been addressed in many judicial decisions.37 Broches 
clearly makes the point that: 
 
“If a constituent subdivision or an agency of a contracting state meets the requirements of 
the Convention as regards designation and approval and has consented to submit or has 
submitted a dispute with a national of another contracting state to arbitration under the 
Convention, the former contracting state is responsible for compliance with a resulting 
award, whether or not the subdivision or agency is acting for or on behalf of that 
contracting state.”38 
 
It, therefore, follows that the violation of the ICSID Convention’s travaux 
preparatoires by a state could lead to state responsibility if it meets the requirements 
stipulated in Article 25(1) and (3).39  
                                                
34 This is clarified in Article 25(3), it says: 
“(3) Consent by a constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State shall require the 
approval of that State unless that State notifies the Centre that no such approval is 
required.” 
35 C. Schreuer, ‘The ICSID Convention: A Commentary’, (CUP, UK 2001), pp. 1100 
36 See J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text and Commentaries (CUP, UK 2005). 
37 Salini v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, paras. 60–62; Vivendi v Argentina, Award, 21 
November 2000 paras. 41, 46. 
38 A. Broches, ‘Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, 
Enforcement, Execution’, 2 ICSID Review 287 (1987) pp. 298. 
39 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, (CUP, UK 2001) pp. 1100. 
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After the effect of binding force and finality of the awards to the parties under 
Article 53, the next step is to recognise, enforce and execute an arbitral award under 
Article 54. Article 54 provides that: 
 
“(1) Each Contracting state shall recognise an award rendered pursuant to this Convention 
as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its 
territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that state. 
A contracting state with a deferral constitution may enforce such an award in or 
through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if 
it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state. 
(2) A party seeking recognition or enforcement in the territories of a contracting state 
shall furnish to a competent court or other authority which such state shall have 
designated for this purpose a copy of the award certified by the Secretary-general. 
Each contracting state shall notify the Secretary-general of the designation of the 
competent court of other authority for this purpose and of any subsequent change in 
such designation. 
(3) Execution of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of 
judgments in force in the state in whose territories such execution is sought.” 
 
Whilst Article 53(1) requires ‘the parties’ to an arbitration, which are the state and 
the investor, to abide by and comply with the arbitral award, Article 54(1) obliges all 
‘contracting states’ to recognise and ensure the enforcement of arbitral awards rendered 
pursuant to the Convention as if the award was a final judgment of a court in that state.40 
Therefore, these two Articles are directed to different entities and impose different 
obligations, which should not be conflated. Accordingly, the text of the obligation to 
comply under Article 53 is automatic and independent, which is not conditional upon the 
enforcement mechanisms under Article 54.41 However, Article 54 comes into play only in 
the event of non-compliance of the losing party under Article 53 and a refusal to pay an 
                                                
40 S. A. Alexandrov, ‘Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Article 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention’ in C. 
Binder , U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch and S. Wittich (eds.), International Investment Law for the Twenty-First 
Century: Essay in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP, New York 2009) pp.323. 
41 A. Broches, ‘Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, 
Enforcement, Execution’, 2 ICSID Review 287 (1987) pp 288; A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States’, 136 Recueil des Cours 
331, 299 (1972-II). 
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arbitral award. Broches asserts that “as Article 53 affirmed the absolute binding force of 
the award on the international law level, Article 54 affirms its external finality, i.e., vis-à-
vis domestic court. The award is res judicata in each and every contracting state”42 
 
Before turning to analyse Article 55 of the ICSID Convention, it is essential to 
highlight the term ‘enforcement’ and ‘execution’ since the ICSID Convention uses both 
words in the same provision. This terminology has led to confusion as to whether the 
word ‘enforcement’ and ‘execution’ have different meanings.43 Article 54(1) and Article 
54(2) only refer to ‘enforcement’, whereas Article 54(3) refers to ‘execution’. The 
distinction between the ‘enforcement’ and ‘execution’ has raised some concerns. 
However, there is no clear rule whether these terms should be treated either 
synonymously or separately.44  
 
The French and Spanish texts of the Convention do not distinguish between 
‘enforcement’ and ‘execution’. On this matter, Professor Schreuer has suggested that the 
appropriate way to interpret and reconcile Article 54 is by resorting to the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. It, therefore, could be said that the words 
‘enforcement’ and ‘execution’ are essentially identical in meaning45. Most courts and 
authors support this trend by using the term ‘enforcement’ as a broad concept to embrace 
all steps, which are ‘recognition’, ‘enforcement’ and ‘execution’ covered by Article 54.  
 
Last but not least, Article 54(3) deals with the execution of arbitral awards. This 
provision provides contracting states with the possibility for review of arbitral awards at 
the execution stage using their municipal law concerning execution in which such a 
review under the ICSID Convention only allows on the procedural grounds, for instance, 
a sovereign immunity defence, not on the merits of the award, Accordingly, the 
                                                
42 A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States’, 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 400 (1972-II). 
43 See N. Blackaby, C. Partasides, A. Redfern and M. hunter, Redfern and hunter on International 
Arbitration, (OUP, New York 2005) pp. 627. 
44 J. M. Hunter and J. G. Olmedo, ‘Enforcement/Execution of ICSID Awards against Reluctant States’, 12 
J. World Investment & Trade 307 (2011) 311. 
45 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp. 1135. 
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contracting states have the total discretion to determine whether arbitral awards could be 
executed against particular assets under their municipal laws.46 The reasoning behind this 
provision has been explained in The Report of the Executive Directors to the ICSID 
Convention: 
 
“...Because of the different legal techniques followed in common law and civil law 
jurisdictions and the different judicial systems found in unitary and federal or other non-
unitary states, Article 54 does not prescribe any particular method to be followed in its 
domestic implementation, but requires each contracting state to meet the requirements of 
the Article in accordance with its own legal system.”47 
 
This explanation confirms the determination of the law, of enforcing states, that 
governs the execution arbitral awards in a municipal court, which is different in each 
country. However, Article 54(3) does not allow the execution law in the enforcing state to 
review an arbitral award, but only to serve as a procedural bar. Consequently, it does not 
affect the finality and enforceability of the ICSID awards without judicial interference.48 
Professor Schreuer has been clear on this point that “the impossibility to enforce an 
ICSID award as a consequence of the law concerning the execution of judgments in one 
or several states in no way affects the obligation of the party to the ICSID arbitration to 
abide by and comply with the award in accordance with Art.53(1).”49 Accordingly, the 
failure of a state party to recognise and enforce an award would be in breach of a treaty 
obligation leading to a consequence of state responsibility, including diplomatic 
protection. This illustrates the advantages of ICSID awards over other types of arbitral 
awards. 
 
The last provision of the recognition and enforcement of the award section under 
the ICSID Convention is Article 55, which states: 
 
                                                
46 J. M. Hunter and J. G. Olmedo, ‘Enforcement/Execution of ICSID Awards against Reluctant States’, 12 
J. World Investment & Trade 307 (2011) 311. 
47 See A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States, 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 401 (1972-II). 
48 G. Delaume, ‘ICSID Arbitration in Practice’, 2 International Tax & Business Law 58, 74 (1984). 
49 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp. 1149. 
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“Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any 
contracting state relating to immunity of that state or any foreign state from execution.” 
 
The purpose of this provision is to emphasise and clarify Article 54, being that the 
execution of an arbitral award is subject to the domestic law of the enforcing state, with 
no exception, and that the award should be equated as a final judgment of a domestic 
court. The domestic law concerning execution, inevitably, includes the law on sovereign 
immunity. Accordingly, the effectiveness of such a measure of execution depends on the 
municipal law on sovereign immunity prevailing in the country where the execution is 
sought.50 This is because the ICSID Convention does not alter or supersede the rules of 
immunity from execution applicable in contracting states under their municipal law and 
arbitral awards, therefore, will be treated differently amongst contracting states. 51   
 
The Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention has given the 
explanation on this Article that: 
 
“The doctrine of sovereign immunity may prevent the forced execution in a state of 
judgments obtained against foreign states or against the state in which the execution is 
sought. Article 54 requires contracting states to equate an award rendered pursuant to the 
Convention with a final judgment of its own courts. It does not require them to go beyond 
that and to undertake forced execution of awards rendered pursuant to the Convention in 
cases in which final judgments could not be executed.” 
 
As indicated above, it could be suggested that it may be the aim of the provision 
to prevent forced execution, particularly execution against the non-commercial or public 
assets of enforcing states52 and thus Article 55 does no more than acknowledge a state 
practice on sovereign immunity from execution.53 Insofar as the sovereign immunity 
from execution is concerned, the meaning and the scope of sovereign immunity from 
                                                
50 V. O. Nmehielle, ‘Enforcing arbitration awards under the International Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention)’, 7 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 21, 29 
(2001). 
51 G. Delaume, ‘ICSID Arbitration in Practice’, 2 International Tax & Business Law 58, 74 (1984). 
52 A. Broches, ‘Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, 
Enforcement, Execution’, 2 ICSID Review 287 (1987) pp. 329. 
53 A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 404 (1972-II). 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   126 
execution still lacks consensus between developing and developed states, given that the 
drafting stage of the Convention and the situation remains the same. The drafters of the 
Convention were concerned the inclusion of waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution but “it would have run into the determined opposition of developing countries 
and would have jeopardized the wide ratification of the Convention.”54 It is accepted that 
at the time of drafting it was not appropriate time for such a drastic step; thus, Article 55 
leaves the law on sovereignty immunity unaffected. Even though the solution expressed 
in Article 55 might be regrettable, it is not avoidable.  
 
3. The New York Convention 
(a) Background 
Apart from the ICSID Convention, the New York Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 also plays an important role as an 
effective tool in providing and determining recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards, particularly in relation to commercially related cases on a contractual basis.55 The 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958,56 
so called ‘the New York Convention’, was adopted by the United Nations. It entered into 
force on 7 June 1959 and currently has 149 contracting states.57  The New York 
Convention generally aims to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards between private parties.58 Even though the New York Convention does not 
explicitly refer to the state as a party, it covers the enforcement against sovereign states as 
well. However, this proposition should not be overstated since, the enforcement of 
                                                
54 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009), pp. 1154, Citing on A. Broches, 
‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
136 Recueil des Cours 331, 403 (1972-II). 
55 See A. Jan van den Berg, ‘The New York Convention of 1958 : An Overview; Yearbook Vol. XXVIII 
(2003) < http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12125884227980/new_york_convention_of_1958_overview.pdf > ; A. Asouzu, 
International Commercial Arbitration and African States : Practice, Participation, and Institutional 
Development (CUP, New York 2011).  
56 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10, 1958, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517. 
57 As of 2013, the contracting states are listed at: http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states. 
58 A. J. van den Berg, ‘The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation’, 277-282 (1981). 
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arbitral awards against sovereign states might raise some problems. This is due to the fact 
that the New York Convention is silent on the issue of sovereign immunity.59  
 
Fundamentally, the New York Convention applies to foreign arbitral awards 
rendered in accordance with a written arbitration agreement made in a country other than 
an enforcing state.60 Unlike the domestic nature of an ICSID award, the award rendered 
under the New York Convention is not deemed as a domestic award by the enforcing 
state, but rather recognised as a foreign arbitral award.61 Therefore, it is necessary to 
compare the differing provision of rules under these two Conventions. These rules can be 
seen in the applicable laws for the enforcement of arbitral awards before municipal courts 
in which they have an impact on the effectiveness of arbitral awards.   
 
(b) The enforcement of New York Convention awards 
Generally, the contracting states are required to recognise and enforce arbitral 
awards in accordance with their rules of procedure provided in Article III. This provides: 
 
“Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in 
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, 
under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed 
substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or 
enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the 
recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.”62 
 
The binding force and recognition of the New York Convention award is subject 
to the procedural rules in a state where the arbitral award is sought. This is contrary to the 
                                                
59 H. Fox, ‘State Immunity and the New York Convention’ in E. Gaillard and D. Pietro (eds.), Enforcement 
of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice 
(Cameron May, UK 2009) pp. 829. 
60 Art. I(1) of the New York Convention. It says:  
“This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made 
in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of 
such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons, whether physical 
or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the 
State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.” 
61 See A. Bucher, ‘Court Intervention in Arbitration’ in R. B. Lillich and C. N. Brower (eds), International 
Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards “Judicialization and Uniformity”?: the Twelfth Sokol Colloquium 
(Transnational Publisher, New York 1994) pp.29. 
62 Art. III of the New York Convention. 
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ICSID award, which is automatically recognised in a municipal court and independent 
from a municipal court’s review of the case at the stage of recognition and enforcement. 
 
The most distinctive characteristic of the New York Convention is to provide the 
list of grounds on which the recognition and enforcement may be refused. 63  These 
grounds for refusal can be divided into two functions: the refusal proven by the 
respondent and the refusal raised by the court on a public policy concern.64 
 
The first main feature of grounds for refusal is mentioned in Article V(1) to be 
proven by the party against the award. These grounds are listed in short: 
- Lack of a valid arbitration agreement (Article V(1)(a)) 
- Violation of due process (Article V(1)(b)) 
- Excess of the arbitral tribunal’s authority (Article V(1)(c)) 
- Irregularity in the composition of the arbitral tribunal or arbitral 
                                                
63 Grounds for refusing enforcement under Article V: 
“1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party 
against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where 
the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:  
 (a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law 
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law 
to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of 
the country where the award was made; or  
 (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of 
the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable 
to present his case; or  
 (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within 
the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the 
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted 
to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which 
contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognised and enforced; or  
 (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or  
 (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made. 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent 
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The 
subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of 
that country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country.” 
64 A. Van Den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview pp. 13. 
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procedure (Article V(1)(d)) 
- The award has not yet become binding, set aside or suspended (Article 
V(1)(e)). 
 
In addition, the second feature of the grounds could be raised by a court to refuse 
enforcement for reasons of public policy as provided for in Article V(2). This public 
policy exception has been considered as a ‘safety valve’ of the New York Convention, 
due to the varied interpretation in each contracting state’s legislation or judicial process.65 
Consequently, these procedural and substantive grounds for refusal inevitably restrict the 
enforceability of arbitral awards in a municipal court, which will be analysed in the next 
section.  
 
4. The Main Distinctions between the ICSID and New York Convention 
on the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
The previous section has provided a background of the ICSID Convention and the New 
York Convention, it demonstrates that the applible laws relating to the enforcement of 
arbitral awards in both procedural and substantive law are significantly different between 
these two International Conventions. In other words, each mechanism provides a different 
route to the enforcing arbitral awards. Accordingly, the distinction of applicable laws 
might result in a different outcome and effectiveness of the enforcement of arbitral 
awards through international conventions before a municipal court. This has raised many 
obstacles and limitations during the process, which will be predominately dealt with in 
this section. 
 
Insofar as the enforcement of arbitral awards is mainly concerned, it is necessary to 
examine the theoretical aspect of the relationship between the ICSID and New York 
Convention. On the one hand, the New York Convention is subject to the reciprocity 
reservation, in that it only enforces ‘foreign arbitral awards’ made in the territory of a 
                                                
65 S. Choi, ‘Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards under the ICSID and New York Conventions’, 28 
International Law and Politics175 (1995-1996) pp. 197. (Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards) 
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Contracting state, with a necessity that the award originates from a commercial dispute 
between private parites.66 The ICSID Convention, on the other hand, governs arbitral 
awards rendered in proceedings originating from investment disputes, between a national 
of one Contracting state and another; the award being enforecable within any territory of 
all state parties.67  
 
In consideration of the nature of the parties to the dispute, although the New York 
Convention does not explicitly refer to a state as a party to a dispute, it undoubtedly 
permits the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award agaisnt soveregin states.68 It might be 
thus viewed that the New York Convention provides the widest scope of application 
compared with the ICSID Convention, which is limited between a ‘foreign national’ and 
a ‘state’. Furthermore, most arbitral awards, conducted under the ad hoc arbitrations by 
arbitration rules: ICC Rules, LCIA Rules, UNCITRAL Rules, or ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules, will be mostly subject to the enforcement pursuant to the New York 
Convention.69 However, only arbitral awards in the specific field of investment, 
conducted under the auspice of ICSID, will be subject to the enforcement under the 
ICSID Convention.70 Accordinlgly, it is not surprising that there are a scant number of 
cases or court decisions under the ICSID Convention.71  
 
From this aspect, it is likely that there are no conflicts as to the applicability between the 
ICSID and the New York Convention, since a succesful claimant will be able to enforce 
an arbitral award in a ‘multiple jurisdiction’ or even a ‘multiple proceeding’ before a 
                                                
66 Art. I (3) of the New York Convention; N. Blackaby, C. Partasides, A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Redfern 
and Hunter on International Arbitration (OUP, New York 2005) pp. 634. 
67 Art. 52 of the ICSID Convention; See C. F. Dugan, D. Wallace, Jr., N. D. Rubins and B. Sabahi, 
Investor-State Arbitration  (OUP, New York 2008). 
68 Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier (n 1), pp. 218; Some Recent Problems in the Practice of Enforcement (n 
24), pp. 441. 
69 A. K. Bjorklund, ‘State immunity and the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards’, in C.Binder, 
U.Kriebaum, A. Reinisch and S. Wittich (eds),  International Investment Law for the 21st century: Essays in 
honour of Christopher Schreuer (OUP, New York 2009), pp. 303 
70 See M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands 2000).  
71 E. Kehoe and P. Maslo, ‘Trends in International Investment Agreements 2009/2010: Recent Stepsin the 
Evolution of Bilateral Investment Treaties and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in K. Sauvant, Yearbook 
on International Investment Law & Policy 2010-2011 (OUP, New York 2012) pp. 37. 
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municial court of their Contracting states.72 However, this special characteristic of the 
enforcement of arbitral awards under international conventions could lead to abuse by 
investors initiating proceedings in a number of forums, to ensure that their rights will be 
all protected.73 In practice, the process of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
by means of international conventions is not independent from municipal law and the 
municipal court system,74 which operates under specific procedural and substantive rules. 
Therefore, although the international conventions are aimed to secure effectiveness and 
uniformity in the enforcement of arbitral awards in most trading countries throughout the 
world, the process of enforcement adopted in each municipal court will vary from 
country to country.  
 
Additionally, the mechanism of enforcement between the ICSID and New York 
Convention is quite different due to its provisions adopted in domestic courts, which will 
result in a different outcome of arbitral awards. Therefore, this raises the question as to 
whether the application of the ICSID and New York Convention guarantees the 
effectiveness of enforcement and provide a uniform standard in limiting a court’s 
discretion to refuse an arbitral award.75 Before answering this question, it is important to 
emphasise the distinction between compliance with international conventions under the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda and the procedural issues of the enforcement of arbitral 
awards. This is due to the fact that the problem of enforcement is a separate issue from a 
non-compliance with a treaty obligation. Alexandroff and Laird have clarified this 
distinction in that “while compliance is an international treaty concept concerning the 
good faith performance of treaty obligations, the question of enforcement of arbitral 
awards has largely involved the challenge by state respondents to adverse investment 
awards in domestic courts.”76  
                                                
72 Some Recent Problems in the Practice of Enforcement (n 24), pp. 441. 
73 H. Wehland, The Coordination of Multiple Proceedings in Investment Treaty Arbitration (OUP, UK 
2013) pp.1-2. 
74 N. Blackaby, C. Partasides, A. Redfern and M. hunter, Redfern and hunter on International Arbitration, 
(OUP, New York 2005) pp. 632. 
Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards (n 65), pp. 176. 
76 A. Alexandroff and I. Laird, ‘Compliance and Enforcement’ in P. Muchlinski et al (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (2008). (OUP, UK 2008) pp. 1172-1173. 
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As far as the procedral and substantive challenges by a domestic court are concerned, the 
three problems discussed hereafter are chosen as they raise a particular practical 
relevance under both Conventions. Firstly, there is the question of the applicable law, 
which governs the enforcement of arbitral awards. This raises the dilemma between 
denationalised arbitration of the New York Convention and delocalised arbitration of the 
ICSID Convention. This unique arbitration mechanism of each convention leads to the 
second problem, which is the finality and the review of arbitral awards in domestic 
courts. Domestic courts in host states have different conditions when interpreting and 
enforcing an abitral award, depending on the provisions stipualted in each convention. 
Lastly, the claim of public policy may be considered a safely valve for a municipal court 
in order to refuse the enforcement of an arbitral award. However, the New York 
Convention and the ICSID Convention provide a different set of rules in dealing with 
these claims, which results in a varying efffectiveness in enforcing an arbitral award at a 
final stage. 
 
(a) The applicable law goverining the enforcement of arbitral awards 
The applicable law governing the enforcement of arbitral awards can be 
categorised in two ways: procedural law and substantive law. Generally speaking, most 
investment treaties or commercial contracts entered into between two parties contain an 
express choice of law, specifically an ‘arbitration clause’, for the resolution of the 
disputes.77 This is based on the assumption that the parties have an autonomy to choose 
the law as well as the courts or tribunals, other than the municipal laws and courts of the 
host state lex fori, which is applicable to investment treaties or contracts.78 Due to the fact 
that an investment dispute involves a sovereign act of state as the subject matter, the 
applicable law governing the dispute is necessarily a ‘hybrid mechanism’ or ‘mixed 
character’ between international and municipal law. This is because the nature of the 
                                                
77 Z. Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 74 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 151 (2003) 
pp.194. 
78 M. Sornarajah, The international law on foreign investment (CUP, UK 2010) pp. 284-305. 
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dispue is based on public-private interest factors.79  
 
In addition, this grey area of public-private interest in an international arbitration 
is a matter of an individual claiming against a state in a regulatory dispute. Therefore, 
whilst a private or commercial interest is at the heart of the jurisdiction governed by a 
municipal commercial law in a host state, a public interest is also considered in order to 
protect a state interest governed by an international treaty or international law. In this 
regard, the applicable law governing this investment dispute could not only be rooted in a 
contractual basis, but may also refer to a public law and international law basis. In order 
to serve and protect the interest of both a state and a private party, the ICSID and the New 
York Convention provide a different route to apply for the applicable law in both 
procedural and substantive rules. As will be seen later, the ICSID and the New York 
Convention serve different purposes in international arbitration. The ICSID Convention is 
chiefly used in order to resolve a dispute between a private party, particularly a foreign 
investor, and a state acting in a sovereign power in a so-called ‘investment treaty 
arbitration.’ However, the New York Convention particularly engages in a dispute 
between private parties, including a dispute between a private party and a state party 
assumed to be acting in a private capacity in a so-called ‘international commercial 
arbitration’.80 
 
As briefly mentioned earlier, the ICSID Convention and ICSID awards are 
independent from municipal law and outside of the jurisdiction of a municipal court for 
the enforcement of an arbitral award.81 In the context of the New York Convention, most 
                                                
79 Z. Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 151 (2003) 
pp. 195; J. Lew, ‘Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial 
Arbitration Awards’ (New York: Oceana Publication, 1978) at p.21; See also S. J. Toope, Mixed 
International Arbitration Studies in Arbitration between States and Private Persons (Grotius Publication 
Limited, London 1990). 
80 Van Harten, ‘The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against 
the State’, 56 ICLQ 371 (2007), pp.372. 
81 See Art.44 of the ICSID Convention; Y. Banifatemi, ‘The Law Applicable in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’, in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A 
Guide to the Key Issues, (OUP, New York 2010), pp. 191.; C. Brown, ‘Procedure on Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and the Relevance of Comparative Public Law’, in S. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law 
and Comparative Public Law (OUP, UK 2010), pp. 659. 
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arbitral awards are governed by the arbitration law where an arbitration is taking place; 
the lex loci arbitri.82 This distinctive nature of the ICSID arbitration provides autonomous 
procedural rules, regardless of the applicable law in a host state. These procedural rules 
are pursuant to the ICSID Convention and preventively bind the municipal courts of a 
Contracting state from exercising jurisdiction on a matter of the interpretation of the 
arbitration agreement, the arbitration procedure and especially the challenge to 
enforcement of arbitral awards.83 Hence, it could be said that the removal of a foreign 
investment dispute from the sphere of a host state law and court applied by  ICSID 
tribunal is ‘internationalised’ in the sense that international law is the lex fori under the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.84 This is stipulated in Article 42 (1) that: 
 
“(1) The Tribunal shall decide in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by 
the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the 
Contracting state party to the dispute (including its rules on conflict of laws) and such 
rules of international law as may be applicable”85 
 
In a matter of conflict of laws, the relevance to the international law of the ICSID 
Convention could be explained by referring to Article 25 and Article 44, which provide 
the fundamental condition, being the giving of consent by a state to the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal and providing its own procedural proceedings pursuant to ICSID Arbitration 
                                                
82 Some Recent Problems in the Practice of Enforcement (n 24), pp. 442; Art. III of the New York 
Convention; See W. Park, ‘The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration’, 32 ICLQ 21 
(1983).; W. Park and J. Paulsson, ‘The Binding Force of International Arbitral Awards’, 23 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 253 (1983).; R. Goode, ‘The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in International 
Commercial Arbitration’, 17(1) Arbitration International 19 (2001). 
83 Z. Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 74 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 151 (2003) 
pp. 219; G. Petrochilos, Procedural Law in International Arbitration (OUP, New York 2004) pp. 252; 
Art.54 of the ICSID Convention.; See also L. Mistelis, ‘Delocalization and Its Relevance in Post-award 
Review’, Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 144/2013; 
A. Broches, ‘Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, 
Enforcement, Execution’, 2 ICSID Review 287 (1987); I. Shihata and A. Parra, ‘Applicable substantive law 
in Disputes between States and Private Foreign Parties: The Case of Arbitration under the ICSID 
Convention’ 9 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 183 (1994); A.R. Parra, ‘Provisions on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on 
Investment, 12 ICSID Review-FILJ 287, 332 (1997). 
84 O. Spiermann, ‘Applicable Law’ in P. Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (2008) (OUP, UK 2008) pp. 93; M. Sornarajah, The international law on foreign 
investment (CUP, UK 2010) pp. 289; See J. Cherian, ‘Investment Contracts and Arbitration: The World 
Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes’ (Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff 1975) pp. 89. 
85 Art. 42(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
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Rules, respectively.86 Therefore, the procedural rules for the ICSID awards are entirely 
insulated from a municipal law system. The municipal court of contracting states is under 
an obligation to refrain from exercising a jurisdiction over a dispute and award.87 This 
jurisprudence could be found in the cases of Amco v. Indonesia88 and Klockner v. 
Cameroon,89 where the tribunals applied rules of international law in lieu of any domestic 
law provisions that would be inconsistent with the requirements of international law.90 As 
stated by Hirsch, “the arbitral awards of the Centre and the works of prominent scholars 
have determined that when there is a contradiction between the municipal law of the host 
state and international law, the latter prevails.”91  
 
                                                
86 A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States’, 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 348 (1972-II)., pp. 352.; O. Spiermann, ‘Applicable Law’ in P. 
Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008) (OUP, UK 2008) pp. 
115; See also CMS Gas Transmission v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003, 7 ICSID 
Reports 494, at para 88, Azurix Corp v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 2003, at para 48-
50, Wena v Egypt, Award, 17 February 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 157, at para 104. 
87 Z. Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 74 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 151 (2003) 
pp. 219. 
88 Amco v. Indonesia, Case no. ARB/81/1, Ad hoc Committee Decision on the Application on Annulment, 
16 May 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 569, at 580. It states 
 “Article 42(1) refers to the application of host-state law and international law. If there are 
no relevant host-state laws on a particular matter, a search must be made for the relevant 
international laws. And, where there are applicable host-state laws, they must be checked 
against international laws, which will prevail in case of conflict. Thus international law is 
fully applicable and to classify its role as ‘only’ supplemental and corrective’ seems a 
distinction without a difference.” 
89 Klockner v Cameroon, Case no. ARB/81/2, Ad hoc Committee Decision on Annulment, 3 May 1985, 2 
ICSID Reports 95, 122-5, 156 and 159; This jurisprudence could be also found in non-ICSID arbitrations: 
Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO) [1958] 27 ILR 117, Sapphire International 
Petroleums v National Iranian Oil Co. [1963] 35 ILR136; British Petroleum Exploration Co. v Libyan 
Arab Republic (1973) 53 ILR 297; Texaco Overseas Petroleum & California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya 
(TOPCO) (1978) 17 ILM 1; and Libyan American Oil Co. v Libyan Arab Republic (LIAMCO) (1978) 20 
ILM 1, where the tribunals held that “international law governed the arbitration between a private party and 
a sovereign state rather than a municipal law at the seat of arbitration as the lex loci arbitri.” 
90 See E. Gaillard and Y. Banifatemi, ‘The Meaning of “and” in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of the 
Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process.’, 18 ICSID 
Review 375 (2003); I. Shihata and A. Parra, ‘Applicable substantive law in Disputes between States and 
Private Foreign Parties: The Case of Arbitration under the ICSID Convention’ 9 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 183 
(1994). 
91 M. Hirsch, The Arbitration Mechanism of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (Nijhoff, The Netherlands 1993) pp. 140; This proposition is also supported by C. Schreuer, The 
ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp. 612; A. Broches, ‘The Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States’, 136 Recueil des Cours 
331, 348 (1972-II) pp. 392; G. Delaume, ‘State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration’, 75 AJIL 784 
(1981) pp.786. 
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Nevertheless, although the ICSID arbitration is substantially delocalised from 
municipal court intervention, due to its nature of a treaty-based and state-involved dispute 
system, it does not mean that international law is entirely regulating the conduct of the 
ICSID tribunal.92 Rather, the ICSID arbitration makes reference to the applicable 
municipal law arising only in the context of execution, in which the process of a tribunal 
might be attacked under the municipal law and municipal court, where the process of 
execution takes place.93 Hence, Chukwumerjie summarizes that: 
 
“While the former [applicable procedural law] governs the procedure for the conduct of 
the arbitration proceedings and the challenge and annulment of any ensuing award, the 
latter [applicable substantive law] provides the rules for the resolution of the substantive 
disputes between the disputes. The delocalization of procedural law does not mean that 
international law should prevail in cases of conflicts with the otherwise applicable 
municipal law.”94 
 
In view of the nature of ICSID arbitration, it is valid to categorise the ICSID 
arbitration and ICSID arbitration award as ‘international’. Luzzatto explains this position 
that: 
 
“…arbitration under the same is international in character in that it is organized and 
regulated only by international rules of the convention, to the exclusion of any reference to 
any municipal law(and to international law) except those specifically contained in the text 
of the convention Arbitration under those rules rests entirely on the international treaty. It 
is therefore independent from any reference to other laws and may be qualified as 
international….”95 
 
Against this background, the issue of delocalized arbitration and the so called 
‘anational’ award, which is detached from a national arbitration law, are much more 
problematic when it comes to enforcement under the New York Convention. As it has 
                                                
92 O. Chukwumerjie, ‘International Law and Article 42 of the ICSID Convention’, 14 ICSID Rev.-FIJL 79 
(1997) pp. 82. 
93 G. Petrochilos, Procedural Law in International Arbitration (OUP, New York 2004) pp. 253; C. 
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp. 674. 
94 O. Chukwumerjie, ‘International Law and Article 42 of the ICSID Convention’, 14 ICSID Rev.-FIJL 79 
(1997) pp. 82. 
95 R. Luzzatto, ‘International Commercial Arbitration and the Municipal Law of States’, 157 Recueil Des 
Cours 13, (1977) pp. 98.  
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been discussed in the question whether the New York Convention award applies to the 
term of ‘anational’ or ‘denationalised’ award,96 the SEEE v Yugoslavia97 case illustrates a 
difficulty to enforce an arbitral award in both Dutch and French court proceedings98 since 
it depends on the national arbitration law. In this case, the award made in the Canton of 
Vaud in Switzerland was given back on the declaration that it was not an arbitral award 
within a meaning specified by the Vaud arbitration law. Following the Vaud Court 
decision, the Dutch Supreme Court and the French Court of Appeal of Rouen accepted 
the theory that the New York Convention applies to an ‘anational’ award, however, 
coming to a different decision in enforcing the same award. It is interesting to highlight 
that the Dutch Supreme Court in its second decision in 1975 considered the award as not 
being ‘anational’ award and thereafter refused the enforcement of arbitral award,99 
whereas the French Court of Appeal of Rouen accepted the ‘anational’ nature of an 
arbitral award and ruled that the decision was binding on the parties in pursuant to the 
New York Convention.100  
 
Choi has argued that “the New York Convention has failed to limit the role of the 
courts in uniformly determining which arbitral awards are “not domestic” and thus 
encompassed by the Convention.”101 This provides a municipal court with far reaching 
interpretative powers in order to determine what arbitral awards can be enforced through 
the New York Convention. Under this circumstance it is significant where the location 
seat of the arbitration is, and thus where an arbitral award is rendered. This may lead to 
forum shopping for countries with the most inclusive view of the scope of the New York 
Convention in which a municipal court has a supervisory control to both an arbitration 
                                                
96 Some Recent Problems in the Practice of Enforcement (n 24), pp. 442. 
97 SEEE v. Yugoslavia, Judgment of 13 November 1984, Cour d’appel de Rouen, 112 Journal Du Droit 
International 473 (1985); SEEE v Yugoslavia, Judgment of Dutch Supreme Court on October 26, 1973. 
98 Some Recent Problems in the Practice of Enforcement (n 24). 
99 Judgment of October November 7, 1975, Hoge Raad, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, No. 174 (1976), 
reported in 1 Y.B. Com. Arb. 198 (1976). 
100 SEEE v. Banaue Mondiale, Repinlique de Yougoslavie, Etat Francais, Judgment of November 13, 1984, 
Cour d’appeal, Rouen, 1985 Revue de I’Arbitrage 115, reported in 11 Y.B. Com. Arb. 491 (1986). 
101 Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards (n 65), pp. 190. 
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process and an enforcement of arbitral awards.102 Accordingly, it is difficult in pursuing a 
denationalised or delocalised arbitration due to the fact that “national courts are always 
asked for support or to intervene… This is why arbitration cannot be fully delocalized 
from the national law”103 as in the word of Professor Loukas Mistelis.  
 
Hence, it could be summarized that ‘denationalized’ arbitration and an ‘anational’ 
award governed under international law cannot be made under the New York 
Convention, since the procedural and substantive law falls within the regime of the 
municipal law in a municipal court. Though the differences and limitations between these 
two conventions do exist, with regards to the applicable law on the enforcement of 
arbitral awards, both international conventions are designed and aimed to settle disputes 
and enforce arbitral awards on the international plane with less interference by a state and 
municipal court and on the pro-enforcement bias.104  
 
In respect of such an attempt by the drafters, it is a valid assertion that ICSID, 
appears to be the nearest arbitration mechanism that operates closely to the 
‘internationalization’ or ‘delocalization’ theory; even it applies a municipal law only in 
the irregularities of the execution process. Consequently, it is best catagorised as a ‘mixed 
character’ or ‘hybridization’ of arbitration in the way that Lew correctly summarized: 
“ICSID arbitration is not a pure international arbitration; rather it falls somewhere 
between public and private international arbitration. It has for this reason been variously 
described as quasi-international or semi-international arbitration.”105 
 
 
                                                
102 ibid.197; G. Delaume, ‘Enforcement of State Contract Awards: Jurisdictional Pitfalls and Remedies’, 8 
ICSID Review-FILJ 29. 48 (1993); Z. Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 
74 Br. Y.B. Int'l L. 151 (2003) pp. 219. 
103 L. Mistelis, ‘Delocalization and Its Relevance in Post-award Review’, Queen Mary University of 
London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 144/2014, pp.172 
104 N. Blackaby, C. Partasides, A. Redfern and M. hunter, Redfern and hunter on International Arbitration 
(OUP, New York 2005) pp.634; G. Petrochilos, Procedural Law in International Arbitration (OUP, New 
York 2004) pp. 257. 
105 J. Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration 
Awards (Oceana Publications, New York 1978) at pp. 21. 
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(b) The finality and the review of aribitral awards in domestic courts 
Without any doubt, the effectiveness of investor-state arbitration is illustrated by 
the enforceability of arbitral awards. One of the main problems in international arbitration 
is the difficulty of ensuring the finality of arbitral awards.106 This is because of the recent 
trend that a municipal court of a host state or an ad hoc committee continues to review the 
merit of the awards or to refuse the enforcement on several grounds.107 With an 
increasing number of cases emphasizing the review of arbitral awards, it has been 
debated whether there is a difference in interpretation and applicability regarding the 
finality of arbitral awards between international conventions on the enforcement of 
arbitral awards. That is to say, it is necessary to examine whether or not the review 
process between a municipal court, pursuant to the New York Convention, and an ad hoc 
committee, pursuant to the ICSID Convention, will be conducted by the same procedural 
and substantive rules and thereafter reach the same outcome. 
 
Article 53 of the ICSID Convention has affirmed the self-contained and 
exhaustive nature of review of the ICSID Convention, which is independent from a 
national court’s procedure when reviewing of arbitral awards. The review procedure 
under the ICSID Convention particularly restricts the review of post-award procedures 
provided only in this Convention: interpretation, revision and annulment.108 The 
independent nature of the ICSID provisions puts the ICSID awards on the same 
grounding as any domestic judgment, creating the obligation to recognise the award as a 
                                                
106 M.B. Feldman, ‘The Annulment Proceedings and the Finality of ICSID Awards’, 2 ICSID Review-FILJ 
85 (1987).  
107 C. Schreuer, ‘From ICSID Annulment to Appeal Half Way Down to Slippery Slope’, 10 International 
Courts and Tribunals 211 (2011); E Baldwin M Kantor and M Nolan, ‘Limit to enforcement of ICSID 
awards’, 23 J Intl Arb 1 (2006) pp. 3-5; See some well known cases on this issue; Benvenuti & Bonfant v 
Congo, ICSID case no. ARB/77/2, Award, August 8, 1980; LETCO v Liberia, ICSID case no. ARB/83/2, 
Award, March 31, 1986; SOABI v Senegal, ICSID case no. ARB/82/1, Award, February 25, 1988.; AIG 
Capital Partners v Kazakhstan [2005] EWHC Comm. 2239, October 20, 2005.; Sedelmayer v Russian 
Federation, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Decision on Jurisdiction and Final Award, July 7, 1998.   
108 MINE v Guinea, Decision on Annulment, 22 December 1989, para 4.02, it states “Article 53 of the 
Convention provides that the award shall be binding on the parties “and shall not be subject to any appeal 
or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention”.; See Art. 50-52 of the ICSID 
Convention.; A. Giardina, ‘ICSID: A Self-contained, non-National Review System’ in R. B. Lillich and C. 
N. Brower (eds), International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards “Judicialization and 
Uniformity”?: the Twelfth Sokol Colloquium (Transnational Publisher, New York 1994) pp. 199.; C. 
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp. 1102-1103. 
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final judgment and not subject to review.109 However, the review of arbitral awards under 
the ICSID Convention is possibly conducted only under its own internal appeal 
procedure, not through a municipal court at the seat of the arbitration.110 Article 52(1) 
lists the grounds of annulment to be determined by the ad hoc committee.111 In the light 
of the self-contained regime for a limited review under Article 53, it is submitted that the 
arbitral awards under the ICSID Convention are prohibited from appeal to a municipal 
court under municipal law.112 This means that the place of arbitration in ICSID 
proceeding is not relevant for the enforcement of an award and its validity, since it is final 
and delocalised from judicial control in municipal court.113 The autonomous review of the 
ICSID arbitration is substantially different from an arbitral award enforced in accordance 
with the New York Convention where it opens to be reviewed by a municipal court at the 
place of arbitration and a municipal court can set aside an arbitral award to be enforced. 
Therefore, a supervisory role of municipal courts in the enforcement of arbitral awards 
under the New York Convention has been eradicated in the ICSID Convention to prevent 
a municipal court intervention. 
 
In contrast with the arbitral awards under the New York Convention, an arbitral 
award is subject to a municipal court review on a wide range of grounds.114 As mentioned 
above, Article V of the New York Convention authorizes a party to contest and a 
municipal court to review an arbitral award on both legitimacy of process and substantive 
                                                
109 A. Boralessa, ‘Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID awards against the 
republic of Argentina: Obstacles that transnational corporations may face’, 17 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev 53 (2004) 
pp. 57 (Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom); Sovereign immunity as a bar (n 8), pp. 
458. 
110 M.B. Feldman, ‘The Annulment Proceedings and the Finality of ICSID Awards’, 2 ICSID Review-FILJ 
85 (1987) pp.90. 
111 Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention provides five specific grounds for the annulment: 
“(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; 
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure; or 
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.” 
112 A. Broches, ‘Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force, Finality, 
Recognition, Enforcement, Execution’, 2 ICSID Review 287 (1987) pp. 290. 
113 C. Schreuer, ‘The ICSID Convention: A Commentary’ (CUP, UK 2001) pp. 1103. 
114 E Baldwin M Kantor and M Nolan, ‘Limit to enforcement of ICSID awards’, 23 J Intl Arb 1 (2006), pp. 
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accuracy of an arbitral award. Therefore, these procedural and substantive challenges set 
forth in the New York Convention may be brought into a municipal court under a forum 
state’s arbitration law at the place of an arbitration or jurisdiction where the arbitral 
award is to be enforced.115 On this account, non-ICISID awards are not generally required 
to be treated as a final judgment of a domestic court of a host state; therefore, it could be 
subject to a review and challenge to an arbitral awards by a municipal court.  
 
In the light of these two international conventions, the distinctive feature of the 
ICSID Convention offers more procedural advantage over the New York Convention and 
other instruments governing the recognition and enforcement of arbitral award. This is 
because they do not cover the enforcement stage in any provisions but leave it to the 
consideration of municipal courts, pursuant to municipal laws or applicable treaties.116 
Therefore, the recognition of non-ICSID awards may be subject to certain conditions or 
review depending on the law of the country where the recognition is sought. 
Consequently, this would lead to the conclusion that the ICSID awards have a higher 
degree of finality than the New York Convention awards due to the fact that the 
Convention eliminates the review procedure in a municipal court by equating the ICSID 
awards to a final domestic judgment, opposed to foreign award under the New York 
Convention.117   
 
The effectiveness of the ICSID procedure has been acknowledged by a municipal 
court in many countries. In Bevenuti & Bonfant v. Congo, the Tribunal de Grande 
instance of Paris granted the recognition of award confirmation exequatur to an investor, 
                                                
115 Sovereign immunity as a bar (n 8), pp. 458; See N. Rubins, ‘Judicial Review of Investment Arbitration 
Awards’ in T. Weiler (eds), NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future 
Prospects (Transnational Publisher, USA 2004) pp.359. 
116 See A.R. Parra, ‘Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID Review-FILJ 287, 332 
(1997). 
117 G. R. Delaume, ‘Decision: Decisions of Regional and Foreign Courts: France-Recognition of ICSID 
Awards-Sovereignty’, 86 AM.J.INT’L. 138 (1992) pp. 139; G.R. Delaume, ‘Recognition and Enforcement 
of State Contracts Awards in the United States: A Restatement, 91 AM.J.INT’L. 476 (1997) pp. 484; C. F. 
Dugan, D. Wallace, Jr., N. D. Rubins and B. Sabahi, Investor-State Arbitration (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 
699; A. Broches, ‘Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards’, 6 ICSID Review-FIJL 321 (1991) pp. 
322; See also W. M. Reisman, ‘The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration’, 1989 
Duke Law Journal 739 (1989). 
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but stipulated a limiting condition by requiring the award creditor first to seek the court’s 
authorisation if they wished to seek a measure of execution on any Congolese assets 
located in France.118 
 
On appeal, the Cour d’appel of Paris referred to Article 54 of the ICSID 
Convention and reversed the lower court’s decision that the provision of Article 54 offers 
a straightforward procedure for a recognition and enforcement of the order of exequatur 
and the function of a municipal court of each contracting states is limited to only confirm 
the authenticity of an arbitral award verified by the ICSID Secretary-General.119 Further, 
the court also referred to Article 55 of the Convention regarding sovereign immunity 
from execution, holding that: 
 
“The judge at first instance, acting on a request pursuant to Article 54 of the Convention of 
Washington, could not therefore, without exceeding his competence, become involved in 
the second stage, that of execution, to which the question of the immunity from execution 
of foreign state relates. 
Consequently, that part of the order of 23 December 1980 of the President of Tribunal de 
Grande instance of Paris which is the object of this appeal must be deleted.”120 
 
According to the Cour d’appel of Paris, the order of exequatur by the lower court 
does not constitute a measure of execution. Rather, it is only a mere preliminary step to 
an execution and therefore the limiting condition was deleted.  
 
Another similar case in the French courts’ is SOABI v Senegal. The lower court in 
this case granted the recognition of an award. Senegal appealed this order and the Cour 
d’appel of Paris vacated the order of exequatur.121 The court relied on French domestic 
law and held that the execution of an arbitral award in France would be contrary to the 
international public policy with regards to the principle of immunity. The exequatur, 
                                                
118 Bevenuti & Bonfant v. Congo, Judgment of December 23, 1980, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris; 
See also 108 Journal Du Droit International 843 (1981). 
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therefore, had to be vacated in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. The Cour de Cassation, however, annulled the Cour d’appel of Paris’s 
decision and held that the principle of immunity from execution should not be considered 
during the recognition stage since Article 53 and Article 54 of the ICSID Convention 
created an autonomous regime for a recognition and execution, which excludes other 
applicable provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in a place where an arbitral award is 
sought.122 
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. case of LETCO v Liberia, which dealt with the recognition 
and enforcement of an ICSID arbitral award also illustrates a problem of automatic 
recognition of arbitral award in a national court. In LETCO, although a United States 
District Court issued an ex parte order to recognise and execute an arbitral award, Liberia 
moved to vacate the ex parte order under the same court. The court referred to the 
obligation under Article 54 and held that: 
  
“The fact that LETCO is a French entity and Liberia a foreign sovereign does not deprive 
the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, this court had jurisdiction to direct 
the entry of judgment against Liberia to enforce the pecuniary obligations of the 
arbitration award in favor of LETCO. The motion to vacate the judgment is denied.”123 
 
Therefore, the U.S. court denied the motion to vacate the award due to the fact 
that when Liberia entered into a concession contract with LETCO and consented to 
ICSID arbitration, it had waived its sovereign immunity from jurisdiction in the U.S. 
under the US FSIA.124 Nevertheless, although the U.S. court recognised, in a way, the 
ICSID arbitral award, the reasoning of the court was in conflict with the automatic 
recognition of arbitral award under Article 54, since it first determined the sovereign 
immunity from jurisdiction in which the parties to the ICSID arbitration have waived by 
consenting to the ICSID arbitration. Furthermore, Article 55 of the ICSID Convention 
allows a municipal court to determine a municipal law on sovereign immunity in the 
                                                
122 SOABI v. Senegal, Cour de Cassation, 11 June 1991, 2 ICSID Reports 341; 118 Journal Du Droit 
International 1005 (1990). 
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execution stage only, not the recognition stage. By relying on this decision, it could set a 
fallacious precedent in the U.S. courts dealing with the recognition of the ICSID arbitral 
awards.125  
 
In accordance with the ICSID Convention, both the decisions in the French and 
U.S. courts distinguished between the recognition of awards and the execution of awards. 
Schreuer has commented on this point that “in most cases recognition will be seen as a 
first step towards enforcement or execution. As a consequence of recognition, the award 
becomes a valid title, which can form the basis of execution. Recognition is subject only 
to the requirements of the Convention and may not be refused for reasons of domestic 
law. By contrast, Art. 54(3) subjects execution to the modalities of the local law of the 
country where execution is sought.”126 Although Article 55 provides an opportunity for a 
state to insert sovereign immunity as a procedural bar to thwart the enforcement and 
execution of arbitral awards against particular assets, a state would violate its compliance 
obligation under Article 53(1) of the ICSID Convention regardless of an ability of an 
investor to enforce such arbitral award against particular assets.127 Therefore, the issue of 
sovereign immunity will only arise when the actual measure of execution is taken under 
Article 55 to enforce the award’s pecuniary obligations.128   
 
Meanwhile, a further concern in this area is the review of awards, which might 
threaten the finality of an arbitral awards.129 In ICSID practice, the risk of undermining 
the finality of arbitral awards is illustrated by ad hoc committee decisions in many well-
known cases: Klockner v Cameroon130, Amco v Indonesia131, MINE v Guinea132, Vivendi 
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v Argentina133 and Wena Hotels v Egypt.134 These cases were annulled when reviewed on 
their merits.135 However, Article 52 provides the grounds on the review of arbitral awards 
to be annulled by allowing the ad hoc committee to make determinations on jurisdictional 
grounds and due process only, thus excluding jurisdiction to make a review of the 
merits.136  Illustratively, most international commercial arbitration instruments allow a 
court authority to decline the enforcement of a final award, not only on the same grounds 
similar to Article 52(1), but also for a lack of arbitrability on the subject-matter of the 
dispute and inconsistency with the public policy concerns.137 Therefore, the annulment 
procedure under Article 52 (1) of the ICSID Convention prevents the lack of arbitrability 
and public policy defences. 
 
In this respect, the ad hoc committee should be more careful to assure the finality 
of arbitral awards and to distinguish more carefully between annulment proceedings and 
an appeal. Otherwise, this would lead to a similar way as in the New York Convention 
appeal mechanism, which would eventually undermine the exceptionality of the ICSID 
annulment procedure.138 By adhering with the main objective of review procedure under 
the ICSID Convention, it is possible to provide a uniform procedure and consistent 
decisions, which could ensure the finality of arbitral awards as well as securing the 
                                                                                                                                            
131 Amco v Indonesia, Case no. ARB/81/1, Ad hoc Committee Decision on the Application on Annulment, 
16 May 1986, 1 ICSID Reports 569 (1993). 
132 Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, Decision on partially 
annulling the award, 22 December 1989, 4 ICSID Reports 79 (1997). 
133 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic, Decision on 
application for annulment, 3 July 2002, 41 I.L.M. 1135 (2002) 
134 Wena Hotels Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on application for annulment, 3 February 
2002, 41 I.LM. 933 (2002). 
135 I. Kalniva and. D. Di. Pietro, ‘The Scope of ICSID Review: Remarks on Selected Problematic Issues of 
ICSID Decision’ in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch and S. Wittich (eds.), International Investment 
Law for the Twenty-First Century: Essay in Honour of Christoph Schreuer, (OUP, New York 2009)  pp. 
221; C. Schreuer, ‘Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings’ in E.Gaillard and Y. Banifatemi 
(eds), Annulment of ICSID Awards: A new Investment Protection Regimes on Treaty Arbitration (Juris 
Pub., New York 2004) pp. 17. 
136 A.K. Bjorklund, ‘The Continuing Appeal of Annulment: :Lessons from Amco Asia and CME’ in T. 
Weiler (ed.) International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, 
Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May, London 2005) pp, 471; J. Paulsson, 
‘Achievements and Prospects, 6 ICSID Review-FIJL 380 (1991) pp. 391. 
137 E Baldwin M Kantor and M Nolan, ‘Limit to enforcement of ICSID awards’, 23 J Intl Arb 1 (2006), pp. 
4. 
138 I. Laid and R. Askew, ‘Finality versus Consistency: Does Investor-State Arbitration Need an Appellate 
System?’ 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (2005) at. 286. 
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enforcement of an arbitral award, without a review from a municipal court at the final 
stage.   
 
 Apart from the review of arbitral awards, it is necessary to further consider 
whether the ICSID tribunal is restricted to grant a relief only to a pecuniary obligation as 
stipulated in Article 54 of the Convention or is it also allowed to grant non-pecuniary 
remedies such as an order of specific performance or an injunction. If the answer for the 
first question is negative, then is it possible to enforce non-pecuniary remedies in the 
ICSID awards under the New York Convention. In considering types of remedies, 
different legal systems and tribunals offers various types of remedies for a reward of 
compensation. However, it could be categorised into two main types of remedies.139 The 
first type refers to pecuniary remedies, which is considered as secondary remedies and to 
be a dominant in investment arbitration, including monetary compensation, interest and 
costs, while the second type refers to non-pecuniary remedies, which is considered as 
primary or judicial review remedies, including injunctions and orders of specific 
performance whether they are an annulling of government measure or decision and a 
declaration of the rights and obligations of the parties.140  
 
Due to the fact that investment tribunals have almost always granted a relief in a 
form of pecuniary damages since their claims are generally connected to an investment in 
which a monetary value is in question. Moreover, a pecuniary remedy is more practical 
and effective as it does not require any defendant state to act pursuant to the award.141 
This could be specifically seen in Article 54 of the ICSID Convention, which only covers 
pecuniary obligations. However, it would be wrong to restrictively interpret this provision 
that the ICSID Convention restricts investors to only pecuniary remedies, not to non-
                                                
139 A. van Aaken, ‘Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and National State 
LiabilityL A Functional and Comparative View’ in S. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (OUP, New York 2010), pp. 721. 
140 D. Gaukrodger and K. Gordon, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment 
Policy Community’, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2012/03, OECD Publishing 
(2012), available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en>, pp. 98 
141 A. van Aaken, ‘Primary and Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and National State 
LiabilityL A Functional and Comparative View’ in S. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (OUP, New York 2010), pp. 734 
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pecuniary remedies. Rather, the ICSID Convention only states that an award shall deal 
with every question submitted to the tribunal.142 Therefore, the ICSID tribunal could be 
able to grant primary remedies. To support this practice, the tribunal is bound by Article 
53 of the ICSID Convention as well as travaux preparatories to comply with awards 
applied to all remedies in the award, which is not affected by a restriction of the award 
enforceability specified in Article 54(1) to only pecuniary obligations.143 Accordingly, a 
non-compliance with a primary remedy would result in a breach of treaty obligations 
leading to a subsequent proceeding.  
 
 From the above situation, it could summarise that the ICSID Convention is not 
restricted a tribunal to grant a relief to only pecuniary obligations but also non-pecuniary 
obligations. In considering the New York Convention, it is possible to enforce a non-
pecuniary award under the New York Convention because it does not limit the 
enforceability of award showing in a number of commercial arbitration cases that most of 
municipal courts have granted both pecuniary and non-pecuniary remedies.144 As the 
New York Convention offers more grounds for an enforcement of arbitral awards, non-
pecuniary remedies in the ICSID awards may be enforced under the New York 
Convention but it might be subject to a municipal law and court in the place of 
enforcement. After all, it should bear in mind that there would be the impossibility of 
enforcing such non-pecuniary obligations; therefore, it would be better off for a tribunal 
to include a pecuniary obligation in the same award as an alternative to a case of non-
performance.145   
 
 
                                                
142 Art. 48(3) of the ICSID Convention. 
143 D. Gaukrodger and K. Gordon, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment 
Policy Community’, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2012/03, OECD Publishing 
(2012), available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en>, pp. 98; See also, C. Schreuer, ‘Non-
Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration’, 20(4) Arbitration International 325 (2004), pp, 326; E Baldwin 
M Kantor and M Nolan, ‘Limit to enforcement of ICSID awards’, 23 J Intl Arb 1 (2006) 
144 G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd Ed.), (Kluwer Law International, The Netherland 
2009), pp. 2481.  
145 C. Schreuer, ‘Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration’, 20(4) Arbitration International 325 
(2004), pp, 332. 
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(c) The Claim of “Public Policy” 
As stated earlier, one of the main advantages sought by parties in international 
arbitration is an ability to select the forum that provides most suitable procedural and 
substantive laws to govern their dispute. Although both the ICSID Convention and New 
York Convention are established to assure the enforceability of arbitral awards, it also 
establishes a different ground in which a municipal court may refuse to enforce an 
arbitral awards. One of the most controversial grounds is a claim of public policy. As a 
matter of fact that the defense of public policy is always used as a ‘safety valve’ or 
‘escape clause’ for a municipal court to refuse an arbitral award since the definition of 
‘public policy’ is uncertain and unpredictable146, it is necessary to examine the scope of 
the ‘public policy’ and how the international conventions define and apply this term in 
the process of enforcement of arbitral awards.  
 
In general, the issue of public policy is predominately seen in the enforcement of 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention, as it is widely accepted that the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards may be refused by a municipal court 
when that recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards would be opposed to the public 
policy of that country.147 On the contrary, the ICSID Convention offers no grounds 
related to a public policy defence on which a municipal court may refuse such 
recognition and enforcement.148 It is submitted that “ICSID Convention awards thus 
avoid any impediments to enforcement found in treaties or domestic laws applicable to 
the enforcement of foreign judgments or awards.”149 Therefore, Schreuer has summarized 
that “since enforcement under the ICSID Convention is easier to obtain than under the 
New York Convention, the question of the applicability of the New York Convention to 
ICSID awards is not likely to arise. But this issue may become relevant in exceptional 
circumstances like the enforcement of an ICSID award in a state that is a party to the 
                                                
146 R. A. Cole, ‘The Public Policy Exception to the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards’, 1 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution (1985) pp. 374. 
147 The Municipal Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (n 3), pp. 656. 
148 Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom (n 107), pp. 57. 
149 Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier (n 1), pp. 216; C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary 
(CUP, UK 2009) pp. 1106-1107. 
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New York Convention but not to the ICSID Convention.”150 Accordingly, the main 
discussion in this section will focus on arbitral awards rendered pursuant to the New 
York Convention.  
 
Since the scope of the public policy is varied due to its interpretation by a 
municipal court from country to country, based on the values and standards accepted by 
that country, it is difficult to define a uniform standard of the public policy, which reflects 
the fundamental economic, legal, political, moral, religious and social standards, which 
change over time.151 This raises the question as to what grounds a public policy could be 
used as a bar to refuse recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It should be noted 
that the concept of public policy exceptions is divided into two major levels:  domestic 
public policy and international public policy. While the former refers to the laws and 
standards that regulate domestic matters, for instance, immorality, unconscionability, 
economic policy, unprofessional conduct and other diverse criteria, the latter is an 
extension of a domestic public policy that will also be applied by that state in an 
international context.152 In this regard, the concept of international public policy is not 
necessarily the same with the domestic public policy.153 
 
As the New York Convention governs the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
in a municipal court, it should be legitimate to apply international public policy when 
refusing recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.154 The Final Report on 
                                                
150 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP, UK 2009) pp. 1118. 
151 A. J. Van Den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation (Kluwer Law, Deventer 1981), pp. 360; J. D. Lew, Applicable Law in International 
Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards (Oceana Publication, New York 
1978) pp.532.  
152 M. Buchanan, ‘Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration, 26 American Business Law 
Journal 511 (1988) pp. 514; P. Lalive, ‘Transnational or (truly International) Public Policy and 
International Arbitration’ in P. Sanders (eds), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in 
Arbitration (International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress series no. 3) (Kluwer, New York 
1986) pp. 257. 
153 M. Buchanan, ‘Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration, 26 American Business Law 
Journal 511 (1988) pp. 514; Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards (n 65), pp. 198. 
154 Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, International 
Law Association New Delhi Conference (2002) Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, pp. 5, 
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public policy as a bar to enforcement of international arbitral awards by International 
Law Association presented in 2002, reflects an attempt to provide a narrower scope of 
public policy exception. According to the report, it is generally accepted that enforcement 
should be refused only in exceptional circumstances.155 This reason reflects the trend of 
pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention.  
 
As far as the ICSID Convention does not expressly refer to the public policy 
exception, Article 52 provides some grounds for an annulment, which might fall within 
the scope of international public policy: corruption on the part of a member of the 
tribunal and serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.156 However, since 
the independent nature of the ICSID awards is considered as a final judgment and not 
subject to review, those grounds cannot be challenged in a municipal court in order to 
refuse enforcement of arbitral awards. Kalnina and Di Pietro explain this point: 
 
“One of the reasons for this absence is the fact that commercial arbitration awards are 
virtually always rendered between private parties and are aimed at enforcing private 
contracts which might or might not be compatible with the public policy of the country 
where enforcement of the award might be sought. In the case of ICSID arbitration, on the 
other hand, the dispute arises either out of a contract containing an ICSID arbitration 
clause entered into by a ‘host state’ and a foreign investor or out of an alleged breach of a 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) signed by the host state. It is therefore at least arguable 
that ICSID arbitration deals with disputes arising out of subject matters that have already 
been subject to a certain degree of scrutiny as to their compatibility with public policy.”157   
                                                                                                                                            
 “the expression “international public policy” is used in these Recommendations to 
designate the body of principles and rules recognised by a State, which, by their nature, 
may bar the recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award rendered in the context of 
international commercial arbitration when recognition or enforcement of said award would 
entail their violation on account either the procedure pursuant to which it was rendered 
(procedural international public policy) or of its contents (substantive international public 
policy).” 
155 ibid 2; The narrower of public policy decision of the court could be found in Parsons & Whittemore 
Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe Generae de I’Industrie du Papoer (RAKTA), 508 F. 2d 969 (2nd Cir. 1974), in 
which the court held that “the enforcement of an international award may be denied on public policy 
grounds only if enforcement would violate the forum’s state most basic nations of morality and justice.” 
156 See Art. 52 of the ICSID Convention; Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards, Committee on International Commercial Arbitration, International Law 
Association, London Conference (2000) pp.9. 
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Therefore, in conclusion, whereas the New York Convention allows a municipal 
court to raise a defence of international public policy exception in order to refuse a 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in both procedural and substantive 
grounds, the ICSID leaves no place for a public policy defence to restrain the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, either at a domestic or international level. Thus, the 
public policy exception is considered as potentially a main bar to the enforcement of 
arbitral awards.  Consequently, a municipal court should apply a narrower scope of public 
policy; otherwise it would ultimately undermine the finality of arbitral awards and the 
pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention.158 
 
(d)  Conclusion: A Value of Arbitral Awards and its Alternative to 
Enforcement  
From the main distinctions between the ICSID and the New York Convention, 
although both conventions aim at ensuring the enforcement of arbitral awards in pursuant 
to the pro-enforcement bias, in the event of non-voluntary compliance of a respondent 
state with arbitral awards, investors are likely to be left without any effective remedies to 
execute an arbitral awards due to the application of sovereign immunity from execution. 
This is because both conventions are silent on post-award settlement or remedies, which 
directly address the problem of sovereign immunity from execution in the enforcement of 
arbitral awards apart from the a resort to a diplomatic protection and claiming before the 
ICJ by an investor’s home state provided in the ICSID Convention. This could imply that 
a non-compliance of an arbitral award would likely lead to a state responsibility. In fact, 
the actual legal nature and value of arbitral awards should not be undermined by the 
absent of post-award remedies in the Convention.  
 
As mention earlier, an arbitral award either commercial or investment awards is 
acknowledged as an outcome or decision made by an arbitration tribunal in an arbitration 
                                                                                                                                            
Law for the Twenty-First Century: Essay in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (OUP, New York 2009)  pp. 
226. 
158 See F. Junita, ‘Public Policy Exception in International Commercial Arbitration- Promoting Uniform 
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proceedings in a form of non-monetary nature and payment of a sum of money.159 
Therefore, this essential characteristic of arbitral awards could create, de facto and de 
jure, a value and its international currency provided by the international conventions in 
which it provides a wider scope of enforceability than a court judgment of a state.160 
Accordingly, an arbitral award should not be governed by the law of the place where it 
was made, but it should have a transnational effect. This legal nature of arbitral award is 
supported by the French Supreme Court decision in Putrabali that; 
 
“an international award, which is not connected to any legal system, is an international 
judicial decision, whose legality is examined with regards to the applicable laws in the 
country where its recognition and enforcement are sought.”161 
 
Therefore, the transnational dynamic of arbitral awards will have an impact in its 
value when enforcing an arbitral award, particularly in the event of non-compliance, in 
which the value of an arbitral award might be negotiated. According to the survey 
conducted by the School of International Arbitration in 2008, 44% of the participating 
corporations had received a full value and 84% of the participating corporations had 
received more than 75% of the full value of the award from enforcement and 
execution.162 In order to protect the highest value of arbitral award, the survey shows that 
some of the corporations had negotiated a post-arbitral award settlement with the 
opposing party after the arbitral award had been delivered.163 Such a post-award 
settlement can be used as an alternative to a voluntary compliance or enforcement with an 
arbitral award through the actions of municipal courts.  
 
                                                
159 See A full definition of arbitral award defined in US Legal Dictionary, quoted in L. Mistelis, ‘Award as 
an Investment The Value of an Arbitral Award or the Cost of Non-Enforcement’, Queen Mary University 
of London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 129/2013, pp. 4 
160 L. Mistelis, ‘Award as an Investment The Value of an Arbitral Award or the Cost of Non-Enforcement’, 
Queen Mary University of London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 129/2013, pp.8-9; 
See also W. Laurence Craig, ‘Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration’, 30 Texas International Law Journal 1 (1995); E. Gaillard, ‘Representation of 
International Arbitration’, 1(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 271 (2010); 
161 Societe PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Ste Rena Holding, French Cour de Cassation, 29 June 2007. 
162 L. Mistelis & C. Baltag, ‘Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and Settlement and 
International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices, 19 Am. Rev. Int’L Arb. 319 (2008), pp.324-
325. 
163 Ibid 339. 
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This post-arbitral award settlement refers to an agreement reached by the parties 
after the original award has been rendered by the arbitral tribunal so that it could modify 
the rights and obligations of the original arbitral awards by changing the terms of its 
performance.164 Under this circumstance, an investor may refrain from their original 
rights and obligations so as to allow a recalcitrant state to reduce a payment of arbitral 
award, to pay an arbitral award in instalments and to change a different time frame in 
exchange for a guarantee of prompt payment.165 The negotiation of post-award settlement 
would benefit both parties to the arbitration, especially for an investor to avoid potential 
costs and endless time in a process of enforcement of arbitral awards. Recently, it has 
been reported that Argentina had agreed to negotiate a post-award settlement with the 
award creditors relating to five investment treaty arbitration awards made between 2005-
2008 (CMS Gas Transmission Company, Azurix Corp, Vivendi Universal SA, Continental 
Casualty Company and National Grid plc).166 This post-award settlement brings an end 
to a long running dispute by transferring of previously issued Argentinean sovereign 
bonds with a lower amount of compensation.  
 
After all, since the post-award settlement has put an investor in a less 
advantageous position than the original arbitral award has provided. Therefore, this 
method might be not widely welcomed in some countries in which they may wish to 
proceed with the enforcement of original arbitral awards. In pursuing this, a non-
compliance with an enforcement of arbitral awards would amount to a breach of 
investment treaty obligations, which inevitably lead to a state responsibility. Such a 
presumption of state responsibility for a breach of investment treaty obligations will be 
fully discussed in chapter 7.   
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5. Concluding Remarks 
As the main distinctions between the ICSID and New York Convention have been 
already discussed above, the fundamental difference underlying these two conventions is 
the public-private model of the arbitration mechanism. This leads to a different route 
when dealing with enforcing and executing arbitral awards in relation to a sovereign 
immunity doctrine. In contrast, under a contractual basis of international commercial 
arbitration, investment treaty arbitration in the context of BIT, constitutes another form of 
dispute settlement, which involves a public law context at both domestic and international 
level,167where a state might subject the entirely of its public law regulatory powers to 
adjudication by a private law arbitration tribunal.168  
 
In order to protect a state sovereignty under the ICSID arbitration, a sovereign immunity 
doctrine is expressly included to ensure that there will be a procedural means available to 
a state to protect its interests against enforcement of an arbitral award. However, the New 
York Convention makes no mention about the sovereign immunity doctrine in any of its 
provisions. In this respect, the ICSID arbitration goes a step further by introducing a state 
and state sovereignty into a public dimension through a private law model of the 
arbitration mechanism in order to answer a public law question.169 This is in contrast to 
the New York Convention, which significantly leaves the public law question within a 
private law model to deal with a state party without any adjustment.  
 
Therefore, such an attempt to create a ‘denationalized’ arbitration and the ‘anational’ 
award governed under international law towards a ‘internationalization’ and 
                                                
J. D. Lew, L.A. Mistelis and S. M. Kroll (eds.), Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer law international, The Hague/London/New York 2003), pp. 24 
167 W. Burke-White and A. von Staden, ‘Private litigation in a public law sphere: The standard of review in 
Investor-state arbitrations’, University of Pennsylvania Law school (2009) 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1291&context=upenn_wps&sei-
redir=1#search=%22Private+litigation+in+a+pibliv+law+sphere:+The+standard+of+review+in+Investor-
state+arbitrations%22> , pp. 285;  
168 Sovereign immunity as a bar (n 8). 
169 See S. Schill, ‘Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public Function of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the Arbitrator’, 23 Leiden J. Int’l L. 401 (2010); J. Lew, 
Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Commercial Arbitration Awards 
(Oceana Publications, New York 1978). 
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‘delocalization’ theory is more possible with the ICSID Convention, since its public-
private model of arbitration mechanism supports the most fundamental aspects of 
investment treaty arbitration. It balances the bargaining power of parties by avoiding a 
state having more influence over the municipal court in rendering a judgment outside an 
argument, which has been presented.170  
 
This form of public law adjudication is reflected in the ability of the international 
tribunals, particularly the ICSID, to override domestic law with public international law, 
obliged by a state under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other forms of 
International Investment Agreements (IIAs).171 In this aspect, the limitations of impact of 
investment treaty arbitration might be subject to the application of sovereign immunity 
doctrine at the domestic level before a municipal court.172  
 
However, it could be seen that the New York Convention might find it difficult to adopt a 
public law concern, owing to its private law model. Therefore, it could be summarised 
that the distinctive feature of the ICSID Convention offers a more procedural advantage 
over the New York Convention and other instruments governing the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral award. Thus leading to a conclusion that the ICSID awards have a 
higher degree of effectiveness than New York Convention awards, due to the fact that the 
ICSID was specifically created to deal with the matter of public law in a private law 
model.173 For this reason, investment treaty arbitration should be, more appropriately, 
described as a public-private law model utilised to best resolve a dispute between state 
and private investor.  
 
                                                
170 Sovereign immunity as a bar (n 8). 
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172 S. Schill, ‘International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights: A Case Study 
in Cross-Regime Analysis as an Instrument of Defragmentation’, http://works.bepress.com/stephan_schill/1 
, pp20. 
173 G. R. Delaume, ‘Decision: Decisions of Regional and Foreign Courts: France-Recognition of ICSID 
Awards-Sovereignty’, 86 AM.J.INT’L. 138 (1992) pp. 139. 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   156 
  Chapter 5 
The Impact of International Arbitration Conventions  
on an Agreement to Arbitrate before Municipal Courts 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of sovereign immunity raised during the process of enforcing arbitral awards is 
a significant problem before municipal courts. Both the New York and the ICSID 
Conventions leave the enforcement and execution of arbitral awards to the municipal 
court to determine and interpret in accordance with the applicable municipal law of 
sovereign immunity, mentioned in chapter 4. Thus, it is strongly considered that apart 
from the treaty obligations in the international conventions, the enforcement of arbitral 
awards cannot be effective without the supportive role of the municipal courts and legal 
system.1 With regards to the law of sovereign immunity, it has been the subject of a 
number of government and non-government projects for codification.2  
 
Apart from the commercial activity exception, mentioned earlier in chapter 3, most of the 
recent international codifications on sovereign immunity contain a provision concerning 
the ‘agreement to arbitrate’ as an exception to the waiver of immunity, as well as a 
measure to combine these two exceptions. Therefore, a fundamental proposition made in 
this thesis is that an agreement to arbitrate by parties not only constitutes a wavier of 
immunity from jurisdiction but also extends to constitute an implied waiver of immunity 
from execution. This chapter seeks to illustrate how far an agreement to arbitrate 
exception and its combination to a commercial activity exception could possibly override 
the defence of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and execution in a municipal court 
brought under the ICSID and New York Conventions. This is considered as a cross-
fertilization of international investment law and public international law on sovereign 
immunity. 
 
                                                
1 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments, (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp.67. 
2 J. Crawford, ‘Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity’, 75(4) AJIL 820 (1981) pp. 831. 
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However, it is very difficult to identify how such a state undertaking to arbitrate could 
constitute an implied wavier of immunity from execution. Although there is a general 
accord in municipal laws on sovereign immunity that a foreign state can consent or waive 
its sovereign immunity from jurisdiction by submitting a dispute to arbitration,3 it is still 
unclear whether such consent or waiver could also constitute an implied waiver in respect 
to the immunity from enforcement and execution.  
 
Undoubtedly, it becomes appealing to examine whether, in the absence of an express 
waiver of sovereign immunity, consent to arbitration by a state, under an agreement to 
arbitrate provision, could be considered as an implied waiver of immunity from 
jurisdiction and execution before a municipal court in a forum state. It is widely accepted 
that an agreement to arbitrate by a state constitutes an implicit waiver of immunity from 
jurisdiction in a municipal court.4 Thus, a state cannot plead sovereign immunity as a bar 
in order to establish a jurisdiction over a dispute when it enters into an arbitration 
agreement. This is found in many recent codifications, arbitral tribunals and court 
decisions.5 However, this position is questionable when it comes to the immunity from 
execution, since there is no clear provision that views an agreement to arbitrate as a 
waiver for immunity from execution in any recent codifications.  
 
A further question is whether such an implied waiver of immunity from jurisdiction could 
be legitimately extended to immunity from enforcement and execution of a resultant 
award. It is noteworthy that this problem becomes more significant against the backdrop 
of a separate regime of immunity, which distinguishes between a waiver of immunity 
from jurisdiction and a waiver of immunity from execution.6 In this context, a waiver 
                                                
3 Section 9(1) of the UK SIA; Section 1605(a) of the US FSIA; Section 17(1) of the Australian FSIA; 
Article 12 of the European Convention; Article 17 of the UN Convention. 
4 A. Bjorklund, ‘Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: 
The re-politicization of International Investment Disputes’, 21 Am.Rev.Int’l. Arb. 211 (2010) pp. 221 
(Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier); G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and 
Transnational Arbitration’, 2(2) ICSID Review 403 (1987) pp. 403. 
5 See J.G. Wetter, ‘Pleas of Sovereign Immunity and Act of Sovereignty before International Arbitral 
Tribunals’, 2 J. Int. Arb. 7 (1985). 
6 K.I. Vibhute, ‘Waiver of State Immunity by an Agreement by Arbitrate and International Commercial 
Arbitration’, J. Bus. L. 550 (November 1998) pp. 559. 
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from immunity from jurisdiction cannot constitute a waiver of immunity from 
enforcement and execution; therefore, a separate waiver of immunity from execution is 
necessarily required.7  
 
This state practice could be seen in the provision of many codifications, for instance, the 
UN Convention, the European Convention, the US FSIA and the UK SIA.8 Nevertheless, 
there is a trend towards a single immunity regime in which an implied waiver of 
immunity from jurisdiction by an agreement to arbitrate extends to immunity from 
execution in certain municipal courts, for instance, the Swiss Court and the French 
Court.9 As will be discussed later in this chapter, this trend might be more practical and 
effective in keeping with the parties’ intentions entering into arbitration proceedings. 
Without doubt, the conflict of these two approaches, as to the interpretation of an 
agreement to arbitrate, would have an adverse effect on the enforcement of an arbitral 
award.  
 
2. Immunity from Jurisdiction 
The first opportunity during arbitration proceedings when a state could plead a sovereign 
immunity defence is at the stage when a municipal court, in the forum state, exercises its 
jurisdiction in order to recognise and confirm an arbitral award. Bernini and Van den 
Berg clarify this point, stating that “the state will more frequently rely on a plea of 
immunity from jurisdiction when recognition and enforcement of the award is sought, 
rather than wait until actual measures of execution are requested and raise the exception 
                                                
7 The Second report on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property by Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul, 
Special Rapporteur, A/CN.4/331 and Add.1, Vol II (1) (1980) pp. 206;  
 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign State Immunity and Arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 219. 
8 See also Art. 17 of the UN Convention; Section 1610(a)(1) and (b)(1); Section 13(3); Art. 23 of the 
European Convention. 
9 K.I. Vibhute, ‘Waiver of State Immunity by an Agreement by Arbitrate and International Commercial 
Arbitration’, J. Bus. L. 550 (November 1998) pp. 560.; See Creighton Limited v. Government of the State of 
Qatar, The French Cour de Cassation, (6 July 2000), reported in XXV Yearbook of Commercial 
Arbitration 458 (2000); Kingdom of Greece v Julius Bar and Co., Swiss Federal Tribunal, 6 June 1956; 23 
ILR 195. 
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of immunity from execution.”10 As previously mentioned, a state might possibly claim 
sovereign immunity from jurisdiction, before a municipal court of a forum state, on the 
basis of a territorial jurisdiction doctrine. This plea of sovereign immunity at the first step 
of enforcement of an arbitral award could hamper the smooth conduct of arbitration 
proceedings and undermine the effectiveness of the whole arbitration process; leading to 
unsatisfactory outcomes. In asserting the sovereign immunity defence, the degree of 
application by a municipal court may depend on the international conventions that a state 
is a party to, as well as its municipal law or state practice on sovereign immunity in a 
forum state. 
 
A trend towards a restrictive sovereign immunity has brought about two fundamental 
grounds for the exclusion of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction: commercial activity 
exception and agreement to arbitrate exception. Such exceptions are widely accepted in 
many jurisdictions, in both civil and common law countries, but they are still subject to 
municipal sovereign immunity laws as well as international conventions on enforcement 
and execution of arbitral awards.11 The commercial activity exception has been discussed 
earlier; therefore, the main purpose of this section will be to focus on an agreement to 
arbitrate exception employed to defeat a sovereign immunity defence. In this respect, 
although the issue of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction is less problematic than 
immunity from enforcement and execution, the degree of its success is varied and 
unpredictable owing to the lack of uniformity in the rules and regulations amongst 
different jurisdictions.12  
 
In arbitration proceedings, the restrictive immunity approach has offered significant 
progress to the enforcement of arbitral awards. As far as a sovereign immunity from 
                                                
10 G. Bernini  and A. J. Van den Berg, ‘The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against a State: The Problem 
of Immunity from Execution’ in Lew (eds), Contemporary problems in international arbitration (Queens 
Mary college 1986) pp. 359. (The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against a State) 
11 Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier (n 4), pp. 220; See also A. K. Bjorklund, ‘State immunity and the 
Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards’, in C.Binder, U.Kriebaum, A. Reinisch and S. Wittich 
(eds),  International Investment Law for the 21st century: Essays in honour of Christopher Schreuer (OUP, 
New York 2009). 
12 See G.R. Delaume, ‘ICSID Arbitration and the Courts’, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 784 (1983). 
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jurisdiction is concerned, the question arises as to whether an agreement to arbitrate, by a 
submission to arbitration, is considered an implicit waiver of immunity from jurisdiction 
in the absence of an express waiver. However, the position of a waiver of sovereign 
immunity from jurisdiction is quite clear and less problematic than the immunity from 
execution. The general rule of thumb in this context is that an agreement to arbitrate 
should be regarded as an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction of a 
municipal court, thus compelling arbitration proceedings.13 As Delaume put it: 
 
“Decisions of international and domestic tribunal, treaty and statutory provisions found in 
the European Convention and modern Western statues, all concur that a State party to an 
arbitration agreement is precluded from asserting its immunity in order to frustrate the 
purpose of the agreement.”14 
 
For this reason, a state cannot plead a sovereign immunity defence in order to frustrate 
the jurisdiction of a municipal court. This proposition is now well-accepted in many 
jurisdictions, both common and civil,15 provided either directly or by implication in the 
European Convention,16 the US FSIA,17 the UK FSIA,18 the Australian FSIA19 and the 
UN Convention.20 In addition, the same theory that an agreement to arbitrate provides an 
implied waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction has been eloquently pursued in 
the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention. It could be correctly stated that 
both conventions provide, in effect, a similar provision on this matter, in pursuance of 
treaty obligations by states; pacta sunt servanda.21 In accordance with the New York 
Convention, Article II (1) provides that: 
 
                                                
13 G.R. Delaume, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 3(1) Arb. J. 28 (1987), pp. 30; See 
also G.R. Delaume, Transnational Contract: Applicable Law and Settlement of Dispute, Chapter XI, April 
1990, pp. 67        
14 G.R. Delaume, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 3(1) Arb. J. 28 (1987), pp. 30.  
15 G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 2(2) 
ICSID Review 403 (1987) pp. 405. 
16 The European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, at Art. 12. 
17 The United Kingdom Sovereign Immunity of 1978, 17 ILM 1123 (1978), at Sec. 9. 
18 The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1330, Sec. 1605(a)(1). 
19 The Australia Foreign States Immunities Act, No. 196 (Austl. 1985), 25 ILM 715 (1986), at Sec. 17. 
20 The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property of 2004, at Art. 
17. 
21 J.G. Wetter, ‘Pleas of Sovereign Immunity and Act of Sovereignty before International Arbitral 
Tribunals’, 2 J. Int. Arb. 7 (1985) pp. 14-15. 
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“Each Contracting States shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties 
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may 
arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, 
concerning a subject-matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”22 
 
It can be assumed from this provision that although there is explicit provision for a 
waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction, the issue of sovereign immunity from 
jurisdiction has been settled in many jurisdictions, such as Netherlands,23 the United 
States24 and France.25 The trend amongst those jurisdictions is that “when a State has 
waived its immunity by submitting to arbitration, the scope of the waiver extends to 
proceedings for confirmation or recognition of the resulting award.”26 Thus, a plea of 
sovereign immunity, regarding immunity from jurisdiction, has been unsuccessfully when 
claiming under the New York Convention. However, this position might not be easily 
solved when it concerns sovereign immunity from enforcement and execution, which is 
more complicated.27  
 
Such uncertainty, with regards to the provision of a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
jurisdiction, is totally eliminated from the outset under the ICSID Convention. Under the 
ICSID Convention, the consenting to ICSID arbitration constitutes an irrevocable waiver 
of immunity from jurisdiction, either at the stage of institution of the arbitration 
proceedings or at the time of recognition of ICSID award, where such consent could not 
be unilaterally revoked once it is given to the ICSID arbitration. 28 In addition, a 
municipal court is not allowed to judicially interfere in the decision on the merits of the 
case because of the binding character of ICSID award and arbitration agreement.29 This 
                                                
22 Article II (1) of the New York Convention.  
23 N.V. Cabolent v National Iranian Oil Co., Hague Court of Appeal 28 November 1968, 9 ILM 152 
(1970). 
24 Ipitrade International S.A. v Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978), 17 ILM 1395 
(1978). 
25 Societe Europeenne d’Etudes et d’Entreprises v Republique Federale de Yougoslavie et al., Revue de 
l’Arbitrage 1975, 328, Journal de Droit International 1971, 131.  
26 G.R. Delaume, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 3(1) Arb. J. 28 (1987), pp. 33.  
27 S. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration Studies in Arbitration between States and Private Persons 
(Cambridge, Grotius 1990) pp. 140. 
28 G.R. Delaume, ‘Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration’, 38(2) Arb. J. 34 (1983), pp. 36. 
29 See Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
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unique feature of the ICSID arbitration could sufficiently shield a foreign investor by 
preventing any state party raising a plea of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction; this 
potentially being far more effective than any other mechanism. These propositions are 
well stipulated in Article 53, Article 54(1) and Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention, as 
already clarified in chapter 4. In the words of Delaume: 
 
“In the system of the Convention, the Contracting State party to the dispute is deemed to 
waived any defence, including immunity from suit, which would interfere with the ICSID 
machinery and would be inconsistent with the consent given by that State to ICSID 
arbitration.”30 
 
Apart from international conventions, an agreement to arbitrate provision has been 
similarly set out at a regional level; being the European Convention on State Immunity of 
1972. It provides that: 
 
“Where a Contracting State has agreed in writing to submit to arbitration a dispute which 
has arisen or may arise out of a civil or commercial matter, that State may not claim 
immunity from the jurisdiction of a court of another Contracting State on the territory or 
according to the law of which the arbitration has taken or will take place in respect of any 
proceedings relating to: 
(a) the validity or interpretation of the arbitration agreement, 
(b) the arbitration procedure, 
(c) the setting aside of the award,  
unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides.”31 
 
It could be said that the European Convention explicitly denies sovereign immunity from 
jurisdiction when there has been a consent to arbitration under an arbitration agreement in 
a commercial activity.32 A more recent codification, which is almost identical to the 
European Convention, is the UN Convention. Although it is not yet into force, the 
provision concerning an agreement to arbitrate is considered an excellent model for the 
codification and revision in this area.33 
                                                
30 G.R. Delaume, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 3(1) Arb. J. 28 (1987), pp. 34. 
31 Art. 12(1) of the European Convention. 
32 See A. Reinisch, ‘European Court Practice concerning state immunity from enforcement measures’, 17 
EJIL 803, 836 (2006). 
33 Art. 17 of the UN Convention, it reads: 
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From the above situation, a state, as a party to international convention or regional 
convention, is obliged under international convention treaty obligations to recognise and 
enforce an arbitral award, which a private party seeks to enforce in any states contracted 
to such conventions. However, it must be noted that this only applies if a forum state and 
a recalcitrant state are parties to the international convention in question.34 In this context, 
pursuing enforcement of an arbitral award under a different international convention 
might require different conditions to establish a jurisdiction in a forum state, such as a 
jurisdictional nexus. However, it is still subject to the law governing the dispute, which 
might possess additional restrictions in relation to the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
Thus, it could be summarised that an international convention is, inevitably, considered 
the first hurdle in enforcement of an arbitral award, followed by the law governing the 
dispute, thereafter followed by either international law or the municipal law in a forum 
state. Accordingly, an implied waiver might differ in various states owing to the diverse 
degrees of interpretation in the particular municipal courts.  
 
In connection, the first codification for a municipal law on sovereign immunity is the US 
FSIA, which concerns an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction by 
submission an agreement to arbitrate.35 Without doubt, a foreign state in the United States 
courts is not immune from a sovereign immunity defence relating to jurisdictional 
immunity.36 The issue of waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction is initially 
clarified in Section 1605(a) (1), it provides: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
“If a State enters into an agreement in writing with a foreign natural or juridical person to 
submit to arbitration differences relating to a commercial transaction, that State cannot invoke 
immunity from jurisdiction before a court of another State which is otherwise competent in a 
proceeding which relates to: 
(a) the validity, interpretation or application of the arbitration agreement; 
(b) the arbitration procedure; or 
(c) the confirmation or the setting aside of the award, 
unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides.” 
34 X. Yang, State Immunity in International Law (CUP, UK 2012) pp.325. 
35 M. Feldman, ‘Waiver of Foreign Sovereign Immunity by Agreement to Arbitrate: Legislation Proposed 
by the American Bar Association’, 40(1) Arb. J. 24 (March 1985), pp. 26. 
36 K.I. Vibhute, ‘Waiver of State Immunity by an Agreement by Arbitrate and International Commercial 
Arbitration’, J. Bus. L. 550 (November 1998), pp. 554. 
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“(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or of the States in any case- 
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by 
implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may 
purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.”37 
 
Before the amendment of the US FSIA in 1988, it contained no explicit provision relating 
to the status of an arbitration agreement clause as a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
jurisdiction. Additionally, it did not specify any jurisdictional nexus between the 
underlying claim and the United States for a waiver exception, unlike other immunity 
exceptions, which led to a judicial controversy.38 In this respect, the legislative history of 
the FSIA in the House Report indicates that “the court have found such waivers in cases 
where a foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another country or where the foreign 
state has agreed that the law of a particular country should govern a contract.”39 While 
this proposition might suggest a solution to the difficulty of waiver of sovereign 
immunity from jurisdiction it still left a further issue unresolved. A divergence of 
opinions amongst the court decisions has been highlighted relating to whether by 
referring “to arbitration in another country” underlying an intention of Section 
1605(a)(1), whether the US FSIA requires a jurisdictional territorial link between the 
arbitration and the United States in order to constitute an implicit wavier of immunity.40  
 
One of the leading cases regarding this issue in the 1978 is Ipitrade International, S.A. v 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, which is considered to be the first decision dealing with the 
arbitration clause as an implied waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction under 
section 1605(a)(1) of the US FSIA. The court concluded that “[Nigeria’s] agreement to 
adjudicate all disputes arising under the contract in accordance with Swiss law and by 
                                                
37 Section 1605(a)(1) of the US FSIA. 
38 A Working Group of the International Litigation Committee of the Section of International Law and 
Practice of the American Bar Association, Report on the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, April 
2001, pp. 66-71. 
39 H.R. Rep. No.1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Congressional & 
Administrative News 6604, at 6617. 
40 See Victory Transport Inc. v Comisaria General de Abastacimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d 
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), where the court accepted an implied waiver of immunity by 
an agreement to arbitrate in New York to establish jurisdiction in the US. 
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arbitration under International Chamber of Commerce Rules constitutes a waiver of 
sovereign immunity under the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities] Act. This waiver cannot 
be revoked by a unilateral withdrawal.”41  
 
Accordingly, although the parties to the dispute agreed to submit a contractual dispute to 
ICC arbitration in Switzerland, it was possible to enforce such an arbitral award before a 
United States court due to the fact that all the relevant parties in the disputes, the United 
States, France, Switzerland and Nigeria, were signatories to the New York Convention. 
Therefore, they were obliged under the treaty commitment to give effect to the arbitration 
agreement and the resulting award.42 
 
Furthermore, a similar reasoning was considered in the cases of Libyan American Oil Co. 
v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahriya (LIAMCO)43 in 1980 and Verlinden B.V. v 
Central Bank of Nigeria44 in 1980. Ironically, whereas the court in the United States 
accepted an implicit waiver from jurisdiction under the New York Convention, the same 
award was declined in the Swiss court on the ground of the nexus requirement between 
the underlying transaction and Switzerland.45 Accordingly, those cases have raised a 
controversial issue on a jurisdictional territorial connection. As Delaume points out, “the 
controversial question can, therefore, be limited to situations in which the seat of 
arbitration is neither in the United States nor in a country linked to the United States by a 
multilateral or a bilateral treaty.”46 In addition, the effect of a territorial connection 
requirement for an implied waiver was also echoed in Ohntrup v Firearms Center Inc.47 
and Zernicek v Petroleos Mexicanos48, where the courts held that “most courts have 
refused to find an implicit waiver of immunity to sue in American courts from a contract 
                                                
41 Ipitrade International, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) at 826. 
42 G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 2(2) 
ICSID Review 403 (1987) pp. 410. 
43 Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahriya (LIAMCO), 482 F. Supp. 1175 
(D.D.C. 1980).  
44 Verlinden B.V. v Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
45 G.R. Delaume, ‘Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration’, 38(2) Arb. J. 34 (1983), pp. 37. 
46 G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 2(2) 
ICSID Review 403 (1987) pp. 410. 
47 Ohntrup v Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
48 Zernicek v Petroleos Mexicanos, 614 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Tex. 1985). 
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clause providing for arbitration in a country other than the United States.”49 In this 
respect, although an arbitration clause could effectively be considered an implicit waiver, 
it should be borne in mind that: 
 
“It may well not be an effective waiver for purposes of subject matter and in personam 
competence when suit is brought on the award in a place other than that of the arbitration. 
After all a person who agrees to an arbitration clause does not contemplate proceedings in 
a place other than that in which the arbitration is to take place and perhaps the place in 
which he resides. Construing a waiver of immunity clause as waiving objection to suit in a 
place with which the defendant has no reasonable connection would appear not only unfair 
but may also be unconstitutional.”50 
 
By reference to the above-mentioned cases, it appears that the use of an arbitration 
agreement would give rise to a waiver of sovereign immunity. However there must be 
some form of territorial connection.51 Although the amendment made to the US FSIA 
would not solve this particular problem, it provides a clearer proposition as to an 
agreement to arbitrate clause.52 The US FSIA amendment in 1988 provide an additional 
exception to sovereign immunity from jurisdiction with respect to an arbitration 
agreement; where there is a jurisdictional territorial connection or minimum contacts with 
the United States in order to constitute a basis for a personal jurisdiction in the United 
                                                
49 ibid at 411.  
50 H. Smit, N. M. Galston, S. L. Levitsky (eds), International Contracts, Parker School of Foreign and 
Comparative Law, Columbia University (M. Binder, New York 1981) pp 259. 
51 R. J. Oparil, ‘Waiver of Sovereign Immunity in the United States and Great Britain by an Arbitration 
Agreement’, 4 J. Int’l Arb. 61 (1986) pp. 76. 
52 Section 1605(a)(6); it reads: 
“(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or of the States in any case- 
…(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign 
state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences 
which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement 
by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made pursuant 
to such an agreement to arbitrate, if 
(A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to take place in the United   
States, 
(B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other  
international agreement in force for the United States calling for the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, 
(C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been 
brought in a United States court under this section or section 1607, or (D) 
paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise applicable.:.” 
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States.53 As a result, this provision provides evidence that “a foreign state’s agreement to 
submit a dispute to international commercial arbitration amounts to a waiver of sovereign 
immunity in any suit to enforce arbitral awards relating to such agreements”54 wherein it 
would consequently permit enforcement of an arbitral award claimed under the New 
York Convention.55  
 
Furthermore, apart from the treaty commitment under the New York Convention, the 
issue of waiver of sovereign immunity by an agreement to arbitrate, pursuant to the US 
FSIA, was also raised in the context of the ICSID Convention. As mentioned earlier, the 
ICSID arbitration has the exclusive character of precluding any other remedy under 
Article 26 of the ICSID Convention. Therefore, a municipal court in a forum state is 
barred from considering the matter; instead it has to decline a jurisdiction on the rule of 
abstention.56 This situation was illustrated in Maritime International Nominees 
Establishment (MINE) v Republic of Guinea57 in which both parties had agreed to submit 
to the ICSID arbitration. Interestingly, MINE submitted a matter to the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) instead of the ICSID arbitration as previously agreed. 
Whereas the district court confirmed an arbitral award and found an implied waiver on 
the ground of the nexus requirement arising out of the arbitration agreement under the 
ICSID Convention with the United States58, the court of appeal reversed the decision on 
the ground that it ignored the exclusive character of the ICSID arbitration, which has 
precedence over the US FSIA.59 Consequently, by consenting to the ICSID arbitration, 
immunity from jurisdiction is eradicated at the outset without any jurisdictional 
connection under either the US FSIA or the New York Convention. 
                                                
53 G. Kahale, ‘New Legislation on the United States Facilities Enforcement of Arbitral Agreements and 
Awards Against Foreign States’, 6(2) J. Int. Arb. 57 (1989), pp. 61-62; H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity 
(OUP, New York 2008) pp. 339. 
54 K. Halverson, ‘Is a Foreign State a “person”? Does it Matter?: Personal Jurisdiction, Due Process, and 
the Foreign Sovereign immunities Act’, 34 N.Y.U. J. of INT’L L. & POL’Y 115 (2001) pp. 123. 
55 Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier (n 4), pp. 222. 
56 G.R. Delaume, ‘Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration’, 38(2) Arb. J. 34 (1983) pp. 38. 
57 Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v Republic of Guinea, 505 F.Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 
1981). 
58 ibid 143 
59 G.R. Delaume, ‘Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration’, 38(2) Arb. J. 34 (1983) pp. 39.; G. 
Sullivan, ‘Implicit Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by Consent to Arbitration: Territorial Scope and 
Procedural Limits’, 18 Texas International Law Journal 329 (1983) pp. 332. 
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Against this background, with the requirement of a jurisdictional nexus in the United 
States, the UK SIA does not require any territorial connection.60 In the words of Fox, 
“unlike the ECSI or the US FSIA, the English Act does not impose, for all the enacted 
exceptions which it introduces in order to give effect to the restrictive doctrine of 
immunity, additional jurisdictional links; it stipulates such a requirement for some 
exceptions but most importantly omits it with regard to the general exception for 
commercial transaction.”61 By excluding a jurisdictional link, Section 9(1) of the UK SIA 
provides that: 
 
“9(1) Where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute which has arisen, or may 
arise, to arbitration, the State is not immune as respects proceedings in the courts of the 
United Kingdom which relate to the arbitration.”62 
 
This section may be faced with a degree of ambiguity relating to the interpretation on 
whether an agreement to arbitrate anywhere worldwide will be construed widely as 
consenting to UK court jurisdiction or it should be interpreted narrowly to restrict only 
the consent to arbitration in United Kingdom in order to remove immunity from 
proceedings in the UK courts.63 The situation of jurisdictional connection has been raised 
with regards to Section 9 in Svenska v Lithuania case.64 After reviewing Parliamentary 
proceedings, the Lord Chancellor stated that: 
 
“Clause 9 of the Bill provides that where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute 
to arbitration in, or according to, the law of the United Kingdom, the State is not immune 
as respects proceedings which relate to the arbitration. The Amendment removes the links 
with the United Kingdom, and by deleting the reference to the United Kingdom or its law, 
                                                
60 The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against a State (n 10), pp. 368; G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions 
Related to Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 2(2) ICSID Review 403 (1987) pp. 410. 
61 H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 268. 
62 Section 9(1) of the UK SIA. 
63 H. Fox, ‘States and the Undertaking to Arbitrate’, 37 Int’l. & Comp. L.Q. 14 (1988) pp. 11-14. 
64 Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v Lithuania and Another [2006] EWCA Civ 1529; [2007] WLR 876; 
H. Seriki and M. Beeley, ‘State Immunity and Arbitration: Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania and AB Geonafta’, 9(2) Int. A.LR. 37 (2006); See also X. Yang, 
State Immunity in International Law (CUP, UK 2012) pp.337-338. 
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it will ensure that a State has no immunity in respect of enforcement proceedings for any 
foreign arbitral award.”65 
 
Owing to this, the position in the United Kingdom is quite clear, being that the UK courts 
will not require a jurisdictional connection between an arbitration agreement and the 
United Kingdom itself, unlike the specific requirement contained in the US FSIA.66 
However, Fox is in favour of the narrow construction of implied waiver of sovereign 
immunity from jurisdiction and argues that “whilst it is probably correct, that an 
arbitration which produces a legally unenforceable award is probably not an arbitration 
agreement according to English law it may be going too far to construe consent to 
arbitration as producing consent to enforcement elsewhere.”67 Accordingly, it should be 
noted that an implied consent under section 9(1) of the UK SIA applies only to the 
jurisdictional proceedings, and is not extended to the enforcement stage, expressly 
provided for under Section 13, and is subject to a different exception.68 Thus, the 
adjudication stage is completely separate from the enforcement stage under the UK SIA.  
 
Considering the above situations, all recent codifications on sovereign immunity contain 
provisions relating to an agreement to arbitrate as an implied waiver of exception to 
immunity from jurisdiction.69 However, its scope could be subject to considerable 
variations from one state to another.70 Although it can be assumed that an agreement to 
arbitrate might be sufficient to constitute an implicit waiver of immunity from 
jurisdiction, the problem could arise in the event that the arbitration proceedings do not 
have a jurisdictional territorial connection or minimum contact with the forum state.  
                                                
65 The Parliament proceedings reported in Hansard on 28 June 1978, Col. 316, quoted in H. Fox, The Law 
of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 287. 
66 H. Fox, ‘States and the Undertaking to Arbitrate’, 37 Int’l. & Comp. L.Q. 14 (1988) pp. 14; See also four 
cases in a US court concerning the jurisdictional connection, Verlinden B.V. v Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 
F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Ipitrade International, S.A. v Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 
824 (D.D.C. 1978); Libyan American Oil Co. v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahriya (LIAMCO), 482 
F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980). 
67 H. Fox, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Arbitration’ in J DM Lew, Contemporary problems in international 
arbitration (Queen Mary College, UK 1996) pp. 326. 
68 H. Fox, ‘States and the Undertaking to Arbitrate’, 37 Int’l. & Comp. L.Q. 14 (1988) pp. 15. 
69 T.A. O’Brien, ‘The validity of the foreign sovereign immunity defense in suits under the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral awards’, 7 Fordham Int’l L.J. 321 (1983-1984) 1, 
344. 
70 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments, (Grotius, Cambridge 1988), pp.64 
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However, this circumstance could only be seen in the context of non-ICSID arbitration, 
where a domestic court is allowed to intervene and consider the matter of the dispute. 
This is in contrast with the ICSID arbitration where the exclusive character of the ICSID 
machinery excludes all the judicial intervention by a municipal court at all stages of the 
proceedings,71 plus as a municipal court is obliged by the ICSID Convention to remove 
all jurisdictional considerations from the process of recognition of an arbitral award.72 On 
this basis, the problem of jurisdictional immunity is eliminated in the context of the 
ICSID Convention. By comparing the effectiveness of the ICISD arbitration and the New 
York Convention, it is significantly demonstrated that the ICSID arbitration is by far 
more effective than the non-ICSID arbitration when enforcing an arbitral award. 
 
3. Immunity from Enforcement and Execution 
As discussed in the previous section, it is now well recognised amongst major 
jurisdictions that a plea of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction is no longer available in 
the arbitration proceedings. This is because a consent under an agreement to arbitrate 
exception and a commercial activity exception are considered a waiver of sovereign 
immunity from jurisdiction in a forum state. The situation is not always that 
straightforward for immunity from enforcement and execution. As Delaume points out, 
“the rules regarding sovereign immunity from execution are in even greater disarray than 
those concerning immunity from suit. Certain legal systems continue to deny execution 
against the property of foreign states even after rendition of a judgment or award against 
the state involved. Other systems subject execution to prior approval by the executive 
branch of government”73 Without doubt, sovereign immunity issues play an even more 
important role as a bar to enforcement and execution proceedings  
 
As the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention leaves the issue of immunity 
                                                
71 G.R. Delaume, ‘ICSID Arbitration and the Courts’, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 784 (1983) pp. 791; See Art. 53 of 
the ICSID Convention. 
72 G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 2(2) 
ICSID Review 403 (1987) pp. 411.; See Art. 54 of the ICSID Convention. 
73 G.R. Delaume, ‘Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration’, 38(2) Arb. J. 34 (1983) pp. 45. 
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from execution to municipal laws or applicable treaties,74 such municipal laws and 
applicable treaties on sovereign immunity provide different routes and conditions in 
relation to the enforcement and execution of arbitral awards; resulting in different degrees 
of effectiveness. In the event of a non-express waiver of sovereign immunity from 
enforcement and execution, enforcement and execution of arbitral awards is commonly 
possible under two exceptions: an implied waiver of sovereign immunity exception by an 
agreement to arbitrate and a commercial activity exception. Therefore, it is necessary to 
discuss the extent of impact that a sovereign immunity defence could have on the New 
York Convention and the ICSID Convention for the enforcement and execution of 
arbitral awards.  
 
Once an arbitral award has been recognised under the jurisdiction of a forum state, a 
further significant question as to whether the implied waiver of immunity from 
jurisdiction by an agreement to arbitrate can be legitimately and automatically extended 
to the enforcement and execution of the resultant award.75 This question becomes more 
significant against the backdrop of the effectiveness of arbitration proceedings as most 
municipal courts will consider immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from 
enforcement and execution as separate immunities.76 In this context, it is suggested that a 
waiver of sovereign immunity is not usually interpreted as extending to immunity from 
enforcement and execution.77 Thus, although a state consents to the jurisdiction of a 
municipal court in a forum state by an agreement to arbitrate, it does not imply that a 
municipal court could interpret such consent to jurisdiction as an implied waiver of 
immunity from enforcement and execution.  
 
On the other hand, courts and municipal laws on sovereign immunity in some 
jurisdictions, equally treat the immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from 
                                                
74 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1117-1118. 
75 K.I. Vibhute, ‘Waiver of State Immunity by an Agreement by Arbitrate and International Commercial 
Arbitration’, J. Bus. L. 550 (November 1998) pp. 559. 
76 Second report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, by Mr.M.Ogiso, Special 
Rapporteur, [1989] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 72, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.1. 
77 A. Bjorklund, ‘Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: 
The re-politicization of International Investment Disputes’, 21 Am.Rev.Int’l. Arb. 211 (2010) pp. 222. 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   172 
enforcement and execution on the same ground of restrictive approach of sovereign 
immunity.78 Crawford concludes this proposition that “there are reasonably good grounds 
for treating a rule of restrictive immunity from execution as, in principle at least, entailed 
by restrictive immunity from jurisdiction.”79 Therefore, it does not make any sense if a 
state engaging in arbitration proceedings and consenting to the jurisdiction, by an 
agreement to arbitrate, does not abide by the resultant award.80 In this context, it could be 
said that the position of sovereign immunity from enforcement and execution is not yet 
settled. Given the present state of law, an issue of sovereign immunity remains illusory, 
even after a municipal court assumes jurisdiction to enforce the award.81 
 
It is currently generally accepted that immunity from enforcement and execution 
measures may be waived by a state. This is clearly stated in Article 18 and 19 the UN 
Convention and Article 23 of the European Convention. Apart from those international 
codifications, Section 1610(a) (1) of US FSIA82 and Section 13(3) of UK SIA83 allow for 
the possibility to waive immunity from execution in a level of municipal laws. Most 
municipal laws on sovereign immunity agree on the general rule that this requires a 
separate waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and a waiver of sovereign 
immunity from enforcement and execution.84 Under the US FSIA, there is express 
reference to two distinct immunities: immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from 
attachment and execution, together with two distinct waivers of these immunities.85 
Interestingly, the two distinct immunities are both “subject to existing agreements to 
which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act.”86 By the effect of 
these sections, although section 1609 and 1610 match the rules set forth in section 1604 
                                                
78 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 212. 
79 J. Crawford, ‘Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Immunity’, 75(4) AJIL 820 (1981) pp. 854. 
80 K.I. Vibhute, ‘Waiver of State Immunity by an Agreement by Arbitrate and International Commercial 
Arbitration’, J. Bus. L. 550 (November 1998) pp. 560. 
81 M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
London, Boston 2000) pp. 302-303. 
82 Section 1610 (a)(1) of US FSIA. 
83 Section (13)(3) of UK SIA. 
84 See Section 1604 and 1609 of the US FSIA and Section 2 -11 and Section 13-14 of the UK SIA where it 
separates immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from enforcement; See also G.R. Delaume, ‘The State 
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85 X. Yang, State Immunity in International Law (CUP, UK 2012) pp.354. 
86 See Section 1604 and 1609 of the US FSIA. 
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and 1605 in regard to immunity from jurisdiction, the US FSIA requires a separate waiver 
in respect of the jurisdiction and the execution process.87 Therefore, a waiver of sovereign 
immunity from jurisdiction does not affect sovereign immunity from execution.88 Section 
1610 (a)(1) provides an exception paralleling the exceptions in section 1605 (a) regarding 
sovereign immunity from jurisdiction that: 
 
“(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603 (a) of 
this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from 
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of 
the United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if— 
        (1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution or 
from execution either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the 
waiver the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the 
waiver, or”89 
 
Under this provision, a party seeking to execute an arbitral award against a foreign state’s 
property must proceed against only a property used as a commercial property in the 
United States and then must satisfy an additional exception provided in subsection (a)(1) 
regarding a waiver of sovereign immunity either explicitly or by implication. However, 
this exception applies only to a foreign state entity, irrespective of an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state, which has a different exception pursuant to Section 
1610 (b).90 In this respect, only property of the foreign state or one of its political 
subdivisions, used for a commercial activity in the United States upon which the claim is 
based, is subject to execution, whereas the execution could be made against all property 
in the United States of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, regardless of the 
nexus connection and the use of the property.  
 
As Section 1610(a) combines a waiver of sovereign immunity and commercial activity as 
an exception for the execution, it provides a narrower restriction than a sovereign 
                                                
87 G.R. Delaume, ‘Three Perspectives on Sovereign Immunity Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: The 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976’, 71(3) AJIL 399 (1977) pp. 410. 
88 ibid 416. 
89 Section 1610 (a)(1) of the US FSIA. 
90 Section 1610 (b) of the US FSIA. 
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immunity from jurisdiction under Section 1605, which only requires either a waiver or a 
commercial activity. In other words, a foreign state enjoys a broader immunity or more 
protection in respect of execution.91 This can be referenced to the House of 
Representative Report, in which the drafters of the FSIA only partially lifted a sovereign 
immunity from execution; it explains that: 
 
“The FSIA would remedy, in part, the present predicament of a plaintiff who has obtained 
a judgment against a foreign state. Under existing law, a foreign state in our courts enjoys 
absolute immunity from execution, even in ordinary commercial litigation where 
commercial assets are available for the satisfaction of a judgment. [The FSIA] seeks to 
restrict this broad immunity from execution… by partially lowering the barrier of 
immunity from execution”92 
 
Consequently, even though the separation of sovereign immunity is not expressly stated 
in the US FSIA, it could possibly be assumed from the US state practice that a waiver of 
sovereign immunity from jurisdiction cannot be implicitly extended to a waiver of 
sovereign immunity from execution; since the two immunities are separate and distinct. 93 
The US court reaffirmed this position of the US practice in FG Hemisphere; the court 
expressed its view that: 
 
“Although jurisdiction over the parties does not change after the action commences or 
after the party submits to the court’s jurisdiction, immunity from execution is nevertheless 
narrower than jurisdictional immunity… We reject [the plaintiff’s] argument because it 
conflates the considerations and effects attendant to commencement and/or notice of a suit 
seeking to execute upon the foreign sovereign’s property with those attendant to deciding 
whether to authorize execution upon that property.”94 
 
In relation to the US Court’s reaffirmation of the distinction between the two immunities 
it should be highlighted that US state practice under the US FSIA, regarding a sovereign 
immunity of execution under sections 1610 and 1611, is subject to any international 
                                                
91 X. Yang, State Immunity in International Law (CUP, UK 2012) pp.355. 
92 The US House of Representative Reports, Report No. 94-1487, 1976, pp.8 and 27. 
93 G.R. Delaume, ‘Three Perspectives on Sovereign Immunity Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: The 
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agreements to which the US is a party. According to the Legislative History in the House 
of Representatives Report:  
 
“Explicit and implied waivers [are] governed by the same principles that apply to waiver 
immunity from jurisdiction under section 1605(a) (1) of the bill. A foreign state may 
waive its immunity from execution, inter alia, by the provisions of a treaty, a contract, an 
official statement, or certain steps taken by the foreign state in the proceedings leading to 
judgment or to execution.”95 
 
In this context, the US courts have found an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution in an arbitration agreement made by a foreign state in another country.96 
Accordingly, the consideration of an agreement to arbitrate in pursuant to international 
convention provisions, should be in line with the municipal laws on sovereign 
immunity.97 To support this position, some scholars have contended that a state 
undertaking to arbitrate could be considered as an implied waiver of immunity from 
execution.98 They believe that if a state consents to arbitration, it must be considered to 
accept all the consequences, including complying with an unfavourable award. Bernini 
and Jan Van Den Berg pointed out this position, stating that: 
 
“By agreeing to arbitration, a state must be deemed to have waived immunity. For the 
same reason, we deem it inappropriate to distinguish between immunity from jurisdiction 
and immunity from execution in relation to arbitration. It is in our opinion, illogical that 
having agreed to arbitration a state would have waived its right to invoke immunity from 
jurisdiction but not its right to immunity from execution.”99 
 
Therefore, it should be admitted that the distinction between immunity from jurisdiction 
                                                
95 The US House of Representative Reports, Report No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), pp. 18; 
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and immunity from enforcement is not relevant if a foreign state acts as a private person 
in commercial activities. However, it should be pointed out that since most arbitration 
proceedings are considered as an equivalent basis of non-immunity of commercial 
activity under the US FSIA, it is doubtful whether an explicit waiver could add anything 
for the purpose of the enforcement of an arbitral award and extend to non-commercial 
property.100 Thus, it is worthwhile mentioning Schreuer’s comment wherein he contends 
that “the rationale for denying immunity in case involving agreement to arbitrate is 
consent and this should not be combined with other exceptions to immunity. Such a 
combination would tend to dilute or even defeat the effects of the arbitration exception by 
adding further requirements.”101 
 
Before going further, it is necessary to highlight other municipal laws concerning waiver 
of sovereign immunity from execution in order to compare state practices in this area. 
Similarly, although the UK SIA allows a foreign state a general immunity concerning the 
prohibition of foreign state property being subject to the enforcement of a judgment or 
arbitration award under section 13(2),102 it also provides an exception under section 13(3) 
to such immunity, being that: 
 
“(3) Subsection (2) above does not prevent the giving of any relief or the issue of any 
process with the written consent of the State concerned; and any such consent (which may 
be contained in a prior agreement) may be expressed so as to apply to a limited extent or 
generally; but a provision merely submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts is not to be 
regarded as a consent for the purposes of this subsection.”103 
 
By this provision, it could be said that only written consent under subsection (3) is 
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sufficient to waive immunity from execution. This is in contrast with the US FSIA, which 
allows for a waiver of immunity from execution either by express statement or by 
implication.104 This aspect raises the question as to whether an implied consent under 
section 9, regarding an agreement to arbitrate, is limited in its effect to matters arising 
before or during arbitration proceedings but also to the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards.105 However, the UK SIA, unlike the US FSIA, makes it clear that a 
waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction, by submitting to the jurisdiction of the 
courts, is not necessarily regarded as a waiver of sovereign immunity from execution.106 
Lord Diplock has clarified this distinction between the two immunities in Alcom v. 
Republic of Colombia, stating that:   
 
“The State Immunity Act 1978… draws a clear distinction between the adjudicative 
jurisdiction and the enforcement jurisdiction of courts of law in the United Kingdom. 
Sections 2 to 11 deal with adjudicative jurisdiction. Sections 12 to 14 deal with procedure 
and of these, sections 13(2) to (6) and 14(3) and (4) deal in particular with enforcement 
jurisdiction. Section13(3)… makes it clear that such submission does not of itself imply 
any submission to the enforcement jurisdiction of the courts. Separate consent to that is 
needed.”107 
 
Once again, the UK state practice on sovereign immunity from execution follows the US 
state practice by treating the execution stage as a distinct feature of immunity requiring a 
separate consent.  However, the UK SIA and the Australian FSIA do not follow the US 
practice in containing a specific provision limiting execution to only property that ‘is or 
was used for commercial activity’ in a forum state. Rather, the UK SIA allows for a 
waiver of immunity from execution against a non-commercial property of foreign state 
under section 13(4) by an expressed waiver of immunity from execution under section 13 
(3). Moreover, the UK SIA authorises the head of the state’s diplomatic mission to waive 
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a sovereign immunity from execution, which is provided for under section 13(5).108  
 
At this point, it should be highlighted that whilst the US FSIA provides an easier route to 
waive a sovereign immunity from execution, either expressly or by implication, it should 
not be overstated as that a waiver, either express or by implication, under the US FSIA is 
restricted to only commercial assets. The US FSIA additionally requires a nexus 
connection to exist between the property subject to execution and the commercial activity 
underlying the claim.109 Such a requirement under the US FSIA will make it more 
difficult to execute against a foreign state’s property, which will be discussed in chapter 
6. 
 
In addition to these municipal laws on sovereign immunity, specific provisions of express 
consent can be found, almost identically, in treaty commitments of a forum state,110 for 
instance, the European Convention111 and the UN Convention.112  Following this trend, it 
can be, so far, said that a separate and express consent is necessary for a waiver of 
sovereign immunity from execution among major jurisdictions. In particular, Article 20 
of the UN Convention lays down a clear-cut provision in Article 20. It says: 
                                                
108 Section 13 (5) of the UK SIA, it reads: 
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“Where consent to the measures of constraint is required under articles 18 and 19, consent 
to the exercise of jurisdiction under article 7 shall not imply consent to the taking of 
measures of constraint.”113 
 
By the effect of this provision, it can be concluded that the UN Convention follows 
exactly the same format under the municipal laws on sovereign immunity. It does this by 
distinguishing the immunity from jurisdiction and the immunity from execution entitled 
to a foreign state before a municipal court of a forum state. This, accordingly, results in 
the current state practice where a separate waiver must provided in relation to these two 
immunities; wherein a waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction does not mean a 
waiver of sovereign immunity from execution.114  
 
This situation is in accordance with the concern emphasised by Delaume, as mentioned 
earlier, in which the rules concerning sovereign immunity from execution are more 
confused and unsettled than those concerning sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and 
may be subject to a prior approval by the executive branch of government.115 In this 
respect, it cannot be said that a state’s obligation under municipal law and international 
conventions regarding a sovereign immunity from execution is irrelevant. Rather, such 
state obligations play an important role in the execution of arbitral awards against foreign 
state property. This, in turn, leads to forum shopping, in order to locate the most 
favorable forum.116 A waiver of sovereign immunity from execution, thus, can also be 
construed from provisions in international conventions.  
 
4. The Impact of International Arbitration Conventions 
The issue of sovereign immunity from execution cannot be settled when it comes to the 
conflict of laws between international conventions and municipal laws on sovereign 
immunity. This raises concern as to whether international conventions can overrule a 
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defence of sovereign immunity from execution provided under a municipal law. 
Chamlongrasdr has pointed out this concern, stating that “international conventions can 
be said to have a prevailing effect over the forum State’s laws when they appear to be in 
conflict.”117 Therefore, it is appealing to consider the relationship between international 
conventions and municipal law in order to uncover a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution. As far as international conventions are usually concerned, neither the New 
York Convention nor the ICSID convention provide any provisions for the purpose of 
waiver of sovereign immunity from execution. It is, consequently, a matter of 
interpretation by a municipal court to consider the combination of provisions under both 
international conventions and municipal laws, which the state is obliged to follow. 
 
(a) The ICSID Convention 
By leaving sovereign immunity from execution untouched and subject to a 
municipal law of sovereign immunity, where the arbitral award is sought,118 it is clear 
that the ICSID Convention does not intend to prevent the invocation of a sovereign 
immunity defence in the process of execution. The answer to the problem of sovereign 
immunity from execution thus cannot be found in the ICSID Convention.119  As in the 
Report of the Convention, it is explained that “the doctrine of sovereign immunity may 
prevent the forced execution in a State of judgments obtained against foreign States or 
against the State in which execution is sought.”120 Therefore, whilst a sovereign 
immunity defence cannot be raised to attack the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards at the outset of an ICSID arbitration, such a defence is available to attack the 
execution of arbitral awards in a forum state, provided in Article 55 of the ICSID 
Convention. Schreuer concludes that “state immunity only comes into play when 
concrete measures of execution are taken to enforce the award’s pecuniary obligations, 
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typically after recognition has been granted.”121 In this respect, it is worth pointing out 
that the defence of sovereign immunity from execution is the only ground permitted 
under the ICSID Convention for non-enforcement of arbitral awards.122 However, the 
intention of the drafter of the ICSID Convention is to limit the role of municipal court 
and state intervention by only placing a sovereign immunity from execution in the 
execution stage. Therefore, an intervention by a municipal court in a host state would 
undermine the main objective of the Convention as well as the will of state parties, which 
would make an award simply “a piece of paper deprived from any legal value and 
dependent on the will of state organs.”123 
 
In this circumstance, it requires emphasis that the ICSID Convention has made a 
clear distinction between two aspects: immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from 
execution, as well as immunity from enforcement and immunity from execution, as 
mentioned in chapter 4 in the leading cases of Benvenuti & Bonfant v Congo,124 SOABI v 
Senegal125 and LETCO v Liberia.126 It can be summarised from these cases that some 
major jurisdictions draw a clear distinction between the recognition of an arbitral award 
and their actual execution. Following this distinction, although an agreement to arbitrate 
may be seen as a waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement to 
have an arbitral award recognised and enforced under the ICSID Convention, such a 
waiver could not be, per se, automatically extended to immunity from execution against a 
foreign state’s property in which a separate waiver is required. In other words, a waiver 
of sovereign immunity from execution can only be found in a case where there is an 
unambiguous affirmation of an express wavier of immunity from execution.127 Therefore, 
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it can be said that although the sovereign immunity doctrine has shifted to a restricted 
approach, in which a waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction is widely accepted 
in a large number of countries, a sovereign immunity from execution remains absolute.128  
 
As mentioned earlier, Van den Berg, has opposed the above presumption by 
supporting a single immunity rule.129 In this respect, a wavier of sovereign immunity 
from execution could be implied from a waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction 
in accordance with the application of pacta sunt servanda principle,130 where a state must 
comply with an arbitration awards, if it has consented to arbitration under the treaty 
obligations.131 However, this principle might have a greater effect under other 
international arbitration rules and institutions. Fox has argued that “agreement to rules 
such as those of the ICC by a state party, or commitment by a contracting state to the 
New York Convention, or adoption of the UNCITRAL Model law by a state, all of which 
instruments impose obligations on the party to honour any arbitral awards rendered, 
argues for an even stronger case of implied wavier of immunity from execution of the 
award.”132 Although this approach might be applied in some jurisdictions, where they 
allow a restrictive immunity to execution, such as Switzerland133 and Germany,134 there is 
only limited evidence that this approach is applied, since this could interfere with the 
rights of a state in relation to its political and economic considerations.135  
 
The inclusion of a waiver of sovereign immunity from execution has been raised 
in the process of drafting the Convention. However, this appeared to have far-reaching 
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implications during the drafting process due to the fact that “an attempt to include such a 
waiver would have run into the determined opposition of developing countries and would 
have jeopardized the wide ratification of the Convention.”136 As a matter of fact, although 
the ICSID Convention does not provide any waiver for immunity, it cannot be said that it 
freezes the law on state immunity, but makes reference to a municipal law on sovereign 
immunity from execution as it evolves over time.137  
 
As the ICSID Convention refers to a municipal law on sovereign immunity 
regarding an execution against a foreign state’s property, it could be seen that a waiver of 
sovereign immunity from execution is possible, in principle, under a municipal law on 
sovereign immunity, as illustrated earlier. In practice, it may be subject to some specific 
conditions under a municipal law regarding a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution. One possible solution in locating a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution is to treat consent to the ICSID arbitration as an implied waiver of sovereign 
immunity from execution.138 The possibility of locating such an implied waiver is limited 
and subject to certain conditions under a municipal law on sovereign immunity where the 
execution is sought.139  
 
One might assume that consenting to an ICSID arbitration could be interpreted as 
an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity from execution. Such a proposition is not 
literally applicable to ICSID arbitration because Article 55 of the ICSID Convention 
specifically preserves a sovereign immunity from execution to be in accordance with a 
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municipal law on sovereign immunity of the forum state.140  In this context, whilst some 
municipal laws, for instance, the US FSIA, allow an explicitly or implicitly waiver of 
sovereign immunity, waiver of sovereign immunity from execution has to be explicit in 
many municipal laws, for instance, the UN Convention, the UK SIA and the European 
Convention. Accordingly, the validity of an implied waiver inevitably does not depend on 
the ICSID Convention but on the municipal law on sovereign immunity and any 
conventions applied by it as part of that law.141  
 
Another approach in locating a waiver of sovereign immunity is to link immunity 
from execution to immunity from execution under a single regime of immunity.142 Under 
this principle, it would be permissible to refuse immunity from execution on the ground 
that whenever there is no immunity from jurisdiction, it should be the same with a 
sovereign immunity from execution.143 As a state party, by consenting to ICSID 
arbitration, is prohibited from pleading its immunity at the time of recognition and 
enforcing arbitral award, it might be assumed that a defence of sovereign immunity from 
execution is also prohibited. Again, as far as Article 55 of the ICSID clearly mentions this 
issue, it would be, however, unwise to rely only on such linking principle.144 Such a 
linking principle is not quite workable with the ICSID arbitration.145 This linking 
principle, under a single regime of sovereign immunity, might be applicable and helpful 
in the execution of an arbitral award under other international conventions, such as, the 
New York Convention and the ICC arbitration.  
 
Referring to the above, it can be summarised that a waiver of sovereign immunity 
from execution by an agreement to arbitrate under the ICSID Convention is hardly 
possible since Article 55 preserves a sovereign immunity from execution according to the 
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relevant municipal law on sovereign immunity where an execution is sought. However, 
this does not mean that a sovereign immunity from execution is an absolute bar to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards.146 Rather, it could be possible to execute an arbitral 
award if the municipal law on sovereign immunity, where an execution is sought, allows 
for an execution to be assumed from an agreement to arbitrate.147 However, such a 
possibility is limited to certain form of conditions such as, jurisdictional nexus, 
commercial activity and specially protected property. Therefore, although a waiver either 
expressly or implied is an exception to sovereign immunity from execution, it might be 
subject to or combined with other exceptions.  
 
The combination of these exceptions is particularly found in the US FSIA, in 
which a waiver of sovereign immunity from execution is not independent but subject to a 
commercial activity exception. This situation is different under the UK SIA, the UN 
Convention and the European Convention, where a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution is independent from the commercial activity exception of a foreign property 
concerned.148 As will be seen in the next section, since the municipal law on sovereign 
immunity in a majority of states shows that a foreign state property used for commercial 
activity is not immune from execution in any case, a waiver of sovereign immunity that 
only covers a commercial property makes little sense and has a minor effect in this 
regard.  
 
(b) The New York Convention 
As previously mentioned, recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards might 
only be refused for a number of exceptions specified in Article V of the New York 
Convention. With regards to the issue of sovereign immunity from execution, whilst the 
ICSID Convention clearly specifies a sovereign immunity from execution in Article 55. 
However, since the New York Convention applies with obligations to all arbitral awards 
rendered pursuant to a written arbitration agreement in any Contracting states other than a 
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state where an enforcement is sought,149 it creates a jurisdictional nexus for a forum state 
to assume the submission to an arbitration agreement as a waiver of immunity. Professor 
Christopher Schreuer contends that “the combination of an agreement to arbitrate in a 
State Party to the [New York] Convention and of the obligations under the Convention 
should lead to the withdrawal of immunity for purposes of the arbitration in all other 
Parties to the Convention.” Further he states that “this joint operation of consent to 
arbitrate and treaty provisions to make it effective in a large number of States is not an 
undue extension of jurisdiction over States which have submitted to arbitration. It is 
entirely foreseeable for them and part of the legal framework accepted when consenting 
to arbitration.”150 
 
Although it is deemed that an agreement to arbitrate under the New York 
Convention regime can be interpreted as a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
jurisdiction,151 it is not clear whether the interpretation can be extended to being an 
implied waiver of sovereign immunity from execution. As illustrated earlier in the 
leading case of Ipitrade, the US court held that “a state’s agreement to adjudicate all 
disputes arising under the contract in accordance with Swiss law and by arbitration under 
International Chamber of Commerce Rules constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity 
that could not be unilaterally revoked.”152 Further case law has relied on the Ipitrade 
decision, including Verlinden BV v. Central Bank of Nigeria. This is a case where the US 
Court held that:  
 
“In Ipitrade International v. Federal Republic of Nigeria — yet another of the Nigerian 
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cement contract cases — a Swiss corporation sued in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia to enforce a final arbitration award against Nigeria pursuant to 
Swiss law and based upon the parties' agreement to submit all disputes to arbitration. 
Federal subject matter jurisdiction in Ipitrade, however, existed by virtue of a treaty for the 
enforcement of foreign arbitration awards to which the United States was a signatory and 
which had been incorporated into federal law.”153 
 
In addition, the court further cited the Congressional Report, which states that: 
 
“With respect to implicit waivers, the courts have found such waivers in cases where a 
foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another country or where a foreign state has 
agreed that the law of a particular country should govern a contract. An implicit waiver 
would also include a situation where a foreign state has filed a responsive pleading in an 
action without raising the defense of sovereign immunity.”154 
 
The effect of this decision is notable, in that, where a foreign state has agreed to 
arbitration in another country, which is a party to the New York Convention, a foreign 
state has explicitly waived its objection to such enforcement actions.155 As mentioned 
earlier in previous chapter, whereas the New York Convention does not provide any 
exceptions for the defence of sovereign immunity from execution, the most possible 
ground that the sovereign immunity could be recognised for refusing the enforcement of 
awards is not only the public policy exception under Article V(2)(b). The recognition 
could be also inserted itself into the New York Convention as ‘rules of procedure’ under 
Article III of the New York Convention. However, there would be serious consequences 
stemming from a reference to the public policy exception, under Article V (2) (b) as a 
waiver of sovereign immunity, in order to avoid an execution of arbitral awards. 
Therefore, this needs to be construed narrowly, as declared in the US case of Parsons & 
Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de I’Industrie du Papier, where the court 
held that public policy can be a ground for refusing the enforcement of arbitral awards 
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“only where enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions of morality 
and justice.”156 
 
Considering the ‘rule of procedure’ approach, it can be submitted that a sovereign 
immunity defence could be inserted as an exception in Article III of the New York 
Convention, which is subject to the procedural rules in a state where the arbitral award is 
sought. On the other hand, it can be contended that a defence of sovereign immunity is 
regarded as a substantive.157 The insertion of sovereign immunity defence to Article III of 
the New York Convention as a substantive law was mentioned by the US Supreme court 
in the Verlinden case, which argued that sovereign immunity under the US FSIA is 
considered as a substantive, not simply a jurisdictional issue.158 However, such an 
expansion of the interpretation of Article III would undermine the main objective of the 
New York Convention, which is to limit the grounds for refusing the enforcement of 
arbitral awards, expressly stated in Article V of the New York Convention.159  
 
In addition, another basis for a waiver of sovereign immunity could be found in 
Article I of the New York Convention, where it obliges a state party to recognise and 
enforce arbitral awards that fall within the Convention.160 By committing to the 
obligations of a forum state under Article I (1), Chamlongrasdr argues that:  
 
“the convention also applies to States which are not a party to the convention because 
Article I (1) requires recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on the 
condition that the forum State where the award is sought to be enforced and the State 
where the award was made are the parties to the convention- from the language of the 
convention, it does not require that the State against which award is sought to be enforced 
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has to be a party to the convention.”161 
 
Therefore, it could be said that Article I of the New York Convention does not 
focus on the nationality of the party seeking to enforce an arbitral award but mainly focus 
on the forum state where enforcement of the award is sought. However, Crawford 
disagrees to this proposition and provides a more restrictive view162 by referring to the 
principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec present, which has been stipulated in Article 34 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It says: “a treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent”163 Therefore, it is believed that 
a third state party obligation under an agreement to arbitrate could be implicitly 
considered as a waiver of any objection to enforcement of arbitral awards on sovereign 
immunity defense only in the case that such a waiver is based on its good faith obligation 
to comply with an adverse award.164 
 
In this respect, although it is possible that the applicability of the New York 
Convention is mainly focused on the forum state where the arbitral award is sought, 
regardless the nationality of state parties and the situs of the arbitration, the New York 
Convention requires a jurisdictional link between the arbitration and the forum state court 
subject to the forum state law; which makes forum shopping more relevant. This situation 
is well illustrated by the proceedings regarding the attempt made by LIAMCO, in which it 
sought to execute an arbitral award against Libya’s assets in France, the United States, 
Switzerland and Sweden.  
 
In France, whilst the court granted exequatur to the arbitral award, it rejected the 
attachment of the Libya’s assets on the ground of absolute immunity.165 In the United 
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States, although the District Court of Columbia held that by an agreement to arbitrate in 
Switzerland regarding the dispute with LIAMCO, Libya had waived its sovereign 
immunity in which the court had a jurisdiction to recognise and enforce an arbitral award, 
the court declined its jurisdiction on the ground of the Act of State doctrine.166 The 
Federal Tribunal in Switzerland refused to exercise jurisdiction and execute against 
Libya’s assets on the ground that the underlying transaction and the arbitrator’s choice of 
arbitration locus in Switzerland were not sufficient to establish a close connection with 
Switzerland.167 In this respect, the nexus requirement under Swiss law creates another 
requirement to the enforcement of arbitral awards submitted under the New York 
Convention. This raises a question as to whether by submitting to an agreement to 
arbitrate under the New York Convention a sufficient legal relationship is created 
between the underlying transaction and the place where an arbitral award is sought, so 
that it could be deemed a waiver of sovereign immunity from execution168  
 
Lastly, LIAMCO had attempted to enforce an arbitral award in Sweden, where the 
Court of Appeals of Svea (Stockholm) held that by consenting to arbitration Libya had 
waived its immunity from jurisdiction and execution.169 From the attempt of LIAMCO to 
enforce an arbitral award in many forums under the New York Convention, it could be 
said that a different forum would be subject to different requirements and result in 
different outcomes. This would be in line with an arbitral award rendered under the 
ICSID Convention, which surrenders the measures of execution to a municipal law on 
sovereign immunity.170  
 
Furthermore, the US practice is, by no means inclined to protect the rights of the 
third state. Such an argument was rejected in the award of Creighton Ltd. v Government 
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of the State of Qatar submitted to ICC arbitration. By reaffirming the decision of the US 
District court, the US Court of Appeal rejected an implied waiver of sovereign immunity 
from execution. This was based on the grounds that, as Qatar was not a signatory state to 
the New York Convention, an agreement to arbitrate in France by Qatar, which is a 
signatory state to the New York Convention, could not be considered or extended as an 
initial intention by Qatar of an implied waiver from execution in the United States.171 In 
addition, the court held that “the legislative history of the FSIA could not be read to 
subject foreign governments to US jurisdiction simply because they agreed to have 
contracts governed by another country’s law or they agreed to arbitrate in a country other 
than their own.”172 The US court of Appeal decision in Creighton is almost identical to 
the decision of the Paris Court of First Instance173 and Court of Appeal174 on the same 
grounds; it was held that “there is not evidence to show that the State of Qatar had waived 
its immunity from execution. Submission to arbitration was not deemed to be sufficient 
proof of such a waiver.”175  
 
The basis of both courts’ decisions in the Creighton case is referred to as the rule 
established in Eurodif v Islamic Republic of Iran decision, where the Court of Cassation 
held that “immunity from execution, which, as a matter of principle, benefits foreign 
states, may only be set aside if the property seized was used or intended for the economic 
or commercial private law activity which gave rise to the claim is based.”176 The court 
further held that submission to arbitration does not constitute an implicit waiver of 
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immunity from execution.177 From the Creighton’s appeal court decision and Eurodif 
decision, it could be summarised that a submission to arbitrate under the New York 
Convention is not considered as an implied waiver of sovereign immunity from execution 
in any Contracting states where a foreign state does not intend to waive its immunity.  
 
(c) Institutional Arbitration Rules  
According to the Creighton and the Eurodif decisions mentioned above, those 
decisions also covered ICC arbitration and were subject to ICC rules in which a 
municipal court of a forum state should consider whether the ICC rules provided for a 
waiver of sovereign immunity from execution. Those decisions referred to Article 24 (2) 
of the ICC rules of 1975,178 which says: 
 
“By submitting the dispute to arbitration by the International Chamber of Commerce, the 
parties shall be deemed to have undertaken to carry out the resulting award without delay 
and to have waived their right to any form of appeal in so far as such waiver can validity 
be made.”179 
 
Thus, by submitting to arbitration under ICC Rules, a state should be deemed to 
have waived its immunity from jurisdiction, as well as immunity from execution, when it 
has signed an agreement to arbitrate under the ICC arbitration in order to undertake the 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award.180 However, this proposition had been 
rejected in the case of Eurodif, where the court considered the separate regime of 
sovereign immunity in which a waiver of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction under 
Article 24(2) does not constitute an implied waiver of sovereign immunity of execution 
of the resulting award.  
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deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can 
validly be made.” 
179 Art. 24(2) of the ICC Rules of 1975. 
180 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 236. 
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The court further explained that “a waiver of immunity requires an unequivocal 
demonstration of the state’s intention to waive its immunity and does not result from 
simply executing an arbitration clause or from reference to the ICC Rules of 
Arbitration”181; therefore, “Article 24 of the said Rules merely contains an undertaking to 
voluntarily enforce the award and to enforce the award and to recognize its binding 
nature, but does not include any reference to the issue of immunity.”182 The decision of 
the Paris Court of Appeal was affirmed by the Cour de Cassation.183 The effect of the 
decisions of both the Paris Court of Appeal and the Cour de Cassation, it should be 
principally implied that a waiver of sovereign immunity from execution would only arise 
only from an explicit state’s manifestation, not by a mere inference.184 Consequently, it 
can be summarised that an agreement to arbitrate is not considered to be sufficient to 
constitute any waiver of sovereign immunity from execution. Fox affirms this proposition 
that: 
 
 “The distinction between consent to jurisdiction to determine the dispute and consent to 
enforce the resultant award is generally observed by national courts and evidenced by a 
separate part.”185 
 
Breaking ground, the Cour de Cassation in Creighton v Qatar overruled the 
decisions of the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance and the Paris Court of Appeal, 
following the precedent of the decisions of the Paris Court of Appeal and the Cour de 
Cassation in Eurodif v Islamic Republic of Iran. The Cour de Cassation in Creighton v 
Qatar held that: 
 
“The obligation entered into by the State by signing the arbitration agreement to carry out 
                                                
181 Republic of Iran v Eurodif, The Paris Court of Appeal, (21 April 1982); 65 ILR 93, at 98. See N.B. 
Turck, ‘French and US Courts Define Limits of Sovereign Immunity in Execution and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards’, 17(3) Arb. Int’l. 327 (2001) pp. 327-328. 
182 Republic of Iran v Eurodif, The Paris Court of Appeal, (21 April 1982); 65 ILR 93, at 98; See Signing 
ICC Arbitration Clause Entails Waiver of Immunity From Execution (n 170), pp. 2. 
183 Republic of Iran v Eurodif, The Cour de Cassation, (14 March 1984); 77 ILR 513. 
184 D.M. Orta and A.K. Hussain, ‘The Crossroads Between Enforcement and Execution of Arbitration 
Awards and Sovereign Immunity- A Primer for In-House-Counsel’, International Chamber of Commerce 
Members' Handbook, UK Edition, Spring 2006, pp. 44. 
185 H. Fox, ‘State Immunity and the New York Convention’ in E. Gaillard and D. Pietro (eds), Enforcement 
of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice 
(Cameron May, UK 2009) pp. 852. 
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the award according to Article 24 of the International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration 
Rules implies a waiver of the State’s immunity from execution.”186 
 
The court further explained that (in translation): 
 
“The immunities of states only play as a role insofar as they have not been waived. 
Immunity from execution, like immunity from jurisdiction, may be waived by the 
beneficiary. A waiver of immunity from execution may be inferred in particular by the 
state’s acceptance, when signing an arbitration clause or arbitration agreement, of the final 
nature of the arbitration award. At the time of the conclusion of the contract… the [ICC 
Rules] explicitly stated that by submitting their dispute to ICC arbitration, the parties 
undertake to carry out the award without delay and that the arbitral award is final (Article 
24).”187 
 
In this respect, the Cour de Cassation has clearly demonstrated that “an arbitral 
award against a state that has given its consent to submit certain disputes to arbitration 
should not be rendered ineffective simply because the state benefits from immunity from 
execution.”188 The Creighton decision is not the first case dealing with an implied waiver 
of sovereign immunity from execution by an agreement to arbitrate. The Court of Appeal 
of Rouen in 1996 in Societe Bec Freres v Office des Cereales de Tunisie, held that by 
submitting to arbitration it had waived its sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and, as in 
their good faith, its immunity from execution.189 By considering the cases of Creighton 
and Societe Bec Freres, it should be emphasised that the court had based their decision on 
the ‘principle of good faith’. This proposition places a state on the same footing as a 
private investor in arbitration proceedings in order to enforce an arbitral award when it 
enters the international market and submits itself under an agreement to arbitrate.190  
 
                                                
186 Creighton Limited v. Government of the State of Qatar, The French Cour de Cassation, (6 July 2000), 
reported in XXV Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 458 (2000).  
187 Creighton v. Ministère des Finances de l’Etat du Qatar, Cass. 1e civ, July 6, 2000, 127 J.D.I. 1054, 
1055 (2000), cited in  N. Pengelley, ‘Waiver of Sovereign Immunity from Execution: Arbitration is Not 
Enough’, 26(6) J. Int’l. Arb. 859 (2009) pp. 864-865. 
188 E. Gaillard, ‘Effectiveness of Arbitral Awards, State Immunity from Execution and Autonomy of State 
Entities Three Incompatible Principles’ in E. Gaillard and J. Younan (eds), States Entities in International 
Arbitration (Juris Publishing, Paris 2008) pp. 180. 
189 Societe Bec Freres v Office des Cereales de Tunisie, Cour of Appeal of Rouen, 20 June 1996, Rev Arb. 
263 (1997), at 267. 
190 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 242. 
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Prior to the Creighton decision, some municipal courts, in practice, were inclined 
to hold that an agreement to arbitrate by a state under the New York Convention was 
deemed a waiver of immunity, extending to proceedings for the confirmation or 
recognition of the resulting awards, for example, the Netherlands,191 the United States192 
and France.193 In addition, this trend of practice is not only found under the ICC rules, a 
similar trend can also be found in the rules of other arbitration institutions, such as, 
Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010194 and Article 26(8) of the 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Arbitration Rules 2014.195 By this 
effect, the Creighton decision has made a significant impact on the long arguable issue of 
sovereign immunity from execution as well as setting a new precedent in defining the 
scope of a waiver of sovereign immunity on the agreement to arbitrate ground. As the 
Creighton decision adopted a single regime of sovereign immunity, it is reasonable to 
limit the possibility to invoke a sovereign immunity defence to the execution stage as 
well as to reserve the parties’ commitments and obligations under a principle of pacta 
sunt servanda regarding the contractual nature of arbitration agreement. On this point, it 
might be said that a party’s obligation under an arbitration agreement prevails over the 
law on sovereign immunity.196 Whereas some municipal courts have accepted this ideal 
approach of a waiver of immunity, it is doubtful whether it will be followed by other 
courts under different arbitration rules. 
 
In this context, this trend of decisions could lead to contradictory results between 
                                                
191 N.V. Cabolent v National Iranian Company, Hague Court of Appeal, 28 November 1968c, International 
Legal Materials 9, 161. 
192 Ipitrade International S.A. v Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978), 17 ILM 
1395 (1978); Libyan American Oil Co. v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahriya (LIAMCO), 482 F. 
Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980). 
193 Ben Aiad v. Bey de Tunis, Trib Civ. Seine, 30 June 1891, Clunet 1892, at 952; Republique Malgache v 
Societe Bruynzeel, Trib. Gr. Inst. Paris (referes), 3 May 1971, J.C.P. 1971, cited in G.R. Delaume, ‘Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration’, 38(2) Arb. J. 34 (1983) pp. 36.  
194 Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2010), 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf 
195 Article 26(8) of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Arbitration Rules 2014, 
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx#Article%2026, (Art. 
26(9) of LCIA 1998) 
196 E. Silva-Romero, ‘ICC Arbitration and State Contract’, 13(1) ICC Int’l Court Arb. Bull. 34 (2002), pp. 
35 
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leading arbitration institutions. This is because an arbitration proceeding under the ICC 
may provide more advantage to an investor or private party over the ICSID and the New 
York Conventions when it comes to a sovereign immunity from execution as the ICC 
arbitration may supersede a municipal law on sovereign immunity. This may be in 
conflict with the ICSID Convention, which under Article 55, expressly preserves 
sovereign immunity from execution in any contracting state’s municipal law on sovereign 
immunity.197 However, it should be mentioned that although a state’s agreement to 
arbitration implies that an award will be binding on the parties, and the parties undertake 
to carry out the award without delay under Article 24, the language of Article 24 does not 
mention any reference to the word enforcement or execution. Article 24 only refers to 
‘enforceability of the award’ in the topic. Therefore, it might not be appropriate to 
interpret the enforcement and execution at the same stage. Mayer-Fabre provides a 
critique on this issue: 
 
“The clause in Article 24-2 (now Article 28-6) of the ICC Rules, emphasizing that the 
award is binding on the parties and that the parties undertake to carry it out without delay, 
is a rather stereotyped and, one may even say, superfluous provision, but for its 
psychological effect. It does not include any reference to the immunity from execution that 
a party may be entitled to invoke. To read a waiver of such immunity between the lines of 
this clause is a far-fetched interpretation.”198 
 
Accordingly, it should be noted that the issue of sovereign immunity from 
execution only arises after recognition of the award is confirmed as exequater. Therefore, 
a recognition of an arbitral award should be considered a preliminary phase of the 
execution, not the ultimate phase of the arbitration process. This is clearly illustrated in 
the provisions of the ICSID Convention.199 Furthermore, the decision of Creighton, by 
the French Cour de Cassation, may not fit flawlessly with the UN Convention provisions, 
in which Article 19 and 20 specifically denote that a state must expressly consent to a 
                                                
197 N. Horn, ‘Arbitration and the Protection of Foreign Investment: Concepts and Means’ in N. Horn (ed.), 
Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects, (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands 2004) pp. 30. 
198 Signing ICC Arbitration Clause Entails Waiver of Immunity From Execution (n 170), pp. 3 
199 G.R. Delaume, ‘Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration’, 38(2) Arb. J. 34 (1983) pp. 45; 
See Bevenuti & Bonfant v Congo, Judgment of June 26, 1981, Cour d’Appel de Paris, 108 Journal Du Droit 
International 843 (1981). 
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waiver of its sovereign immunity from execution in order for an execution of an arbitral 
award against any foreign state’s property. Therefore, the jurisprudence of an implied 
waiver in the Creighton decision, by the French Cour de Cassation under the ICC rules, 
might be out of line with the previous case law and statues requiring an explicit waiver of 
execution immunity.  
 
By a comparison of ICC rules, it is questionable whether by submitting to 
arbitration it can be assumed that a party, obliged under Article 24, waives its sovereign 
immunity from execution in the same manner as its sovereign immunity from 
jurisdiction. Such an assumption requires further clarification in the ICC rules. Currently 
the ICC rules do not provide any reference to a municipal law on sovereign immunity. In 
the context of the Creighton case, there are no statutory or treaty provisions governing 
sovereign immunity under French law in the same way as in UK or UK law. The French 
court decision is based on a subjective approach, employed by interpreting a foreign 
state’s intention, rather than by an objective approach referring to defined provisions in 
the law on sovereign immunity.200  
 
Therefore, the decisions by the French court could be adequately explained by the 
assumption rendered under the ICC arbitration for the purpose of the enforcement under 
the New York Convention. Although the French jurisprudence in respect to an implied 
waiver in the Creighton decision seems to be out of kilter with the French Court, 
subsequently, in Embassy of the Russian Federation et.al v Compagnie NOGA 
d’importation et d’exportation (NOGA)201 the court tried to apply a stricter test with 
regards to a diplomatic immunity. Here it was determined that a general wavier of 
sovereign immunity from execution could not amount or extend to a waiver of diplomatic 
assets. Therefore, such assets could be attached only if was expressly and specifically 
waived in relation to targeted diplomatic assets. This issue will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter.  
                                                
200 Signing ICC Arbitration Clause Entails Waiver of Immunity From Execution (n 170), pp. 3. 
201 Embassy of the Russian Federation et.al v Compagnie NOGA d’importation et d’exportation (NOGA), 
Paris Court of Appeal (1st  Ch. A), 10 August 2000, Case no. 2000/14157. 
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Another recent interesting case regarding a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
enforcement and execution before the French Supreme Court, which is not considered 
only a diplomatic asset but also a public asset, is NML Capital Limited v Republic of 
Argentina (NML).202 In this case, Argentina made two bonds contracts with the Banker 
Trust Company, which contained a pro forma Argentinean wavier of immunity from 
execution, which was annexed to contracts. It provided as follows: 
 
“To the extent that the republic or any of its revenues, assets or properties shall be entitled, 
in any jurisdiction in which any specified court is located in which any related proceeding 
may at any time be brought against it or any of its revenues, assets or properties, or in any 
jurisdiction in which any specified court or other court is located in which any suit, action 
or proceeding may at any time be brought solely for the purpose of enforcing or executing 
any related judgment, to any immunity from suit, from the jurisdiction of any such court, 
from set-off, from attachment prior to judgment, from attachment in aid of execution of 
judgment, from execution of a judgment of from any other legal or judicial process or 
remedy, and to the extent that in any such jurisdiction there shall be attributed such an 
immunity, the republic has hereby irrevocably agreed not to claim and has irrevocably 
waived such immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction… 
provided further that such agreement and waiver, in so far as it relates to any jurisdiction 
other than a jurisdiction in which a specified court is located, is given solely for the 
purpose of enabling the fiscal agent or a holder of securities of this series to enforce or 
execute a related judgment.”203 
 
During 2001 and 2003, NML Capital Limited purchased some of these bonds 
from the New York Stock Exchange. Unfortunately, Argentina defaulted on its debts in 
2001, which resulted in a claim by NML Capital against Argentina before the US Court 
in New York. The court found in favour of NML Capital for an amount of USD 284 
million.204 Following this judgment, NML Capital initiated a series of international 
enforcement proceedings in multiple jurisdictions including France, United Kingdom, 
                                                
202 NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina, Cass civ 1, March 28 2013, No. 11-10-450. 
203 A fiscal agency agreement between Argentina and Banker Trust Company as a Form of Registered 
Security on October 19, 1994.  
204 NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina, No 05 Civ 2434, 2006 WL 1294853 (SDNY, May 10, 
2006). 
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United States and Ghana.205 NML Capital first began to attach assets covered by 
diplomatic immunity before the French Court. On September 28, 2011, the French 
Supreme Court ordered the release of the attachment of diplomatic assets, on the ground 
that such assets were governed by special rules pursuant to the Vienna Convention; which 
requires that a waiver must be both express and specific to be effective.206  
 
Apart from the attachment against diplomatic assets, NML Capital further 
attached against monies owed by Air France, BNP Paribas and Total Austral to 
Argentina, in regard to tax and social security claims; these being considered public 
assets.207 Both the Court of first instance and the Court of Appeal ruled for a  release of 
the attachment of assets as Argentina’s waiver of sovereign immunity did not 
unequivocally and specifically identify such tax and social claims; thus, those assets 
remained to be protected by Argentina’s sovereign immunity from execution.208 
Nevertheless, NML Capital appealed the case to the French Supreme Court, contending 
that Argentina purportedly agreed and waived such immunity, to the fullest extent 
permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction, pursuant to the bond contracts. On March 28, 
2013, the French Supreme Court confirmed the Court of Appeal’s decisions, holding that: 
 
“according to customary international law, as reflected by the United Nations Convention 
of 2 December 2004 on the Jurisdictional Immunities of State and their Property, while 
States can waive, by written contract, their immunity from execution against assets or 
categories of assets used or destined to be used for public purposes, they can only do so in 
an express and specific manner, mentioning the assets or the category of the assets over 
which the waiver is granted.”209 
 
In this respect, the French Supreme Court has recently taken a step further to 
                                                
205 NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina, Cass civ 1, September 28, 2011, No 09-72.057; NML 
Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina, [2011] UKSC 31; EM Limited v Republic of Argentina, 473 F 3d 
463 (2nd Cir 2007), cert denied, 552 US 818 (2007); NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina, Accra 
High Court Commercial Division, October 11, 2012, suit No RPC/343/12. 
206 NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina, Cass civ 1, September 28, 2011, No 09-72.057. 
207 See NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina et Air France, Cass civ 1, March 28 2013, No 11-13-
323; NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina et Total Austral, Cass civ 1, March 28 2013, No 10-
25938. 
208 See E Kleiman, J Spinelli, ‘NML v Argentina: Supreme Court tightens waiver of sovereign immunity 
test’, < http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3b63767e-0978-452e-a447-20ff566c92b4> . 
209 NML Capital Limited v Republic of Argentina, Cass civ 1, March 28 2013, No. 11-10-450. 
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setting a new doctrine towards a greater protection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
by tightening the conditions and extending this approach to public assets; this is separate 
to the stricter test already applied to diplomatic assets in the NOGA case. By requiring an 
express and specific waiver of sovereign immunity to public assets or a category of 
public assets over which the waiver is granted, this French jurisprudence could be seen as 
the strictest approach applied to the waiver of sovereign immunity from execution, thus 
appearing more state friendly approach. However, this practice might undermine the bona 
fide intention of party to waive sovereign immunity from execution. Additionally, this 
approach will increase the difficulty, in practice, to execute an arbitral award in France, 
even in the event of an express waiver.  
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s reference to the UN Convention as a ground to 
support its far-reaching proposition, that a wavier can be only effective if it is both 
expressly and specifically waived to assets or category of assets in which an execution is 
sought, appears questionable.210 This is due to the fact that no provision of the UN 
Convention mentions this strict requirement. Rather, Article 19(a) of the UN Convention 
only requires that a consent by a state for the purpose of sovereign immunity from 
execution must be expressly waived in order to execute an arbitral award against a 
foreign state’s property.  
 
Yet, while the Supreme Court proposition might refer to the combination of 
Article 19(a) with Article 19(b) of the UN Convention in the event of earmarking where 
“the State has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim which is 
the object of that proceeding”, these two exceptions should not be combined for a 
purpose of execution. The text of the UN Convention separates these two exceptions as 
alternatives rather than cumulative requirements.211 Therefore, the attempt of the French 
Supreme court to apply such a strict test will be debatable amongst practitioners when 
considering whether a general willing express waiver by a state binds a state for the 
                                                
210 E Kleiman, J Spinelli, ‘NML v Argentina: Supreme Court tightens waiver of sovereign immunity test’,  
< http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3b63767e-0978-452e-a447-20ff566c92b4> . 
211 ibid 
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purpose of sovereign immunity from execution. If the answer is no, a waiver would be 
deprived of its intention and practical effects.  
 
The state practice of an implied waiver of sovereign immunity from execution can 
be concluded from the decision of FG Hemisphere212 before the Hong Kong Court of 
Final Appeal. The background of the case concerned the ICC awards made in Zurich and 
Paris against Congo in which the original beneficiary, Energoinvest, assigned the benefit 
of the award to FG Hemisphere. Due to the fact that Congo is not a party to the New 
York Convention, FG Hemisphere, therefore, had initiated several enforcement 
proceedings in other New York Convention Contracting States, including the US and 
Hong Kong. As mentioned earlier, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal reversed the 
Court of Appeal decision by declaring that Hong Kong was bound to follow the Mainland 
China approach of absolute immunity wherein Congo was entitled to claim sovereign 
immunity.213 The court also considered whether an agreement to arbitrate is considered as 
a waiver of sovereign immunity from enforcing jurisdiction. Since Congo is not a 
signatory of the New York Convention, it should be noted that an implied waiver of 
sovereign immunity under the New York Convention and ICC Rules might not benefit 
FG Hemisphere. Although the fact in this case is similar to the Creighton case before the 
French Supreme Court, where both Qatar and Congo are not a party to the New York 
Convention, the Court of Appeal argued that;  
 
“It cannot in my judgment be said that by entering upon an ICC arbitration agreement with 
a private party, a foreign state that is not a party to the New York Convention is going 
beyond the making of a representation to the private party and is making a representation 
to each Convention State that it consents to the enforcement against it in the Convention 
State of such arbitral award as may be made. It seems to me that jurisdiction in the forum 
state can, in such circumstances, only be conferred by legislation or by an express 
representation by the foreign State to the forum State.”214 
 
The Court of Final Appeal confirmed this position and held that although the ICC 
                                                
212 FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of the Congo, FACV 5-7/2010  
213 Ibid 31 
214 FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of the Congo, CACV373/2008, CACV 43/2009, 
para 171. 
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rules require the parties to waive any forms of immunity, it should have “an unequivocal 
submission to the jurisdiction of the forum State at the time when the form State’s 
jurisdiction is invoked against the impleaded State.”215 Therefore, it could summarise that 
a wavier must be made in a forum state by a foreign state, which follows the VCLT rule 
of pacta tertiis as mentioned earlier in order to protect a right of a third state.216   
 
In summary, although some municipal courts and arbitration institution rules 
accept an agreement to arbitration as constituting a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution, a party might face other difficulties when attempting to execute an arbitral 
award against a foreign state asset. This is due to the fact that most jurisdictions and their 
municipal laws on sovereign immunity limit the execution of an arbitral award to only 
property used for commercial activities.217 Furthermore, even in the event that a state has 
expressly waived its sovereign immunity from execution, it is doubtful whether it means 
that such an execution could be applied to any or all foreign state assets, including those 
assets used for public purposes or diplomatic functions.  
 
This controversial issue is not yet settled and will be discussed further in this 
thesis. Consequently, it can be said that a waiver of a sovereign immunity exception in 
itself does not resolve the problems related to sovereign immunity from execution. The  
main challenge is to determine whether the foreign state’s asset, claimed in a dispute, 
falls within the commercial activity exception provided in the relevant municipal law on 
sovereign immunity; as mentioned earlier in chapter 3. Therefore, the combination of an 
agreement to arbitrate exception and a commercial activity exception will be considered a 
main challenge to overcoming a defence of sovereign immunity in order to enforce 
arbitral awards. Moreover, such combinations of sovereign immunity exceptions may be 
                                                
215 FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of the Congo, FACV 5-7/2010, para 392. The 
court also refers to cases in paras 384-393 including Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v Lithuania and 
Another [2006] EWCA Civ 1529; Mighell v. Sultan of Johore [1984] 1 QBD 149; Duff Development Co. 
Ltd. v Government of Kelantan [1924] AC 797; A Company Ltd. v. Republic of X [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
520, where an implied of waiver of sovereign immunity is not granted, 
216 FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of the Congo, CACV373/2008, CACV 43/2009, 
para 170. 
217 See the US FSIA Section 1610(a) and the UK SIA Section 13(4). 
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subject to certain restrictions, as to whether they are certain types of property, which are 
considered specially protected, and tests of jurisdictional nexus and the act of state 
doctrine, may not be easily applied. These restrictions added to the sovereign immunity 
defence exceptions would cause difficulty to an investor attempting to execute against 
those properties.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Although the precedent in Creighton, under ICC arbitration, has defined what conduct 
constitutes a waiver of immunity from execution, by an agreement to arbitrate, this does 
not allow execution against all property of foreign state but it is limited to commercial 
property. In addition, it will be difficult to execute against certain types of specially 
protected property, including bank account of diplomatic mission, military property, 
central bank property and cultural heritage property. This difficulty is reflected in the 
cases of NOGA, NML and FG Hemisphere, in which the Courts adopted a stricter rule to 
a wavier of sovereign immunity from execution. Therefore, this difficulty, towards a 
state-friendly approach, will challenge and undermine the effectiveness of arbitration and 
investors being able to satisfy arbitral awards. In turn this difficulty may lead to an 
increased need for cautious risk management when a party is considering whether to 
invest in a foreign state where the municipal court applies such a strict test.    
 
In this context, while the exclusion of immunity from execution is regrettable for the 
ICSID Convention, Schreuer argues that “the impossibility to enforce an ICSID award as 
a consequence of the law concerning the execution of judgments in one or several states 
in no way affects the obligation of the party to the ICSID arbitration to abide by and 
comply with the award in accordance with Article 53(1).”218 Failure to comply with this 
treaty obligation will result in the revival of the diplomatic right of protection under 
Article 27(1), as well as the possibility of taking the dispute to the ICJ under Article 64 
under a state responsibility. This thesis supports this contention and will further examine 
this possibility in later chapters. This contribution will increase the effectiveness of the 
                                                
218 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009), pp 1149. 
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investor-state arbitration in combination with the most clear and certain solution of 
including the waiver of immunity from execution in BITs or municipal laws as seen in 
NML case that a limitation of an express waiver of any immunity specified only in the 
contract but not in the BITs or municipal laws. Consequently, the parties will possess a 
greater knowledge of the predictability of the execution of arbitral awards, relying on 
legal and political protection, which will in turn lead to economic benefits for both 
parties.     
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  Chapter 6 
Challenges and Limitations to  
Enforcing Arbitral Awards against Foreign States 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite the uncertainty of the law on sovereign immunity, a number of domestic courts 
and their municipal sovereign immunity laws have clearly expressed the position that 
immunity from enforcement and execution is no longer absolute. Those views remain 
controversial as noted in scholarly literature.1 As already noted, municipal laws require 
either an express or implied waiver of immunity from execution on certain types of state 
property, which may serve sovereign purpose.2 In this context, whilst it is possible to 
waive sovereign immunity from execution in order to levy against both sovereign and 
commercial properties of a foreign state, it might be difficult to levy execution against 
certain types of property, which are protected despite a waiver of sovereign immunity 
from execution.3  
 
As mentioned earlier, difficulties may arise in executing an arbitral award under the US 
FSIA, the UK SIA and the UN Convention due to the type of property involved, which 
are mostly considered as having a non-commercial purpose or being so-called ‘specially 
protected property’, such as, central bank account, diplomatic property and military 
property.4 In order to deal with this difficulty, the predominant focus situates on 
qualification, so as to decide whether such specially protected property serves sovereign 
or commercial purposes.  
 
                                                
1 A. Reinisch, ‘European Court Practice concerning state immunity from enforcement measures’ 17 EJIL 
803 (2006) pp. 804. (European Court Practice) 
2 See L.J. Bouchez, ‘The nature and scope of state immunity from jurisdiction and execution’ Netherlands 
Y.B.I.L. 1 (1979) 
3 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 260. 
4 A. Boralessa, ‘Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID awards against the 
republic of Argentina: Obstacles that transnational corporations may face’, 17 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev 53 (2004) 
pp. 96. (Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom) 
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As noted in Chapter 3, whereas the test for sovereign immunity from jurisdiction focuses 
on the nature of an activity in establishing jurisdiction to commercial activity, the test to 
distinguish between commercial property and sovereign property for sovereign immunity 
from execution usually concentrates on the purpose of property.5  Accordingly, this could 
imply that the limitations on the immunity from execution are somewhat less intrusive 
than in the field of immunity from jurisdiction.6 Therefore, a more cautious view is 
reflected in the codification of the law of sovereign immunity, at both a domestic and 
international level, by adopting a stricter test in order to protect a state property from 
execution, whether by section 1610 and 1611 of the US FSIA, section 13 of the UK SIA 
and Article 19 and 20 of the UN Convention.  
 
Nevertheless, it is not always easy to adopt such a purpose test in the context of a 
property with a mixed commercial and sovereign purpose; this becomes particularly 
apparent in the case of a bank account. The execution against such sovereign property, 
belonging to a foreign state, would be sensitive to the international relations between 
states, as seen in the French case of Embassy of the Russian Federation et.al v 
Compagnie NOGA d’importation et d’exportation (NOGA),7 the US cases of Birch 
Shipping Co v The United Republic of Tanzania8 and LETCO v Liberia9 and the UK case 
of Alcom Ltd. v Republic of Colombia.10 According to these cases, the legal basis of 
sovereign immunity, to protect this special property, can be primarily found in the 
municipal laws on sovereign immunity, treaties, and customary international law relating 
to diplomatic immunities. Nevertheless, some recent codifications of sovereign immunity 
allow execution against properties with such a mixed purpose or even specially protected 
properties with some differences in the degree of exception.11  
                                                
5 C. Schreuer, State immunity: Some recent developments (Grotius Publication, Great Britain 1988) pp. 145. 
6 European Court Practice (n 1), pp. 804. 
7 Embassy of the Russian Federation et.al v Compagnie NOGA d’importation et d’exportation (NOGA), 
Paris Court of Appeal (1st  Ch. A), Case no. 2000/14157. 
8 Birch Shipping Co v Embassy of The United Republic of Tanzania, D.C.C., 18 November 1980, 63 ILR 
524 (1982). 
9 LETCO v. Liberia, United States District Court, the District of Columbia, Judgment, 16 April 1987, 2 
ICSID Reports 390. 
10 Alcom Ltd. v The Republic of Colombia, House of Lords (Court of Appeal), AC 580 (1984). 
11 See Sec. 16(1) of the UK SIA and Section 1610(a)(4)(B) and 1611(b) of the US FSIA. 
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However, the term ‘mixed purpose of foreign property’ specifically refers to the mixed 
purpose of an embassy bank account, which is particularly attached for the purpose of 
execution. In this context, a bank account of a foreign state should be treated differently 
and separately from an embassy bank account, in which the latter could be categorised as 
property of a diplomatic mission, being specially protected. Therefore, it is the purpose of 
this chapter to consider whether the exceptions provided in certain recent codifications 
have provided sufficient grounds in order to allow for execution against foreign property 
with a mixed purpose and of specially protected property. 
 
Further difficulties arise during the process of execution concerning the jurisdictional 
nexus between the underlying claim (subject-matter) and the place where the award is 
sought, plus the nexus requirement between the underlying claim (subject-matter) and 
property sought to be executed. As shown in many cases, whilst a claim of sovereign 
immunity from execution is defeated by a commercial activity exception, provided under 
major codifications on sovereign immunity, some codifications add a specific link 
requirement in order for execution against a foreign state’s commercial property.12 
Consequently, it is difficult to establish or find this specific link since the majority of 
foreign states are unlikely to keep commercial property, which has a connection with a 
claim in a forum state.13 Accordingly, another proposition is whether the additional 
requirement of connection causes further difficulties and burdens in executing an arbitral 
award against a property of a foreign state. 
 
Certainly, these difficulties have caused some potential challenges and limitations to 
enforcing arbitral awards against foreign states’ property, for both the municipal courts 
and investors.  Nevertheless, various recent codifications have provided exceptions 
thereby improving the effectiveness of the execution of arbitral awards, albeit with a 
mixed degree of success.  
 
                                                
12 See Sec. 1610(1)(2) of the US FSIA. 
13 Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom (n 4), pp. 94. 
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2. Execution against Mixed Purposes and Specially Protected Foreign 
State Properties 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, most municipal laws on sovereign immunity require an 
express or implied waiver of immunity from execution regarding certain types of state 
property, which are serving a sovereign purpose. However it remains difficult to 
categorise certain types of property, which are specially protected from execution in any 
situation, even in the case where a foreign state has expressly waived its sovereign 
immunity from execution.14 Moreover, this difficulty is also found in certain types of 
property, which serve both commercial and sovereign purposes. Therefore, it is a purpose 
of this section to identify some difficulties arising in cases dealing with bank accounts 
held by diplomatic missions, central bank funds and specially protected properties, as 
well as to show how municipal courts in major jurisdictions overcome these difficulties.  
  
(a) Bank Accounts Held by Diplomatic Missions in the Executing Country 
A bank account is a popular object for the execution of an arbitral award, as it is 
often not clearly designated for specific purposes and may be used for mixed sovereign 
and commercial activities.15 Accordingly, the underlying reason for this difficulty is the 
question of the future or intended use of property; being particularly difficult and 
uncertain. Therefore, it is submitted that a bank account, held by a foreign state in a 
forum state, is not necessarily used or is intended for the exclusive use of a sovereign 
purpose and thus could be exempt from an execution measure.16 Ideally, if such a bank 
account has been earmarked or allocated by a foreign state for a purpose of execution 
under a dispute, it would be easier for an investor to attach and satisfy against that bank 
account; as well as it being easier for a municipal court to treat such a bank account as 
non-immune property.17 In practice, it seems unlikely that a state would earmark or 
allocate property in such a way, for the satisfaction of an execution under a dispute in an 
                                                
14 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 260. 
15 G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 2(2) 
ICSID Review 403 (1987) pp. 415. 
16 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 268. 
17 J. Crawford, ‘Decisions of British Courts During 1984 Involving Questions of Public of Private 
International law’ 55 British Yearbook of International Law 330 (1984) pp. 342. 
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agreement or contract.  
 
At the outset, where a bank account is not destined for a specific purpose or is not 
used for a mixed purpose of both sovereign and commercial activities, it might be 
difficult for an investor to execute against a mixed purpose bank account. This is because 
municipal law provisions on sovereign immunity only allow execution against 
commercial property of foreign state in the absence of waiver. As mentioned earlier, 
Section 13(4) (b) of the UK SIA provides that a “property which is for the time being in 
use or intended for use for commercial purposes”18 might be subject to execution for the 
purpose of an enforcement of arbitral award. Similarly, Section 1610(a)(6) of the US 
FSIA provides that property of a foreign state in the United States “used for a commercial 
activity in the United States” is not immune from a sovereign immunity from execution 
upon a confirmation of a judgment of arbitral award.19  
 
On this point, both codifications allow execution against the commercial property 
of foreign state in the absence of waiver. The US FSIA combines a commercial activity 
exception with a waiver exception; however, it also limits the execution to only 
commercial property. Accordingly, it can be acknowledged that it does not allow 
execution against a sovereign property even in the case of a waiver. In regards to a 
restrictive immunity, it should be highlighted that commercial property should not be 
immune from execution regardless of a waiver. This is because a waiver of sovereign 
immunity from execution only becomes relevant to property used for a sovereign 
purpose. In other words, a state cannot raise a sovereign immunity defence in respect to 
execution against commercial property of a foreign state. In turn, such a defence might be 
available in relation to foreign state property used for a sovereign purpose.  
 
Therefore, it may be argued that “by incorporating the conditions set out in 
subsection 1-7 of section 1610 (a), the draftsmen have made the FSIA step backwards to 
                                                
18 See Section 13(4)(b) of the UK SIA. 
19 See Section 1610 (a)(6) of the US FSIA. 
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the less restrictive immunity from execution.”20 In addition, the US FSIA imposes a 
further restriction on execution to “the commercial property upon which the claim is 
based” in pursuant to a nexus requirement.21 This is in contrast with the UK SIA, which 
allows a state to waive its immunity for property used for a sovereign purpose, requiring 
no nexus connection between a commercial property and an underlying claim.22 By this 
effect, the UK SIA separates or divides a commercial activity exception from a waiver 
exception, which appears easier for the investor when executing an arbitral award.23 
 
In this respect, it is important to consider whether the specific bank account in 
question is in use or used for a sovereign or commercial purpose. Schreuer suggests two 
contrasting ways in order to determine the purpose of a bank account, being that: 
 
“One possible answer is to see bank accounts and other money credits as inherently 
commercial assets which cannot be regarded as directly serving sovereign purpose… The 
opposite argument sees the mere possibility of a future public use of financial assets as 
sufficient reason always to regard bank accounts belonging to foreign States as immune as 
a general precaution.”24 
 
Nevertheless, both extreme positions cannot answer the problem of qualification 
of property, since the origin of the property might be used in determining the nature of 
the property, as seen in the UN Convention, 25which adopts both a nature and purpose 
test. As mentioned earlier, a bank account is not always solely used for a sovereign 
purpose. It is even more complex if the bank account in question is not destined for a 
specific purpose but is used for mixed purposes. Therefore, the main focus turns to the 
consideration of whether money is specially designated for a particular public function 
and whether the main portion of money in a bank account is used for a sovereign or 
commercial activity.  
                                                
20 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 261. 
21 See Section 1610(a)(2) of the US FSIA. 
22 See Section 13(3)(4) of the UK SIA. 
23 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments, (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp.68-69.; 
Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom (n 4), pp. 105. 
24 ibid 149; See also C. Schreuer, ‘Some Recent Developments in the Law of State Immunity’, 2 
Comparative Law Yearbook 215 (1978) pp. 233. 
25 See Art. 2(2) of the UN Convention. 
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However, it is impractical to find an actual intention for the use of money in an 
account, as well as the future purpose of money, which hardly possible to predict. 
Although a practical and uniform test is not settled among recent codifications, the UK 
SIA provides a solution by allowing the Head of the foreign State’s diplomatic mission to 
issue a certificate as sufficient evidence for confirmation as to whether such a property is 
in use or intended for a sovereign purpose use.26  The practice in the United Kingdom 
appears to be a solution for this problem of qualification, but it is not entirely shifting the 
burden of proof onto the foreign state. In fact, it is placing the burden of proof on an 
investor to find evidence of the commercial purpose of foreign property in order to 
disapprove the Head of the foreign State’s diplomatic mission’s certificate.27 This 
problem is even more complex when considering a mixed purpose of an embassy bank 
account, which is the main focal point for execution of an award, and also the main focus 
in this section. 
 
Generally speaking, as a rule of customary international law, the privileges and 
immunities of diplomats and their properties are protected by the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (‘The Vienna Convention’). In this respect, such privileges 
and immunities are not affected by the provisions of a municipal law on sovereign 
immunity before a municipal court for the purpose of execution.28 The UK SIA29 and the 
European Convention30 have clearly expressed a saving clause in their provisions 
                                                
26 See Sec. 13(5) of the UK SIA.; See also G.R. Delaume, ‘The State Immunity Act of the United 
Kingdom’, 73(2) AJIL 185 (1979) pp.196.; K.P. Knierim, ‘Sovereign Immunity from Judicial Enforcement: 
The Impact of the European Convention on State Immunity’, 12 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 130 (1973).; I.M. 
Sinclair, ‘The European Convention on State Immunity’, 22 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 254 (1973). 
27 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments, (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp.152-153.; D. 
Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 266-267. 
28 See Sec.16(1) of the UK SIA; Sec. 1604, 1609 and 1611 of the US FSIA; Art. 32 and 33 of the European 
Convention; Art. 21 and 26 of the UN Convention. 
29 Sec. 16(1) of the UK SIA, it reads: 
“(1) This Part of this Act does not affect any immunity or privilege conferred by the 
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 or the Consular Relations Act 1968.” 
30 Art. 32 of the European Convention, it reads: 
“Nothing in the present Convention shall affect privileges and immunities relating to the 
exercise of the functions of diplomatic missions and consular posts and of persons 
connected with them.” 
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regarding the preservation of diplomatic immunities.31 Such a saving clause has been 
explained in the Explanatory Report on the European Convention on State Immunity: 
 
“Diplomatic and consular immunities and privileges are already governed by rules of 
international law, notably those contained in the Vienna Conventions of 18 April 1961 and 
24 April 1963, and in bilateral agreements. The considerations which underlie these 
privileges and immunities are different from those underlying the present Convention. The 
Convention cannot prejudice diplomatic and consular immunities, directly or indirectly. It 
is clear from Article 32 - and this is confirmed by Article 33 - that in the event of conflict 
between the present Convention and the instruments mentioned above, the provisions of 
the latter shall prevail.”32 
 
Therefore, sovereign immunity law or state immunity law should not be mixed up 
with a diplomatic law. Whilst the former governs states, in order to protect their 
jurisdictional immunities and their property, the latter governs the protection of 
diplomatic premises,33 their furnishings and other property thereon, the means of 
transport of the mission,34 the achieves and documents of the mission,35 diplomatic bags36 
and especially diplomatic agents and their properties.37  
                                                
31 H. Fox, ‘Enforcement Jurisdiction, Foreign State Property and Diplomatic Immunity’ 34(1) ICLQ 115 
(1985) pp. 126. 
32 The Explanatory Report on the European Convention on State Immunity 1972, para 117, U.K.T.S. No. 
31 
33 Art. 21 (1) of the Vienna Convention, it reads: 
“1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may 
not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.” 
34 Art. 21 (3) of the Vienna Convention, it reads: 
“3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the 
means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or 
execution.” 
35 Art. 24 of the Vienna Convention, it reads: 
“The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolable at any time and wherever 
they may be.” 
36 Art. 27 (3) of the Vienna Convention, it reads: 
“3. The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained.” 
37 Art. 29 of the Vienna Convention, it reads: 
“The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of 
arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all 
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.” 
   Art. 30 of the Vienna Convention, it reads: 
“1. The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and 
protection as the premises of the mission. 
2. His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 31, his 
property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability.” 
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A bank account held in the name of a foreign diplomat mission or so-called 
‘embassy bank account’ has been ranked amongst the most frequent property to be 
executed in enforcement cases, however, the Vienna Convention does not expressly 
mention it in any of its provisions. Although the Vienna Convention makes no provision 
for immunity to the bank account of a diplomatic mission, one can refer to two provisions 
involving personal immunity of the diplomatic agent and his property under Article 29 
and 30(2), plus the immunity of property attached to the premises of the diplomatic 
mission under Article 22 and 24. In this context, it could be, therefore, said that an 
embassy bank account could be considered as a property of the diplomatic agent, as well 
as a property of a diplomatic mission. In fulfilling a lacuna in the Vienna Convention, 
Denza argues that “although under Article 24 of the Convention the archives of a mission 
are inviolable ‘wherever they may be’, Article 22.3 gives immunity from search, 
requisition, attachment, or execution only to property on the premises of the mission, and 
accounts are not held on the premises.”38 Furthermore, Fox provides additional reasoning 
as to the inclusion of an embassy account as immune property, being that: 
 
 “to grant immunity to the bank account of the diplomatic mission would, therefore, be to 
accord immunity to the bank account of the State… the Vienna Convention included no 
provision relating to back accounts of the diplomatic mission because they were 
considered to be covered by general State immunity, and the law relating to general State 
immunity so far as property in diplomatic use is concerned looks to the Vienna 
Convention and the protection of diplomatic immunities to afford immunity.”39 
 
By referring to the law on state immunity, it is assumed that state practice tends to 
apply the law of state immunity together with the diplomatic law when it is required to 
consider the immunity of an embassy’s bank accounts before a municipal court. This 
rationale between the law on sovereign immunity and diplomatic law lies primarily on a 
customary and conventional diplomatic and consular law in protecting the ability of 
                                                
38 E. Denza, Diplomatic Law Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (3rd ed) 
(OUP, UK 2007) pp. 156-157. 
39 H. Fox, ‘Enforcement Jurisdiction, Foreign State Property and Diplomatic Immunity’ 34(1) ICLQ 115 
(1985) pp. 127-128. 
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diplomatic missions to serve their diplomatic functions.40 Certain significant codifications 
on the law of sovereign immunity have provided separate and specific provisions and 
exceptions to particularly deal with a diplomatic immunity for a special protection.41  
 
For instance, whilst the US FSIA only specifically allows execution relating to a 
judgment establishing rights an immovable property, not used for purposes of 
maintaining a diplomatic and consular mission,42 the UK SIA has expressly preserved 
immunities or privileges conferred by the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964 or the 
Consular Relations Act of 1968.43 Notwithstanding the fact that the US FSIA and the UK 
SIA do not expressly refer to an immunity for the bank account of a diplomatic mission, 
the UN Convention has expressly stated in Article 21(1) (a) that “property, including any 
bank account, which is used or intended for use in the performance of the functions of the 
diplomatic mission of the State”44 shall not be recognised as property used for 
commercial purposes. Accordingly, a bank account of diplomatic mission is immune 
from an execution. Thus, the overlap between the law on sovereign immunity and 
diplomatic law becomes more evident since many investor-state arbitration cases have 
attempted in executing against embassy bank accounts.  This is demonstrated in the cases 
of Philippine Embassy Bank Account, Alcom and Birch. 
 
The proposition and the inclusion of the bank account of a diplomatic mission as 
immune property were considered by the German Federal Constitutional Court in the 
landmark decision of the Philippine Embassy Bank Account case, where the court noted 
that: 
                                                
40 European Court Practice (n 1), pp. 811-812. 
41 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1169. 
42 Sec. 1610 (a)(4)(B) of the US FSIA, it reads: 
“(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603 (a) of 
this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from 
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of 
the United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if— 
   (4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property— 
        (B) which is immovable and situated in the United States: Provided, That such 
property is not used for purposes of maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission or the 
residence of the Chief of such mission, or” 
43 Sec. 16(1) of the UK SIA. 
44 See Art. 21 of the UN Convention. 
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“This and similar treaty provisions confirm the general rule of international law that 
property used by the sending State for the performance of its diplomatic function in any 
event enjoys immunity even if it does not fall within the material or spatial scope of the 
inviolability provisions in Article 22 of the Vienna Convention.”45 
 
By extending the scope of the inviolability and immunity to an embassy bank 
account, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that “claims against a general 
bank account of the embassy of a foreign state which exists in the State of the forum and 
the purpose of which is to cover the embassy costs and expenses are not subject to forced 
execution by the State of the forum.”46 The court further accepted that a general current 
bank account might be used by a foreign state as a shield for financial transactions, which 
are not directly related to the functions of a diplomatic mission.47 In this context, by 
claiming immunity over a bank account of embassy, a proof of a specific threat in 
running the embassy was not necessary, only an ‘abstract danger’ was sufficient.48  
 
Similarly, the UK Court determined, on very similar facts, whether money in a 
mixed account was used or intended for use commercially in Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of 
Colombia case. In order to determine a purpose of money, a commercial exception under 
section 13 (4) must be considered, as well as a certificate of the head of the diplomatic 
mission under section 13 (5). Pursuant to the UK SIA, such a certificate is sufficiently 
proved as an evidence for the use or intended use of property, unless the contrary is 
proved. Therefore, a burden of proof is left to a creditor to challenge the conclusiveness 
of a certificate issued by the head of the diplomatic mission.49  
 
Although the Colombian Ambassador had submitted a certificate to the lower 
court confirming that the funds in question were not used for commercial purposes but 
                                                
45 The Philippine Embassy Bank Account, German Federal Constitutional Court (13 December 1977), 46 
BVerfGE 342 (1977), at 317; 65 ILR 146 (1984). 
46 ibid 187. 
47 ibid 317; 65 ILR 146 (1984) at 190; See E. Wiesinger, ‘State Enforcement from Enforcement Measures’ 
University of Vienna (July 2006) pp. 18.  
48 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp.153. 
49 G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 2(2) 
ICSID Review 403 (1987) pp. 416-417. 
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they were used for the day-to-day expenditures in running the embassy, the Court of 
Appeal refused a certificate on the grounds that such a certificate was not accepted as a 
conclusive evidence and that an account being used for daily expenses running the 
embassy could not be deemed as protected property.50 On this point, Delaume highlights 
that while “Alcom acknowledges the right of the creditor to challenge the conclusiveness 
of official certificate…, in practice,… a creditor will be prevented from reaching State 
property, unless that property has been clearly earmarked by the State for commercial 
use.”51 Therefore, such a certificate issued by the head of a diplomatic mission would act 
as a bar to reaching a remedy by a creditor as well as providing a ‘blanket protection’ to 
the UK SIA, in which the drafters intended to remove such argument by providing an 
exception at Section 13(4).52 
 
While Donaldson MR in the Court of Appeal additionally suggested that the 
nature of the transaction should be taken into an account in order to determine the 
property in question53, the House of Lords unanimously reversed the decision and held 
that: 
 
“Even though the type of accounts involved might be used to pay for the supply of goods 
or services to a diplomatic mission, such accounts were intended to meet many other 
expenditures falling outside the scope of the concept of “commercial purpose”, and that, 
therefore, the monies in these accounts could not be subject to measures of execution.”54 
 
The decision of the House of Lords restored the balance of a restrictive approach 
                                                
50 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp.154. 
51 G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 2(2) 
ICSID Review 403 (1987), pp.  417 
52 H. Fox, ‘Enforcement Jurisdiction, Foreign State Property and Diplomatic Immunity’ 34(1) ICLQ 115 
(1985) pp. 122. 
53 Alcom Ltd. v Republic of Colombia, 1 All ER 1 [1984], at 5; ILM 22 (1983) p. 1307, the Court of Appeal 
stated: 
“The purpose of money in a bank account can never be “to run an embassy”. It can only be 
to pay for goods and services or to enter into other transactions which enable the embassy 
to be run.”; 
D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 280. 
54 Quoted in G.R. Delaume, ‘Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, 3(1) Arb. J. 28 (1987), 
pp. 40; Alcom Ltd.v. Republic of Colombia, House of Lords, 12 April 1984, 2 All E.R. 6 [1984]; 2 W.L.R. 
750 [1984]; ILM 23 (1984); See also H. Fox, ‘Enforcement Jurisdiction, Foreign State Property and 
Diplomatic Immunity’ 34(1) ICLQ 115 (1985) pp. 120. 
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towards sovereign immunity and the protection of functional immunity of diplomatic 
mission. In determining the concept of commercial purpose, the House of Lords 
disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s approach on looking at the nature of the transaction; 
instead, it relied on the overall purpose of the bank account. Fox has pointed out that “the 
test in the Act by the use of the words “purpose” and “intended for use” concentrates on 
present use and future destination rather than the origin of the funds.”55 Therefore, 
although some of the money in the bank account might be used for a commercial 
purpose, such a bank account of diplomatic mission, used for mixed purposes or not 
designated exclusively for a commercial purpose is exempt and immune from execution. 
In this case, Lord Diplock followed the reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court in the Philippine Embassy Bank Account case. In this context, although the Vienna 
Convention does not specifically refer to an embassy bank account, it can refer to Article 
356 and Article 2557 of the Vienna Convention in which it respects the full facilities for 
the performance of the diplomatic function, considered as a customary international law 
of diplomatic immunity.58  
 
In contrast, the US district court in Birch Shipping Corp v Embassy of the United 
Republic of Tanzania59 adopted a different approach from the Philippine Embassy Bank 
Account and Alcom cases, when dealing with the purpose test of an embassy account. In 
this case, the court considered whether the property in question was used for a 
                                                
55 H. Fox, ‘Enforcement Jurisdiction, Foreign State Property and Diplomatic Immunity’ 34(1) ICLQ 115 
(1985) pp. 134. 
56 Art. 3 of the Vienna Convention, it reads: 
“1. The functions of a diplomatic mission consist inter alia in :  
 (a) representing the sending State in the receiving State; 
 (b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its 
nationals, within the limits permitted by international law; 
 (c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State; 
        (d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving 
State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State; 
 (e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, 
and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations. 
2. Nothing in the present Convention shall be construed as preventing the performance of 
consular functions by a diplomatic mission.” 
57 Art. 25 of the Vienna Convention. 
58 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp.154. 
59 Birch Shipping Corp v Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F.Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980). 
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commercial or sovereign purpose. The court based its decision on the nature test rather 
than the purpose test in distinguishing the property of a foreign state. The US court held 
that: 
 
“The only significant question, then, is whether it is proper to attach an account which is 
not used solely for commercial activity. Certainly the statue [the FSIA] places no such 
restriction upon property which may be attached nor is there anything in the legislative 
history indicating that Congress contemplated such a limitation… Indeed, a reading of the 
Act which exempted mixed accounts would create a loophole, for any property could be 
made immune by using it, at one time or another, for some minor public purpose. 
Defendant asserts, however, that failure to find this property immune will make it 
impossible for foreign countries to maintain embassies. Even if it could be shown this was 
actually a problem, the solution would not be the broad immunity defendant asks, but 
segregation of public purpose funds from commercial activity funds. Holding otherwise 
would defeat the express intention of Congress to provide, in case of commercial litigation 
such as this, that ‘a judgment creditor [would have] some remedy if, after a reasonable 
period, a foreign state or its enterprise failed to satisfy a final judgment.’ H.Rep.No. 94-
1487, at 6606. Accordingly, the property at issue here is not immune from attachment, and 
the motion to quash the writ is denied.”60 
 
In determining a commercial exception, although an account of an embassy is 
immune under Section 1609 of the US FSIA, the use of the account fell within the term 
‘commercial activity’ under the Section 1603 of the US FSIA, which is not immune from 
execution in the event that a foreign state has waived its immunity from execution either 
explicitly or by implication. In this respect, the District Court considered an agreement to 
arbitrate by Tanzania could be considered as an implied waiver of immunity from 
execution under the US FSIA. Accordingly, the court confirmed that it would create a 
loophole in the FSIA by removing mixed accounts from the reach of a State’s creditors as 
well as it would undermine the expressed intention of Congress to provide a remedy for a 
creditor if a foreign state failed to satisfy its final judgment.61 On this basis, the US court 
allowed execution against a foreign embassy bank account in the United States, which 
was not used solely for a commercial purpose and therefore, the mixed purpose bank 
                                                
60 ibid 313. 
61 ibid Citing H.Rep. No.94-1487, at 6606. 
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account of a foreign state was not immune from execution.  
 
The reasoning in both Alcom and Birch shows the difficulties in executing against 
an embassy bank account,62 which is not used wholly or substantially for the public 
function of embassy but used for mixed purposes. It is suggested by the US District Court 
that the segregation of an account used for a public purpose from a commercial purpose 
would be preferable for a foreign state. This would prevent the restraint of the 
maintenance of embassy if an embassy account is sought to be executed by a creditor.  
 
However, the US District Court reversed the Birch decision in LETCO v Liberia. 
After the unsuccessful execution of an arbitral award in New York,63 LETCO made a 
further attempt in executing the same award before the US District Court for the District 
of Columbia in Washington D.C.64 In following a general trend of international law on 
sovereign immunity from execution with regards to embassy accounts, the court 
affirmatively held that: 
 
“The Court presumes that some portion of the funds in the bank accounts may be used for 
commercial activities in connection with running the Embassy, such as transactions to 
purchase goods or services from private entities. The legislative history of the FSIA 
indicates that these funds would be used for a commercial activity and not be immune 
from attachment. The Court, however, declines to order that if any portion of a bank 
account is used for a commercial activity then the entire account loses its immunity… On 
the contrary, following the narrow definition of “commercial activity”, funds used for 
commercial activities which are “incidental” or “auxiliary”, not denoting the essential 
character of the use of the funds in question, would not cause the entire bank account to 
lose its mantle or sovereign immunity.”65 
                                                
62 See I. Goldner, ‘States and State-Controlled Corporations in International Commercial Arbitration’, 7 
CROAT. ARB. Y.B. 159 (2000) pp. 169; M. Leigh, ‘Sovereign Immunity- United Kingdom Act- 
Garnishment of Embassy Bank Account- Definition of “Commercial Purpose”’, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 143 
(1985) pp. 143-144. 
63 Liberia Eastern Timber Corporation v Liberia, The District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
650 F. Supp. 73 (1986). 
64 Liberia Eastern Timber Corporation v Government of the Republic of Liberia, 16 April 1987, 2 ICSID 
Reports 390; V. O. Nmehielle, ‘Enforcing arbitration awards under the International Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention)’, 7 Annual Survey of International & Comparative 
Law 21 (2001) pp.33. 
65 Liberia Eastern Timber Corporation v Liberia (LETCO), 16 April 1987, 2 ICSID Reports 395. 
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In reaching this conclusion, that a mixed account is immune from execution, the 
court’s reasoning relied on both diplomatic law and state immunity law. On the one hand, 
whilst the Vienna Convention has no specific provision regarding an embassy bank 
account, Article 25 of the Vienna Convention provides that “the receiving State shall 
accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the mission.”66 In this 
context, an embassy bank account is included for the purposes of the Vienna Convention 
and is required to have protection in order to support the full facilities for the 
performance of the diplomatic functions.67 On the other hand, the court held that a bank 
account did not qualify as a property used or intended to be used for a commercial 
activity under the US FSIA, but was utilised for the maintenance of the full facility of 
diplomatic function. By respecting the interaction between a diplomatic law and state 
immunity law, the District Court summarised that “the US Congress did not intend the 
FSIA to affect diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention because the FSIA was 
enacted subject to existing international agreements to which the US is the party at the 
time of enactment of this act…”68  
 
On these grounds, the court found that an embassy bank account used for mixed 
purposes is immune from execution, in accordance with both diplomatic law and state 
immunity law.69 In this respect, the reasoning of the US court allowed diplomatic 
considerations to interfere with the sovereign immunity doctrine.70 By this proposition, it 
can be seen from the cases of Alcom and LETCO that the court considered the primary 
purpose of the property; being the use to support the main function of diplomatic mission, 
in order to determine that the funds in a bank account were held by the diplomatic 
                                                
66 Art. 25 of the Vienna Convention.  
67 Liberia Eastern Timber Corporation v. Liberia (LETCO), 16 April 1987, 2 ICSID Reports 392/3; D. 
Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 278; C. 
Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1170. 
68 Liberia Eastern Timber Corporation v Liberia, The District Court for the Southern District of Columbia, 
659 F. Supp. 606 (D.C.C. 1987), at 608. 
69 ibid 607.; V. O. Nmehielle, ‘Enforcing arbitration awards under the International Convention for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention)’, 7 Annual Survey of International & Comparative 
Law 21 (2001) pp.33. 
70 G.R. Delaume, ‘Contractual Waivers of Sovereign Immunity: Some Practical Considerations’, 5(2) 
ICSID Review-FILJ 232 (1990) pp. 253. 
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mission rather than the subsidiary purpose, which was the use of certain necessary 
commercial activities in running the diplomatic mission.71  
 
Apart from the difficulties seen in the UK and US cases regarding the execution 
against an embassy bank account, French case-law has proven to have more difficulties 
and limitations regarding execution against embassy bank accounts.72 In Noga v Russian 
Federation73, Noga, a Swiss company, had made a loan agreement with the government 
of the Russian Federation in order to guarantee the sale of petroleum products. In 
pursuing a matter between both parties, the sequence of two contracts in 1991 and 1992 
demonstrated that the Russian Federation had not only signed an arbitration clause but 
also expressly waived its right to any immunity from suit, execution and attachment, 
which was entitled by principles of customary international law as well as international 
conventions.74  
 
In considering a waiver clause of all immunities by the Russian Federation, the 
French court was more cautious in interpreting such a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution clause in a strict and narrow manner. This was due to the fact that NOGA had 
attached against the bank accounts of the Russian embassy, which was considered 
diplomatic property in need of special protection, in accordance with diplomatic 
immunity law.75 In this connection, despite the Russian Federation having made an 
express waiver from all immunities, including diplomatic immunity, the Paris Court of 
Appeal held that “such a waiver did not extend to the diplomatic immunities from 
execution guaranteed by the 1961 Vienna Convention and by customary international 
law, which are governed by specific rules distinct from those applicable to foreign States’ 
                                                
71 Alcom Ltd. v Republic of Colombia, 2 Lloyd’s Rep 31 (QB) 35 [1984]; Liberia Eastern Timber 
Corporation v Liberia, The District Court for the Southern District of Columbia, 659 F. Supp. 606 (D.C.C. 
1987), at 610; See H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 298,368. 
72 J. Paulsson, ‘Sovereign Immunity from Jurisdiction: French Caselaw Revisited’ 19 International Law 277 
(1985) pp 284-285. 
73 Embassy of the Russian Federation et.al v Compagnie NOGA d’importation et d’exportation (NOGA), 
Paris Court of Appeal (1st  Ch. A), Case no. 2000/14157. 
74 N.B. Turck, ‘French and US Courts Define Limits of Sovereign Immunity in Execution and Enforcement 
of Arbitral Awards’, 17(3) Arb. Int’l. 327 (2001) pp. 332 
75 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 292. 
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sovereign immunities.”76  
 
Accordingly, a determination of a waiver of diplomatic immunity must refer to 
the Preamble77 and Article 378 of the Vienna Convention in which it preserves the 
privileges and immunities of diplomatic as well as the protection of full facilities of 
diplomatic functions. Although the Paris Court of Appeal accepted that the Vienna 
Convention does not specifically refer to a bank account of diplomatic mission, the Court 
relied on Article 25 of the said Convention.”79  
 
In summary, it can be concluded that an express waiver of all immunities on a 
contractual basis cannot extend to diplomatic immunities, which is a special regime and 
requires a separate and unambiguous intention of the foreign state for such a waiver to be 
effective.80 Therefore, most courts tend to interpret a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
enforcement provided for in the contract with a limited scope, in order to avoid a possible 
conflict, which may arise from a special protection of diplomatic immunity pursuant to 
consular and diplomatic law.81 Carrier explains on this point that “diplomatic immunity 
and State immunity are independent of one another originates from the fact that the 
character of the former is too specific and too high for it to be enough to transform itself 
into a waiver of the latter.”82 
 
In considering the decision of NOGA, it is unavoidable to make reference and 
                                                
76 This court decision was cited in N. Mayer-Fabre, ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign 
States, A New Milestones: Signing ICC Arbitration Clause Entails Waiver of Immunity From Execution 
Held French Court of Cassation In Creighton v. Qatar, July 6, 2000, 15(9) Mealey’s International 
Arbitration Report 1 (September 2000) pp. 4. 
77 The Preamble of the Vienna Convention, which concerns “…the sovereign equality of States, the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and the promotion of friendly relations among nations,… 
Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the 
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States,…” 
78 Art. 3 of the Vienna Convention. 
79 Art. 25 of the Vienna Convention; Embassy of the Russian Federation et.al v Compagnie NOGA 
d’importation et d’exportation (NOGA), Paris Court of Appeal (10 August 2000), reported in (2001) XXVI 
Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 273, at 275. 
80 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 294. 
81 European Court Practice (n 1), pp. 818. 
82 R. Carrier, ‘France: Shrinking of Immunity from Execution and Discovery of Diplomatic Immunity from 
Execution’, 18(1) Mealey’s International Arbitration Report 46 (January 2003) pp. 49. 
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comparison with the reasoning in Creighton.83 This would raise a concern of the practical 
consequence of the Creighton jurisprudence as to whether an implied waiver, resulting 
from a reference to an agreement to arbitrate under the ICC Rules, could be extended to 
all properties belonging to a foreign state, including those which are used for a sovereign 
purpose or even for a diplomatic function. As the NOGA decision adopted a stricter test, 
in order to shield a property used for a diplomatic function and specially protected by the 
diplomatic law,84 it cannot be said that the Creighton decision has established a universal 
norm or precedent regarding such an implied waiver for immunity from execution.  
 
In this respect, it is necessary to consider municipal law on sovereign immunity, 
which provides protection for an embassy bank account in a different degree. The 
reasoning in the NOGA case is closely consistent with the UN Convention, which 
expressly excludes a bank account used or intended for use in the performance of the 
functions of the diplomatic mission of the State from a measure of constraint,85 unless a 
foreign state has specifically consented by express waive from immunity from execution 
or allocated or earmarked the property in that respect.86 However, the court in the NOGA 
case appears to have interpreted a narrower scope of protection over certain properties 
than in the UN Convention, even though the foreign state had waived immunity from 
execution. More importantly, this express reference to a bank account, provided for in the 
UN Convention, does not clearly clarify mixed purposes of embassy bank account. This 
raises a question as to whether such a mixed purpose of embassy bank account could be 
                                                
83 Creighton Limited v. Government of the State of Qatar, The French Cour de Cassation, (6 July 2000), 
reported in XXV Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 458 (2000).  
84 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 296. 
85 See Art. 21(1)(a) of the UN Convention. 
86 See Art. 19(a) and (b) of the UN Convention, it reads: 
“No post-judgment measures of constraint, such as attachment, arrest or execution, against 
property of a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another 
State unless and except to the extent that: 
 (a) the State has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated: 
 (i) by international agreement;  
 (ii) by an arbitration agreement or in a written contract; or 
 (iii) by a declaration before the court or by a written communication after a dispute 
between the parties has arisen; or 
        (b) the State has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim 
which is the object of that proceeding; or” 
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attached.  
 
It is difficult to find a solution to this problem in any other codifications, since 
most municipal codifications on sovereign immunity,87 as well as the Vienna 
Convention,88 are silent on the issue. Therefore, the issue of mixed purposes of an 
embassy bank account shall depend on a municipal court’s interpretation, due to the fact 
that there is no uniform practice in this matter. There was an attempt to amend the US 
FSIA in 1988 when dealing with a bank account. This attempt was by adding a final 
paragraph at Section 1610 (a), reading that: 
 
“This subsection shall not apply to property that is used for purposes of maintaining a 
diplomatic or consular mission or the residence of the chief of such mission, including a 
bank account unless that bank account is also used for commercial purposes unrelated to 
diplomatic or consular functions.”89 
 
In this respect, the proposed amendment of the US FSIA aimed to protect from 
execution a bank account with a mixed purpose, which was not only used for a sovereign 
purpose but also for necessary commercial activities in running the diplomatic mission. It 
should be highlighted that such an amendment does not protect the bank account of a 
diplomatic mission used for commercial activities, which is not related to the diplomatic 
function. Accordingly, the effect of the amendment would provide a greater confidence to 
both investor and sovereign state in dealing with sovereign immunity issue and providing 
a fairness of arbitration mechanism.90  Nevertheless, it is regretted that the proposed 
amendment was not incorporated in the current text of the US FSIA. In this context, it 
would be desirable to enact the proposal into the law of sovereign immunity amongst 
major countries in order to provide clear provisions specifically when dealing with mixed 
                                                
87 Section 16 of the UK SIA only preserves any privilege and immunity to the Diplomatic Privileges Act 
1964 or the Consular Relations Act 1968, not mentions the bank account, whereas Section 1611 of the US 
FSIA does not include a bank account in certain types of property immune from execution. 
88 The mere wording of Article 22 of the Vienna Convention excludes the bank account from protection.  
89  M.B. Feldman, ‘Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The ABA Position’, 20 International 
Law 1288 (1986) pp. 1301; T.B. Atkeson and S.D. Ramsey, ‘Proposed Amendment of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act’, 79 AJIL 770 (1985) pp. 788. 
90 T.B. Atkeson and S.D. Ramsey, ‘Proposed Amendment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’, 79 
AJIL 770 (1985) pp. 783. 
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purposes of embassy bank accounts. It is submitted that a development of the law in this 
area is required to move closer to the intentions of the UN Convention, and would be a 
realistic right step on the issue.  
 
More importantly, it is suggested that in regards to the burden of proof onus, 
concerning the commercial use of property, the burden of proof should be shifted to a 
foreign state in clarifying whether the property in question is used for sovereign or 
diplomatic purposes. Without this change a private party is left with a difficult or even 
impossible task in locating sufficient evidence in order to prove that an embassy bank 
account is used for a commercial purpose. Accordingly, as in the words of Schreuer, “the 
German Constitutional Court’s concept of an abstract danger should be replaced by the 
criterion of an immediate and genuine threat to the foreign State’s official functions.”91 
 
As the position of an embassy bank account with a mixed purpose is quite 
uncertain in relation to diplomatic property in both state immunity law and diplomatic 
law, major codifications on state immunity law and diplomatic law expressly refer to 
certain kinds of property, which enjoy a special protection of sovereign immunity from 
execution.92 These certain kinds of properties include diplomatic property, military 
property, central bank property and cultural heritage property, which require special 
protection. In addition, these specially protected properties are always considered as 
property specifically used by a state for sovereign or diplomatic functions. They are 
always immune from execution and not subject to forced execution regardless of any 
commercial activity exception. This is in contrast with other foreign state properties, 
which are destined a sovereign purpose; however, they can be subject to execution in the 
case where a foreign state has either explicitly or implicitly waived a sovereign immunity 
from execution.   
 
 
                                                
91 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp.155. 
92 See. Section 1611 of the US FSIA, Section 14(4) and 16(1) of the UK SIA, Section 31(4) and 32(3)(a) of 
the Australian FSIA, Section 12(3) and (4) of the Canadian SIA and Article 21 of the UN Convention. 
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From the cases mentioned above, it should be noted that a state practice on the 
execution of arbitral award against an embassy bank account with a mixed purpose 
remains uncertain and varies from country to country. It is evident that there is no actual 
case law dealing with the execution of embassy bank accounts with mixed purposes in 
the investment-related area. This is possibly due to the fact that it is very difficult for a 
creditor to attach to any diplomatic assets, which are always considered immune as 
sovereign assets, by diplomatic law and municipal law. Accordingly, a state practice in 
regards to a mixed purpose of an embassy bank account is excessively deferential to a 
foreign state in preserving the performance of diplomatic functions and state 
sovereignty.93 This would, however, affect the legitimate interest of foreign investors. 
Thus, it is important that future court of tribunal cases adopt a proportionality test in 
order to balance the measure of sovereign immunity and the aim to pursue and maintain 
international stability.94  
 
More importantly, this approach could also be used to achieve the legitimate 
interests for state and foreign investors by considering whether an express waiver of 
immunity from execution is possible in relation to specially protected properties or 
embassy bank accounts’ with mixed purposes, under significant codifications. It is argued 
that although some codifications do not clearly mention waiver of sovereign immunity 
from execution with regards to specially protected property, such a waiver of sovereign 
immunity from execution remains possible, but only with an express intention regarding 
specific property.95  
 
(b) Central Bank Funds 
Apart from the mixed purpose of embassy bank account, this section will discuss 
the controversy arising from the attachment and execution against a central bank, which 
is an additional attractive option for a private party. Generally speaking, central banks 
frequently have funds or accounts aboard with a bank of another country for official 
                                                
93 C. Ryngaert, ‘Embassy Bank Accounts and State Immunity from Execution: Doing Justice to Financial 
Interests of Creditors, 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 73 (2013) pp. 73. 
94 ibid 87. 
95 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1171. 
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purposes, especially, a bank reserve.96 It can be said here that central bank accounts or 
funds are always immune from execution. However, this immunity also extends to a 
central bank account used to facilitate commercial transactions of a foreign state or its 
entity.97 Without any doubt, this special protection, granted to a central bank fund or 
account as a privilege status, is clearly regarded differently than that of an embassy bank 
account with a mixed purpose.  
 
Before the enactment and entry into force of municipal laws on sovereign 
immunity, some municipal courts did not treat central bank accounts differently from 
ordinary bank accounts. In the Trendtex case, the Court of Appeal, based its decision on 
customary international law,98 considering that the Central Bank of Nigeria was not 
entitled to immunity from execution on the ground that the Central Bank of Nigeria was 
not an entity or constituent subdivision of the state, which is entitled to claim immunity.99 
The same approach is found in Hispano Americana Mercantil S.A. v Central Bank of 
Nigeria in which sovereign immunity was refused to the Central Bank of Nigeria on 
similar grounds.100  
 
Subsequently, the most recent codifications on sovereign immunity provide a 
central bank with a privileged immune status, requiring special protection from 
execution. Section 14(4) of the UK SIA provides special protection for central banks, in 
that the “property of a State’s central bank or other monetary authority shall not be 
regarded for the purposes of subsection (4) of section 13 above as in use or intended for 
use for commercial purposes…”101 In this context, whereas a measure of execution can 
be executed against the commercial property of foreign state, provided for in section 
                                                
96 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments (Grotius, Cambridge 1988) pp.156. 
97 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 308. 
98 European Court Practice (n 1), pp. 826. 
99 Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank of Nigeria, CA, 13 January 1977 [1977] 2 WLR 356; 64 
ILR 111. 
100 Hispano Americana Mercantil S.A. v Central Bank of Nigeria, United Kingdom, Court of Appeal, Civil 
Division, 25 April 1979; 64 ILR 221. 
101 Sec. 14(4) of the UK SIA.  
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13(4), a central bank’s property is not subject to section 13(4),102 which requires special 
protection, provided for in section 14(4). Special protection provided for in section 14(4) 
has become a key reason court decisions concerning the consideration of immunity from 
bank accounts. For instance, the English court in Banca Carige case stated that: 
 
“The immunity from enforcement proceedings of a central bank (section 14(4) State 
Immunity Act), is a relevant factor for a Court to consider when dealing whether to 
exercise a discretion allowing proceedings to be served outside the jurisdiction.”103 
 
The adoption and entering into force of the UK SIA would now produce different 
results in the cases of Trendex and Hispano Americana Mercantil, given that the UK SIA 
provides that a central bank account receives a special protection.  Reading section 
14(3)104 together with 14 (4)105 of the UK SIA it can be assumed that the aim is to 
provide a special protection of full immunity to all property of a central bank. Without 
this the specific property would be subject to execution and treatment under the same 
rules as in the case of a foreign state or its separate entity, which is able to be sued.106 
Therefore, a central bank, whether its status is not distinguishable from state or operating 
as a separate entity, is not to be regarded as in use or intended for use for a commercial 
purpose in any case.107 In addition, since the wording of section 13(4) together with 14 
(4) excludes a property of a central bank, categorised as being used for a commercial 
                                                
102 Sec. 13 (4) of the UK SIA. 
103 Banca Carige SpA Cassa di Risparmio Geneva e Imperia v Banco National de Cuba and another, Ch.D. 
(Companies Court), 11 April 2001, 3 All ER 923 [2001]; 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 147 [2001]. 
104 Sec. 14(3) of the UK SIA, it reads: 
“(3) If a separate entity (not being a State’s central bank or other monetary authority) 
submits to the jurisdiction in respect of proceedings in the case of which it is entitled to 
immunity by virtue of subsection (2) above, subsections (1) to (4) of section 13 above 
shall apply to it in respect of those proceedings as if references to a State were references 
to that entity.” 
105 Sec. 14(4)of the UK SIA. 
106 Section 14 (1) of the UK SIA, it reads: 
“(1) The immunities and privileges conferred by this Part of this Act apply to any foreign 
or commonwealth State other than the United Kingdom; and references to a State include 
references to— 
(a) the sovereign or other head of that State in his public capacity; 
(b) the government of that State; and 
(c) any department of that government, 
but not to any entity (hereafter referred to as a “separate entity”) which is distinct from the 
executive organs of the government of the State and capable of suing or being sued.” 
107 G.R. Delaume, ‘The State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom’, 73(2) AJIL 185 (1979) pp.190-197. 
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purpose, even though it is actually used for a commercial purpose, it would be difficult to 
determine the purpose of a property and whether it falls within a commercial activity 
exception, so as to be executed against. Therefore, an execution against the property of a 
central bank is only possible when a foreign state has explicitly and specifically waived 
its immunity from execution to the property of the central bank in question.108  
 
Apart from the UK SIA, section 1611 (b) (1) The US FSIA upholds the immunity 
from execution for a property in a possession of a foreign central bank or monetary 
authority held for its own account.109 The wording “held for its own account” intends to 
distinguish funds used to perform functions of actual central bank activities from those to 
finance commercial transactions of foreign states or other entities.110  In this respect, it 
means that only funds or accounts held for its own account in the name of a foreign 
central bank and used to perform the functions of central bank are immune from 
execution.111 However, as in the case of a mixed purpose normal bank account, some 
central bank accounts have been used for both genuine central bank activities and certain 
commercial activities.  
 
In this situation, the US court considered in the case of Weston that if “property 
used for commercial activity and property of a central bank held for its own accounts are 
not mutually exclusive categories”112, such a central bank account used in connection 
                                                
108 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1174. 
109 Sec. 1611(b)(1) of the US FSIA, it reads: 
“(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this chapter, the property of a 
foreign state shall be immune from attachment and from execution, if— 
1) the property is that of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its 
own account, unless such bank or authority, or its parent foreign government, has 
explicitly waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, 
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the bank, authority or government 
may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver; or”; 
     See E.T. Patrikis, ‘Foreign Central Bank Property: Immunity from Attachment in the United 
States’, University of Illinois Law Review 265 (1982), pp. 277; P.L. Lee, ‘Central Banks and 
Sovereign Immunity’, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 327 (2002-2003).   
110 A. Dickinson et.al. (eds), State Immunity: Selected Materials and Commentary (OUP, New York 2004) 
pp. 325-326; C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1171. 
111 Weston Compagnie de Finance et d’Investissement, S.A. v La Republica del Ecuador, 823 F. Supp 1106 
(SDNY 1993) at. 1112.  
112 ibid  
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with commercial activity by a foreign state or its entities could not be regarded as a 
commercial activity, in which it is not immune from execution.113 Therefore, a central 
bank account used for mixed purposes will not invalidate the entire account from 
immunity from execution.114 On the contrary, by “the mere placing of funds not used for 
a central bank function in an account of a foreign state bank account”115, a central bank 
account of foreign state is not immune from execution. Combining these two 
propositions, if the funds in a central bank account could be distinguished between funds 
held for the central bank’s own account and other funds,116 a court could consider a 
segregation of funds in order to permit execution against property or funds of a central 
bank account used for a commercial activity, whereas the rest of fund or property used 
for the function of central bank would remain immune from execution. This segregation 
of funds approach was adopted in the case of LETCO117 when dealing with the mixed 
purpose of embassy bank account.  
 
Making a comparison between the UK SIA and the US FSIA, it could be pointed 
out that the UK SIA provides a wider scope of protection for the property of a central 
bank than in the US FSIA. This is because the UK SIA specifically defines a fund or the 
property of a central bank as non-commercial activity, whilst the US FSIA is limited to a 
fund or property of central bank, which is held for its own account. The English High 
court applied this broad interpretation of sovereign immunity from execution for a central 
bank funds in AIG Capital Partners v Kazakhstan.  
 
In this case, AIG requested that the English court execute against Kazakhstan 
funds, held by third parties (ABN AMRO Mellon Global Security Services BV), pursuant 
to a global custody agreement with the National Bank of Kazakhstan in order to satisfy an 
                                                
113 ibid 1113; See also Olympic Chartering, S.A. v Ministry of Industry and Trade of Jordan, 134 F. Supp. 
2d 528 (SDNY 2001) at 533. 
114 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 304. 
115 Weston Compagnie de Finance et d’Investissement, S.A. v La Republica del Ecuador, 823 F. Supp 1106 
(SDNY 1993) at 1114. 
116 ibid 
117 Liberia Eastern Timber Corporation v Liberia (LETCO), 16 April 1987, 2 ICSID Reports 395. 
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ICSID award against Kazakhstan.118 Pursuant to the UK SIA, the court ruled that 
“property of a State’s central bank or monetary authority shall not be regarded for the 
purposes of subsection (4) of section 13 above as in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes.”119 Accordingly, the court further found that the question of the 
intended use of central bank property was irrelevant.120 Therefore, notwithstanding 
Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention to enforce an arbitral award, AIG was unable to 
execute an arbitral award against Central bank assets because those funds were immune 
from the enforcement before the English court.121 Similarly, this wider scope of 
protection can also be seen in Article 21 of the UN Convention.122 Pursuant to the UK 
SIA and the UN Convention, it can be assumed that sovereign immunity from execution 
for a central bank fund remains absolute, in which any investment activities of a central 
bank could likely benefit from immunity owing to a very broad definition of central bank 
assets.  
 
This special treatment for central bank funds under the sovereign immunity 
doctrine could imply that central bank funds have become an increasingly popular target 
of award for creditors. As seen above, the rules on sovereign immunity from execution in 
relation to central bank funds vary as to the degree of protection in each jurisdiction. 
However, one common rule between jurisdictions is to hold its assets as immune property 
serving a sovereign purpose. The main aspect behind this, under the US FSIA and the UK 
SIA, is to attract foreign investment into the jurisdictions of New York and London, 
respectively, as financial and banking centers.123 Moreover, this could be coupled with 
the trend of governments increasingly getting involved in foreign investment as a state-
                                                
118 A. Alexandroff and I. Laird, ‘Compliance and Enforcement’ in P. Muchlinski et al (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Investment Law (2008)(OUP, UK 2008) pp. 1181-1182. 
119 AIG Capital Partners Inc. and another v Republic of Kazakhstan (National Bank of Kazakhstan 
Intervening), High Court, Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court), 20 October 2005, [2005] EWHC 
2239 (Comm); 11 ICSID Reports 141, para 57. 
120  ibid paras 57, 61; C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1172. 
121 AIG Capital Partners Inc. and another v Republic of Kazakhstan (National Bank of Kazakhstan 
Intervening), High Court, Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court), 20 October 2005, [2005] EWHC 
2239 (Comm); 11 ICSID Reports 141, paras 90-91. 
122 H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 646. 
123 D. Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors, OECD Working 
papers on international investment, 2010/2, OECD Publishing (2010) pp. 24; See also, M. Waibel, 
Sovereign Defaults before International Courts and Tribunals (CUP, UK 2011) pp. 19-20.  
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controlled investor, such as in Sovereign Wealth Funds (‘SWFs’) and State-Owned 
Enterprises (‘SOEs’). Such a state involvement in SWFs could be linked in some form to 
their national central banks, either created as a part of central bank or managed by a 
central bank to invest in a foreign state.124 Therefore, whilst this trend might provide 
some significant benefits for both home and host states in terms of capital flows and 
economy expansion, it raises some concerns and difficulties for private parties to pursue a 
legitimate aim against them with regard to the enforcement of an arbitral award. With 
regard to a reasoning of the UK court in the AIG case, it would create a risk for foreign 
investors and set a precedent for future cases, which would undermine the effectiveness 
of the investor-state arbitration.  
 
(c) Specially Protected Property 
Another significant question might be raised as to whether an express waiver of 
sovereign immunity from execution has an effect in relation to specially protected 
property. With regards to the central bank account, the US FSIA specifically allows by 
Section 1611(b) (1) the central bank or authority or its home foreign government to 
expressly waive its immunity from execution of central bank property.125 This position 
would be the same in regards to the UK SIA. Although the UK SIA does not expressly 
mention a waiver of sovereign immunity of a central bank property, it is possible to refer 
to Section 13(3),126 which requires the written consent of a state so as to apply to a 
limited extent or generally to a property in question, including a property of a central 
bank clarified in Section 14(4).127  
                                                
124 D. Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors, OECD Working 
papers on international investment, 2010/2, OECD Publishing (2010) pp. 24 
125 Sec. 1611(b)(1) of the US FSIA. 
126 Sec. 13(3) of the UK SIA, it reads: 
“(3) Subsection (2) above does not prevent the giving of any relief or the issue of any 
process with the written consent of the State concerned; and any such consent (which may 
be contained in a prior agreement) may be expressed so as to apply to a limited extent or 
generally; but a provision merely submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts is not to be 
regarded as a consent for the purposes of this subsection.” 
127 Section 14 (4) of the UK SIA, reads: 
“Property of a State’s central bank or other monetary authority shall not be regarded for 
the purposes of subsection (4) of section 13 above as in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes; and where any such bank or authority is a separate entity 
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With regard to a pre-judgment attachment (provisional measures of constraint), 
the purpose is to secure the assets of a party before a final judgment for a post-judgment 
execution, in order to avoid a situation where a losing party tries to frustrate an 
execution.128 The use of pre-judgment attachment seems to be very limited in most 
codifications due to the fact that it may raise a conflict in relation to the immunity from 
execution doctrine.129 Therefore, a differentiation has to be made between pre-judgment 
attachment and post-judgment attachment, in which the former requires the measure of a 
written consent or explicit waiver by a party.  
 
The possibility of a waiver of immunity from execution for central bank assets, 
under subsection 1611(b)(1) of the US FSIA, does not include mention of a waiver in 
respect to a pre-judgment attachment. Therefore, this means that a foreign central bank or 
monetary authority could expressly waive a sovereign immunity from execution for its 
property or fund held in its own account only for a post-judgment attachment.130 This 
limitation is less restrictive in the case of property falling into the commercial activity 
exception under Section 1610 (d), which allows for a pre-judgment attachment, provided 
that there is express consent.131 This circumstance might be different for a post-judgment 
attachment, which allows a foreign state to waive “its immunity from attachment in aid of 
                                                                                                                                            
subsections (1) to (3) of that section shall apply to it as if references to a State were 
references to the bank or authority.” 
128 European Court Practice (n 1), pp. 834.-835. 
129 J. Ostrander, ‘The last bastion of sovereign immunity: A Comparative look at immunity from execution 
of judgments’, 22 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 451 (2004) pp. 553. 
130 Weston Compagnie de Finance et d’Investissement, S.A. v La Republica del Ecuador, 823 F. Supp 1106 
(SDNY 1993), at. 1111; A. Dickinson et.al. (eds), State Immunity: Selected Materials and Commentary, 
(OUP, New York 2004) pp.326. 
131 Sec. 1610 (d) of the US FSIA, it reads: 
“d) The property of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603 (a) of this chapter, used for a 
commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attachment prior to the 
entry of judgment in any action brought in a court of the United States or of a State, or 
prior to the elapse of the period of time provided in subsection (c) of this section, if— 
(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment prior to 
judgment, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may purport to 
effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, and 
(2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment that has 
been or may ultimately be entered against the foreign state, and not to obtain jurisdiction.” 
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execution or from execution either explicitly or by implication”132 provided under Section 
1610(a)(1). Yet, a pre-judgment attachment for a central bank’s property is permissible 
under the Section 13(3) of UK SIA and Article 18 of the UN Convention,133 but only with 
express consent.134  
 
Therefore, it could be seen that in relation to pre-judgment attachments, 
provisional measures and injunctions might be further obstacles when attempting to 
secure funds or properties made prior to the adjudication of a decision on the merits 
concerning an execution of an arbitral award. Municipal laws and international 
codifications on sovereign immunity tend to allow pre-judgment attachments with a 
requirement that the express consent by a foreign state has been provided.135 In this 
context, such a pre-judgment measure is easier to utilise when dealing with commercial 
property of a foreign state, and not a central bank or sovereign property, which evoke 
sensitivities concerning the international relations between countries.136  
  
(d) Concluding Remarks 
In summary, both central bank and specially protected property are not considered 
as commercial property falling within the commercial activity exception. However, the 
execution against such property remains possible with the provision of an express 
                                                
132 Sec. 1610 (a)(1) of the US FSIA 
133 Art. 18 of the UN Convention, it reads: 
“No pre-judgment measures of constraint, such as attachment or arrest, against property of 
a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State 
unless and except to the extent that: 
 (a) the State has expressly consented to the taking of such measures as indicated: 
 (i) by international agreement;  
 (ii) by an arbitration agreement or in a written contract; or 
 (iii) by a declaration before the court or by a written communication after a dispute 
between the parties has arisen; or 
        (b) the State has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim 
which is the object of that proceeding.”; 
     H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (OUP, New York 2008) pp. 616-618. 
134 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1178; D. Chamlongrasdr, 
Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 311. 
135 See Sec. 1610(d) of the US FSIA, Sec. 13(2)(a) and 13(3) of the UK SIA, Sec. 10(1) of the Canadian 
SIA, Art. 23 of the European Convention and Art. 18 of the UN Convention.  
136 See C. Schreuer, State immunity: Some recent developments (Grotius Publication, Great Britain 1988) 
pp. 162; G.R. Delaume, ‘Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration’, 38(2) Arb. J. 34 (1983) pp. 
41-42; European Court Practice (n 1),) pp. 834. 
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consent. In this respect, the situation of a central bank is clearer than in the case of 
diplomatic and military properties, which are still uncertain and need more consideration 
in accordance with municipal law and diplomatic law. As seen in certain cases and 
codifications, whilst a waiver of immunity from execution is possible in principle, certain 
types of property, for example, diplomatic and military property, require a specific 
express waiver in relation to the property in question. Additionally, the property is subject 
to specific conditions under municipal law or even diplomatic law, as in the case of 
NOGA were an express of waiver could not extend to diplomatic property, which is 
specifically protected and governed by the Vienna Convention. To overcome this 
difficulty, municipal laws and international codifications should include clear specific 
provisions dealing with immunity from execution and the waiver required in regards to 
embassy accounts, diplomatic property, military property and other specially protected 
properties. As states appear to get significantly and increasingly involved in foreign 
investments, the development of law in this area would be very important in order to deal 
with more complex issues for future investment claims. Currently, the UN Convention 
appears to be the most practical contemporary codification, which deals with this 
complicated issue and provides the best solution and outcomes for both states and private 
parties, albeit that it has not yet been entered into force.  
 
3. The Nexus Requirement  
Another challenge and limitation with regard to immunity from execution remains the 
question as to whether the nexus requirement between property, which is sought to be 
executed against and the underlying claim, or the entity upon the matter is really based, 
presents a further hurdle for a denial of immunity in the execution of an arbitral award. 
The underlying reason behind this requirement can be traced back to the jurisdictional 
rules in which a court could not exercise a jurisdiction over a foreign state in a forum 
state unless a foreign state had waived sovereign immunity or satisfied other exceptions, 
for example, commercial activity exception, the acts done at the forum, the contract made 
in a forum state, the nationality of the parties and the agreement to arbitrate. In this 
context, a foreign state may be exposed to litigation in unexpected countries, taking into 
account that a party may take the approach of forum shopping approach in order to defeat 
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jurisdictional rules.137 The cases of Ipitrade International, S.A. v Federal Republic of 
Nigeria138 and Libyan American Oil Co. v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahriya 
(LIAMCO),139demonstrate that cases may be rendered in several jurisdictions on the 
basis that an agreement to arbitrate applies as an implied waiver of sovereign immunity 
from jurisdiction, regardless of jurisdictional territorial connection.  
 
In order to anticipate this situation, some countries have required that a minimum contact 
or jurisdictional link between a jurisdiction of the court and the subject-matter of the 
transaction exists, in order to exercise a jurisdiction and execution over a claim and 
property. In the absence of this nexus requirement, it is impossible for a private party to 
execute against foreign property, which has no connection with the subject-matter of a 
claim or with a state party to the dispute. In some codifications, the nexus requirement is 
seen as an additional important condition to be met after a commercial activity exception 
has been established in the case of forced execution.140 Contrary to the strict approach, 
some codifications require no nexus requirement between the property to be executed and 
the underlying claim.141 Accordingly, states have adopted various extreme approaches 
when dealing with a minimum contact requirement in their municipal law as well as in 
international codifications, which has led to different results arising from the specific 
court practice in a specific situation. By imposing this requirement, the property of a 
foreign state would be more protected by placing a further parameter to restrain the 
availability of property; this would also provide a better way of predicting situations 
when considering execution.142  
 
Nevertheless, the additional condition of a nexus requirement would undermine the 
effectiveness of the arbitration mechanism, by leaving a private party without a remedy. 
                                                
137 G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and Transnational Arbitration’, pp. 
418. 
138 Ipitrade International, S.A. v Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) at 826. 
139 Libyan American Oil Co. v Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahriya (LIAMCO), 482 F. Supp. 1175 
(D.D.C. 1980).  
140 See Sec. 1610(a)(2) of the US FSIA, Art. 19(c) of the UN Convention; Enforcement in the United States 
and United Kingdom (n 4), pp. 93. 
141 See Sec. 13(4) of the UK SIA  
142 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 317. 
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Chamlongrasdr argues that “by imposing the requirement of the connection between the 
property and the underlying claim, not only does it cause difficulties for courts in 
determining the attachable property, but also private parties seeking execution against the 
property of a foreign state have to face with unnecessary burdens.”143  Therefore, it is a 
purpose of this section to determine the effect of a nexus requirement, which is adopted 
in many municipal and international laws on sovereign immunity.  
 
The strictest requirement is found at Section 1610(a) (2) of the US FSIA, which requires 
a connection between the property and the underlying claim under a two-tier test. After it 
has been found that property is of a commercial type, a private party must prove that such 
commercial property is used for a commercial activity and has a minimum connection 
with the underlying claim in the United States.144 Therefore, this provision limits the 
availability of attachable property, as not all commercial property of a foreign state 
located in the United States is used for a commercial activity and has a connection with 
the underlying claim. However, it is important to note that this nexus requirement 
provision is applicable only to the property of a foreign state, and not to the property of 
state instrumentalities, which do not require a nexus requirement.145 Therefore, the 
execution against the property of state instrumentalities is a simpler option when 
attempting execution against the property of a foreign state; allowing execution against 
any commercial property of state instrumentalities in the United States.146   
 
                                                
143 ibid 318. 
144 Section 1610 (a) of the US FSIA. 
   See C. Schreuer, State immunity: Some recent developments (Grotius Publication, Great Britain 
1988), pp. 130; G.R. Delaume, ‘Judicial Decisions Related to Sovereign Immunity and 
Transnational Arbitration’, 2(2) ICSID Review 403 (1987) pp. 414. 
145 See Sec. 1610(b)(2), it reads: 
“(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United States of an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall 
not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment 
entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if— 
 (2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not 
immune by virtue of section 1605 (a)(2), (3), or (5) or 1605 (b) of this chapter, regardless 
of whether the property is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is based, or” 
146 J. Ostrander, ‘The last bastion of sovereign immunity: A Comparative look at immunity from execution 
of judgments’, 22 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 451 (2004) pp. 558-559. 
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In establishing a nexus requirement between arbitration and the forum state, the US 
courts have interpreted an agreement to arbitrate as an implied waiver for the 
jurisdictional requirement. Since a nexus requirement is only combined with a 
commercial activity exception under the US FSIA, a waiver exception under Section 
1610(a) (1) does not refer the nexus requirement to the United States.147 Accordingly, the 
US court practices had tended to exercise a jurisdiction regardless of the place of 
arbitration and nexus requirement. This can be seen in the cases of Ipitrade148 and 
LIAMCO.149  
 
As already discussed in chapter 5, separate to the US Court declining jurisdiction in 
LIAMCO,150 the LIAMCO award was additionally rendered in Switzerland. In 
Switzerland, the court “declined to exercise jurisdiction and refused to permit execution 
against the assets of Libya located in Switzerland on the ground that the underlying 
transaction… bore no contact with Switzerland other than the fact that the sole arbitrator 
had elected to locate the seat of arbitration in Geneva.”151 Therefore, the Swiss court 
practice weighted its decision on the significant connection with the Swiss territory.152 
The US court also adopted a significant contact approach in the case of Verlinden B.V. v 
Central Bank of Nigeria.153 In this case, the court required a specific link to the United 
States in order to exercise a jurisdiction over a foreign arbitration. The court refused to 
interpret an agreement to arbitrate as an implied waiver of immunity, stating that: 
 
“…where a foreign state agrees to submit its disputes with another, non-American private 
party to the laws of a third country, or to answer in the tribunals of such country, it does 
                                                
147 C. Schreuer, State immunity: Some recent developments (Grotius Publication, Great Britain 1988), pp. 
81. 
148 Ipitrade International, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978), at 826. 
149 Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahriya (LIAMCO), 482 F. Supp. 1175 
(D.D.C. 1980).  
150 Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 
1175 (D.D.C. 1980) 
151 Socialist Libyan Arab Popular-Jamahiriya v. Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO), Swiss Federal 
Tribunal (19 June 1980), 62 ILR 228, at 234-236. 
152 J.F. Lalive, ‘Swiss Law and Practice in Relation to Measures of Execution against the Property of a 
Foreign State’, 10 Neth. Y.B. Int’l L. 153 (1979). 
153 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 
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not implicitly waive its immunity to jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.”154 
 
However, the effectiveness of arbitration rendered under the New York Convention is 
reliant on the cooperation of the municipal courts ensuring enforcement and execution of 
an arbitral award against the attachable property of foreign state. In this context, Schreuer 
has provided that “its [the New York Convention] function in our context is to create an 
obligation of courts of Parties to the Convention to enforce arbitral agreements and 
awards rendered in other States Parties to the Convention. It thereby creates the necessary 
jurisdictional nexus to the forum state to make submission to arbitration operative as a 
waiver of immunity.”155  
 
In the framework of the ICSID arbitration, it should be borne in mind that although an 
agreement to arbitrate could be interpreted as an implied waiver of immunity from 
jurisdiction and enforcement, provided in Article 54 of the ICSID Convention, Article 55 
of the ICSID Convention preserves the immunity from execution subject to the municipal 
law on sovereign immunity where the execution is sought. This reasoning was clarified in 
LETCO v Liberia, where the court specifically referred to a waiver of immunity to 
recognition and refused execution, where the court had no authority.156 Therefore, a 
submission to the ICSID Convention could provide a necessary jurisdictional link to a 
forum state in enforcing an arbitral award, but not at the execution stage, which is subject 
to municipal law. 
 
In this context, the 1988 amendment of the US FSIA would make it easier to execute 
ICSID awards. Section 1610(a) (6) provides that the property of a foreign state used for a 
commercial activity in the United States shall not be immune from a sovereign immunity 
from execution upon a confirmation of a judgment of arbitral award. Accordingly, 
although it still requires the commercial property of a foreign state in the United States, 
for the purpose of the execution of an arbitral award, it does not require any jurisdictional 
                                                
154 ibid 1302. 
155 C. Schreuer, State immunity: Some recent developments (Grotius Publication, Great Britain 1988) pp. 
87. 
156 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1173. 
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nexus between the commercial property of a foreign state and the subject-matter of the 
underlying claim, unlike in the case of an execution of judgments against the property of 
foreign state. It could, therefore, be said that the amendment of the US FSIA is more 
generous to arbitral awards than to the judgments of the US courts.157 
 
The requirement of a connection between the property to be executed and the underlying 
claim is also adopted in the French court practice. The Cour de Cassation in Eurodif case 
ruled that “property of a foreign State could be subject to measures of execution provided 
that the property sought to be executed had been allocated for an economic or 
commercial activity of a private law nature, which had given rise to the subject matter of 
the claim at issue.”158 Following this decision, the Cour de Cassation in Sonatrach also 
affirmed the requirement for a connection between the property to be executed and the 
subject-matter of the claim. The court held that “the assets of a foreign state, which are in 
principle subject to garnishment, with exceptions, especially when they are intended for 
economic or commercial activities of a private nature from which the claim of creditor 
arises.”159 In addition, the French court made a distinction between property held by a 
foreign state itself and held by foreign state instrumentalities, in which a nexus 
requirement does not extend to the latter. This approach is in the same line with the US 
FSIA to revoke a nexus requirement for an instrumentality.160  
 
Interestingly, the UN Convention provides a further type of nexus requirement by 
modifying the link criteria between a commercial serving commercial purpose and the 
state entity against which the proceeding was directed. This new nexus requirement 
eliminated the nexus requirement concerning the underlying claim, provided in the 1991 
                                                
157 ibid 1161; See G.R. Delaume, ‘Enforcement of State Contract Awards: Jurisdictional Pitfalls and 
Remedies, 8 ICSID Review-FILJ 29 (1993) pp.42. 
158 Republic of Iran v Eurodif, French Cour de Cassation (14 March 1984), 77 ILR 513, at 515, quoted in D. 
Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 323. 
159 Sonatarch v. Migeon, French Court de Cassation (1 October 1984), 26 I.L.M. 998 (1987), at 1003.  
160 J. Ostrander, ‘The last bastion of sovereign immunity: A Comparative look at immunity from execution 
of judgments’, 22 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 451 (2004) pp. 561. 
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ILC’s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property.161 In 
pursuant to Article 19(c), a post-judgment measure of constraint is possible in the case 
only of an execution against the commercial property of a foreign state in connection 
with the entity against which proceedings refer.  
 
The Annex to the Convention, provides that the ‘entity’ under Article 19 means “the 
State as an independent legal personality, a constituent unit of a federal State, a 
subdivision of a State, an agency or instrumentality of a State or other entity, which 
enjoys independent legal personality.”162 In order to fulfill this requirement, the UN 
Convention treats the state and its constituent subdivisions and agencies of the foreign 
state in the same way to the situation where an arbitral award has been directed against 
the entity of a foreign state and must be executed against the property owned by the same 
entity.163 O’Keefe and Tams point out that: 
 
“the final limb of Article 19 (c) stipulates that, when it comes to post-judgment measures 
of constraint, the State of the forum must ensure that its court respect the ‘segregation’ or 
division of foreign State property among the various, separate legal persons recognized by 
the municipal law of that foreign State.”164 
 
Accordingly, the UN Convention might provide a broader scope of execution in 
comparison to the US FSIA, since it permits execution against all commercial properties 
of the entity involved in the proceedings, and is not limited to the execution of 
                                                
161 See Article 18(1)(c) of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property of 1991; 30 ILM 1563 (1991), it reads: 
“1. No measures of constraint, such as attachment, arrest and execution, against property 
of a State may be taken in connection with a proceeding before a court of another State 
unless and except to the extent that: 
(c) the property is specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other 
than government non- commercial purposes and is in the territory of the State of the forum 
and has a connection with the claim which is the object of the proceeding or with the 
agency or instrumentality against which the proceeding was directed.”; 
   See L.W. Lowe, ‘The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property: The Commercial Exception’, 27 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 
657 (1988-1989). 
162 The UN Convention. Annex to the Convention, Understandings with respect to certain provisions of the 
Convention, with respect to article 19.  
163 See C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A commentary (CUP UK 2009) pp.1166. 
164 R. O’Keefe and C. J. Tams (eds), The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and Their Property A Commentary (OUP, UK 2013) pp. 324. 
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commercial property, which has a connection with the subject-matter of the claim. In this 
respect, the new requirement under the UN Convention is similar to the approach adopted 
in the UK SIA, which permits execution against the commercial property of a foreign 
state with no nexus requirement. Section 13 (4) of the UK SIA permits execution against 
property, which is “for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purpose.” 
Therefore, execution is possible when it is an execution against any commercial property 
of a foreign state; this is due to the fact that the UK SIA does not require any nexus 
requirement to the underlying claim.  
 
Following this trend, The Australian SIA165 and the Canadian SIA166 have adopted this 
approach, where there is no nexus requirement. In the French case of Creighton in the 
Paris Court of Appeal, the court, however, was silent on the matter of a nexus 
requirement when executing an arbitral award against a property of the state entity of 
Qatar not the State of Qatar itself. This was when the property of the state entity of Qatar 
had no connection with the underlying claim.167 By this reasoning of the Court of Appeal 
in Creighton, the approach of endorsing a nexus requirement, adopted in Eurodif and 
Sonatrach, appears to be overturned.168 Therefore, it can be assumed that this precedent 
would bring the French court practice on sovereign immunity from execution closer to 
the United Kingdom practice, which requires no connection between the property and the 
underlying claim, but only a commercial character of the property.169 
 
                                                
165 See Section 32(3)(a) of the Australian SIA, it reads: 
“(3) For the purposes of this section: 
               (a) commercial property is property, other than diplomatic property or military 
property, that is in use by the foreign State concerned substantially for commercial 
purposes; and” 
166 See Section 12(1)(b) of the Canadian SIA, it reads: 
“(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), property of a foreign state that is located in Canada 
is immune from attachment and execution and, in the case of an action in rem, from arrest, 
detention, seizure and forfeiture except where 
(b) the property is used or is intended to be used for a commercial activity or, if 
the foreign state is set out on the list referred to in subsection 6.2(2), is used or is intended 
to be used by it to support terrorism or engage in terrorist activity;” 
167 Creighton v. Qatar, Paris Cour de Appeal, 12 December 2002 [2003] Revue de I’arbitrage 417, at 527. 
168 See G.R. Delaume, ‘Recent French Cases on Sovereign Immunity and Economic Development 
Activities’, 2(1) ICSID Rev. 152 (1987). 
169 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 324. 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   244 
In summation, although the nexus requirement is not endorsed in all state practices for the 
purpose of execution, it remains one of the greatest hurdles for a private party in order to 
satisfy its arbitral award. Moreover, it also causes more difficulties for a municipal court 
to establish or define a connection between a property and the underlying claim. Such a 
practice can obviously be found in the US FSIA, in which a private party and a municipal 
court have found it difficult when executing an arbitral award. Therefore, since sovereign 
immunity from execution is no longer absolute, it should be possible that the property of 
a foreign state, used for a commercial activity, can be subject to a forced execution 
without any further nexus requirement. To hold otherwise, both parties would be 
confronted by an unnecessary and excessive burden, which might undermine the 
effectiveness of arbitration process.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
The challenges and limitations in executing against a bank account, diplomatic and 
military property, as well as a mixed purpose bank account of a diplomatic mission 
appear to be significant hurdles to the enforcement of arbitral awards. This is because 
these specially protected properties are not only subject to conditions and exceptions of 
municipal law on sovereign immunity, but are also specifically governed by the Vienna 
Convention; making it more difficult to execute against these properties. Furthermore, 
certain municipal laws add a further requirement of a jurisdictional link between the 
specific property and the underlying claim. Such a practice can be identified easily in the 
US FSIA, whereby private parties and the municipal courts have found it extremely 
difficult to execute arbitral awards. However, since the 1988 amendment of the US FSIA 
excludes the applicability of a nexus requirement and the act of state doctrine in the 
context of arbitral agreement, it has become easier to enforce an arbitral award in the 
United States.  
 
In many cases, a private investor is left without any remedy and state responsibility; 
therefore, the main concern here is how to protect a private investor in order to enable 
satisfaction of an arbitral award, without any violation of the sovereignty of state in order 
to protect its sovereign property and public interest. Without doubt, it is a challenge for 
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both the state and the investor, especially a court to adopt a public law concept of 
proportionality analysis, in order to strike a fair balance between investor rights under the 
treaty or agreement and sovereign rights under municipal or international law on 
sovereign immunity. To overcome this difficulty, municipal laws and international 
codifications should include clear specific provisions dealing with immunity from 
execution and waivers in regards to embassy accounts, diplomatic property, military 
property and other specially protected properties; providing a lucid approach in dealing 
with mixed purposes of those properties. 
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  Chapter 7 
Practical Considerations and A Way Forward  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite the fact that there are various possibilities in overcoming limitations and 
challenges whilst executing against both sovereign and commercial properties, the 
difficulties remain significant for both state and private investor. Further solutions are 
required to conquer this situation. These solutions range from the amendment of 
international conventions, providing a reliable and effective mechanism to reforming 
municipal laws on sovereign immunity, to the provision of a realistic and practical 
approach going forward. At a domestic level, the domestic courts and sovereign 
immunity laws have expressed the clear position that immunity from enforcement and 
execution is no longer absolute. Nonetheless, the approach towards immunity from 
execution is unclear. Significantly, a vigorous effort by states to pursue reform, at the 
international level, is unlikely to be achievable given the sensitive nature of execution 
and its possible impact on international relations between states.  
 
To achieve an amiable environment relating to investment treaty arbitration between a 
host state and the foreign investor, it is necessary to consider the interrelationship 
between international sovereign immunity laws plus the rules on enforcement of 
international investment arbitration awards.1 This is due to the special character of 
investment treaty arbitration as a public-private regime. Such a dynamic perspective 
could possibly provide a thorough analysis of the protection of private economic rights 
obliged by provisions under international investment law and state sovereignty obliged by 
law under sovereign immunity. Within this framework, it is a challenge for a court to 
strike a fair balance between the investor rights under treaty or agreement and the 
sovereign’s rights under the municipal or the international law relating to sovereign 
                                                
1 S. Schill, ‘International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights: A Case Study in 
Cross-Regime Analysis as an Instrument of Defragmentation’, Available at 
<http://works.bepress.com/stephan_schill/1> , pp. 3-4. (International Investment Law, the Law of State 
Immunity, and Human Rights) 
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immunity. On this basis, the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) has been 
established to bridge the gap between the two international areas in order to support the 
enforceability of investment arbitration awards.2 
 
Nonetheless, it is against this backdrop that the host state’s municipal court will 
frequently be ill positioned when enforcing and/or executing a state’s obligations under 
investment treaties vis-à-vis foreign investors by claiming a defence of sovereign 
immunity.3 By allowing a host state to breach its investment treaty obligations, before a 
municipal court, it is unable to serve and support the ISDS mechanism, thus not 
providing an efficient and effective institution that could assist enforcement of an arbitral 
award. Therefore, even though the ISDS mechanism ensures the enforceability of arbitral 
awards, it is unlikely to achieve this without municipal court’s support. Accordingly, 
sovereign immunity law is inevitably placed between international law and municipal 
law, giving rise to an increased debate and staunch challenges from scholars and 
practitioners concerning its interpretation and implementation.4 In this chapter, it must be 
considered that sovereign immunity law should be treated no differently from other 
defences, which are stipulated in investment treaties e.g. public policy and other 
procedural grounds, denying access to court or justice in a municipal court of a host state. 
 
Accordingly, as most international conventions, concerning the enforcement of arbitral 
                                                
2 A. Reinisch, ‘The Proliferation of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Threat of 
Fragmentation vs. the Promise of a more Effective System? Some Reflections From the Perspective of 
Investment Arbitration’  in: I. Buffard/J. Crawford/A. Pellet/S. Wittich (eds), International Law between 
Universalism and Fragmentation – Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner (Leiden – Boston, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), pp. 111. 
3 S. Schill, ‘Enabling Private Ordering-Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in International 
Investment Treaties’, 18 Minn. J. Int’l L. 1 (2009), pp.21. 
4 B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, ‘Investor-state arbitration as Governance: Fair and equitable treatment, 
proportionality and the emerging global administrative law’, New York University Public law and legal 
theory working papers (2009) , Available at 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1146&context=nyu_plltwp&sei-
redir=1#search=%22Investor-
state+arbitration+as+governance:+Fair+and+equitable+treatment,+proportionality+and+the+emerging+glo
bal+administrative+law%22 >, pp.1 (Investor-state arbitration as Governance); See also M. Sornarajah, The 
international law on foreign investment (CUP, UK 2010); See also Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, 
‘Investment treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law’, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 128 
(2006); See also Gus Van Harten, Investment treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP, New York 2007), 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   249 
awards, do not deal with the issue of sovereign immunity from execution and subject to a 
consideration of municipal law, a state’s breach of its obligations with regard to foreign 
investors is a matter for the municipal court and its municipal law on sovereign 
immunity. Consequently, a sovereign immunity defence could be utilised by a host state 
refusing the enforcement and execution of an arbitral award, thus leaving a foreign 
investor without any remedy or state responsibility. Professor Schreuer has highlighted 
that “allowing plaintiffs to proceed against foreign states and then to withhold from them 
the fruits of successful litigation through immunity from execution may put them into the 
doubly frustrating position of having been lured into expensive and seemingly successful 
lawsuits only to be left with an unenforceable judgment plus legal costs.”5 Therefore, 
sovereign immunity from execution could be seen as the ‘Achilles Heel’ of ISDS.6  
 
It could be assumed that reliance on solely investment treaty standards might be 
insufficient to bridge the gap between the international investment law and municipal 
sovereign immunity law providing a fair balance between investor and sovereign interest. 
In this regard, although substantive standards of investment protection may increase 
protection against a defence of sovereign immunity, applied in a municipal court, such 
investment obligations may be of limited value against the application of sovereign 
immunity.  International conventions, including the New York and ICSID Convention, do 
not offer an ideal solution in relation to a conflict of laws. As seen in the previous 
chapters, a pure economic approach of investment treaty arbitration system has failed to 
balance the rights under investment protection of foreign investors with rights to regulate 
of a host state as well as it is perceived as a threat to the effectiveness of other legal 
regimes. More importantly, both Conventions are silent on a post-award remedy in the 
event of non-voluntarily compliance by a respondent state, which leaves a private 
investor with no effective remedy to execute an arbitral award by themselves, irrespective 
of a traditional recourse to a home state’s diplomatic protection and state responsibility.  
 
When dealing with the public and private interest concerns, a public law concept under a 
                                                
5 C. Schreuer, State immunity : Some recent developments (Grotius, Cambridge 1988), at 216. 
6 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009), pp.1154. 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   250 
‘proportionality analysis’ could, therefore, become a last resort when addressing the 
issues arising between the public and private interest, as well as accommodating a non-
investment matter within the system of international investment law and arbitration7 since 
it is deemed to be methodologically workable as a means to compare and balance the 
interests by a court or tribunal. Moreover, it could also be an effective tool to deal with 
the theoretical tension between conflicting legal concepts. In pursuing this approach, an 
investment treaty tribunal and municipal court would be able to weight a regulatory 
measure or sovereign immunity defense raised by state against the economic damage 
done to a private investor by that regulatory measure or defense.8 A proportionality 
analysis is adopted as an interpretation method in the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) to resolve tensions between private and public interest. This is especially so 
regarding international investment and human rights law. Therefore, the analysis could 
also develop into a tool when resolving the tensions between international investment and 
sovereign immunity laws, as in the law of human rights. Put differently, whereas such a 
method of interpretation could protect both public and private interests, it could be 
implemented to diminish the abuse of sovereign power, especially when invoking 
unjustified sovereign immunity, as well defending the public interest in a claim for the 
protection of a private interest.9   
 
In this context, this chapter intends to provide two fundamental frameworks. Firstly, a 
practical considerations section, which will offer potential solutions, ranging from 
international law to municipal law including an amendment of international conventions; 
an inclusion of an express waiver regarding the execution of sovereign immunity; the 
development of municipal law. Secondly, a way forward section will further analyse the 
doctrinal framework of the relationship between international investment and sovereign 
                                                
7 B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investor’s Rights with State Regulatory 
Actions in the Public Interest- The Concept of Proportionality’ in S. Schill (ed.), International Investment 
Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP, New York 2010), pp. 77.; See Moshe Hirsch, ‘Interactions 
between investment and non-investment obligations in international investment law’, (The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, 2006)  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=947430> 
8 B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investor’s Rights with State Regulatory 
Actions in the Public Interest- The Concept of Proportionality’ in S. Schill (ed.), International Investment 
Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP, New York 2010), pp. 77 
9 International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights (n 1), pp. 25-26. 
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immunity law and the enforcement of an arbitral award under the investor-state 
arbitration, which leads to a state responsibility 
 
This cross-fertilisation of combining two fundamental sets of frameworks would provide 
potential practical considerations as well as uniting the two areas of international law; 
being the so-called ‘defragmentation’ of international law towards a harmonised 
development.10 Consequently, this will result in an efficient and effective investor-state 
arbitration dispute process in which a municipal court could play an important role in 
executing an arbitral award without relying on the old rule of diplomatic protection 
intervening by a home state of foreign investor. It is not the intention of the mechanism to 
recall a re-politicisation of investment dispute. 
 
2. Practical Considerations 
In spite of the limitations and challenges when executing an arbitral award, it could be 
said that the investor-state arbitration remains the most useful instrument to assure the 
enforceability of arbitral award to foreign investors, compared with a municipal court, 
which provides no guarantee for foreign investors. This is because the modern national or 
international law of arbitration and sovereign immunity have developed to the point that 
the mechanism could provide some assurances for sovereign states and foreign 
investors.11 Nonetheless, these modern codifications do not clearly stipulate the state’s 
obligations and the investor’s rights when sovereign states are unwilling to comply with 
the award of an arbitrator or to abide concerning the obligations under investment treaties 
and / or international conventions.12  
 
                                                
10 C. Schreuer, ‘The Relevance of Public International Law in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Investment Disputes’, < www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/81_csunpublpaper_1.pdf >, pp. 9; See also 
Anne Van Aaken, ‘Fragmentation of International law: The case of International investment protection’, 
(University of St. Gallen Law School, Law and Economics Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 
2008-1, 2008), pp. 2. 
11 G.R. Delaume, ‘Enforcement of State Contract Awards: Jurisdictional Pitfalls and Remedies, 8 ICSID 
Review-FILJ 29 (1993), pp.29. 
12 L. Reed and L. Martinez, ‘Treaty Obligations to Honor Arbitral Awards and Diplomatic Protection’ in 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards D. Bishop (eds), Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against Sovereigns, 
(Jurisnet, New York 2009), pp.13. 
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As discussed earlier, successful investors have run into difficulties in the attempt to 
enforce awards, despite the protection provided by arbitration clauses in BITs.13 In order 
to overcome these difficulties, and provide a fair balance between investor benefits and 
public interests, most leading jurisdictions are attempting placate the investor-state 
arbitration by developing their sovereign immunity laws with a restrictive approach on 
sovereign immunity from execution. Under this approach, the basic concept is to allow 
the execution against the foreign state’s commercially used property; being at the core of 
most modern municipal and international laws on sovereign immunity. Whilst a doctrine 
of sovereign immunity has evolved in less restrictive way, it is worth noting that the 
waiver of an immunity from jurisdiction does not include a waiver of immunity from 
enforcement; requiring a separate waiver. Nevertheless, a more liberal approach can be 
observed in the decisions of the French court. The court has interpreted an agreement to 
arbitrate in ICC arbitration as an implied waiver from the sovereign immunity. The 
proposition was clearly set out in the Creighton case, which has had a substantial impact 
in relation to the interpretation of an agreement to arbitrate clause, not only regarding the 
ICC arbitration, but also other arbitration tribunals.14  
 
As observed above, the approach of the municipal courts to the interpretation of 
sovereign immunity laws is insufficient, by itself, to solve the problem of a sovereign 
immunity from execution. Accordingly, the investment treaty arbitration mechanism 
requires some practical considerations to close the loophole that a sovereign immunity 
defence has fashioned in the execution and /or enforcement of an arbitral award. With 
this intention, this thesis currently provides two possible ways that various changes can 
be made: 
 
 
                                                
13 H. Booysen, ‘The Municipal Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against States in Terms of Arbitration 
Conventions, with special reference to the New York Convention- Does International Law Provide for a 
Municipal Law Concept of an Arbitrable Act of State?’, 12 South African Yearbook of International Law 
73 (1986/87), pp. 74. 
14 See chapter 5 at page 180-190 for a detail of an implied waiver of sovereign immunity from execution in 
Creighton case before a French Supreme Court under the ICC arbitration; D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state 
immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007), pp. 246. 
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a) The amendment of international conventions 
b) The development of municipal laws regarding sovereign immunity.    
 
(a) Amendment to international conventions and investment treaties to 
include an express waiver of sovereign immunity from execution 
It is proposed that an initial practice consideration should be to amend 
international conventions including the ICSID and New York Convention. This 
amendment should create an amiable atmosphere by providing a substantial degree of 
enforceability of arbitral awards. Accordingly, the amendment should ensure that host 
countries can attract foreign investment with a guarantee that their dispute resolution will 
be protected.15  
 
In relation to the ICSID Convention, the inclusion of a sovereign waiver from 
execution was considered during the drafting process of the Convention. However, the 
Convention drafters were concerned that “it would have run into the determined 
opposition of developing countries and would have jeopardized the wide ratification of 
the Convention.”16 At this point, the drafters believed that it was not the right time for 
such a drastic step. Therefore, Article 55 does not affect the law on sovereignty 
immunity.17 In contrast to a strict interpretation of the ICSID Convention, there is a 
possibility of waiving sovereign immunity from execution by an agreement to arbitrate 
clause, demonstrated by the case of Creighton.18 Here a state agreement to arbitrate under 
                                                
15 J. Paulsson, ‘ICSID’s Achievements and Prospects’, 6(2) ICSID Review 380 (1991); P. Lalive, ‘Some 
Threats to International Investment Arbitration’, 1(1) ICSID Review 26 (1986); D. Soley, ‘ICSID 
Implementation: Am Effective Alternative to International Conflict’, 19 International Law 522 (1985); V. 
O. Nmehielle, ‘Enforcing Arbitration Awards under the International Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention)’, 7 Ann. Surv. Int’l & Comp. L. 21 (2001). 
16 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009), pp. 1154, Citing on A. Broches, 
‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
136 Recueil des Cours 331, 403 (1972-II). 
17 A. Boralessa, ‘Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID awards against the 
republic of Argentina: Obstacles that transnational corporations may face’, 17 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev 53 (2004) 
114. (Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom) 
18 Creighton Limited v. Government of the State of Qatar, The French Cour de Cassation, (6 July 2000), 
reported in XXV Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 458 (2000). 
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the ICC rules to “have undertaken to carry out resulting award without delay” 19 could be 
implicitly interpreted to extend such a waiver to immunity from execution, which 
supplanted a municipal law on sovereign immunity.  
 
The decision of Creighton set a new judicial precedent as to the implied waiver of 
sovereign immunity. Maniruzzaman explains that “such a tendency may be attributed to 
the consideration for effectiveness of arbitral award and the State’s intention to comply 
with the arbitral award in good faith by its agreement to arbitrate.”20 Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that such a precedent is still not widely adopted or applied at an 
international level under a different rule and tribunal of arbitration, as it would derogate a 
sovereignty of state in protecting its rights and sovereign properties.  Accordingly, this 
precedent could be thus limited to commercial properties of a foreign state, not extending 
to property used for sovereign activities as well a diplomatic mission’s property and 
embassy bank account. This limitation had been highlighted by the French case of 
NOGA, in which the French court determined that “although Russian Federation had 
explicitly waived any rights of immunity, such a general waiver of sovereign immunity 
from execution did not explicitly express the state’s intention to waive its diplomatic 
immunity guaranteed by the Vienna Convention and customary international law.”21 
Therefore, it could be summarised that the French court reasoning in Creighton has 
interpreted the text of the ICC arbitration beyond the intention of parties and drafters, 
being that the ICC rules do not make any express reference to a waiver of sovereign 
immunity. 
 
On this basis, the most effective solution to the issue would be to include a 
                                                
19 The ICC rules has been amended to the current ICC rules, which are now in force from 1 January 2012. 
Article 24(2) of the ICC Rules of 1975 is substantially similar to Article 34(6) of the current ICC Rules. 
20 A. Maniruzzaman, ‘Sovereign Immunity and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against State Entities: 
Recent Trends in Practice’ in American Arbitration Association Handbook on International Arbitration 
Practice (Jurisnet LLC, New York 2010), pp. 348; See E. Gaillard, ‘Effectiveness of Arbitral Awards, State 
Immunity from Execution and Autonomy of State Entities Three Incompatible Principles’ in E. Gaillard 
and J. Younan (eds.), States Entities in International Arbitration (Juris Publsihing, Paris 2008). 
21 Embassy of the Russian Federation et.al v. Compagnie NOGA d’importation et d’exportation (NOGA), 
Paris Court of Appeal (10 August 2000), reported in (2001) XXVI Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 
273, at 275. 
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specific waiver of the immunity from execution to any applicable law, which concerns 
the enforcement and execution of an arbitral award, including international conventions 
and investment treaties. Regarding the ICSID Convention, as Article 55 stipulates that the 
immunity from execution is subject to a municipal law on sovereign immunity where an 
arbitral award is sought, the limitations and exceptions might be diverse depending on the 
particular law on sovereign immunity, which changes over time. In this manner, foreign 
investors will not be assured under Convention that an award would be satisfied in the 
forum state, instead accepting the uncertain municipal law and its unforeseen 
consequences.22 This would in no doubt lead to a forum shopping for the most preferred 
municipal law, and result in ICSID arbitration becoming an unpredictable and unreliable 
mechanism.  
 
Accordingly, the ICSID Convention requires amendment to reformulate the 
policy on the execution of ICSID awards, so that not only recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral award is guaranteed, but additionally the implementation of awards. This could 
be based on the proposition that when a state has waived a sovereign immunity from 
jurisdiction, it should imply a waiver of sovereign immunity from execution23 as reflected 
in the ICC arbitration rules,24 LCIA arbitration rules25 and UNICITRAL arbitration 
rules.26 Decisions supporting the implied waiver of immunity from execution are 
                                                
22 Bernini  and A .Jan van den Berg, ‘The enforcement of arbitral awards against a state: The problem of 
immunity from execution’ in Lew (eds.), Contemporary problems in international arbitration (Queens 
Mary college 1986), pp. 360.; C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009), pp. 
1157. 
23 V. O. Nmehielle, ‘Enforcing arbitration awards under the International Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention)’, 7 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 21 
(2001), pp.35.  
24 Art. 34(6) of the ICC Arbitration Rules. 
25 Art. 26(9) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules, it reads; 
“All awards shall be final and binding on the parties. By agreeing to arbitration under 
these Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any award immediately and without any 
delay (subject only to Article 27); and the parties also waive irrevocably their right to any 
form of appeal, review or recourse to any state court or other judicial authority, insofar as 
such waiver may be validly made.” 
26 Art. 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, reads; 
“2. All awards shall be made in writing and shall be final and binding on the parties. The 
parties shall carry out all awards without delay.” 
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available in France,27 Switzerland,28 Germany29 and the United States.30  
 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that although some codification changes 
regarding sovereign immunity towards a restrictive immunity of sovereign immunity 
from execution make it possible to enforce against sovereign state property. It is in part 
doubtful if the issue of sovereign immunity in this forum should be left to the prudence of 
a municipal court and its law. If this is the case, an arbitral award might not be subject to 
only municipal court discretion, but also interference by the political influence of the host 
state’s domestic policies and laws. Therefore, the ICSID award could not be considered 
as having finality and de-politicisation.31  
 
In this regard, an initial attempt by the ICSID drafters to create a depoliticised 
mechanism for a settlement of investment disputes would be undermined by government 
intervention and diplomatic protection. Latin America Countries first attempted to adopt 
a Calvo Doctrine and Drago Doctrine to restrain an abuse of diplomatic protection and 
occupation of armed forces (or so-called government intervention) by more powerful 
foreign governments against weaker governments. The implication of these doctrines is 
obliged foreign investments and investors to the exclusive jurisdiction with the host 
country by the domestic laws and tribunals rather than those of their home countries.32  
However, the effectiveness of the Calvo and Drago doctrines should not be overstated, 
not being able to totally dispose of government intervention and diplomatic protection 
given their applicability has only inhibited Lain America countries. Moreover, a powerful 
state is still able to intervene on behalf of its investor to protect its national interest. 
Therefore, a diplomatic protection by the espousal of claims of its national against other 
                                                
27 See Creighton Limited v. Government of the State of Qatar, The French Cour de Cassation, (6 July 
2000), reported in XXV Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 458 (2000). 
28 See Arab Republic of Egypt v. CINETEL, Federal Tribunal, 20 July 1979, 65 ILR 425 (1984), at 430. 
29 See Central Bank of Nigeria, Landgericht Frankfurt, 2 December 1975, 65 ILR 131 (1984), at 135. 
30 See Birch Shipping Co v. Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F.Supp. 311 (1980), at 312.; 
Walker International Holdings Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 395 F. 3d 229 (5th Cir. 2004), at 234. 
31 See D. Schneiderman, ‘Revisiting the Depoliticization of Investment Disputes’ in K.P. Sauvant (eds.), 
Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2010-2011 (OUP, New York 2012), pp. 693. 
32 I.F.I. Shihata, ‘Towards a greater depoliticisation of Investment disputes: The roles of ICSID and 
MIGA’, 1 ICSID Review- Foreign Investment law journal 1 (1986), pp.2 
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states remains significant when a state deems such action is necessary and appropriate.33 
 
For this reason, it is the main objective of the establishment of the ICSID to create 
a framework under travaux preparatories. This could carefully stabilise the interests of 
all parties and depoliticise the settlement of investment disputes.34 This would provide 
increased effective protections and enhanced solutions for foreign investors, where they 
receive direct access to an international remedy, “rather than relying on the uncertainties 
of diplomatic protection”.35 On this basis, a dispute settlement would not be embedded 
within a political mechanism once the state and an investor provided consent to such 
arbitration. This obligation is stipulated in Article 27 of the Convention, disempowering 
contracting states from providing diplomatic protection or pursuing an international claim 
on behalf of nationals. Accordingly, the heritage of the ICSID arbitration could be viewed 
as an effective mechanism to remove a home state control, either by government 
intervention or diplomatic protection. Shihata proposed that “an examination of the 
ICSID Convention’s provisions on the exhaustion of local remedies, the application of 
domestic law, and diplomatic protection should show that the ICSID Convention indeed 
offers developing countries benefits that may not be obtained even from a wider 
application of the Calvo Clause.”36  
 
Yet, the goal of the ICSID arbitration towards a ‘de-politicisation’ could not be 
literally achieved. Insofar, the ICSID arbitration recalls the path of the Calvo and Drago 
doctrines by reinserting a municipal court consideration regarding an enforcement of 
arbitral award plus the diplomatic protection. Whereas Article 27 of the ICSID 
Convention is initially intended to remove state intervention, it later provides an 
exception for state intervention when a contracting state fails to abide or comply with an 
ICSID award. Here, the amendment of the Convention is imperative in order to take a 
                                                
33 ibid 4 
34 ibid 
35 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009), pp. 416; A. Bjorklund, ‘Sovereign 
Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: The re-politicization of 
International Investment Disputes’, 21 Am.Rev.Int’l. Arb. 211 (2010), pp. 239-240.;  
36 I.F.I. Shihata, ‘Towards a greater depoliticisation of Investment disputes: The roles of ICSID and 
MIGA’, 1 ICSID Review- Foreign Investment law journal 1 (1986)  pp.13. 
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step towards achieving a goal of de-politicisation.  
 
The amendment of any international convention is not an easy task due to the fact 
that it requires the approval of all contracting states; such a consensus being difficult to 
reach in a short time.37 Further, it may be difficult to persuade developing countries to 
include such an express waiver as seen in the drafting’s Convention period.38 Therefore, a 
more effective route would be to include such an express waiver in investment treaties or 
on a contractual basis, which would reduce the importance of the particular parties 
involved to almost a bilateral matter.39 In this context, it could be said that a contractual 
wavier would be easier than a treaty-based wavier because it relates to only a particular 
contract, not having an affect on every investor of that contracting states like the case of a 
treaty-based waiver.40  
 
Such a waiver could be written to specify the scope and the attachable property 
involved, including sovereign property and diplomatic mission’s property once a dispute 
had commenced.41 Delaume emphasised the importance of drafting “in order to increase 
the effectiveness of waivers of immunity, their scope should be widened to include also 
the type of provisions which are commonly found in private law contracts in the form of 
choice-of-forum and arbitration clause.”42 To strengthen the bargaining power of a 
private party to execute an arbitral award, the ICSID Center has recommended a model 
clause of 1981 that; 
 
“The [name of Contracting State] hereby irrevocably waives any claim to immunity in 
regard to any proceedings to enforce any arbitral award rendered by a Tribunal constituted 
pursuant to this Agreement, including, without limitation, immunity from service of 
                                                
37 Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom  (n 16), pp. 119. 
38 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009)  pp. 1154. 
39 Alexis Blane, ‘Sovereign immunity as a bar to the execution of international arbitral awards’, 41 JILP, 
453 (2009) pp. 496. 
40 ibid 498. 
41 A. Bjorklund, ‘Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: 
The re-politicization of International Investment Disputes’, 21 Am.Rev.Int’l. Arb. 211 (2010), pp. 230. 
42 G.R. Delaume, ‘Contractual Waivers of Sovereign Immunity: Some Practical Considerations’, 5(2) 
ICSID Review-FILJ 232 (1990)  pp. 233. 
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process, immunity from jurisdiction of any court, and immunity of any of its property 
from execution.”43 
 
The formula of this model clause would raise the question whether a waiver 
extends to any property used for sovereign and commercial activities. Moreover, it would 
limit a foreign investor to reach specially protected property of the foreign state, for 
example, the central bank and/or diplomatic property, which is protected by the Vienna 
Convention. Moreover, a mixed purpose of a bank account is also a very attractive but 
problematic object to execute. Accordingly, the scope of waiver should be specified by 
the willingness of parties. Schreuer has provided a consolidated version, which includes 
all possible property to be executed that; 
 
“The Host State hereby irrevocable waives any rights of sovereign immunity as to it and 
any of its property, regardless of the commercial or non-commercial nature of this 
property, in respect of the enforcement and execution of an award rendered by an Arbitral 
Tribunal constituted pursuant to this agreement. Such property includes any bank account 
belonging to the Host State whether held in the name of diplomatic mission or otherwise. 
This waiver extends to property, including bank accounts belonging to the Host State’s 
central bank or other monetary authority.”44 
 
From the above proposed clause, the detailed scope of waiver can be widened or 
narrowed depending on negotiation between both parties. Despite an express waiver of 
immunity from execution, provided for in investment treaties and contracts, the US courts 
still apply the US FSIA. This limits the execution of foreign property used for 
commercial activities.45 Although the US FSIA respects “international agreements to 
which the United States is a party”,46 as well as arbitration agreement,47 such a blanket 
waiver might not be workable and must fall within the exceptions provided in the US 
FSIA. Accordingly, since an express waiver might not provide a greater assurance to the 
investor in the US jurisdiction, an express waiver clause might be more effective in other 
                                                
43 Clause XIX of the ICSID Model Clauses of 1981, 1 ICSID Reports 207.  
44 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009)  pp. 1181.  
45 Af-Cap Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d. 1080 (9th Cir. 2007) 1087. 
46 Sec. 1609 of the US FSIA. 
47 Sec. 1610(a)(6) of the US FSIA. 
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jurisdictions,48 as the United Kingdom, where it allows execution regarding both 
sovereign and commercial property. Where a state and a private party have agreed to 
arbitration and enforcement, the opportunity of an express waiver of the sovereign 
immunity raise concerns, in that the state has an obligation to meet its liabilities to private 
parties whom enter into commercial transactions.   
 
More importantly, a model clause could be seen as a pre-judgment measure of 
constraint or a conservatory measure, where a state could earmark certain property for the 
purpose of execution, prior to the adjudication. Once again, most international and 
municipal laws on sovereign immunity are more restricted to some limitation regarding a 
pre-judgment attachment, which has been previously discussed. The waiver of an 
immunity from a pre-judgment attachment needs to not be confused with the opposing 
waiver of an immunity from execution; being a different matter and subject to alternative 
requirements.49 Consequently, the waiver of immunity from a pre-judgment attachment 
must be express and clear in order to secure certain properties for the purpose of 
execution.50 
 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the adoption of the UN Convention would 
provide a unified regime of execution of arbitral awards under a restrictive approach 
towards a customary international law. However, it could not be achieved to represent as 
a state practice to bind on non-parties to the treaty.51 This is due to the fact that each state 
adopts a different degree to a restrictive approach of sovereign immunity, which shows a 
considerable divergence among states. This can be concluded that a restrictive approach 
is widely though not universally recognised in which such state practices are very 
                                                
48 Alexis Blane, ‘Sovereign immunity as a bar to the execution of international arbitral awards’, 41 JILP, 
453 (2009), pp. 500. 
49 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp. 1179. 
50 G.R. Delaume, ‘ICSID and the Transnational Financial Community’, 1 ICSID Review-FILJ 237 (1986), 
pp. 250. 
51 L. F. Damrosch, ‘Changing the International Law of Sovereign Immunity Through National Decisions’, 
44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1185 (2011), pp. 1189-1191.  
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difficult to interpret.52  
 
More importantly, some provisions in the UN Convention are not congruent with 
the existing sovereign immunity laws and state practices, which might provide more 
favours to states. Accordingly, the attempts for an international convention on sovereign 
immunity could not be successful, which leaves the usefulness of the UN Convention 
open to doubt. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that a state party to the New York 
Convention and ICSID Convention would adopt the UN Convention to create a uniform 
regime of sovereign immunity from execution in a near future.  
 
Instead of amending international conventions and international treaties or 
creating a uniform regime of rules on sovereign immunity, a more practical and realistic 
way is to create a lex specialis set of soft law instruments regarding the minimum 
international standard on sovereign immunity from execution. Fox suggested a creation 
of rules relating to an attachment of a property of state in an enforcement of arbitral 
award through an UNCITRAL Model law. He proposed that “the advantage of such an 
initiative is that it would separate the much less controversial topic of enforcement of 
arbitral awards to which a state is a party from the general question of proceedings in 
national courts concerning state activities.”53 Therefore, a state could adopt a Model law 
into their municipal law, which has a lex specialis status within a regime of international 
investment law. This could further supplement to the rules and principles provided in the 
UN Convention and also support to the development of existing rules in a municipal law 
on sovereign immunity. 
 
From the above situation, the amendment of international conventions or 
international treaties may only be achievable in certain jurisdictions, and may be subject 
to particular restrictions under the municipal law. Therefore, it is additionally necessary 
to have a parallel amendment of municipal law regarding sovereign immunity in each 
                                                
52 D. Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors, OECD Working 
papers on international investment, 2010/2, OECD Publishing (2010) pp. 11. 
53 H. Fox, ‘State immunity and enforcement of arbitral awards: Do we need an UNCITAL model law mark 
II for execution against state property?’, 12 Arb. Int’l 89 (1996) pp. 93 
   Enforcing Arbitral Awards Against Sovereign States 
Khanapoj Joemrith   262 
country, in order to secure the execution of an arbitral award before a municipal court, 
plus support the applicability of international conventions. In achieving this, a model law, 
as mentioned above, should be incorporated in the same way as international 
conventions.54  
 
(b) Development in the interpretation of municipal law on sovereign 
immunity  
In the light of the above, it would be illusory to amend the international 
conventions or investment treaties. Although a contractual waiver might be a more 
practical and effective route, such a waiver might be subject to various requirements 
stipulated in municipal laws on sovereign immunity. In order to avoid a shopping forum 
and an unattached arbitral award, it is necessary to harmoniously amend the sovereign 
immunity from the execution rule at a municipal law level. The law on sovereign 
immunity in each country has evolved to reflect its own tradition, therefore, being various 
interpretation approaches, making it difficult to uniform a rule on sovereign immunity 
from execution.55 At present, most municipal laws on sovereign immunity provide a 
promising approach by their reliance concerning the commercial property of foreign state 
under a restrictive approach.56 However, foreign investors might find it difficult to satisfy 
and locate the availability of attachable commercial property due to the burden of proof.  
 
As previously noted, under the US FSIA and UK SIA, foreign investors are 
required to demonstrate that the property in question is used for a sovereign or 
commercial purpose. Predominately, the UK SIA permits that the head of the diplomatic 
mission has the authority to issue a certificate confirming that a property is not used nor 
                                                
54 H. Fox, ‘State immunity and enforcement of arbitral awards: Do we need an UNCITAL model law mark 
II for execution against state property?’, 12 Arb. Int’l 89 (1996) pp. 93. 
55 A. Bjorklund, ‘Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: 
The re-politicization of International Investment Disputes’, 21 Am.Rev.Int’l. Arb. 211 (2010) pp. 230. 
56 H. Fox, ‘State immunity and enforcement of arbitral awards: Do we need an UNCITAL model law mark 
II for execution against state property?’, 12 Arb. Int’l 89 (1996) pp. 93; A. Bjorklund, ‘Sovereign Immunity 
as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: The re-politicization of International 
Investment Disputes’, 21 Am.Rev.Int’l. Arb. 211 (2010), pp. 231. 
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intended for use commercially, unless the contrary is proven by foreign investor.57 In this 
context, the burden of proof is left with a foreign investor to classify the particular 
property. However, it is a complex task to clarify a cross-examination of the head of 
diplomatic mission’s certificate, this being prohibited by Article 31(2) of the Vienna 
Convention.58 Accordingly, it is recommended that a shifting of burden of proof to a state 
would be preferable, in which a state would clarify whether the property is used for a 
sovereign purpose. At the same time, a state would be able to protect its inviolability of 
certain properties, which require special protection. By shifting the burden of proof onto a 
state, a foreign investor is no longer presented with the difficult circumstance of 
attempting to clarify the purpose of property in question. Even in a more complicated 
case of mixed purposes of property, a state can better protect its sovereign property.  As 
Fox suggests: “it might go so far, as does Swiss law, to reverse the burden of proof where 
the party seeking enforcement has a valid award against a state so as to require the state 
to prove that the property sought to be attached is not governmental in nature or that it is 
in non-commercial use.”59  
 
An additional potential solution is to specify and narrow a list of non-commercial 
immune property, which is not subject to an execution. Most codifications in this area do 
not provide a clear list of certain types of state property; including the diplomatic central 
bank and military property, which are always immune from execution as well as a 
possibility of waiver of state property and those specially protected property. Although 
the UN Convention seems to be closest to this, the list of specially protected property 
under Article 21 is almost expansive rather than restrictive in scope. Further, it is silent 
on properties with mixed purposes, such as, the mixed purposes of a bank account. 
Therefore, a proposed amendment of the 1988 US FSIA, which was not incorporated in 
the text, should be a consideration for other states to amend their municipal law.60 
                                                
57 Section 13(5) of the UK SIA.  
58 See Art. 31(2) of the Vienna Convention, it reads; 
“A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.” 
59 H. Fox, ‘State immunity and enforcement of arbitral awards: Do we need an UNCITAL model law mark 
II for execution against state property?’, 12 Arb. Int’l 89 (1996), pp. 93. 
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Lastly, the most generous and preferred approach is to jurisdictionally extend the 
waiver of sovereign immunity, which encompass a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution. This approach can be identified in many cases in the United States, 
Switzerland and France, in which a state’s initial agreement to arbitrate could constitute a 
complete waiver of sovereign immunity, even at the stage of enforcement.61 Bowett 
confirms the proposition that “in most jurisdictions, a Sovereign State’s agreement to 
arbitrate is deemed to be a waiver of immunity for the purposes of arbitration and, in 
addition, the waiver is generally regarded as extending to enforcement and execution of 
any award.”62 Such a waiver is based on the basic premise that “consent to arbitration 
excludes all other remedies.”63 This exclusion of any other remedy is also stipulated in 
Article 26 of the ICSID Convention.64  
 
Nevertheless, neither international conventions nor municipal law on sovereign 
immunity has adopted a broad approach of implied waiver of sovereign immunity. 
Although this practice is not yet adopted in a municipal law, it could be found in cases 
rendered under the ICC arbitration and enforced by the New York Convention, which 
allow an explicit waiver from immunity from execution by an agreement to arbitrate. A 
wide adoption of such a broad approach is unlikely to take place in the near future as it 
appears to be too drastic for states to waive any immunity and any property of foreign 
state to be executed. It is noteworthy that such a practice will definitely undermine the 
sovereignty of state.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Law 1288 (1986) pp. 1301, which suggested an amendment of Section 1610 (a) of the US FSIA, it reads: 
“This subsection shall not apply to property that is used for purposes of maintaining a 
diplomatic or consular mission or the residence of the chief of such mission, including a 
bank account unless that bank account is also used for commercial purposes unrelated to 
diplomatic or consular functions.” 
61 S. Toope, Mixed International Arbitration Studies in Arbitration between States and Private Persons 
(Cambridge, Grotius 1990) pp. 148. 
62 Bowett, ‘Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in the Settlement of Disputes’, 180 Hague 
Recueil 169 (1983), pp. 220. 
63 R. Luzzatto, ‘International Commercial Arbitration and the Municipal Law of States’, 157 Recueil Des 
Cours 13, (1977) pp. 93. 
64 See Art.26 of the ICSID Convention. 
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A more practicable way would be to limit such an implied waiver of sovereign 
immunity from execution to solely commercial property whilst including certain 
restrictions, such as a jurisdictional link. This broad approach, with a limitation to 
jurisdictional nexus, can be seen in Switzerland, where it allows the execution of an 
arbitral award, but a foreign investor has to find a legal relationship between an arbitral 
award and Switzerland.65 In this way, whilst a foreign state receives more protection by 
narrowing the scope of municipal law on sovereign immunity and avoiding non-
compliance of the arbitral award by the defence of sovereign immunity, a state could be 
able to maintain its state sovereignty as well as to protect its sovereign property including 
specially protected property and its obligations under investment treaties. Not all 
proposed interpretation approaches of municipal law on sovereign immunity might be 
adopted into codifications in this area soon; however, some of them are already 
implemented in the interpretations of certain courts. This can be identified as a small step 
for a development of the interpretation approach into municipal law, but it is better than 
no development. In this way, no matter how a state frustrates an enforcement of an 
arbitral award, when raising immunity from execution, it will raise a presumption that a 
state responsibility for its breach of the investment treaty obligations, by a certain extent, 
will not be remedied and remains.  
 
3. A Way Forward: Reform and the Use of Proportionality? 
The non-compliance of an arbitral award would likely lead to a state responsibility. It is 
doubtful whether by treaty obligations, diplomatic protection should be the last resort in 
the enforcement of an arbitral award, in the perspective of investor-state arbitration. This 
is because a state consents to arbitration under the investment treaty or agreement 
contract in which the obligation to comply with an arbitral award exists, independently of 
any enforcement measures.66 Accordingly, the defence of sovereign immunity, raised to 
refuse the enforcement of an arbitral award, would only be a procedural bar to execution, 
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66 L. Reed and L. Martinez, ‘Treaty Obligations to Honor Arbitral Awards and Diplomatic Protection’ in D. 
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which has no effect on the binding nature of an arbitral award.67 As Schreuer contends: 
“the obligation to comply exists also where a State party finds that it can rely on State 
immunity in accordance with Art. 55. State immunity may be used to thwart enforcement 
against certain types of property of the award debtor. But it does not affect the obligation 
to comply with the award.”68  
 
Moreover, most tribunals have frequently referred to the rules of State Responsibility, 
relying on the 2001 ILC’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (the 2001 ILC’s Articles) when it awards damages as compensation. 
Article 31 of the 2001 ILC’s Articles provides that “the responsible State in under an 
obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful 
act.”69 However, this practice of the tribunals might be theoretically questioned. As 
explained by Marboe, “the rules on state responsibility have developed in inter-state 
relationships, thus between sovereign states on the basis of equality under international 
                                                
67 Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom (n 16), pp. 109-110. 
68 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp. 1107. This reasoning can be 
seen in the Ad Hoc Committee in MINE v. Guinea, Interim Order No.1, 12 August 1988, para 25, it reads; 
“… It should be clearly understood, that State immunity may well afford a legal defence to 
forcible execution, but it provides neither argument nor excuse for failing to comply with 
an award. In fact, the issue of State immunity from forcible execution of an award will 
typically arise if the State party refuses to comply with its treaty obligations. Non-
compliance by a State constitutes a violation by that State of its international obligations 
and will attract its own sanctions. The Committee refers in this connection among other 
things to Articles 27 and 64 of the Convention, and to the consequences which such a 
violation would have for such a State’s reputation with private and public sources of 
international finance.”; 
     The same reasoning is affirmed by the ad hoc Committee in Mitchell v. DR Congo, Decision on the stay 
of enforcement of the award, 20 November 2004, para 41 reads; 
“The immunity of a State from execution (Article 55 of the Convention) does not exempt 
it from enforcing the award, given its formal commitment in this respect following 
signature of the Convention. If it does not enforce the award, its behavior is subject to 
various indirect sanctions. Precisely, reference is made to Articles 27 and 64 of the 
Convention. The investor’s State has the right, according to Article 27, to exercise 
diplomatic protection against the State which does not respect its obligation to enforce an 
arbitral award of the Centre; but also, according to Article 64, to have recourse to the 
International Court of Justice. Moreover, a State’s refusal to enforce an ICSID award may 
have a negative effect on this State’s position in the international community with respect 
to the continuation of international financing or the inflow of other investments.” ; 
       See also B. Juratowitch, ‘The Relationship between Diplomatic Protection and Investment 
Treaties’, 23(1) ICSID Review-FILJ 10 (2008).  
69 Art. 31 of the 2001 ILC’s Articles.  
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law.”70 Since the nature of investment treaty arbitration is a relationship between a state 
and foreign investor governing by the rules in a form of global administrative law, it, 
therefore, raises a question whether the rules on state responsibility are appropriate to 
deal with a particular legal relationship between a state and a private investor. Yet, the 
2001 ILC’s Articles does not apply to a case brought by an individual against a state.71 In 
this regard, although investment treaty arbitration provides the advantages of procedural 
remedies for private investors independent from a home state’s diplomatic protection, 
private investors could not directly claim against a respondent state before the ICJ in case 
of non-compliance but inevitably recourse to a home state to exercise a diplomatic 
protection and submit a dispute to the ICJ. 
 
In this circumstance, the failure to abide and/or comply with an arbitral award is an abuse 
of its agreement to arbitrate and the state’s responsibility pursuant to international treaty 
obligations.72 Therefore, a state is obligated to honour an arbitral award under its treaty 
obligations pursuant to the New York Convention73 or the ICSID Convention,74 where it 
may be party.75 If this statement holds true, the system of investor-state arbitration would 
potentially revert to the re-politicisation. This scenario may undermine one of the 
fundamental aims of investor-state dispute settlement, which is attempting to suspend the 
right to diplomatic protection plus contributing to the de-politicization of investment 
disputes.76 The potential of re-politicisation will raise concerns as to the legitimacy and 
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suitability of the existing system when dealing with an enforcement of arbitral award.77  
 
As already mentioned in chapter 4, such an assessment and interpretation would only 
depend on a municipal court and its municipal law on sovereign immunity. In practice, a 
municipal court, however, has an inadequate reference to investment treaty obligations 
and investment treaty standards. Therefore, it could not disregard the potential tension 
among international investment and sovereign immunity law. Accordingly, the interests 
underlying the investor-state arbitration are the shield of private economic rights provided 
under investment treaty obligations, on the one hand, and state sovereignty provided 
under sovereign immunity law, on the other.78 This tension would inevitably lead to the 
municipal court becoming a review mechanism, as in the case of arbitral tribunals, in 
order to strike a fair balance between investor and public interest for the enforcement of 
an arbitral award.79  
 
In the case of arbitral tribunals, the system of investment treaty arbitration combines 
public international law with the private arbitration rules mechanism, used for resolving 
disputes between private parties in commercial arbitration as the procedural law.80 Not 
surprisingly, this hybrid model of investment treaty arbitration is currently in a unique 
category of pubic law adjudication. The hybrid model and its mechanism have been 
understood by many scholars81 as public regulatory or administrative law, which is 
developing into a form of ‘global governance’. In the sphere of global governance, it 
demands the legitimate exercise of power. Given the public-private characteristic of 
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investment treaty arbitration, it becomes the system of hybridisation,82 where neither 
public international law nor private transnational dispute resolution can separately 
rationalise its mechanism.  
 
In the attempt to adopt this public-private approach, balancing public and private 
interests, the mechanism is not well-aligned with the enforcement immunity of an arbitral 
tribunal. Schill observes that; 
 
 “the balance that the procedural framework on investor-state arbitrations strikes between 
private and public interests by leaving enforcement immunity untouched also allows States 
to refuse enforcement of investment treaty awards for purely opportunistic motives… In 
that regard, enforcement immunity is antagonistic to the objective of international 
investment law to promote and protect foreign investors.”83 
 
At a domestic level, although it is suggested that municipal courts adopt some investment 
treaty obligations and standards, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection 
and security when dealing with sovereign immunity issue, the issue is far from settled. 
Moreover, a municipal court may refuse to develop certain special rules for the 
enforcement of an arbitral award, but then adhere to principles applicable in juridical 
proceedings.84 Therefore, a cross-fertilization of the assessment between investment 
treaty obligations and sovereign immunity law at a municipal court level is preferable, in 
which it could have the potential to resolve a tension between international investment 
and sovereign immunity law.  
 
Therefore, when there is a tension between investment law and sovereign immunity law, 
a sovereign immunity law should not be considered as a specific rule under international 
law in order to avoid a fragmentation of international law on sovereign immunity. Rather, 
it is apparent that the general law of sovereign immunity has moved towards a restrictive 
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approach in commercial areas, in order to reverse the risk of undermining international 
investment law remedies. Consequently, this change of the general rule on sovereign 
immunity from execution, in relation to international investment law, could reflect the 
defragmentation of international law.  
 
In pursuing a cross-fertilisation assessment of investment treaty obligations and sovereign 
immunity law, a proportional analysis under public law may adequately result in striking 
a fair balance between investment protections and public concerns, in order to respect and 
accommodate investment and non-investment obligations. In the words of Kingsbury and 
Schill, “proportionality analysis is a method of legal interpretation and decision-making 
in situations of collision or conflicts of different principles and legitimate public policy 
objective.”85 Such a legal interpretation could analyse conflict issues on the basis of ‘more 
or less’ rather than ‘all-or-nothing fashion’.86  
 
In the context of this thesis, a proportionality analysis could assist in weighing the claim 
of a sovereign immunity defence, raised by a state to decline the execution of an arbitral 
award, and the investor’s rights under investment treaty obligations, to have an arbitral 
award satisfied. This may best facilitate both the interests of the investor and state; both 
being protected by two diverse principles of law in a harmonious way. The outcome of 
such an execution would best serve both parties on a proportional basis, in which the 
execution would not lead to a total loss of interest of either party, resulting in the 
increased acceptability and neutral outcome of the award. 
 
So far, the practice or proportionality analysis is infrequently seen in arbitral tribunals’ 
jurisprudence in order to directly deal with sovereign immunity law. Additionally, 
municipal courts, when domestically applying sovereign immunity law, are not regularly 
                                                
85 B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investor’s Rights with State Regulatory 
Actions in the Public Interest- The Concept of Proportionality’ in S. Schill (eds), International Investment 
Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP, New York 2010)  pp. 79. 
86 Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Privatizing human rights : The interface between international investment protection 
and human rights’ in A. Reinisch & U. Kriebaum (eds), The law of international relations – Liber 
Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold (Eleven International Pub. 2007), pp. 189. 
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referred to investment treaty standards, as a jurisdictional bar or to the enforcement of an 
arbitral award. From a jurisprudence of the ICSID, it, however, has adopted a form of 
proportionality analysis in the consideration of if the grant of a sovereign immunity, at a 
domestic level, constitutes a breach of certain investment treaty obligations. This can be 
observed in Desert Line v Yemen,87 Saipem v Bangladesh88 and Mondev v United States,89 
where the tribunals found that there had been a violation of certain investment treaty 
obligations and declared that the enforcement of an arbitral award is undeniable. Among 
these cases, the tribunal’s reasoning in Mondev v. United States particularly demonstrates 
consideration by way of a proportionality analysis, observing that; 
 
 “The function of the present Tribunal is not, however, to consider hypothetical situations, 
or indeed any other statutory than that for tortious interference with contractual relations. 
This was the immunity relied on by BRA and upheld by the trial judge and the appeal 
courts. In that specific context, reasons can well be imagined why a legislature might 
decide to immunize a regulatory authority, mandated to deal with commercial 
redevelopment plans, from potential liability for tortious interference. Such an authority 
will necessarily have both detailed knowledge of the relevant contractual relations and the 
power to interfere in those relations by granting or not granting permissions. If sued, it will 
be able to plead that it was acting in a good faith and in the exercise of a legitimate 
mandate- but such a claim may well not justify summary dismissal and will thus be a 
triable issue, with consequent distraction to the work of the Authority.”90 
 
By reference to a good faith and legitimate mandate, the tribunal considered that the 
legitimate government regulation of a host state could be weighted in the consideration of 
a tribunal confining access to the domestic court in certain situations. To put it another 
way, although it could be assumed that the application of sovereign immunity regarding 
jurisdictional immunity could affect investment treaty obligations, in order to prevent an 
access to a domestic court, the application can be subject to a host state’s limitation 
                                                
87 Desert Line Protect LLC v. The Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, 5 February 
2008, para 193. 
88 Saipem S.p.A. v The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, 30 June 2009, 
paras 6-51. 
89 Mondev International Ltd. v United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 11 
October 2002, para. 139-156. 
90 ibid 153. 
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because of legitimate public policy grounds.91 A breach of investment treaty obligations, 
by domestic court interference, can also seen in Saipem v. Bangladesh, concerning the 
enforcement of arbitral awards. In this case the ICSID tribunal considered the issue as to 
whether an illegal interference by a domestic court in ICC arbitration could lead to a 
breach of the Italy-Bangladesh BIT pursuant to an expropriation provision. As a matter of 
fact, the Bangladeshi court interfered with the ICC arbitration by revoking the authority 
of the ICC tribunal and arbitrators, as well as declaring that the ICC award was a nullity 
and unenforceable. In this matter, the ICSID tribunal seized the matter and confirmed its 
jurisdiction by reference to Article 9(1)92 of the Italy-Bangladesh BIT. The ICSID 
tribunal found that the actions of the Bangladeshi court constituted an expropriation:93 
 
 “Because, by the Respondent’s own submission, the ICC award could not be enforced 
outside Bangladesh, the intervention of the Bangladeshi courts culminating in the 
declaration of the Supreme Court that the ICC Award was “non-existent” substantially 
deprived Saipem of its rights and thus qualifies as a taking.”94 
 
Apart from the BIT breach on expropriation, the tribunal considered that a violation of 
Article II of the New York Convention, regarding the recognition of an arbitration 
agreement, has occurred. Although Bangladesh contended that the New York Convention 
was not relevant as Bangladesh had not so far adopted it into its national legislation, the 
fact was that a violation of the Convention would lead to Bangladesh’s international 
responsibility, according to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
The Vienna treaty provides that “a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law 
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”95 Additionally, Article 3 of the 
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally 
                                                
91 International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights (n 1), pp. 22. 
92 Art. 9(1) of the Italian-Bangladesh BIT, reads; 
“Any disputes arising between a Contracting Party and the investors of the other, relating 
to compensation for expropriation, nationalization, requisition or similar measures 
including disputes relating to the amount of the relevant payments shall be settled 
amicably, as far as possible.” 
93 Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, 30 June 
2009, paras 97. 
94 ibid 130. 
95 Article 27 of the VCLT, quoted in Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/7, Award, 30 June 2009, para 165. 
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Wrongful Acts confirms that “the characterization of an act of a State as internationally 
wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the 
characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.”96 Thus, the tribunal concluded 
that “the revocation of the arbitrators’ authority was contrary to international law, in 
particular to the principle of abuse of rights and the New York Convention.”97 In this 
sense, although the tribunal’s reasoning did not concern a sovereign immunity defence, 
raised in a domestic court to refuse an enforcement of arbitral award, it could be 
compared to the principles and issues considered in this case.98  
 
Resulting from the above-mentioned cases, investment treaty tribunals have practically 
determined a variety of investment treaty obligations when dealing with the situation of 
an investor being prevented access to a domestic court or having an arbitral award 
domestically enforced. Nevertheless, it should be noted that neither a jurisdictional 
immunity doctrine nor an enforcement immunity doctrine has been specifically adopted 
or raised in the consideration of a domestic court’s defence against investment treaty 
obligations. With regards to the effectiveness of arbitral awards, an access obstacle to the 
domestic court should have the equivalent effect to the application of the sovereign 
immunity doctrine, restricting jurisdiction and/or enforcement. In this respect, Schill 
summarises that “as regards the rights granted under investment treaties, sovereign 
immunity, in principle, should be treated no differently from other instruments resulting 
in a denial of access to courts or other obstacles to enforcement.”99  
 
On this presumption, it does not follow that a state could always raise a sovereign 
immunity defence without any state liability. Rather, a state is, by all means, responsible 
regarding a breach of investment treaty obligations if such a conduct cannot be 
considered as made in good faith and by legitimate mandate. In interpreting investment 
                                                
96 Art. 3 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, quoted in Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/7, Award, 30 June 2009, para 165. 
97 Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award, 30 June 
2009, paras 1370. 
98 International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights (n 1), pp. 23-24. 
99 ibid 25. 
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treaty obligations before a tribunal or a domestic court, the legitimate conduct of a state 
could, thus, be used as a weight against a sovereign immunity defence, in order to 
balance public and private interests. In consequence, investment treaty tribunals are 
inclined to apply some kind of proportionality analysis, even if this is still in a small 
number of cases.  
 
Against the above tribunal jurisprudence, the proportionality analysis is widely adopted 
in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, so as to resolve tensions between international 
investment law and sovereign immunity law. The ECtHR’s jurisprudence has mostly 
dealt with sovereign immunity and protection of investor rights, in a context of human 
rights law. However, it can also be adapted and used as guidance in dealing with the 
relationship between international investment law and sovereign immunity law, in order 
to determine whether the state raised defence of sovereign immunity, used to refuse an 
execution of arbitral award, may be considered a breach of investment treaty obligations 
under international investment law.  
 
In the ECtHR jurisprudence, most cases have relied on Article 1 of the Protocol100 
regarding the right to property and Article 6(1) of the ECHR101 as to a fair trial in order to 
deal with the matters of sovereign immunity. The ECtHR has interpreted Article 6(1) of 
the ECHR not just as guaranteeing an individual access to justice before a domestic 
                                                
100 Art. 1 of the Protocol of ECHR, it reads; 
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 
101 Art. 6(1) of the ECHR, reads; 
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the 
interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the 
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.” 
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court102 but additionally granting individuals a right to judicial decisions enforced.103 
Therefore, this particular reasoning goes much further than the investment treaty 
tribunals’ proportionality analysis method, which predominately considers a matter of 
access to a domestic court, when considering a matter of sovereign immunity. In Fayed v. 
United Kingdom, the court considered the issue of sovereign immunity from jurisdiction, 
used as a bar to the right of access to court. The court observed that: 
 
 “Certainly the Convention enforcement bodies may not create by way of interpretation of 
Article 6(1) a substantive civil right which has no legal basis in the State concerned. 
However, it would not be consistent with the rule of law in a democratic society or with 
the basic principle underlying Article 6 para.1 (art.6-1)…if…a State could, without 
restraint or control by the Convention enforcement bodies, remove from the jurisdiction of 
the courts a whole range of civil claims or confer immunities from civil liability on large 
groups or categories of persons”104 
 
In this respect, the ECtHR considered that the individual’s access right to court under 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR is not absolute, but may be subject to a state imposed 
limitation, which satisfies a legitimate aim and proportionality.105 The court applied the 
proportionality analysis as well as a margin of appreciation to balance the defence of 
immunity from jurisdiction, raised by a state to protect public interest, and the rights of 
individual to access the court with legitimate and necessary means. It should be noted that 
a proportionality analysis could be used as a method to balance the interests of both 
parties, which is not only in favour of a foreign state to protect public interest106 as in the 
cases of McElhinney107, Forgarty108 and Al-Adsani,109 but can be also served in the 
interest of the individual to protect its rights by limiting the interference of foreign state 
                                                
102 Golder v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 4451/70,  Judgment, 21 February 1975, para 28. 
103 Hornsby v Greece, ECtHR Application no. 18357/91, Judgment, 19 March 1997, para 40; Lithgow and 
Others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no.9006/80; 9262/81; 9263/81; 9265/81; 9266/81; 9313/81; 
9405/81, Judgment, 8 July 1986, para 201. 
104 Fayed v United Kingdom, Judgment, ECtHR Application no. 17101/90, Judgment, 21 September 1990, , 
para 65. 
105 Ibid, which is quoting Lithgow and Others v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no.9006/80; 9262/81; 
9263/81; 9265/81; 9266/81; 9313/81; 9405/81, Judgment, 8 July 1986, para 194. 
106 International Investment Law, the Law of State Immunity, and Human Rights (n 1), pp. 35 
107 McElhinney v Ireland, Judgment, ECtHR Application no. 31253/96, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 
36. 
108 Forgarty v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 37112/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 35. 
109 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 55. 
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to pursue a legitimate aim, as seen in Cudak v. Lithuania.110  
 
Since all three cases of McElhinney,111 Forgarty112 and Al-Adsani,113 have been rejected 
by the respondent state courts, in the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim against a third 
state, on the ground of a state sovereign immunity from suit, the ECtHR had to consider 
whether a failure of the respondent states to exercise a jurisdiction over such claims 
ultimately constituted a breach of the claimants’ rights under Article 6(1) of the ECHR, 
as to a right of access to court.114 In this respect, it raised an important issue before the 
ECtHR regarding the relationship between the right of access to court and a fair trial 
under Article 6(1) of the ECHR and the law of sovereign immunity. When considering 
the relationship between these two laws, the ECtHR applied a proportionality analysis in 
order to interpret and balance the individual’s right to court access and sovereign 
immunity law. The court proceeded on a proportionality analysis, considering the 
applicability of Article 6(1) of the ECHR. It noted that:    
  
 “The right of access to court is not, however, absolute, but may be subject to limitation; 
these are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls for 
regulation by the State. In this respect, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of 
appreciation, although the final decision as to the observance of the Convention’s 
requirements rests with the Court. It must be satisfied that the limitations applied do not 
restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the 
very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will not be compatible with 
Article 6 (1) if it does not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is no reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.”115 
 
By such reasoning, the ECtHR confirmed an application of a margin of appreciation in 
                                                
110 Cudak v Lithuania, ECtHR Application no.15869/02, Judgment, 23 March 2010, para 60-75. 
111 McElhinney v Ireland, Judgment, ECtHR Application no. 31253/96, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 
36. 
112 Forgarty v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 37112/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 35. 
113 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 55. 
114 E. Voyiakis, ‘Access to Court v State Immunity’, 52(2) ICLQ 297 (Apr. 2003) pp. 297. 
115 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 53; 
Forgarty v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 37112/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 33; 
McElhinney v Ireland, Judgment, ECtHR Application no. 31253/96, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 
34.; See Waite and Kennedy v Germany [GC], ECtHR Application no. 26083/94, Judgment, 18 February 
1999, para. 59. 
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limiting a right of access to a court by a legitimate aim and proportionality. In pursuing a 
legitimate aim, the ECtHR determined that “the grant of sovereign immunity to a State in 
civil proceedings pursues a legitimate aim of complying with international law to 
promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of another State’s 
sovereignty.”116 After achieving a legitimate aim, the ECtHR further considered whether 
the grant of sovereign immunity to a respondent state was a proportionate measure under 
the ECHR. The ECtHR supplemented this determination by a reference to international 
law, particularly, the customary law of treaty interpretation as codified in Article 31 
(3)(c) of the VCLT, which provides that the treaty interpretation should be taken into 
account with “any relevant rules of international law applicable to the relations between 
the parties.”117 In this aspect, the ECtHR applied the international law aspects of the 
sovereign immunity doctrine to the ECHR by observing that: 
  
 “The Convention, including article 6, cannot be interpreted in a vacuum. The Court must 
be mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human rights treaty, and it must be 
take the relevant rules of international law into account. The Convention should so far as 
possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms 
part, including those relating to the grant of State immunity.118 
 
It follows from this that measures taken by a High Contracting Party which reflect 
generally recognised rules of public international law on State immunity cannot in 
principle be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restricting on the right of access to 
court as embodied in Article 6(1). Just as the right of access to court is an inherent part of 
the fair trial guarantee in that Article, so some restrictions on access must likewise be 
regarded as inherent, an example being those limitations generally accepted by the 
community of nations as part of the doctrine of State immunity.”119 
 
                                                
116 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 54; 
Forgarty v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 37112/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 34; 
McElhinney v Ireland, Judgment, ECtHR Application no. 31253/96, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 
35. 
117 Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. 
118 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 55; 
Forgarty v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 37112/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 35; 
McElhinney v Ireland, Judgment, ECtHR Application no. 31253/96, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 36  
119 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 56; 
Forgarty v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 37112/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 36; 
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By the simultaneous consideration of the interpretation of the ECHR and sovereign 
immunity law, it may be stated that a right of access to a court and a fair trial, under the 
ECHR, would not impair a state’s right to raise a sovereign immunity defence under 
international law, if it pursues a legitimate aim and acts proportional, plus complies with 
the international law, promoting comity and good relations between states. By this 
reasoning of the ECtHR, the court held in McElhinney,120 Forgarty121 and Al-Adsani122 
that the respondent state’s action of giving sovereign immunity was not a breach of the 
right of access to a court, guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the ECHR.  Although all three 
cases were argued distinct grounds regarding the court’s unequal restriction on a right of 
access to court against a sovereign immunity from suit, the ECtHR reached the same 
decision. However, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR does not always find that there has 
been no infringement to the right to access to court under ECHR by the grant of state 
sovereign immunity. It could be argued that the ECtHR decisions in McElhinney,123 
Forgarty124 and Al-Adsani125 did not employ an in-depth investigation into a 
proportionality analysis when balancing the right of access to court and sovereign 
immunity.126 Therefore, this jurisprudence has been challenged by a decision of Cudak v. 
Lithunia,127 where the court did not rule in support of the state, but for the individual. 
 
In this case, the ECtHR was required to consider whether the dismissal of a claim by a 
local staff member of the Polish Embassy from the Lithuanian Court, based on a 
sovereign immunity defence constituted a breach to the applicant’s right to court access. 
The court first followed the previous jurisprudence to consider that “the grant of 
immunity to a state in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with 
                                                
120 McElhinney v Ireland, Judgment, ECtHR Application no. 31253/96, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 
36. 
121 Forgarty v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 37112/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 35. 
122 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 55. 
123 McElhinney v Ireland, Judgment, ECtHR Application no. 31253/96, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 
36. 
124 Forgarty v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 37112/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 35. 
125 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECtHR Application no. 35763/97, Judgment, 21 November 2001, para 55. 
126 A. Reinisch, ‘European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from Enforcement Measures’, 17(4) 
EJIL 803 (2006) pp. 816. 
127 Cudak v Lithuania, ECtHR Application no.15869/02, Judgment, 23 March 2010, para 60-75. 
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international law”.128 However, the court additionally referred to the United Nations 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property of 2004 noting that 
although the application of absolute immunity had been eroded, immunity still applied to 
both the diplomatic and consular staff, which was seen as customary law.129 The 
applicant in this case did not execute any particular tasks associated to the exercise of 
governmental authority, diplomatic or consular officer; being just a switchboard operator 
at the Polish Embassy.130 Accordingly, the UN Convention and customary international 
law did not extend to immunity regarding the applicant’s duty, which was not considered 
a governmental or diplomatic function. Therefore, the court held that; 
  
 “By upholding in the present case an objection based on State immunity and by declining 
to hear that applicant’s claim, the Lithuanian courts, in failing to preserve a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality, overstepped their margin of appreciation and thus impaired 
the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to a court. 
 
Accordingly, there has been a violation of art 6(1) of the Convention.”131 
 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR provides that a proportionality analysis is not only used 
as a method to protect a state or public interest, but can also be extended to protect an 
individual or private interest. In this way, to assist in interpretation, a court can have 
recourse to other potential sources or rules of international law, including customary 
international and general principles of law, provided for in Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. 
Consequently, a proportionality analysis can be consistent with the rules of interpretation 
for an application regarding the investment treaty obligations.132 However, it does not 
mean that a proportionality analysis is proposed as an alternative to the rules provided for 
in the VCLT; instead, it assists the VCLT in harmonising a conflict between competing 
rights and interests of both parties through interpretation, when the rule of interpretation 
does not indicate the priority of laws in conflict.133  
                                                
128 ibid 60. 
129 ibid 64-67. 
130 ibid 69. 
131 ibid 74-75. 
132 Investor-state arbitration as Governance (n 4), pp.23 
133 B. Kingsbury and S. Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investor’s Rights with State Regulatory 
Actions in the Public Interest- The Concept of Proportionality’ in S. Schill (eds), International Investment 
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Consequently, a proportionality analysis, as adopted in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
could be additionally compatible for investment treaty arbitration, in the balance of 
public-private interests arising from investor rights under investment treaty obligations 
and state sovereignty under sovereign immunity law. By treating investment treaty 
obligations similar to a right granted under the ECHR, it may be used to reduce the scope 
of the defence of sovereign immunity doctrine in a municipal court interpretation. 
Therefore, a proportionality analysis may possibly be a win-win solution for both state 
and foreign investor, where a state would be limited in its exercise of a legitimate public 
interest, and a foreign investor would be afforded the best possible protection of its 
private interest. In this situation a defragmentation of international law would exist, 
where international investment law and sovereign immunity law could peacefully work 
together to pursue legitimacy and consistency in investment treaty arbitration when 
balancing public and private interests.   
 
More importantly, as investment treaty arbitration leaves the execution stage to the 
determination by a municipal court, it would not escape from judicial consideration or 
preference. A proportionality analysis could be satisfied in a municipal court 
interpretation to ensure that a sovereign immunity defence is not abused in order to 
frustrate the legitimate and proper expectations of foreign investors. In this changing 
paradigm, states are obliged under investment treaty arbitrations as well as foreign 
investor protections, and being limited in their restrictions, thus providing a sufficient 
leeway for a state to protect public interest. In this context, a state is willing to enforce an 
arbitral award and a foreign investor is able to satisfy an arbitral award, since it provides 
a more appropriate balance between public and private interests, on a more or less basis, 
not an all or nothing fashion. Accordingly, on the one hand, a foreign investor does not 
need to place reliance on a diplomatic protection by a home state if a state refuses to 
enforce and execute an arbitral award; on the other hand, a home state does not have to 
                                                                                                                                            
Law and Comparative Public Law (OUP, New York 2010) pp. 78.; See Anne van Aaken, ‘Defragmentation 
of Public International Law Through Interpretation: A Methodological Proposal’, 16 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 483 (2009). 
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put itself in a risk position potentially affecting diplomatic relations when dealing with a 
dispute on an interstate matter. Under this approach, the investment treaty arbitration 
could maintain a mechanism of de-politicisation combined with a proportionality analysis 
to balance and harmonise pubic and private interests in a de-fragmentation regime of 
international law.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
In the light of these practical considerations, a sovereign immunity defence raised by a 
state does not necessarily undermine or constrain investment treaty obligations. Instead, 
these two bodies of international law could be harmoniously interpreted and co-exist in 
order to develop an appropriate framework, where an appropriate balance can be 
provided for concerning the protection of an investor’s private economic rights and the 
state’s responsibility relating to the public interest, in the light of the competing 
international obligations in disputes.134 As Ursula Kriebaum has summarised “a balancing 
between the investors and the host states interests that does not lead to ‘all or nothing’ 
decisions, as is currently the case, could be helpful.”135 For this reason, the balancing of 
state obligations and investor rights could be considered an effective tool in promoting 
investment for both capital exporting countries and capital importing countries towards a 
fair and impartial forum. Last but by no means least, this attempt would require the 
parallel development of international conventions and municipal laws on sovereign 
immunity so as to secure the execution of an arbitral award before a municipal court, as 
well as to support the applicability of international conventions.  In answering the central 
research question of this thesis, as to whether the defence of sovereign immunity doctrine 
is fully available to a state or is it subject to the limitations specifying in the municipal 
sovereign immunity law of the country in which the enforcement is sought?, the thesis 
holds that a foreign investor can be successful in the enforcement and execution of its 
                                                
134 Jasper Krommendijk and John Morijn, ‘Proportional by what measure (s)? Balancing Investor interests 
and human rights by way of applying the proportionality principle in investor-state arbitration’ in P-M 
Dupuy, F Francioni and E-U Petersmann (eds), Human rights in international investment law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2009)  pp.423. 
135 Ursula Kriebaum, ‘Privatizing human rights : The interface between international investment protection 
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Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold, (Eleven International Pub. 2007), pp. 189. 
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arbitral awards against the commercial assets of a sovereign state with certain limitations 
specified in the municipal sovereign immunity law. Thus, this would limit the excessive 
or unjustified claims of sovereign immunity as a defence against the enforcement of an 
arbitral award, in which state responsibility could not be avoided for the breach of 
investment treaty obligations towards private investors. 
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Chapter 8 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The development of the sovereign immunity doctrine has shifted from the practice of 
absolute immunity to restrictive immunity before a municipal court in order to uphold the 
balance of interests between a state and a private party.1 Under the restrictive doctrine, a 
commercial exception to immunity is considered the hallmark of a restrictive approach,2 
in which it only grants immunity to public acts of states (acta jure imperii) whilst 
denying immunity to their private acts (acta jure gestionis). This could be seen as an 
initial step to balance the public and private interest on account of the proportionality 
analysis; used as a tool to increase the balance court decision-making.  
 
With regards to the investor-state dispute settlement, many states have also adopted a 
restrictive immunity doctrine to distinguish between sovereign activity and commercial 
activity, as well as the separation between property used for public purposes and property 
used for commercial purposes, in order to determine jurisdiction and enforcement 
powers. In this respect, the separate regime of immunity from enforcement and execution 
from immunity from jurisdiction is considered by most states and reflected in the New 
York Convention and the ICSID Convention. It is submitted that once a state is a party to 
the Conventions and consents to submit the dispute to a tribunal, which is so called “an 
agreement to arbitrate”, it is deemed to have waived its immunity from jurisdiction, 
raised during the recognition and enforcement procedures before the tribunals and 
courts.3  
 
This position was also adopted in the US FSIA, the UK SIA and the UN Convention, but 
                                                
1 C. Schreuer, ‘Some Recent Developments in the Law of State Immunity’, 2 Comparative Law Yearbook 
215 (1978) pp. 215; G.M. Badr, State Immunity: An Analytical and Prognostic View (Martinus Niighoff, 
The Hague 1984) pp.22. 
2 D. Gaukrodger, Foreign state immunity and foreign government controlled investors, OECD Working 
papers on international investment, 2010/2, OECD Publishing (2010) pp. 18. 
3 Bernini and Van Den Berg, ‘The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against a State: the Problem of 
Immunity from Execution’ in J DM Lew, Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration (Queen 
Mary College, UK 1996) pp. 359. 
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with considerable variations.4 In these circumstances, it, however, appears that immunity 
from execution is considered to be unclear and absolute in which it could be said that 
sovereign immunity from execution continues to be the “Achilles  Heel” of investor-state 
arbitration. Therefore, the municipal court and municipal law on sovereign immunity 
itself does not provide a sufficient legal protection for foreign investors against sovereign 
acts or the regulatory acts of host states.  
 
The ICSID Convention and the New York Convention are the most frequent vehicles in 
determining and providing for the enforcement of arbitral awards against the state. The 
current mechanism of investment treaty arbitration and the network of multilateral 
treaties and conventions ensure the enforceability of international arbitral awards in 
multiple jurisdictions by limiting the challenges in a municipal court. On the one hand, 
the New York Convention fails to limit the role of municipal court to determine and 
interpret the merit of the award by providing the grounds to deny the enforcement of 
arbitral awards. On the other hand, the ICSID Convention requires the municipal court to 
treat and enforce its awards as a final judgment in that state but it leaves the execution 
stage to be determined by a municipal court and law. By their terms, even though both 
Conventions have a different route in enforcing arbitral awards, it has to come to the 
municipal court to determine and interpret in accordance with municipal law. Thus, the 
attempt to delocalise the mechanism of investment treaty arbitration could not be 
achieved without a careful concern on municipal laws on sovereign immunity. 
 
Although the trend of codifications on sovereign immunity follows a similar approach to 
restrictive sovereign immunity, a state practice, however, shows that it seems to be more 
cautious about the withdrawal of immunity from execution. This is because it might have 
more harmful effect on the relations between the forum state and home state of foreign 
investor in both political and economical considerations.5 Furthermore, this situation is 
much less clear with regards to the enforcement of arbitral awards under the non-ICSID 
                                                
4 C. Schreuer, State immunity : Some recent developments (Grotius Publication, Great Britain 1988) pp. 63. 
5 L.J. Bouchez, ‘The Nature and Scope of State Immunity from Jurisdiction and Execution’ (1979) 
Netherlands Y.B.I.L. 1, pp. 19. 
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Convention rules, particularly the New Convention. In the context of the New York 
Convention arbitration, it allows a judicial intervention made on the basis of a municipal 
law of a forum state since the first stage of establishing the jurisdiction over a dispute 
through the final stage of execution against state assets.6  
 
On the contrary, the ICSID arbitration goes a step further by introducing a state and state 
sovereignty into a public dimension through a private law model of the arbitration 
mechanism in order to solve a public law question.  Consequently, it could be said that 
the ICSID Convention is considered as a public-private model of arbitration in a way to 
bring some form of proportionality to protect the interest of both investor and state. By 
any means, this raises concern as to whether international conventions can overrule a 
defence of sovereign immunity from execution provided under a municipal law. 
 
With regards to the ICSID Convention, a waiver of sovereign immunity from execution 
by an agreement to arbitrate under the ICSID Convention is hardly possible because 
Article 55 preserves a sovereign immunity from execution according to the relevant 
municipal law on sovereign immunity where an execution is sought. However, this does 
not mean that a sovereign immunity from execution is an absolute bar to the enforcement 
of arbitral awards.7 Rather, it could be possible to execute an arbitral award if the 
municipal law on sovereign immunity, where an execution is sought, allows for an 
execution to be assumed from an agreement to arbitrate.8 In addition, such a possibility is 
limited to certain form of conditions such as, jurisdictional nexus, commercial activity 
and specially protected property. Therefore, although a waiver either expressly or implied 
is an exception to sovereign immunity from execution, it might be subject to or combined 
with other exceptions.  
 
Nevertheless, the combination of these exceptions is particularly found in the US FSIA, 
in which a waiver of sovereign immunity from execution is not independent but subject 
                                                
6 C. Schreuer, State Immunity: Some Recent Developments, (Grotius, Cambridge 1988), pp.86-91. 
7 D. Chamlongrasdr, Foreign state immunity and arbitration (Cameron May, London 2007) pp. 224. 
8 C. Schreuer, ‘Commentary on the ICSID Convention’, 14 ICSID Review 46 (1999) pp. 151. 
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to a commercial activity exception. This situation is different under the UK SIA, the UN 
Convention and the European Convention, where a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution is independent from the commercial activity exception of a foreign property 
concerned.9  
 
Considering the New York Convention, the New York Convention also does not provide 
any waiver of sovereign immunity from execution in any provisions. However, the 
defence of sovereign immunity from execution could be raised on the public policy 
exception under Article V(2)(b). The recognition could be also inserted itself into the 
New York Convention as ‘rules of procedure’ under Article III of the New York 
Convention, which is subject to the procedural rules in a state where the arbitral award is 
sought. However, an arbitral award sought under the New York Convention may often be 
refused by the country’s competent authority in the event that the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.10 In 
addition, the concept of international public policy has come as having a limiting effect 
on the application of public policy exception, which is not necessarily the same with the 
domestic public policy. Since a purpose of the New York Convention is to oblige a court 
to comply and enforce an arbitral award with little discretion for interpretation, that 
immunity from execution might not be accepted as easily as an exception for proceedings 
to enforce an arbitral award under Article V of the New York Convention. 
 
In addition, another basis for a waiver of sovereign immunity could be found in Article I 
of the New York Convention, where it obliges a state party to recognise and enforce 
arbitral awards that fall within the Convention. From the Creighton’s US Appeal Court 
decision and Eurodif’s French Supreme Court decisions, it could be summarised that a 
submission to arbitrate under the New York Convention is not considered as an implied 
waiver of sovereign immunity from execution in any Contracting states where a foreign 
                                                
9 C. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention : A commentary, (CUP UK 2009) pp.1174. 
10 H. Booysen, ‘The Municipal Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against States in Terms of Arbitration 
Conventions, with special reference to the New York Convention- Does International Law Provide for a 
Municipal Law Concept of an Arbitrable Act of State?’, 12 South African Yearbook of International Law 
73 (1986/87) pp. 98. 
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state does not intend to waive its immunity.  
 
More interestingly, those decisions were also submitted to the ICC arbitration and subject 
to ICC rules in which a municipal court of a forum state should consider whether the ICC 
rules provided a provision to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity from execution. 
The Cour de Cassation in Creighton v Qatar held that an implied waiver of sovereign 
immunity from execution could be found by an agreement to arbitrate. It should be 
emphasised that the court had based their decision on the ‘principle of good faith’. This 
proposition places a state on the same footing as a private investor in arbitration 
proceedings in order to enforce an arbitral award when it enters the international market 
and submits itself under an agreement to arbitrate. 
 
Although the precedent in Creighton, under ICC arbitration, has defined what conduct 
constitutes a waiver of immunity from execution, by an agreement to arbitrate, this does 
not allow execution against all property of foreign state but it is limited to commercial 
property. In addition, it will be difficult to execute against certain types of specially 
protected property, including bank account of diplomatic mission, military property, 
central bank property and cultural heritage property. This difficulty is reflected in the 
cases of NOGA and NML, in which the French Supreme Court adopted a stricter test to a 
wavier of sovereign immunity from execution. Meanwhile, in the recent case of FG 
Hemisphere before Hong Kong Courts, it is found that an agreement to arbitrate under the 
ICC Rules was not tantamount to an implied waiver of sovereign immunity from 
execution. Therefore, this difficulty, towards a state-friendly approach, will challenge and 
undermine the effectiveness of arbitration and investors being able to satisfy arbitral 
awards. 
 
The challenges and limitations in executing against a bank account, a diplomatic and a 
military property as well as a mixed purpose bank account of diplomatic mission appears 
to be an important hurdle to an enforcement of arbitral awards. This is because these 
specially protected properties are not only subject to conditions and exceptions to a 
municipal law on sovereign immunity but it also specifically governed by the Vienna 
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Convention, which makes it more difficult to execute against these properties. 
Furthermore, some municipal laws further add another requirement of jurisdictional link 
between the property and the underlying claim. Such a practice can be obviously found in 
the US FSIA in which a private party and a municipal court have found a hard time in 
executing an arbitral award. However, since the amendment of the US FSIA in 1988 
excludes the applicability of nexus requirement and act of state doctrine in the context of 
arbitral agreement, it becomes easier to enforce an arbitral award in the United States.  
 
Despite the fact that there are various possibilities in overcoming limitations and 
challenges whilst executing against both sovereign and commercial properties, the 
difficulties remain significant for both state and private investor. Further solutions are 
required to conquer this situation. These solutions range from the amendment of 
international conventions, providing a reliable and effective mechanism to reforming 
municipal laws on sovereign immunity, to the provision of a realistic and practical 
approach going forward. At a domestic level, the domestic courts and sovereign 
immunity laws have expressed the clear position that immunity from enforcement and 
execution is no longer absolute. Nonetheless, the approach towards immunity from 
execution is unclear. Significantly, a vigorous effort by states to pursue reform, at the 
international level, is unlikely to be achievable given the sensitive nature of execution 
and its possible impact on international relations between states. 
 
This difficulty could be seen from the amendment of any international convention, which 
is not an easy task. This is due to the fact that it requires the approval of all contracting 
states; such a consensus being difficult to reach in a short time.11 Therefore, a more 
effective route would be to include such an express waiver in investment treaties or on a 
contractual basis, which would reduce the importance of the particular parties involved to 
almost a bilateral matter. 
 
                                                
11 A. Boralessa, ‘Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID awards against the 
republic of Argentina: Obstacles that transnational corporations may face’, 17 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev 53 (2004)  
pp. 119. 
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A more practicable way would be to limit such an implied waiver of sovereign immunity 
from execution to solely commercial property whilst including certain restrictions, such 
as a jurisdictional link. This broad approach, with a limitation to jurisdictional nexus, can 
be seen in Switzerland and the UN Convention, where they allow the execution of an 
arbitral award, but a foreign investor has to find some forms of legal relationship. In this 
way, whilst a foreign state receives more protection by narrowing the scope of municipal 
law on sovereign immunity and avoiding non-compliance of an arbitral award by the 
defence of sovereign immunity, a state could be able to maintain its state sovereignty as 
well as to protect its sovereign property including specially protected property and its 
obligations under investment treaties in parallel with a restrictive sovereign immunity 
doctrine adopted in most jurisdictions.. 
 
This practical consideration should be coupled with a change of practitioners’ perception 
including judges, arbitrators and public international lawyers towards a modern investor-
state arbitration regime.  Under this regime, it attempts to distinguish an application of 
sovereign immunity doctrine upon an enforcement of arbitral awards from court 
judgments. This is due to the fact that arbitral awards and court judgments should be 
treated differently in a way that an arbitral award is an outcome of commercial or 
investment dispute resolution where both parties are committed in a business relationship 
on the same footing as a private person to waive a sovereign immunity.  
 
However, it is apparent that while the ICSID Convention treats an arbitral award as a 
final judgment of a court, the New York Convention treats foreign arbitral award to the 
same standard of foreign judgment. In addition, a municipal law and municipal court are 
not willing to develop a special rule for the enforcement of arbitral award.12 Therefore, as 
long as the practitioners continue to apply the same degree of sovereign immunity 
doctrine to the enforcement of arbitral awards as court judgments, a problem of sovereign 
immunity raised before a municipal court would remain as a barrier in enforcing an 
                                                
12 H. Fox, ‘State Immunity and the New York Convention’ in E. Gaillard and D. Pietro (eds.), Enforcement 
of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice 
(Cameron May, UK 2009) pp. 860-861. 
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arbitral award. In this way, an investor-state arbitration mechanism could not be 
considered as an alternative method to enforce an arbitral award, but it stands as a 
dependent system of dispute resolution to a municipal court.  
 
In parallel, it should be noted that an investor-state dispute settlement is not based on a 
form of reciprocal dispute settlement between an investor and a state.13  Instead, it should 
be analysed as a structure of “global governance”, being a mechanism of an adjudicative 
evaluation in public law.14 From this perspective, this issue becomes a matter of public-
private distinction, with many doctrines in public international law coming into play in 
tandem with international investment law in order to understand and classify this 
distinction.  
 
Faced with this particular interaction of legal concepts, there is a close relationship and 
mutual influence between these two areas of international law; the analysis of 
international investment law in certain specific issues, referring to the doctrines of public 
international law, and public international law affected by the development of 
international investment law. This highlights the cross-fertilisation and integration of 
international investment law with other areas of international law in relation to the 
interpretation and application of legal concepts by an arbitral tribunal in pursuant to a 
system of hybridisation, pertinently covering the concept of state immunity, state 
responsibility and treaty interpretation. In this regard, the interconnections between 
international investment law and other areas of international law will develop on the basis 
of harmonisation or defragmentation rather than fragmentation through treaty 
interpretation methods as clarified in the VCLT’s systematic integration principle.  
 
In the context of this thesis, a proportionality analysis could assist in weighing the claim 
of a sovereign immunity defence, raised by a state to decline the execution of an arbitral 
award, and the investor’s rights under investment treaty obligations, to have an arbitral 
award satisfied. This may best facilitate both the interests of the investor and state; both 
                                                
13 Gus Van Harten, Investment treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP, New York 2007), pp. 45 
14 ibid 
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being protected by two diverse principles of law in a harmonious way. The outcome of 
such an execution would best serve both parties on a proportional basis, in which the 
execution would not lead to a total loss of interest of either party, resulting in the 
increased acceptability and neutral outcome of the award. 
 
In abandoning an absolute approach of sovereign immunity from investment treaty 
arbitration by a proportionality analysis, a sovereign immunity defense raised by a state 
does not necessarily undermine investment treaty obligations. Instead, these two bodies 
of international law could be harmoniously interpreted and co-exist in developing a 
framework towards a defragmentation of international law to find an appropriate balance 
between the investor protection of private economic rights and the state responsibility of 
public interest in the light of the competing of different international obligations in 
disputes.15 For this reason, the balancing of state obligations and investor rights could be 
considered as an effective tool to promote the investment for both capital exporting 
countries and capital importing countries towards a fair and impartial forum.  
 
For future research on this topic, it is necessary to have a more consideration on whether 
a proportionality analysis can be effectively adopted in investment treaty arbitrations as 
in the case of ECtHR in order to balance rights of foreign investors with host states’ right 
to regulate. This is due to the fact that most arbitral tribunals are not willing to adopt such 
approach as an interpretative method and treating a sovereign immunity defence 
differently from other procedural defences. However, with a limited number of case 
study, it could be argued that the structure of investment treaty arbitration and the 
substantive provisions in the BITs might not be able to fully support the adoption of 
proportionality analysis.16 Therefore, it is important to particularly look at this concern on 
future cases in order to provide a more thorough analysis.  
                                                
15 Jasper Krommendijk and John Morijn, ‘Proportional by what measure (s)? Balancing Investor interests 
and human rights by way of applying the proportionality principle in investor-state arbitration’ in P-M 
Dupuy, F Francioni and E-U Petersmann (eds), Human rights in international investment law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2009), pp.423. 
16 P. Ranjan, ‘Using the Public Law Concept of Proportionality to Balance Investment Protection with 
Regulation in International Investment Law: A Critical Appraisal’,  3(3) CJICL 853-883 (2014). 
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